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Introduction
Financial managers and accountants are today faced with increasing responsibility for compliance with all manner of financial reporting requirements. As the number of financial
restatements has grown, and questions about management integrity have shaken investor
confidence, the roles of financial managers and accountants have taken on both more importance and greater risk. Investors have come to the realization that financial decision making
is rarely a simple black or white choice; rather, they now understand that the variety of ways
in which a complex transaction can be structured may dictate the accounting result. For this
reason, many institutional investors are now more concerned with the personal values and
integrity of financial managers and accountants than with other more traditional investment criteria. At the same time, financial managers and accountants have assumed a more
prominent position in the management hierarchy; exposure to liability for financial decision
making is at an all-time high. Civil litigation can no longer be counted on as the last word
in liability for deficient financial reporting, and the search for more sources of recovery
means that financial managers and accountants are more likely than ever to become targets
in legal actions, regardless of their culpability. Against this backdrop, financial managers and
accountants must maintain and enhance their decision-making skills within a values-driven
environment, or they may suffer serious consequences for their failure to do so.
This book is designed to provide you with a series of case studies that illustrate real-world
ethical dilemmas and the application of values consistent with the high standards of the profession. The case studies
• are drawn, in most instances, from facts reported in actual court cases and disciplinary proceedings that involve financial managers and accountants.
• put the reader in the central decision-making role using “you are the CFO” and
“you are the audit partner” hypotheticals, among others.
• include analyses that consider various outcomes and a discussion of why the financial manager or accountant should choose or avoid particular courses of action.
• are accompanied by focus points discussing essential professional values and their
application.
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The case studies include ethics topics encompassed by professional ethics codes issued by
state accounting societies and accountancy boards and topics addressed in the AICPA Code
of Professional Conduct, such as
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

independence.
integrity and objectivity.
confidentiality.
contingent fees, including commissions and referral fees.
compliance with audit, consulting, and other standards.
client records.
offering services over the Internet.
internal accounting controls, procedures, and records.
procedures concerning identification, reporting, and investigation of accounting
irregularities.
• the importance of ongoing ethics training and education, including maintaining an
effective compliance program for liability protection.
In addition to the ethical subject matter, you must analyze the fact scenarios and determine how to apply accounting pronouncements and policy statements covering many of
today’s most important accounting and audit issues, including
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

revenue recognition.
critical accounting policies.
consolidation of variable interest entities.
disclosure in management discussion and analysis.
market risk.
pro forma earnings.
loan loss reserves.
materiality.
related-party transactions.
itrading.

You can expect to encounter issues within this book that are the subject of newly adopted
and proposed interpretations issued by the AICPA Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC); independence issues that are subject to analysis under the current and
proposed updates to ET section 100-1, Conceptual Framework for AICPA Independence Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards); updates concerning PEEC’s codification of the AICPA
Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA Code) and how recasting the AICPA Code will
change the language, but not the substance, of the AICPA Code; issues addressed in recent
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations,
Financial Reporting Releases, Statements and Cautionary Advice, Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s
Rules of Practice, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; and recent standard setting, rulemaking, and concept releases issued by the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board.
viii
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Some of the cases have been prepared using fact patterns and questions that will prompt
you to consider how disclosure or regulatory filings might have been prepared that are compliant with both the letter and spirit of the disclosure requirements, more effective, and more
likely to reduce the risk of legal or regulatory action.

Chapter Topics
Chapter 1, “Superlative Software Corporation—You Are the CFO,” is a role play in which
you assume the position of a newly hired CFO of a software company who discovers revenue recognition issues when preparing for the annual audit. More digging reveals a variety
of possible revenue acceleration and cost deferral issues. The practices appear to have originated on the prior CFO’s watch, but it is not clear whether the CEO or others might have
been involved in what appear to be improper practices. The outside audit firm does not
appear to be aware of the possible irregularities. As the CFO, you are called upon to decide
how to deal with these issues and to whom to report.This case raises issues related to revenue
recognition, establishing and assessing internal controls, proper reporting procedures, and
compliance with accounting and auditing standards.
In chapter 2, “Pointer Electronics, Inc.—You Are the Engagement Quality Review (Concurring) Partner,” you are placed in the position of being a concurring partner on an audit that
is nearing its completion.You have identified certain excess reserves that do not appear to be
presented in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles and have discussed
these concerns with the engagement partner. The engagement partner has not yet proposed
adjustments to eliminate the excess reserves and has argued that the proposed adjustments are
not material to the company’s financial statements as a whole. The company has received an
unqualified audit opinion in the past, and it appears the reserves may have been an issue in
prior years’ audits, although the working papers evidence no disagreements, and there is no
indication that the prior concurring partner was focused on the reserve issue. You are considering taking the position that the report be withheld unless the adjustments are made. As
the concurring partner, you must decide to whom and when this position is communicated,
whether the audit firm has conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and what recommendations you will make to the audit committee of the board.
Issues raised by this case include integrity and objectivity, compliance with auditing standards
and accounting principles, and procedures for investigating and reporting irregularities.
The case in chapter 3, “BAN&K Advisory Services LLC—You Are the Advisory Services
Partner,” is one in which you are employed as the managing partner of an audit firm that
offers advisory services to small businesses that the management teams or owners are interested in selling. An audit client approached the firm recently and asked the firm to provide
advice about a possible sale transaction. The client wishes the audit firm to be compensated
with a contingent fee if the sale transaction closes. As the managing partner, you are concerned about the potential buyer’s reliance on financial statements audited by your firm,
what happens if the sale does not occur, and the implications of the contingent fee.This case
features issues including independence, integrity and objectivity, and contingent as well as
value-added fees.
ix
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Chapter 4, “Forensic Review Services LLC—You Are the Forensic Investigator,” posits
a situation in which you are a forensic auditor who has been called in to assist counsel in
conducting an internal investigation of a private company. The audit committee has uncovered evidence that certain members of management may have used company assets to pay
personal expenses. The officers are protesting bitterly that the expenses were approved by
members of the board, but the board has suspended the officers (with pay, for the time
being) while the investigation proceeds. The private company’s audit firm has indicated it
had no evidence of any diversion of corporate assets, and it issued a clean opinion on the
two prior years’ financial statements.You have been asked by the audit firm that you discuss
with them any questionable entries in the company’s books, but they are thus far refusing to
permit you to review their working papers. In undertaking the investigation, management
interviews reveal facts that cause you to question whether someone at the audit firm might
have known of diversion of corporate assets. This case focuses on integrity and objectivity, confidentiality, client records, compliance with auditing standards, and investigation and
reporting procedures.
In chapter 5, “Bank of Little Beach—You Are the Valuation Specialist,” you are asked
to approach a group of ethical issues from a different vantage point: you are employed
by a government regulatory agency as an accounting investigator and are being asked to
evaluate if the agency should institute proceedings against the CFO of a public company.
The company filed quarterly financial statements in the last two quarters of the prior fiscal
year that included references to repurchase agreements the company had entered into with
several counterparties covering a bond portfolio. The company’s disclosures stated that the
repurchase agreements were long-term, so-called “repo-to-maturity” transactions that were
appropriately classified as sale transactions rather than borrowings. However, your agency
has been contacted by a whistle-blower who has alleged that the company entered into
the repo transactions right before the end of each quarter because the management team
concluded the company had to “dress up” its balance sheet by showing additional liquidity,
or its stock would experience a major sell-off. The whistle-blower also has alleged that two
counterparties have become concerned about the declining value of the bond portfolio and
demanded the company post additional collateral, which the company does not have available, to secure the repurchase agreements. The company has made no public disclosure of
these demands. You have been asked by your supervisor to take the CFO’s testimony in an
upcoming deposition. Not only do you have to develop questions that will elicit information about the nature of the repurchase agreements and the possible “window dressing” of
the quarterly balance sheets, you need to determine who else may have information relevant
to your inquiry. You must also recommend if the government should institute disciplinary
proceedings against the CFO.The issues explored in this case include differentiating between
secured borrowing and sale transactions, client records, confidentiality, and internal accounting controls and procedures.
As the corporate controller of a large public company, chapter 6, “Megatron Corp.—You
Are the Corporate Controller,” has you making decisions that will not only affect your future
but the future of many others.Your company recently announced that a significant subsidiary
had concluded a large contract with a third party doing business in Hong Kong. After the
x
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press release went out, you received a phone call from one of your friends in the marketing
department of the subsidiary. She informs you she saw a letter on the desk of the executive
vice president in charge of marketing that related to this contract and that it looked to her
like the letter had other conditions applicable to the contract.
Unfortunately, she could not get a copy of the letter. Based on the size of the contract,
you know it was material to the subsidiary, but it is not material to the parent company and,
therefore, does not have to be filed with the SEC. You also know the company’s trading
window will open in less than 1 week and that officers and directors may sell stock because
the company’s stock is close to a 52-week high. You are going to have to make some fast
decisions about who to go to (audit firm, CFO, audit committee) and what to say. The facts
of this case cover integrity and objectivity, confidentiality, internal accounting controls, and
procedures for investigating and reporting irregularities.
On a somewhat lighter note, chapter 7, “AA&C LLP—You Are a Member of the Practice Development Committee,” one of your partners has suggested that the firm enter into
a joint marketing arrangement with an e-business that offers valuation services. You have
been asked to report to the committee on the issues created by such an alliance, including
any limitations or requirements the firm will need to observe in doing business with the
valuation firm. This case requires you to consider independence, integrity, referral fees, and
Internet service offerings.
In chapter 8, “Precious Mining Inc.—You Are the Audit Committee Chair,” you will learn
that today’s audit committees occupy a central role in the corporate governance process, as
well as one with overall responsibility for hiring, interacting with, and firing the outside
audit firm. As a CPA, you carry the license and certification that make you a knowledgeable
audit committee financial expert. In this case, a former controller for an Australian subsidiary of the company has sent an e-mail to you and the partner at the audit firm alleging
that so-called “round-trip” transactions and irregular overpayments have occurred between
the subsidiary and a third party. The CEO is made aware of the allegations, and you act as
the company’s interface with the CEO, the audit firm, and your fellow audit committee
members in getting to the bottom of these allegations. This case involves assessing reporting
procedures, internal controls, audit committee responsibilities, and auditor obligations on
discovery of financial irregularities.
The chapter 9, “Incisive Lasers Corporation—You Are the Outside Attorney for the Controller,” case study asks you to put yourself in the position of serving as outside counsel
to a controller of a public company who has been accused by the SEC of participating in
wrongdoing. The case seeks your evaluation of the controller’s conduct from an outsider’s
perspective, and it calls for you to apply your knowledge of applicable professional standards
and disciplinary outcomes that may come to bear. You will have an opportunity to review
common ethical issues faced by financial reporting staff in industry, to become more sensitive
to the professional standards applied specifically to accountants, and to understand some of
the consequences that can be visited upon CPAs for violating the SEC’s professional conduct
standards.
In chapter 10, “Scrap Metal Aggregators, Inc.—You Are the Tax Return Preparer,” you are
asked to familiarize yourself (or get reacquainted) with the AICPA Statements on Standards
xi
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for Tax Services (SSTSs); Treasury Department Circular No. 230, Regulations Governing Practice before the Internal Revenue Service; and the consequences for ethical violations as provided
in the AICPA Code. This chapter and case study focus on the SSTS regime, and the next
chapter covers Circular No. 230 and associated AICPA Code provisions. In this case, you
are serving as a tax return preparer for a pass-through entity and suddenly become aware
of cash transactions that have occurred off the books. The case raises issues including client
confidentiality, liability of tax return preparers, reporting obligations, and client retention
decisions.
In chapter 11, “Radar One, LLP—You Are the Amended Return Preparer,” you will have
an opportunity to review Circular No. 230 and applicable provisions of the AICPA Code
with respect to ethical issues, and you will also examine the ethical obligations of CPA tax
professionals under Circular No. 230. In the case, you are approached by a potential client
who participated in an offshore tax shelter transaction that was later identified by the IRS as
a listed transaction and who is facing an investigation that may involve exposure to potential
criminal charges. The case asks you to consider client and third-party obligations to provide
information to the IRS, opinion standards, obligations to amend prior years’ returns, and fee
issues.
In chapter 12, “Military Communications Corp.—You Are the Outside Tax Auditor,” you
are asked to analyze the tax and ethical implications of an option’s backdating program that
has just come to light, taking into account the focus points from Internal Revenue Code
Sections 409A and 162(m).You are approached by the audit committee chair who informs
you that he has uncovered (a) a scheme at the highest levels of the company to backdate and
conceal actual option grant dates and (b) apparent payoffs to enlist a junior officer’s participation in the scheme. This case asks you to consider tax and disclosure reporting obligations
related to discounted stock rights, corporate and individual tax implications associated with
discounted stock rights, and possible responses to these issues.
Abundant resources are available over the Internet when and if you need examples of
corporate ethics programs. The most effective ethics program is one that is right for your
business and industry (or practice type), establishes the proper tone at the top, and promotes
values that will make and keep your business or firm a respected member of the business or
professional community.

xii

1
Case 1—Superlative Software
Corporation—You Are the CFO
Introduction
The following case study is designed to highlight the most common cause of accounting irregularities, busted audits, restatements, and accounting enforcement actions: revenue
recognition. Time and again, financial managers are called upon to make business decisions
about how (or if) to record revenues from the sale of services or products. Many of these
decisions are made in reliance on the representations of officers or employees of the organization, meaning your integrity can oftentimes be riding on the integrity of others. Although
maintaining proper internal controls and procedures are instrumental in addressing many of
these issues, personal integrity and the willingness to confront difficult choices are a necessary part of effective financial management. A lack of integrity on your part or subordinating
your judgment to others may condemn the organization to joining the ranks of corporate
wrongdoers and may expose you to regulatory, civil, or criminal sanctions. Therefore, when
you encounter difficult revenue recognition issues, take time to reflect on the regulatory,
ethical, and business implications of your decisions, and ask yourself, How will this determination look in hindsight, particularly to someone outside our company?

Focus Points
Historically, revenue recognition has surfaced time and again in financial fraud cases. The
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1987-1997—An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies that analyzed approximately 200
cases of fraudulent financial statement reporting from 1987–97 found that over 50 percent of
these cases involved either the premature recording of revenues or the recording of fictitious
revenues. Moreover, the CEO and CFO were implicated in the fraudulent reporting in 83
percent of the cases. Most of the cases were brought against companies that lacked an audit
committee or had an audit committee that met only once each year.
According to the 2011 Securities Class Action Filings study conducted by Cornerstone
Research and Stanford Law School and issued in 2012, 94 percent of the federal securities class action lawsuits filed in 2011 included allegations of misrepresentations in financial
documents. Allegations of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) violations
1

Business Ethics: Real-World Case Studies

appeared in 34 percent of the cases, an increase from 26 percent in 2010. Allegations of
internal control weaknesses were cited in 26 percent of 2011 class action filings, a new
high and a continuation of the 5-year trend in the increasing frequency of these allegations. Cornerstone Research and Stanford Law School also issued an annual review of class
action settlements in 2012: Securities Class Action Settlements—2011 Review and Analysis. In
the 2011 review, it was noted that allegations related to GAAP violations were included in
only approximately 45 percent of settled cases compared with nearly 70 percent of settled
cases in 2010 and 68 percent during the prior 5 years.
In the FBI’s Financial Crimes Report to the Public: Fiscal Years 2010–2011, the FBI stated:
The majority of corporate fraud cases pursued by the FBI involve accounting
schemes designed to deceive investors, auditors, and analysts about the true financial condition of a corporation or business entity. Through the manipulation of
financial data, the share price, or other valuation measurements of a corporation,
financial performance may remain artificially inflated based on fictitious performance indicators provided to the investing public. In addition to significant financial losses to investors, corporate fraud has the potential to cause immeasurable
damage to the U.S. economy and investor confidence.

As issued, AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
Professional Standards), highlighted several incentives and sources of pressure that may increase
the risk of fraudulent financial reporting, including
• the company’s financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry,
or entity operating conditions.
• excessive pressure on management to meet third-party expectations, such as those of
analysts, creditors, rating agencies, or potential acquisition targets.
• management’s or the board members’ net worth is threatened by the company’s
financial performance.
• incentive sales or profitability goals create undue pressure on management or operating personnel.
Avoid this pitfall: If other members of your management team evidence tendencies to
internalize these types of pressures, your integrity (not to mention your professional career)
may ride on your ability to withstand such pressures. In talking with the other members of
management, remind them that once the company takes the first step down that slippery
slope, it becomes increasingly likely that more steps will have to be taken, thus leading to
a “snowball” effect. If you sense this is where pressures from third parties are likely to take
the company, you need to carefully consider whether you want to be associated with the
company under these circumstances. It is interesting to note that many cases of fraudulent
financial reporting begin as minor adjustments that multiply over time and ultimately result
in a restatement that finds the company and its officers the subject of regulatory action.
Conversely, a management team that deals with these or other pressures in an honest and
forthright manner will command the respect of outsiders and is a desirable place for you
to be.
2
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So Why Did the CFO Get Involved in the Fraud?
The preceding lead-in obviously raises a key issue: why would a CFO perpetrate or
assist in the perpetration of accounting fraud? The question was the subject of the
paper “Why Do CFOs Become Involved in Material Accounting Manipulations?”
published in the September 2010 issue of the Journal of Accounting and Economics.The
paper sought to identify the incentives and role of the CFO in material accounting
manipulations through examining Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as other data.
The authors elected to examine the CFO’s role in fraud for two critical reasons:
First, CFOs typically oversee the process of preparing financial reports
and are viewed as watchdogs for financial reporting quality. For firms
with accounting manipulations, the CFOs have failed in their monitoring
role. Moreover, relative to other executives, CFOs are in a unique position
to carry out accounting manipulations, from transaction structuring, to
choosing an improper accounting method, to making false journal entries.

The authors then considered two possible explanations for why the CFO elected
to get involved in a fraud. First, did the CFO choose to do so for immediate personal
financial gain, or was the CFO subjected to pressure from the CEO? Interestingly,
the paper concluded that CFOs at companies charged with accounting manipulations exhibited no higher pay for performance compensation (equity incentive compensation) than CFOs in a control group. The paper went on to say, however, that
CEOs of manipulating firms exhibit higher pay-for-performance sensitivities and power (i.e., the CEO is more likely to be Chairman of the
Board and a founder, and more likely to have a higher share of the total
compensation of the top five executives) than CEOs of non-manipulating firms. The association between manipulation and CEO power is
stronger for firms with CEOs having high equity incentives.Thus CEOs
appear to benefit via higher equity incentives and have the power to
pressure CFOs to undertake manipulations.

The bottom line is that powerful and persuasive CEOs are a clear and present
danger to CFOs who lack the backbone or stamina to stand up to CEO pressure
to manipulate the numbers.

Revenue Recognition: The Future
and The Present
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Concepts Statements; SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletins (SABs); and a wealth of FASB Statements, Accounting Principles Board Opinions,
Accounting Research Bulletins, AICPA Statements of Position, SEC Financial Reporting
3
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Releases (FRRs), FASB Emerging Issues Task Force1 issuances, and FASB Accounting
Standards Updates (ASUs) give general and specific industry guidance for revenue recognition. (See the discussion in the introduction of SAB Nos. 101 and 104 for a nonexclusive
listing of revenue recognition releases, including their industry topics.)
On November 14, 2011, and January 4, 2012, FASB and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) re-exposed the draft revenue recognition standard that was first exposed
in June 2010. The re-exposed draft was issued by FASB as a proposed ASU, Revenue Recognition (Topic 605): Revenue from Contracts with Customers. The comment period runs through
March 13, 2012, and the boards have indicated that the final standard (expected to be
adopted in 2012) is not expected to be effective prior to January 1, 2015, for public entities
and January 1, 2016, for nonpublic entities. FASB has stated that the application guidance
and descriptions were modified significantly in the most recent exposure draft. However, the
latest exposure draft retains the five key steps when determining revenue recognition:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identify the contract with the customer.
Identify the separate performance obligations in the contract.
Determine the transaction price.
Allocate the transaction price.
Recognize revenue when a performance obligation is satisfied.

FASB noted that the most significant changes in the 2011 exposure draft were (a) adding criteria to assist in determining when a time-based performance obligation is satisfied,
(b) simplifying criteria for determining whether a good or service is distinct and a separate
performance obligation, (c) eliminating adjustments to transaction prices for collectability
but instead requiring an estimate of uncollectible amounts alongside revenue, (d) eliminating the proposal to discount the transaction price when the period between transfer of the
good or service and payment is one year or less, and (e) allowing use of a most likely amount
approach to estimating variable consideration.
The coming changes to revenue recognition using the IASB and FASB approach will
call for all companies to apply the five-step model, eliminating industry-specific guidance.
Although this is generally perceived as a positive development, it may introduce a greater
degree of judgment into application. Also, some businesses will experience accelerated or
deferred revenue recognition (and more volatility in revenue) on adoption of the new standard and will need to modify their systems and processes to capture new types of information
necessary for application of the five-step model. Additional points of concern are as follows:
• Identifying separate performance obligations
• Applying contract modification guidance
• Applying the onerous test at the performance obligation level

1

The following guidance has been organized under Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification™ that became authoritative in July 2010: FASB Statements, Accounting Principles
Board Opinions, Accounting Research Bulletins, AICPA Statements of Position, Securities and Exchange
Commission Financial Reporting Releases, and FASB Emerging Issues Task Force issuances.
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• Calculating applicable financing elements for each contract when payments differ
from performance progress for more than one year
• Meeting new disclosure requirements
• Possible changes to contract terms needed to achieve the desired and proper reporting
• The required retrospective application of the standard and disclosures that will need
to accompany the presentation of prior periods

Current Revenue Recognition Guidance
Revenue recognition is without a doubt the critical accounting policy to be discussed in
management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A). Furthermore, the discussion of any critical
accounting estimates that underlie revenue recognition is vitally important to regulators and
investors seeking to understand the impact of estimates on a company’s financial performance. Remember, however, as the SEC stated in its August 2001 release Current Accounting
and Disclosure Issues, “The disclosure should be concise and to the point; more disclosure is
not necessarily better.” In other words, quality not quantity.
The following four criteria must be met under SAB Nos. 101 and 104 to recognize revenue: (a) persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists; (b) the product has been shipped,
and the customer takes ownership and assumes the risk of loss; (c) the selling price is fixed
or determinable; and (d) collection of the resulting receivable is reasonably assured. These
criteria are consistent with those set forth in FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC)
985-605 that specifically address revenue recognition in the context of software sales. FASB
ASC 985-605 goes on to state that if software upgrades, enhancements, or consulting services are included that are integral to the functionality of the software license, then contract
accounting is applied, and revenue recognition delayed.

Revenue Recognition and Financial
Misstatement Issues in the Software
Industry
The case included in this chapter is set in the software industry. One of the more common revenue recognition issues that has been highlighted in enforcement cases brought against software
companies (as well as companies in other industries) includes the issue of “round tripping” of
revenues that received much attention after Enron, other energy trading companies, and a host
of telecommunications carriers were accused of engaging in this practice. “Round tripping”
involves the recording of revenues from simultaneous or nearly simultaneous trades of financial
instruments, capacity, licenses, or commodities by two companies. In most instances, “roundtrip” transactions should have been characterized as exchanges rather than sales.
Avoid this pitfall: When dealing with a customer of your company that also happens to
be a supplier of products or services to your company, be especially cautious about booking revenues, particularly if the timing or dollar amount of purchases and sales between the
5
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companies happen to coincide. Remember that these types of relationships will draw a high
degree of regulatory and audit scrutiny, so your files should have backup that will help in
delineating why the transactions were proper, necessary, and in the ordinary course.
Other common revenue recognition issues highlighted in this case study include
• “Channel stuffing,” or excessive shipments to resellers or distributors that are far in
excess of normal order quantities and regarding which there is often an agreement
that the product will not be paid for until sell-through to a customer occurs.
• Product shipments to warehouse way stations for which there are no customers.
• Backdating of customer contracts to dates preceding period-end, even when negotiations extend for days or even weeks past period-end.
• Use of side letter agreements by executives or salespersons to modify normal contract terms to provide for extended rights of return or rights of product approval,
often accompanied by the waiver of return or restocking fees and full refunds of
customer deposits or payments. These agreements are not disclosed to the accounting or financial reporting personnel of the company, resulting in financial statement
misstatements that only come to light in subsequent periods when customer returns
unexpectedly spike.
Avoid this pitfall: Educating the sales force that undisclosed side letters or side agreements are unacceptable as a matter of company policy and will result in their immediate
firing is important to a company avoiding regulatory action. In cases in which quarterend sales are claimed, financial managers are wise to question the timing of the sales and
even seek written confirmation from customers if any doubt exists about whether to book
revenue from a sale. Company policy should clearly state that any modification of customary terms must be approved by a senior officer, and copies of the approval and accompanying documentation must be provided to the accounting department at or before the order
date.

A Real-Life Example
On January 31, 2012, JDA Software Group, Inc. (JDA) announced its fourth quarter and
year-end operating results. The following appeared on page 3 of the earnings release:

Securities and Exchange Commission Inquiry
JDA has received notice from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
requesting information related to revenue recognition and other accounting and
financial reporting matters for certain past fiscal years. JDA is actively cooperating
with the SEC and is committed to addressing any questions the SEC may have.

On March 15, 2012, JDA announced that it would not be filing its 2011 Annual Report
on Form 10-K by the March 15, 2012, extended deadline (the same day as the announcement) because
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the Company continues to complete previously disclosed information requests
from the staff of the SEC’s divisions of Enforcement and Corporation Finance,
which have inquired about certain accounting matters relating to the Company’s
financial statements.The SEC staff ’s inquiries have focused on the Company’s revenue-recognition policies and its impact on the Company’s current and historical
financial statements.

On April 10, 2012, JDA announced that the audit committee of the board of directors
had determined that the company’s annual and quarterly reports from 2008–11 would
need to be restated and could no longer be relied upon. The announcement noted the
following:
• Software license revenue for certain transactions linked to associated service agreements should have been recognized when the service agreements were signed, not
when the license agreement was signed.
• JDA was continuing to evaluate certain software license contracts recorded in 2009
and 2010 that included a clause protecting customers from discontinued products
to determine if that language implies a future deliverable. If so, JDA would generally
be required to recognize the revenue associated with these contracts over the initial
term of the maintenance contract, which is typically a three-year period, instead of
up front, as originally recorded.
• Vendor-specific objective evidence for cloud services from 2008–10 was being reevaluated to determine if JDA met the requirements to recognize associated license
revenue up front. If it is determined these requirements were not met, the license
revenue would be recognized over a period of up to three years.
Not coincidentally, on April 11, 2012, two law firms that specialize in class action suits
issued press releases announcing investigations into whether JDA and certain of its officers
and directors had violated the federal securities laws. The press releases invited persons who
purchased JDA stock between January 26, 2009, and January 31, 2012, and who had questions about their legal rights to contact the law firms.

Questions for Consideration
• In your view, has JDA made any mistakes in how it has dealt with the SEC investigation?
• If you were a member of the audit committee, how would you have wanted these
issues handled?
On September 13, 2006, the SEC issued SAB No. 108 to address issues associated with
quantifying financial statement misstatements. Among other things, SAB No. 108 noted that
some companies are not considering the effects of prior year errors on current year financial statements (which allows improper assets or liabilities to remain unadjusted), but other
companies have argued that it is in accordance with GAAP to allow these errors to remain
on the balance sheet in perpetuity. Whether a company uses the “iron curtain” or rollover
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approaches to quantify a misstatement, SAB No. 108 stresses that exclusive reliance on either
approach may not appropriately quantify material misstatements. These two approaches to
quantifying misstatements can be defined as follows:
• The “iron curtain” approach quantifies a misstatement based on the effects of correcting the misstatement existing in the balance sheet at the end of the current year,
irrespective of the misstatement’s year(s) of origination.
• Conversely, the rollover approach quantifies a misstatement based on the amount of
the error originating in the current year income statement.
SAB No. 108 also notes the deficiencies of each approach:
• The weakness in the “iron curtain” approach is that it does not consider the correction of prior year misstatements in the current year (that is, the reversal of the
carryover effects) to be errors.
• The weakness in the rollover approach is that it can result in the accumulation of
significant misstatements on the balance sheet that are deemed immaterial, in part,
because the amount that originates in each year is quantitatively small.
So, what should your company do if faced with a situation in which, for example, the use
of inappropriate sales cutoffs resulted in a misstatement of prior years’ revenues and accounts
receivable?
The SEC’s answer is that your company would need to quantify the impact of correcting
all misstatements by using both the “iron curtain” approach (to address overstated or understated accounts receivable) and the rollover approach (to address overstated or understated
revenues). If the resulting misstatement is material to the financial statements after all relevant quantitative and qualitative factors are considered, your company’s financial statements
would need to be adjusted.
The bottom line is that under SAB No. 108, the SEC believes that financial statements
require adjustment when either the “iron curtain” or rollover approach results in quantifying
a misstatement that is material after considering all relevant quantitative and qualitative factors.

Consequences
What are the common results of accounting and auditing enforcement cases brought by the
SEC against companies and financial officers that are found to have facilitated premature
revenue recognition?
• The company and officers involved are typically charged with violations of the antifraud, internal controls, and books and records provisions of the federal securities laws.
• The CFO is often charged with lying to auditors.
• The officers are made to disgorge the proceeds of any stock sales and incentive
compensation received as a result of the premature revenue recognition and to pay
civil penalties for their wrongdoing.
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• The officers are suspended or barred from serving as officers or directors of public
companies.
• The company is enjoined from any future violations of the federal securities laws.
The SEC cannot bring criminal charges against a company or an officer of a company, but
recent trends in enforcement cases find the SEC making an increasing number of referrals to
the Department of Justice and U.S. attorneys, who can bring criminal charges against companies or individuals that engage in fraudulent financial reporting. Unfortunately, criminal
referrals appear to be on the rise with respect to cases of fraudulent financial reporting.
These consequences are life altering and, in many instances, become a permanent part
of an officer’s work history. It does not take much thought to realize that a financial officer
or manager with such matters in his or her background is usually unemployable by public
companies.

Ethical Guides
Paragraph .03 of ET section 54, Article III—Integrity (AICPA, Professional Standards), states the
following: “Integrity is measured in terms of what is right and just …. Integrity requires a
member to observe both the form and the spirit of technical and ethical standards.”
The eleventh edition of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines integrity as “firm adherence to a code of esp. moral or artistic values.”
Heraclitus, the Greek poet and philosopher, said “Your integrity is your destiny—it is the
light that guides your way.”
According to chapter 61H1-21.002, “Integrity and Objectivity,” of the Rules of the State of
Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation, “[a] certified public accountant
shall not knowingly misrepresent facts, and, when engaged in the practice of public accounting, shall not subordinate his/her judgment to others including but not limited to clients,
employers or other third parties.”
Flannery O’Connor wrote in Wise Blood, “Does one’s integrity ever lie in what he is not
able to do? I think that usually it does, for free will does not mean one will, but many wills
conflicting in one man.”
The March 29, 1998, Washington Post article “A Conflict for CPAS?” states,“The competitive pressures of the modern marketplace are causing ethical dilemmas for all of America’s
professions …. The best safeguard for the accounting profession may be the simple fact that
this is a business where a firm’s integrity is its best selling point.”
Policy No. 3-0004, “Internal Accounting Controls, Procedures & Records,” which was last
revised on December 3, 2008, of the Haliburton Code of Business Conduct, states that
[t]he Company will continuously evaluate its internal accounting controls, procedures
and records to ensure compliance with the requirements of this Corporate Policy ….
The implementation and maintenance of internal accounting controls, procedures
and records that are adequate in all respects to satisfy the requirements of this Corporate Policy will be the primary responsibility of the Chief Financial Officer.
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In the August 13, 2000, Birmingham Business Journal, John O’Malley wrote in his article “How
to Create a Winning Corporate Culture” that “[c]orporate culture is an unwritten value-set
that management communicates directly or indirectly that all employees know and work
under. It is the underlying soul and guiding force within an organization that creates attitude
alliance, or employee loyalty.”
In the March 9, 2012, Austin Business Journal, M.P. Mueller wrote in her article “Creating
Corporate Culture” that “[a] strong corporate culture starts at the top. It’s the company
leader who builds the environment, sets the tone and communicates the message that it’s OK
to act and behave in a certain way.”

Case Study Facts
Superlative Software Corp., Its Background,
and the CFO
Superlative Software Corp. (Superlative) is a software development and marketing company
headquartered in Phoenix, AZ, that was founded 18 years ago and has been public for 10
years. Superlative markets software to satellite television (SATV) providers that lets these
providers put programming changes into effect nearly instantaneously. Offering a significant
cost and speed advantage over previously existing software solutions, Superlative has enjoyed
compound annual growth rates of over 9 percent per annum in the last 5 years. This has
allowed Superlative to deliver solid bottom line performance and outpace its competitors
such that Superlative now holds a market share of 34 percent for licenses of SATV programming software in the United States and 22 percent worldwide.
In September 2012, Superlative’s CFO, Oren Jaffe, announces he is leaving Superlative
after serving as the controller, and later CFO, for almost 14 years. Superlative issues a press
release indicating the board’s regret at Mr. Jaffe’s departure, citing the years of his service as
contributing in a major way to Superlative’s managed growth and financial well-being. Mr.
Jaffe’s resignation is due to personal reasons, according to the press release you happen to see
on the Internet. Later, you see a short story in the industry rag, SATV Times, that implies
Jaffe has contracted a serious illness and that Superlative intends to hire a new CFO by the
end of the year.

The Interview and Hiring Process
In November 2012, you receive a call from a nationally known headhunting firm.The caller
indicates she is working on behalf of an undisclosed software company and is wondering
if you have any interest in interviewing for the position of CFO. As a partner with over 19
years’ experience in auditing software companies and with several journal articles and seminar presentations to your credit, this is hardly the first call you have received from a headhunter. After asking for some financial details about the company and why it is now looking
for a new CFO, you begin to suspect the headhunter is representing Superlative. When you
ask her directly, she demurs, stating she can only disclose the identity of her client when you
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have indicated you have further interest and signed a confidentiality agreement. Letting curiosity get the best of you, you agree to do so, and a confidentiality agreement shortly comes
across in your e-mail. After signing and returning the agreement, the headhunter calls and
confirms your suspicion that Superlative is the potential employer. You are ecstatic to be in
the hunt for the CFO position because Superlative’s earnings and stock performance are the
standard against which all others in the software industry are judged.
The interview process is grueling, with you and what appear to be several other candidates
being subjected to a comprehensive vetting by the CEO, the COO, the three members of
the audit committee, and two of the audit partners from the company’s audit firm. When
you have a chance to turn the tables, you quickly conclude that the CEO and the COO are
both very knowledgeable about the operating and financial aspects of the SATV software
business. This is hardly surprising, given the success Superlative has enjoyed over the years.
When you ask to talk to Mr. Jaffe, the departing CFO, you are told this will have to wait
until the final two candidates for the CFO position are chosen and that you’ll get to talk to
him at that time if you are fortunate enough to be one of the 2 finalists for the job. After an
agonizing wait of 10 days, you get a phone call from the recruiter with the happy news that
you are one of the final 2 candidates.
The final round of interviews covers some of the same ground that was covered previously,
with a few notable exceptions. First, when the subject of Jaffe comes up, the members of the
audit committee inform you that you will be able to talk to him by phone, not in person.
It seems his illness is keeping him from coming into the office. When you inquire further
about his health, the audit committee members say they know it is serious, but they are not
at liberty to discuss what is a personal matter. At dinner that evening, the CEO confides in
you that Jaffe is believed to have contracted the human variant of mad cow disease due to
his spending lengthy periods of time in London when Superlative was in the middle of its
European expansion in the early 1990s. Knowing this disease is always fatal, you understand
much better Jaffe’s situation and volunteer to greatly abbreviate your questions for him. The
CEO expresses his appreciation, and says you can spend more time with the controller if you
have questions he can address, or failing that, you can talk to the two audit partners about
any accounting issues.
Avoid this pitfall: Having the opportunity to discuss financial reporting; internal controls; and expectations of management, the audit committee, and outside stakeholders with
your predecessor is often a critical means of developing judgments about his or her expertise,
integrity, and reasons for leaving the company. Although this case is extreme due to Jaffe’s illness, you should virtually insist on interviewing your predecessor to give yourself the benefit
of learning all you can about the company you intend to join and the individual you expect
to replace.
*****
The next day, you have a chance to sit down and talk in detail with the controller. The controller appears somewhat miffed that he is not being considered for the CFO position, but
he is cooperative.The controller is reasonably familiar with the literature, including revenue
recognition under FASB ASC 985-605; valuation allowances and warranty reserves related
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to returns; FASB ASC 350, Intangibles—Goodwill and Other, on goodwill and testing for
its impairment; and FASB ASC 985-20 on accounting for the costs of computer software
to be sold, leased, or otherwise marketed. You note that Superlative is providing service
to many of its SATV customers, but training and consulting revenue is being recognized
only as service is performed. The audit partners confirm that Superlative’s accounting has
been meticulous, and commend both Mr. Jaffe and the controller for their work ethic and
accounting skills. Thereafter, you have a brief, if somewhat unsatisfying, conversation with
Jaffe. He confirms he has a serious illness, and this is the only reason he has been forced to
tender his resignation. Jaffe says the controller, members of the audit committee, and the
audit partners are collectively very familiar with Superlative’s books and can answer almost
any question you have about the accounting or prior audits. In an effort to limit your questions, you choose to ask only a few questions about management integrity. Was he certain
of the CEO’s integrity? How about the COO? Was anything done previously by the CEO
or the COO of concern to him from an integrity perspective? Jaffe answers your questions
by expressing support for both the CEO and the COO in short, abrupt responses you
attribute to his illness.You are vaguely uncomfortable with the brevity of his responses, but
you are forced to conclude that anyone facing death imminently will not be eager to talk
of these issues.
One week after the interviews are completed, you are offered the CFO position, with a
substantial raise in pay, a comprehensive benefits package, and an option for 200,000 shares of
stock.You talk over the offer and interviews with your spouse, and after sleeping on it for one
day, you accept the position. You are excited to have been Superlative’s choice and believe
this change will position you to retire in style in just 8–10 years. Superlative issues a glowing
press release about your hiring, and both the trade press and investment community react
positively, with Superlative’s shares rising $0.75 per share on the day of the announcement.
You are as happy as can be, and it looks like the world is your oyster!

Your First Month at Work
Having started with Superlative right before year-end, you become immersed in preaudit
preparations, getting to know the company’s internal controls, checking on end-of-quarter
transactions, and overseeing the general ledger and schedule preparations. You also attend
your first board meeting on January 3, at which tentative year-end results are discussed with
the board members. The numbers continue to tell a strong story, with revenues increasing
by 9.7 percent over the prior year and earnings increasing 9.1 percent over the prior comparable period. The CEO expresses some concern about the fact that Wall Street’s consensus
estimate was looking for a 10 percent increase in earnings, but the most outspoken of the
board members, who is an ex-investment banker and a member of the audit committee, says
a difference of less than 1 percent is truly immaterial given the company’s continued strong
results.
Two days after this board meeting, one of the company’s leading salespeople calls you with
some startling news. She informs you that one of her larger customers in Mexico, Arriba,
had placed a purchase order for a software license, but it had not been included among
12

Chapter 1: Case 1—Superlative Software Corporation—You Are the CFO

year-end sales because the purchase order had to get board approval from Arriba. She goes
on to explain that Arriba’s board had signed a consent form on December 30 approving the
purchase order, but the consent didn’t reach her until January 5. She forwards the consent to
you by fax, and sure enough, the consent is dated December 30.You instruct the controller
to call Arriba’s controller and confirm the date of the board approval and to verify this with
a second source.The controller gets confirmation from both his counterpart at the customer
(in writing) and counsel to the company.The fax tag line across the top of the consent shows
a date of December 31, so it seems to you that booking the sale is proper.You are left wondering about one thing, though: the size of the sale is just enough to allow Superlative to
meet Wall Street’s earnings expectations.
Avoid this pitfall: When you encounter circumstances such as this in which you are
vaguely uncomfortable, and the events appear to allow the company to address an important
pressure point, such as expectations of analysts, rating agencies, or management incentive
compensation, let your gut be your guide. Follow-up is key in these types of situations.
Because you cannot afford to simply ignore the possibility that the sale was contrived in
some fashion, keep asking questions, and don’t stop until you are very comfortable with your
conclusion. Remember, too, that whatever you have done to make yourself comfortable will
be closely examined by auditors and regulators who will have the benefit of hindsight if the
situation is later investigated. Document and ask questions—now is not the time to be shy!

The Denouement
As you continue your preparations for the upcoming audit, you still wonder about the
somewhat “magical” appearance of the order from Arriba, and something continues to nag
at you. Finally, in an effort to put this issue to rest in your own mind, you call the CFO at
Arriba yourself, just to confirm the board’s action had been taken prior to December 31.
Your counterpart, however, has some disturbing news. He indicates that, according to his
records, the board had no meeting in late December, and because one board member was
out of the country from December 15 until January 4, it was impossible for the consent to
have been signed prior to January 4.
Steaming, you call the saleswoman who handles Arriba’s account, Claudia West, and ask
her to explain just what the heck had happened. Claudia responds by saying she cannot talk
about it on the phone, but she would meet you that evening to discuss what took place.You
anxiously await the appointed time for the meeting, wondering what explanation she could
possibly have for what had taken place. When Claudia finally shows up 45 minutes late, it
is clear she has been drinking and is not in the best condition to answer questions. What
answers you do get are enough to make your blood run cold. She confesses that she; the
CEO; and Jaffe, the former CFO, have been working together to, as she put it, “smooth our
earnings.” She says the whole thing was Jaffe’s idea, and rather than being sick, he got scared
their scheme would be uncovered and was at that very moment on his way to a country that
had no extradition treaty with the United States. As she stated it, “the sickest Jaffe ever got
was when he was afraid the auditors had tumbled onto his schemes.” She said she knew what
they were doing was wrong, but once it got started, they had little choice but to continue.
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She also tells you the revenue number had been manipulated upward by recognizing revenue
for services Superlative had not yet performed and shipment of software to international
customers that were merely way stations for parking software until a “downstream” customer
could be located. Claudia asks if you can do anything to help her keep her job, and you
answer, “You better hope we all have someplace to work tomorrow.”
Leaving the meeting in a stunned state, you realize that if even a portion of what you have
learned is true, your career is hanging in the balance. It is also clear to you that immediate
action of some kind is necessary, unless you decide to try and clean up the mess by talking
through the issues with the CEO. You arrive home that evening shaken and disbelieving,
not knowing quite what to do or which way to turn, and wondering about your future as a
financial officer of Superlative or, for that matter, any other company.

Questions for Consideration
1. The next morning, you start to wonder if Claudia’s drinking had made her invent this
fantastic story in order to save her job because she knew you were on to her when you
called her and asked what had gone on with the Arriba purchase order. To determine
if this is the case or if Jaffe really was managing earnings, you
a. set up a meeting with the CEO as quickly as possible.
b. review the schedule of accounts receivable and pull documentation on all customers that licensed software and received services in the last year.
c. go through the Arriba sales documentation again to try and ascertain if Jaffe was
involved in what took place.
d. contact the audit partner to ask the audit firm to review all the relevant records for
service contracts.
2. You decide you are going to have to confer with someone about these allegations so
that you are not going it alone.You bring into your confidence
a. the COO.
b. the audit engagement partner.
c. the chairman of the audit committee.
d. the controller.
e. the CEO.
3. Short of conducting a forensic investigation of Superlative, which of the following
choices offered the best chance of helping you find out Superlative had a revenue
recognition issue before you came on board?
a. Discussing in detail the key accounting policies with the audit committee and
audit partners and seniors.
b. Further conversations with Jaffe.
c. Talking with the sales staff about their familiarity with revenue recognition practices within Superlative.
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d. Reviewing Superlative’s financial statements and schedules.
e. Conferring with the executive vice president of sales and marketing about her
familiarity with Superlative’s revenue recognition policies.
4. Assume you went to the CEO, who confesses to helping Jaffe engineer the financials.
The CEO points out that a restructuring charge could eliminate any accumulated
overstatement, which in any event would be less than 3 percent of net earnings, and
that this would save the company (and save the employees their jobs). He also points
out that any restatement would affect the timing of revenue recognition, rather than
their receipt, meaning that investors really were not hurt by what went on.You
a. understand his position and decide to talk it over with the auditors.
b. ask that you and he jointly confer with the audit committee in the next few days
about what he is proposing.
c. assess the situation and find that due to the immaterial nature of the net adjustments, you should let prior reports stand as is.
d. reject his assertions and tell him you must inform the audit committee of the facts
immediately.
5. Assume that when you go to the CEO, he categorically rejects what Claudia West said
about him and insists that Jaffe acted on his own.The CEO also says he is going to fire
the audit firm and Ms. West immediately because they are culpable in this mess. What
is your best course of action when facing these circumstances?
a. Confer with the COO and ask him to countermand the CEO’s actions.
b. Confer with the audit committee.
c. Inform the CEO that hasty firings could have unintended consequences.
d. Call the audit firm, and tell it that any firing by the CEO is to be ignored.
6. If integrity is a measure of your honesty and trustworthiness, which of the following statements would best describe an honest and trustworthy approach to revenue
recognition issues?
a. Always take the most conservative approach to revenue recognition.
b. Apply the form and spirit of ethical standards when considering revenue recognition.
c. Independence assures integrity in revenue recognition.
d. Overdisclosure is appropriate when dealing with revenue recognition.
7. If your company was prematurely recognizing revenues, and you were one of the
officers in the accounting and finance department, what possible individual penalties might you face if the company and officers were subject to an SEC enforcement
action?
a. Civil monetary penalties
b. Suspension or bar from serving as an officer or a director of a public company
c. Disgorgement of proceeds from stock sales made while revenues were overstated
d. All of the above
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8. If you encountered a question about integrity in the course of serving as a financial
officer of a public company and wanted to consult relevant resources, where would
you go?
a. The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct
b. The code of conduct of your company’s largest competitor
c. The state code of professional responsibility
d. Both (a) and (c)
e. All of the above
9. Which of the following factors must be met to recognize revenue under SAB Nos.
101 and 104?
a. Collection of the receivable is more likely than not.
b. The product is shipped, and the customer is about to assume risk of loss.
c. Persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists.
d. The selling price is reasonably estimable.
e. All of the above.
10. You are considering joining a public company as one of its top financial officers and
are making your own evaluation of the likelihood that the company’s books might
overstate revenues. Which of the following factors, if present, do you believe might
argue in favor of overstated revenues?
a. The company has fallen short of analysts’ consensus estimates in the last three fiscal
quarters.
b. Declining interest rates.
c. Notification of a negative bias and possible downgrade of the company’s debt
securities by Standard & Poor’s.
d. Both (a) and (c).
e. All of the above.
11. In your opinion, would the implementation of additional internal controls been successful in deterring what took place at Superlative? Why or why not?
12. Let us assume that after you toss and turn all night following your meeting with
Claudia West, you go in to the office the next day and tender your resignation.You do
not give any reasons for your resignation. Superlative later hires a new CFO, takes a
relatively good-sized restructuring charge, and there is no restatement of past results or
any further word about Jaffe. Have you met your ethical duties? (Use Florida’s ethical
rules presented in the beginning of this chapter as your measuring stick.)
13. When you inform the audit committee the next day of what appears to have taken
place, the members look at you with expressions of shock and dismay but seem almost
paralyzed. Finally, the chairman looks at you and asks, “Give us a road map of where
we go from here. What should the company do?” How do you answer?
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Suggested Readings
To refresh your knowledge of revenue recognition and the issues surrounding this topic, you
should begin by reviewing SAB No. 104 that is accessible on the SEC’s website (www.sec.
gov). As previously indicated, the introduction of SAB No. 101 has a fairly comprehensive
listing of the literature relating to revenue recognition.The SEC’s Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
101: Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements—Frequently Asked Questions and Answers was
last updated on October 26, 2001, but is also a good resource for revenue recognition questions. Both SAB No. 108 on quantifying financial statement misstatements and SAB No. 99
on materiality also contain helpful, related guidance.
After the credit crisis unfolded in 2008 and 2009, the SEC staff became concerned about
the adequacy of liquidity and funding disclosure and, in particular, the risk posed by shortterm borrowings. In September 2010, the SEC issued Commission Guidance on Presentation of
Liquidity and Capital Resources Disclosures in Management’s Discussion and Analysis, available at
www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9144.pdf.
FRR No. 60, Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies, and
Securities Act Release No. 33-8098, the proposed rule Disclosure in Management’s Discussion
and Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies, provide information about what
critical accounting policies and critical accounting estimates must be disclosed. (The SEC
never took final action with respect to this proposed rule, but its guidance is instructive
nonetheless.) These releases will add considerably to your understanding of required disclosure of revenue-related accounting policies and estimates in MD&A and also outline the
staff ’s view of audit committee involvement in the selection of these policies.
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Case 2—Pointer Electronics, Inc.—
You Are the Engagement Quality
Review (Concurring) Partner
Introduction
In this chapter, you are placed in the position of being a concurring partner on an audit that
is nearing its completion.You have identified certain excess reserves that do not appear to be
presented in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and have
discussed these concerns with the engagement partner. The engagement partner has not yet
proposed adjustments to eliminate the excess reserves and has argued that the proposed adjustments are not material to the company’s financial statements as a whole. The company has
received an unqualified audit opinion in the past, and it appears the reserves may have been an
issue in prior years’ audits, although the working papers evidence no disagreements, and there
is no indication that the prior concurring partner was focused on the reserve issue. You are
considering taking the position that the report be withheld unless the adjustments are made. As
the concurring partner, you must decide to whom and when this position is communicated,
whether the audit firm has conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and what recommendations you will make to the audit committee of the board.
Issues raised by this case include integrity and objectivity, compliance with auditing standards
and accounting principles, and procedures for investigating and reporting irregularities.

Focus Points
In a September 28, 1998, speech before the NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business, thenSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt said
Increasingly, I have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street
earnings expectations may be overriding common sense business practices. Too
many corporate managers, auditors, and analysts are participants in a game of nods
and winks. In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth
earnings path, wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful representation. As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings,
and therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing may be giving way to
manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion.
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“Cookie Jar” Reserves: Just How Pervasive Is This
Practice?
The July 1, 1999, New York Times article “Microsoft’s Accounting Under Scrutiny” states that
the purpose of reserves is to reflect a company’s true revenues, but according to Jack Ciesielski of the Analyst’s Accounting Observer, these accounting practices do “open up the door
to earnings management, if not done right.”
On June 3, 2002, the SEC announced it had entered into a settlement with Microsoft
following an investigation of Microsoft’s accounting practices from July 1994 to June 1998.
Per a February 11, 2009, story on CBSNews.com, “The agency said Microsoft enhanced its
financial results by setting aside artificially large reserves to reduce revenues, with the idea of
reversing that procedure to record the revenues in less profitable times.”
On July 22, 2010, the SEC settled civil charges filed against Dell, the computer maker,
for $111 million, of which Dell paid $100 million. Dell’s Chairman and CEO Michael Dell
and former CEO Kevin Rollins paid $4 million each, former CFO James Schneider paid $3
million plus disgorgement, and former regional vice president of finance Nicholas Dunning
paid $50,000. In addition, Schneider, Dunning, and former assistant controller Leslie Jackson
consented to Rule 102(e) suspensions prohibiting them from appearing or practicing before
the SEC for varying periods.
The SEC charged Dell with two primary violations of the securities laws. The first was
failure to disclose material information that Dell had been receiving exclusivity payments
from Intel not to use central processing units manufactured by AMD, and it was these payments that allowed Dell to meet its earnings targets.
The second set of allegations were based on Dell’s senior accounting officers engaging in
improper accounting by maintaining a series of “cookie jar” reserves that Dell used to cover
shortfalls in operating results from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005.The reserve manipulations allowed Dell to materially misstate its earnings and operating expenses as a percentage
of revenue. These metrics were apparently highlighted by Dell in its public disclosures and
news releases over that 3-year period. The SEC alleged that Dell set aside excess general
reserves in accounts such as the Strat (Strategic) Fund; Other Corporate Contingencies; the
Risks and Opportunities schedules; a restructuring reserve; reserves for Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa region; bonus and profit sharing accounts; and also underaccrued in a liability reserve account. In citing how the reserves were used to manipulate operating results, the
SEC noted that from 2002–05, Dell made at least 23 releases from the Strat Fund and Other
Corporate Contingencies reserves, 16 of which were recorded after the end of the relevant
quarter. Dell tracked and is alleged to have used the excess reserves during the 3-year period
to offset the impacts of unrelated period costs.
The temptation to set aside “cookie jar” reserves is certainly not limited to technology
companies because 2011 saw a series of civil and criminal cases against former officers of
Beazer Homes USA (Beazer). The civil cases against former CFO James O’Leary, settled on
August 30, 2011, and former CEO Ian McCarthy, settled on March 3, 2011, stemmed from a
multiyear fraudulent earnings management scheme conducted by the former chief accounting officer, Michael Rand. When the scheme was uncovered, Beazer was forced to restate its
financial statements for fiscal years 2004–06 and interim periods in fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
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The settlements with former CEO McCarthy and former CFO O’Leary came following the SEC filing actions in federal court seeking court orders to compel McCarthy and
O’Leary to reimburse Beazer for bonuses, incentive-based or equity-based compensation,
and profits from their sales of Beazer stock received during the 12-month period after the
company’s 2006 filing of fraudulent financial statements. Under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), senior corporate executives are required to reimburse their
companies for bonus or incentive compensation and stock sale profits received while their
companies are in material noncompliance with financial reporting requirements due to misconduct, regardless of whether the misconduct was that of the officer in question. McCarthy’s settlement calls for him to reimburse Beazer $5,706,949 in cash; 40,103 restricted stock
units or equivalent value; $772,232 in stock sale profits; and 78,763 shares of restricted stock.
O’Leary’s settlement calls for him to reimburse Beazer a total of $1,431,022 in cash.
As for Michael Rand, on October 28, 2011, he was convicted of 7 criminal charges,
including conspiracy to commit securities fraud; to make false and misleading statements to
auditors and accountants; to circumvent Beazer’s internal accounting controls; and to falsify
the books, records, and accounts of Beazer. He was also convicted of destruction of evidence
in violation of SOX, obstruction of a federal grand jury investigation, and perjury to hinder
an FBI investigation. Rand faces a maximum sentence of 125 years in prison. In November
2011, Rand’s attorneys requested a retrial or judgment for acquittal, and in the meantime,
he remains free on bond.
Rand was previously charged in an SEC civil action with engaging in the fraudulent
earnings management scheme at Beazer. In describing this scheme, here is what the Robert
Khuzami, director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, said:
Michael Rand orchestrated an old-fashioned “cookie jar” earnings management
scheme where he hid from view over $60 million in so-called reserves. Then
when Beazer’s business declined, he fraudulently reversed those secret reserves and
appeased financial analysts, enticed new investors, and most importantly earned
himself an undeserved lucrative bonus.

The scheme alleged by the SEC involved Rand fraudulently decreasing reported net
income from fiscal years 2000–06 (a period of strong growth and financial performance)
through recording improper reserves and liabilities that were later reversed in fiscal year
2006 and the first quarter of fiscal year 2007 to offset declining financial results. In the early
years, the SEC alleged that when Beazer acquired land on which it constructed subdivisions,
it recorded the acquired land—and associated common development costs, such as sewer
systems and streets—as an asset in its land inventory accounts. As subdivisions were built,
the costs in the land inventory accounts were allocated to individual home lots that were
then expensed as a cost of sale when a home was sold, thus reducing the balance in the land
inventory accounts. Because sales within a subdivision occurred over time, the land inventory expense recorded for a particular house was necessarily an estimate. However, if land
acquisition and development costs were properly allocated, the balance in the land inventory
accounts would be at or near zero once the last house in a development was sold.
By increasing land inventory expenses (which Rand did by directing certain divisions to
“set aside all the reserves you reasonably can”), Rand caused Beazer to understate its net
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income by $56 million from 2000–05. As business conditions changed, Rand instructed
divisional financial managers to make journal entries that zeroed out credit balances in its
land inventory accounts, which caused Beazer to overstate its net income by approximately
$16 million in 2006.
Rand is also accused of manipulating the house cost-to-complete reserve that, when properly recorded, is established to cover any unknown expenses that might be incurred on a sold
house after closing, such as the costs of minor repairs or cosmetic touch-ups. Typically from
$1,000 to $4,000 per house and generally reversed within 4–9 months after sale, Beazer had
excess cost-to-complete reserves of over $3 million by the end of the first quarter in 2001
and, in other periods, maintained those reserves well beyond the customary period. When
Beazer needed additional income in 2006, Rand caused Beazer to reverse some of the excess
cost-to-complete reserves and reduced its cost of sales expense by approximately $1.5 million by zeroing out this reserve on a number of houses.
In 2005, Rand instructed one division not to record any cost-to-complete reserve on 85
houses, and in 2006, he also recorded transactions on 360 model homes as sale-leasebacks at
a time he knew those transactions did not qualify for this accounting treatment under GAAP.
Specifically, Beazer had agreements with investor pools that purchased the model homes
under which Beazer had a continuing interest in the potential appreciation in the model
homes. Rand provided copies of sale-leaseback agreements to Deloitte & Touche and certain
internal Beazer accountants that intentionally omitted any language concerning Beazer’s
continuing profit participation. That participation right had been moved to side agreements
that were not disclosed to Deloitte & Touche or internal Beazer accountants.

Standards and Guidance
Setting aside the issue of revenue recognition, the deliberate manipulation of reserves or
estimates is clearly a primary focus of the SEC’s enforcement program. Examples of enforcement actions addressing reserve manipulation include Symbol Technologies, Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, Xerox, Sunbeam, Enron, and Williams, not to mention Microsoft and the earlier seminal case against W.R. Grace. In the regulatory context, the issues of
reserve or estimate manipulations most often appear in the context of a failure or circumvention of internal controls.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 450,
Contingencies, permits a company to establish reserves for identifiable, probable, and estimable
risks and forbids the establishment of reserves for general or unknown business risks unless
they meet the accrual criteria of FASB ASC 450. Excess reserves are to be treated just as a
general reserve (that is, excess reserves that do not meet the accrual criteria should be immediately released into income once they are identified).
Changes in accounting estimates or accounting methods, including those estimates or
methods that may alter existing reserves or result in the creation of new reserves, require
disclosure under FASB ASC 250, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections. Under AU section 380, The Auditor’s Communication With Those Charged With Governance, (AICPA, Professional Standards), and Appendix B to that section, if an auditor finds that management’s
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recorded estimates are clustered at either end of the auditor’s range of acceptable amounts or
if the cumulative effect of estimates used reflects a possible bias, the auditor should consider
whether such matters should be communicated to the audit committee. Today, most audit
committee members will want the auditor to share his or her perceptions of whether the
company is overly conservative in establishing reserves or applying other critical accounting
policies. Although such judgments are not the province of auditors per se, it is revealing that
many audit committees remain intensely interested in the auditors’ view of management’s
judgments, especially in the area of reserves.
AU section 314, Understanding the Entity and Its Environment and Assessing the Risks of
Material Misstatement (AICPA, Professional Standards), provides the outside auditor with a
framework for defining and understanding a company’s internal control structure in order to
plan an audit. The auditor must understand the five interrelated components of the internal
control system: the control environment, risk assessment, the control activities, information
and communication, and monitoring. Although the effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance with applicable laws are addressed by this AU section, the sections
concentrate principally on controls that affect the reliability of financial reporting.
Paragraph .36 of AU section 508, Reports on Audited Financial Statements (AICPA, Professional Standards), states that a judgment of materiality should take into account the significance of an item to a particular entity, the pervasiveness of the misstatement, and the effect
of the misstatement on the financial statements as a whole.

Recent Developments: A New Code of
Professional Conduct Is Coming
In an effort to improve the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA Code) and
increase its utility, the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) is conducting the Ethics Codification Project to recodify and restructure the AICPA Code. In a manner similar to FASB’s project to create FASB ASC, PEEC’s project restructures the AICPA
Code into several parts, each organized by topic; edits the AICPA Code using consistent
drafting and style conventions; incorporates a conceptual framework for members in the
practice of public accounting and members in business; revises certain AICPA Code provisions to reflect the conceptual framework approach (also known as the threats and safeguard
approach); and, when applicable, references existing nonauthoritiave guidance to the relevant
topic. On April 2, 2012, PEEC provided the restructured AICPA Code to pilot testers whose
feedback is to be provided to PEEC by July 1, 2012. PEEC expects to issue an exposure draft
of the restructured AICPA Code for public comment in spring 2013, with a view toward
approval of the new AICPA Code the following spring.
The revised AICPA Code will be divided into four parts:
1. The preface will describe the structure of the AICPA Code and will contain the
principles of professional conduct; a listing of the defined terms that are used in the
AICPA Code; a discussion of nonauthoritative guidance; and a listing of new, revised,
and pending interpretations.
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2. Part 1 will apply to members in the practice of public accounting.
3. Part 2 will apply to members in business and industry.
4. Part 3 will apply to other members, such as those who are retired.
The new AICPA Code will use a citation numbering system much like that in FASB
ASC, with references (as applicable) to the preface or parts 1–3, topics, subtopics, and sections. Implementation of the citation numbering system will be accompanied by removal
of rule numbers; thus, Rule 101, Independence (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101
par. .01), will be referred to as the Independence rule (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET
1.200.001). Rules and interpretations will be aligned in the new AICPA Code under
broad topics. Although rules may appear multiple times in the new AICPA Code (because
many rules apply to those in public practice, as well as those in industry), PEEC’s objective
is to ensure that interpretations applicable to those in public practice will appear only in
part 1, and interpretations that apply to those in business and industry will appear only in
part 2.
The new AICPA Code will also use common drafting conventions, such as referring to
should consider to indicate when consideration of a procedure or an action is presumptively
required; referring to should evaluate to indicate when a member has to assess or weigh a
matter; referring to determine when a member must conclude and make a decision; and
using a plain English approach in rewriting the AICPA Code. Nonauthoritative content not
included within the AICPA Code will be referenced using links that will appear in boxed
text, thus simplifying access to relevant staff positions, frequently asked questions, or basis for
conclusion documents that remain outside the AICPA Code.
The new AICPA Code also incorporates two conceptual frameworks: one for those in
public practice and one for those in business and industry. There is also a conceptual framework for independence for those members in public practice who provide services requiring
independence.
In addition to the new AICPA Code incorporating the conceptual frameworks, PEEC
highlighted for the pilot testers several other areas it believes will incorporate substantive
changes in the new AICPA Code, including
• parts 1 and 2 will contain a discussion of ethical conflict resolution from the nonauthoritative Guide for Complying with Rules 102–505.
• references to independence will use the term attest client rather than client to avoid
confusion.
• guidance concerning when a member serves as a director of a bank will be applied
more broadly to when a member in public practice serves as a director of any entity.
• incorporation of guidance regarding when having a tax power of attorney would
not impair independence (currently covered in Interpretation No. 101-3, “Nonattest Services,” under Rule 101 [AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .05],
provided the client makes all decisions).
• clarifying that a member may not disclose confidential information from a prospective client without violating the Acts Discreditable rule;
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• adding Interpretation No. 501-10, “False, Misleading or Deceptive Acts in Promoting or Marketing Professional Services,” under Rule 501, Acts Discreditable (AICPA,
Professional Standards, ET sec. 501 par. .11), to parts 1 and 3 of the new AICPA Code
(making this interpretation applicable to those in public practice, as well as retired or
unemployed members).
• expanding guidance concerning when billing for a subcontractor’s services with an
increased fee is not considered a commission, from computer hardware maintenance
subcontractors to all subcontractors.
• expanding guidance from Ethics Ruling 136, “Audit with Former Partner,” of ET
section 591, Ethics Rulings on Responsibilities and Practices (AICPA, Professional Standards,
ET sec. 591 par. .271–.272) (presentation of the audit report on plain paper when a
firm consisting of one certified and one noncertified partner has been dissolved, and
the two individuals continue to service the client together), and applying the guidance more broadly, not only to audit engagements but all types of engagements.
On completion of the pilot testing, PEEC will be evaluating the feedback from the testers,
and before the exposure draft is issued, there may well be changes, additions, or deletions
from the revised AICPA Code based upon this feedback. Public comments on the exposure
draft, once issued, may likewise influence the content of the revised AICPA Code. However,
the foregoing provides a preview of how the new AICPA Code will be organized and presented and some potential changes in content.

Related Guidance: Ethics and the
Responsibility of the Concurring Partner
On October 26, 2005, PEEC issued Ethics Rulings No. 113, “Acceptance or Offering of
Gifts or Entertainment,” of ET section 191, Ethics Rulings on Independence, Integrity, and Objectivity (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 191 par. .226–.227), and Ethics Ruling No. 114,
“Acceptance or Offering of Gifts and Entertainment to or From an Attest Client,” of ET
section 191 (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 191 par. .228–.229).The rulings address an
issue that is implicated in the following case study: the acceptance of gifts or entertainment
from a client. Ethics Ruling No. 113 addresses the integrity and objectivity concerns that can
arise in these situations, and Ethics Ruling No. 114 addresses the independence concerns.
The guidance provided by the rulings includes the following.
Unless the gifts or entertainment are reasonable in the circumstances, objectivity would
be considered to be impaired if a member accepts or offers gifts or entertainment to or from
• a client.
• an individual in a key position with the client.
• an individual owning 10 percent or more of the client’s outstanding equity securities
or other ownership interests.
• a customer of the member’s employer.
• a vender of the member’s employer.
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In considering reasonableness, relevant factors include, but are not limited to
• the nature of the gift or entertainment, its cost or value, and the occasion giving rise
to it.
• the nature, frequency, and value of other gifts or entertainment offered or accepted.
• whether the entertainment was associated with the active conduct of business
directly before, during, or after the entertainment.
• whether other clients, customers, or vendors participated in the entertainment and
• the individuals from the client, customer, or vendor and the member’s firm who
participated.
Additionally, a member is presumed to lack integrity if he or she accepts or offers gifts
or entertainment knowing, or was reckless in not knowing, that this would violate policies
maintained by the member, client, customer, or vendor or applicable laws or regulations.
Independence would be considered impaired if a member or the member’s firm accepts
gifts from an attest client (or an individual in a key position, such as an executive officer or a
principal stockholder owning 10 percent or more of the client), unless the value of the gift
is clearly insignificant to the recipient.
Independence would not be considered impaired if
• a covered member accepts entertainment from an attest client, provided the entertainment is reasonable in the circumstances.
• a covered member offers gifts or entertainment to an attest client, provided the gift
or entertainment would be considered reasonable in the circumstances.
On January 15, 2010, the SEC approved the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board’s (PCAOB’s) adoption of Auditing Standard No. 7, Engagement Quality Review (AICPA,
PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Auditing Standards). Auditing Standard No. 7 became
effective for engagement quality reviews of audits and interim reviews for fiscal years that
began on or after December 15, 2009.
Like Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is
Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules,
Auditing Standards), Auditing Standard No. 7 focuses on identifying and reviewing those
areas of the engagement likely to contain higher risks but within the context of the engagement quality review. Engagements covered by the standard include all audit and interim
review engagements that are performed pursuant to the standards of the PCAOB but
exclude other engagements performed according to the standards of the PCAOB (examples
would be engagements pursuant to Auditing Standard No. 4, Reporting on Whether a Previously
Reported Material Weakness Continues to Exist [AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules,
Auditing Standards], and engagements required by SEC Regulation AB).
Paragraph 2 of Auditing Standard No. 7 includes a statement of objective for engagement
quality reviewers (EQRs) that calls for the EQR to “perform an evaluation of the significant
judgments made by the engagement team and the related conclusions reached in forming the
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overall conclusion on the engagement and in preparing the engagement report, if a report
is to be issued, in order to determine whether to provide concurring approval of issuance.”
All registered public accounting firms performing audit or interim review engagements
are required by Auditing Standard No. 7 to conduct engagement quality reviews (otherwise
known as second or concurring partner reviews) to assess whether areas within the engagement pose a higher risk. The requirement for the EQR to affirmatively approve issuance of
the audit report before it is issued traces back to Section 103 of SOX that requires the EQR
to provide concurring approval in the issuance of an audit report.
The EQR must be an associated person of a registered public accounting firm and must be
a partner or person in an equivalent position. The EQR can also be an individual from outside the audit firm, in which case the outside reviewer will be considered an associated person
of the audit firm if he or she is compensated (or his or her employer is compensated) for performing the review, or the reviewer performs the review as agent for the issuing firm. Auditing Standard No. 7 requires that the EQR have the requisite knowledge and competence that
is required of the engagement partner on the engagement under review and must be independent and perform the review with integrity and objectivity.The maintenance of objectivity requires that decisions should not be made on behalf of, or responsibilities assumed for,
the engagement team by either the EQR or persons assisting the reviewer. Auditing Standard
No. 7 provides that the EQR can be assisted by others, but those assistants must also meet the
standards for independence, integrity, and objectivity in discharging their duties.
The firm’s policies and procedures should include provisions designed to provide the firm
with reasonable assurance that EQRs possess these qualities such that the engagement quality review will be performed in accordance with PCAOB standards. A person who served as
the engagement partner during either of the two audits preceding the audit that is undergoing an engagement quality review may not be the EQR.
Under Auditing Standard No. 7, the EQR can provide concurring approval of issuance
only if he or she is not aware of a significant engagement deficiency after performing with
due professional care the review required by the standard. (The PCAOB noted that it intends
due professional care in this context to mean reasonable care and diligence, as that term is
described in AU section 230, Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work [AICPA, Professional Standards].) A significant engagement deficiency is defined as any of the following:
• The engagement team failed to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence in accordance
with PCAOB standards (audits) or failed to perform interim review procedures necessary in the circumstances of the engagement (interim review).
• The engagement team reached an inappropriate conclusion on the subject matter of
the engagement.
• The audit report is not appropriate under the circumstances.
• The audit firm is not independent of the client.
In an audit or interim review, the audit firm may grant permission to the client to use the
engagement report (or communicate the engagement conclusion to its client if no report is
issued) only after the EQR provides concurring approval of issuance.
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The standard specifies the procedures that should be included in the review process (which
are similar to existing requirements) that call for
• evaluating significant judgments related to engagement planning, including
recent engagement experience with the company and risks identified in the client
acceptance and retention process, consideration of the company’s business and
significant activities and related financial reporting issues and risks, and judgments
made about materiality and the effect of those judgments on the engagement
strategy.
• evaluating the engagement team’s assessment of, and audit responses to, significant
risks (including fraud risks) identified by the engagement team and other significant
risks identified by the EQR through performance of procedures required by Auditing Standard No. 7 (noting that the definition of significant risk is a risk of material
misstatement important enough to require special audit consideration).
• evaluating other significant judgments about materiality and disposition of corrected
and uncorrected identified misstatements, as well as the severity and disposition of
identified control deficiencies.
• reviewing the engagement team’s evaluation of the firm’s independence in relation
to the engagement, reviewing the engagement completion document, and confirming with the engagement partner that there are no significant unresolved matters.
• reviewing the financial statements, management’s report on internal control, and the
related engagement report.
• reading other information in documents containing the financial statements to be
filed with the SEC and evaluating whether the engagement team has taken appropriate action with respect to material inconsistencies with the financial statements or
material misstatements of fact of which the EQR is aware.
• evaluating whether appropriate matters have been communicated, or identified for
communication, to the audit committee; management; and perhaps others, such as
regulators.
To evaluate significant judgments made by the engagement team and the related conclusions, Auditing Standard No. 7 calls for the EQR, to the extent necessary to satisfy the preceding requirements, to hold discussions with the engagement partner and other members of
the audit engagement team and to review documentation. The engagement quality review
process for interim financial information is substantially identical to the annual audit except
that interim engagement quality reviews do not require the evaluation of the engagement
team’s assessment of, and audit responses to, significant risks identified by the engagement
team and other significant risks identified by the EQR (however among the significant judgments in engagement planning that must be considered are the nature of identified risks of
material misstatements due to fraud).
In an audit, the EQR should evaluate whether the engagement documentation he or
she reviewed when performing the preceding procedures indicates the engagement team
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responded appropriately to significant risks and supports the conclusions reached by the
engagement team with respect to the matters reviewed.
Auditing Standard No. 7 states that engagement quality review documentation should
include sufficient information to enable an experienced auditor, with no prior connection
with the engagement, to understand the procedures performed by the EQR and others who
assisted the reviewer, including information that identifies
• who performed the engagement quality review and who assisted the reviewer.
• the documents reviewed by the EQR and those assisting the reviewer.
• the date concurring approval of issuance was provided. If approval was not provided,
the reasons why it was not provided.
Engagement quality review documentation should be included in the engagement documentation that must be retained and maintained in accordance with the standards found in
Auditing Standard No. 3, Audit Documentation (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules,
Auditing Standards).
The adoptive release and the full content of Auditing Standard No. 7 can be viewed at
http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/Auditing_Standard_7.aspx.

Ethical Guides
The eleventh edition of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines objectivity as “expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings,
prejudices, or interpretations.”
Rule 102, Integrity and Objectivity (AICPA, Professional Conduct, ET sec. 102 par. .01), states,
“In the performance of any professional service, a member shall maintain objectivity and
integrity, shall be free of conflicts of interest, and shall not knowingly misrepresent facts or
subordinate his judgment to others.”
Andre Breton, the French poet and essayist wrote in Nadja, “Subjectivity and objectivity
commit a series of assaults on each other during a human life out of which the first one suffers the worse beating.”
According to §1701B1 of chapter 17, “Rules of Professional Conduct,” of part XIX, “Certified Public Accountants,” of title 46, Professional and Occupational Standards of the state of
Louisiana, “A licensee … shall be objective and shall not place his own financial interests
nor the financial interests of a third party ahead of the legitimate financial interests of the
client or the public in any context in which the client or the public can reasonably expect
objectivity from one using the CPA title.”
According to §1100.4500B, “Integrity and Objectivity; Conflict of Interest,” of chapter
1100, “Board of Accountancy Licensing and Practice,” of the Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct, “A licensee who knowingly makes, or permits or directs another to make, false and
misleading entries in an entity’s financial statements or records shall be considered to have
knowingly misrepresented facts in violation of this [statute].”
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Case Study Facts
Pointer Electronics and Your Firm’s Involvement
Pointer Electronics (Pointer) has been in business since 1995, when its founder and chief
executive began work on new videoconferencing technology. After developing several desktop videoconferencing products that increased transmission speed and reliability, the founder
was able to secure for Pointer a significant investment from a large, technology-oriented
venture capital fund. Using this capital, Pointer was successful in obtaining multiple patents
for a breakthrough product: on-demand Video Mail.
Rather than sending plain old e-mails, Pointer’s combination of proprietary and patented
bundled hardware and software gives users the ability to send video mail over digital lines to any
user with the Pointer software installed on his or her server. Pointer also figured out a unique
way of increasing its installed base of users: if a user sent a video mail to a computer lacking
the Pointer software, the Video Mail system automatically sent a companion e-mail that asked
the recipient if he or she wanted to download the Pointer software, so the recipient could view
the video mail on his or her computer screen.The downloaded software was available over the
Internet, so viewing the video mail was easy (and free). Of course, the trick was that the recipient had to purchase the hardware if he or she wanted to send a video mail. Pointer went public
on the strength of the Video Mail technology in late 2007, its stock quickly appreciating by 20
percent.With quarterly sequential revenue growth rates of 45 percent or more and year-to-year
increases of more than 10x, Pointer became the darling of Wall Street and, not coincidentally,
Michaelson,Woods, and Ells (MW&E), the accounting firm of which you are a partner.
As changes have occurred in the accounting profession, your firm has grown opportunistically through a combination of savvy acquisitions, excellent client service, and a deserved
reputation among regulatory authorities for stringent quality controls. Now possessing one
of the 20 largest auditing practices of public companies in the country, MW&E is committed
to accounting and auditing excellence. You joined MW&E in 1999 and recently became a
partner in the auditing practice, although you were a partner in another regional firm and
now have almost 24 years experience in accounting and auditing. As it happens, you were a
principal of MW&E at the time Pointer received its large venture capital infusion, and you
worked on the audit team for 3 years before rotating to another assignment. Based in part on
Pointer’s rapid growth and voracious need for capital, MW&E’s audit, tax, and related services billings topped $1.3 million last year and appear headed toward $1.5 million this year.
The partners of MW&E have lavished both praise and pay on Mr. Arnie Ells, the engagement partner for Pointer, because Pointer is now the largest audit client of the firm outside
of quasigovernmental entities and a charitable foundation.
After the retirement last year of another partner, Mr. E.Z. Rider, the partnership had a
meeting to designate the review partner for several audit clients, including Pointer. Much
to your delight, you were designated to serve as the review partner for Pointer, a plum
assignment you landed due to your knowledge of the client’s affairs from its prepublic days
and your well-known mastery of accounting and auditing principles, not to mention your
attention to detail. In private conversations with several of the partners of MW&E who are
your friends, they congratulate you warmly and remind you this could be your springboard
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to become chairperson of the firm in a few short years. You welcome their thoughts but
harbor a few doubts based on the fact you will be working more closely with Mr. Ells than
you had previously. The scuttlebutt around MW&E is that even E.Z. had a few rough spots
with Arnie when E.Z. was the review partner on Pointer’s account. You resolve to go into
the review with an open mind about Arnie, knowing that his service as a founding partner
of MW&E and key role in obtaining Pointer as a client mean he is entitled to considerable
credit, even if he might be a little hard to work with.

The Audit and Your Review
With year-end inventory observations completed and the audit plan in place, January and
February find the audit team hard at work completing the field work and reviewing schedules prepared by Pointer’s financial personnel. Confirmations to banks and customers and
inquiry letters directed to counsel are returned or responded to in the ordinary course, and
all appears to be progressing smoothly to a wrap-up of the audit by the middle of February. As is customary, Pointer announces its preliminary year-end earnings after the close
of trading on the first Monday in February. Pointer’s earnings not only exceed the consensus estimate, but they beat the high-end estimates by $0.02 per share, sending its stock
price climbing by 9 percent to $38.50 per share. The comments from analysts are uniformly
ecstatic, with many analysts comparing the market penetration of Video Mail to the success
enjoyed by Microsoft in its early days when introducing Windows.
In the meantime, you are diligently reviewing working papers because the audit team is
making every effort to complete the audit in time for a February 10 board meeting. The
board is expecting a presentation by MW&E of the next-to-final numbers at this meeting, and both you and Arnie are expected to attend the audit committee meeting that will
precede the board meeting by a few hours. Late on the evening of February 8, one of your
favorite seniors comes into your office with another batch of working papers and pauses
beside your desk for a moment.
“Mary, I know you’ve been working like crazy reviewing these working papers, but I was just
wondering if you’ve had a chance to look over last year’s working papers in as much detail,” he
says. Something about the look on his face strikes you as odd, and your antennae go up.
“Justin, is there something in last year’s papers I should be looking for?” you ask.
“I wouldn’t know, Mary, because Tom Traylor was the senior in charge last year,” Justin
comments. Still, Justin’s demeanor seems strange to you, almost like he is driving at something without being specific. He continues to stand by your desk, saying nothing.You make
some quick decisions that you hope might help the situation.
“Justin, how about if you select a few of the files from last year’s working papers and bring
them in for my review? I just remembered I wanted to review a few audit issues from last
year that might come in handy when I’m finishing off my review for this year.”
Justin’s face seems to register relief, and he nods his agreement as he walks off. “I’ll be back
with those files in a jiffy.”
With your curiosity piqued but believing anything in last year’s working papers will likely
reflect a minor adjusting entry at best, you continue your review. A few hours later, one of your
staff people stops by to drop off a few files with a note indicating they came from Justin. More
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out of boredom with the current year’s review, you open the files and begin to thumb through
them. One of them catches your eye: a file with “Reserves” and “Reserve Analysis” in bold letters
across the top.As you read through the contents of the file, you come across the following memo:
Memo to: Reserve File
From: Tom Traylor
Re: Analysis of Reserves at 12/31/10
I have determined that several issues cause me some feelings of discomfort about Pointer
Electronics’ reserves at 12/31. They are as follows:
1. Pointer established a reserve during this fiscal year for hardware warranty returns.
The amount of the reserve is $1.6 million. Previously, Pointer had no need for such a
reserve because hardware warranty returns were less than $100,000 annually. When I
asked Jack Voss, the CFO, about this reserve, he indicated that Pointer believed it was
appropriate to establish this reserve in view of its rapidly escalating hardware sales and
some problems it had experienced with some of its fiber-compatible cameras. He gave
me a memo from the production department indicating that returns had increased
to $75,000 in the most recent quarter, based almost solely on returns of the fibercompatible cameras. I told him I was concerned about the size of the reserve relative
to their return experience, but he said the audit committee had already discussed this
with Arnie and that everyone had agreed that the reserve and its size were appropriate. I think we need to do further testing of this reserve and make sure Pointer’s
MD&A has included within it some discussion of this development. The third quarter’s MD&A has no reference to these returns.
2. Pointer’s revenues have grown over 240 percent this year in sales to international customers, and it has reserved almost $3.5 million against sales to 2 distributors in Australia and New Zealand.Voss told me the reserve was necessary due to the deteriorating
Australian economy, adverse changes in exchange rates, and an increase in days in
receivables that Voss said these 2 distributors were experiencing. When I asked Voss
if that meant Pointer was making sales to the 2 distributors on consignment, he got
hot under the collar and said Pointer expected to collect every dime, but it wouldn’t
put the distributors out of business to do so. I followed up with Arnie about this, who
said he would talk with Voss to make sure the reserve was adequate but not excessive.
Copy: Working paper correspondence file
You take a look through the file just to see if there was any further information about these
reserves, but you do not see anything.You conclude that Arnie, E.Z., and the audit committee must have been comfortable with the reserve estimates because you do not recall any
adjusting entries of any size on reserves. Just to put your mind at rest, and remembering the
strange look on Justin’s face, you decide to take a look at the working papers for this year’s
reserves on hardware warranty returns and sales in Australia and New Zealand. The working
papers show the hardware warranty reserve has increased by 40 percent, from $1.6 million
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to $2.25 million, not an unreasonable figure given Pointer’s increase in sales. The Australian
reserve has increased to $6 million.You remember that sales in that region did not increase as
fast as sales in the United States and the European Union, and you decide to check on sales to
the 2 distributors. When you find the schedule, you are a little surprised to find that sales to
these distributors actually fell by almost 70 percent. The schedule shows that sales increased
substantially to another distributor, however, so you figure the reserve increase is more related
to the new distributor.You decide to sleep on this and return to it in the morning.
The next day, you ask for a receivables history for all 3 of the distributors in Australia and
New Zealand, figuring you can put this issue to rest. Far from doing so, however, the receivables history only increases your level of concern. What you see seems to support the fact that
the reserve, when initially established, was called for and in an appropriate amount given the
payment history of the 2 distributors. The payment history of the new distributor, however, is
nearly spotless. Based on the fact that this distributor accounted for 60 percent of sales in Australia and New Zealand in 2011, you cannot understand why the reserve has gone up instead of
down.You decide you better call Arnie to discuss this and find out what you are not aware of.

You and the Engagement Partner’s Confrontation
After calling for Arnie and finding out he would be in the office late in the afternoon after
playing golf with Pointer’s CFO, you are able to catch him just before the end of the day. To
try and depersonalize the issues, you decide to approach Arnie by referring to Mr. Traylor’s
memorandum as a way to break the ice. However, when you put the memo in front of Arnie,
he immediately turns red as a beet and explodes.
“Where did you get this? Rider told me he had gone over these points with Traylor and
that there was no reason for Traylor to be uncomfortable! In fact, Traylor admitted he hadn’t
done enough work on the Australia and New Zealand reserves when he wrote the memo
and that he actually helped create a problem that wasn’t there to begin with!” Arnie added a
few expletives that made it clear what he thought of Traylor.
“Arnie, there may not have been an issue last year, but we need to take a look at what will
support Pointer’s position on these reserves for this year,” you say in your best consoling tone.You
proceed to recount what you found in the way of reserves on sales to the old Australia and New
Zealand distributors and the new distributor.Arnie’s face takes on an alarming cast, and after hesitating for a moment, he jumps up and closes his door. He then proceeds to tell you the following.
“Listen, I appreciate the fact that you’ve had to come in here on short notice and pick up
where E.Z. left off last year,” he says. “However, I need to share a few things with you that
might affect how these issues should be resolved. First, you know Pointer is our largest public
company audit client and that if we challenge it on some overly conservative accounting,
it might decide to jump ship next year and hire a national firm, right?” Arnie looks at you
expectantly, but you remain silent. “Also, you do understand that its business is growing so
fast that there is a lot of leeway on what is an appropriate reserve, right?” Again, you are silent.
Arnie then lowers his voice to a whisper. “Look, the hardware reserve might be somewhat
high, but Pointer’s returns have been rising each quarter, so I don’t think you should have a
problem there. The situation in Australia and New Zealand is different.Voss thinks the 2 old
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distributors might go into liquidation in the next 12 months, and if they do, the reserve will
be just enough to cover the uncollected receivables. Pointer’s probably overreserved on the
sales to the new distributor, but it just don’t want to get caught with a shortfall in earnings
if things don’t go well down there. I’ll have Voss call you and take you through the numbers
so that you can get comfortable.”
You leave Arnie, having committed to talk to Voss the next day. In the interim, however,
you pull credit information from Brad & Dunstreet on the 2 old distributors in Australia and
New Zealand. In disbelief, you find the distributors are in reasonable financial shape, or at
least appear to be so. Doing a little detective work on your own, that night, you call Australia
and speak to the chief accounting officer for one of the distributors. She tells you they are
doing fine, and they expect to pay off their receivables balance in the next 120 days, less some
amount for the warranty claims on the defective fiber optic cameras they sold.When you ask
how many they had, she indicates that fully 30 percent of their cameras came back and that
they are still getting warranty claims even now, 9 months later.You are convinced the problem with Pointer goes much deeper, but you are unsure how involved Arnie is at this point.
The next morning, you arrive at work to find an e-mail from the chairman of the firm
indicating that Pointer’s CEO and CFO have asked that a new review partner be assigned
to their account. The e-mail states, “Voss said you may not have understood their business
quite as well as they had hoped.”The e-mail goes on to say that Arnie has concurred in their
request for the appointment of a new review partner, believing that, perhaps, you have been
overzealous in your role and had a negative impact on the firm’s relationship with Pointer.
You understand that Arnie’s relationship with the founding partners of MW&E makes it
almost impossible for you to convince them that Arnie has lost his objectivity about Pointer.
Knowing that Arnie lied to you about the financial health of the two distributors, you are
beginning to wonder what else he has lied about. Far from being intimidated, though, you
are convinced you can act to save Pointer from a fate far worse than a revision in reserve
numbers and also preserve MW&E’s reputation for top-notch audit work.

Questions for Consideration
1. What documents would you want to have in your possession before talking to any
other partner of MW&E about this situation?
a. The Traylor memo
b. The credit report for the Australian distributor
c. The schedule of Pointer’s reserves
d. All of the above
2. If you are going to question Arnie’s objectivity when talking to your partners or the
chairman of the firm, what is the most compelling evidence you can focus on?
a. The fact that Arnie was playing golf with Voss
b. The existence of the Traylor memo
c. Arnie’s reaction when he saw you had the Traylor memo
d. The fact that Arnie seconded your removal as review partner
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3. You approach the vice chairwoman of MW&E, and she agrees you all have a major
problem that has to be addressed immediately. What is your suggestion to her for the
next step?
a. Go to the chairman of MW&E to convince him of the problem.
b. Call the SEC and send a resignation letter citing a Section 10A illegal act as the
basis for resigning.
c. Meet with the chairman of Pointer’s audit committee.
d. Confer with the CEO of Pointer.
4. If your partners understood your position but required more convincing, what additional work would you want to do in order to provide the best support for the conclusion that Arnie had indeed lost his objectivity concerning Pointer?
a. Undertake a complete analysis of the warranty and Australian and New Zealand
reserves.
b. Ascertain what revenues were derived from sales of hardware and to the Australian
and New Zealand distributors so as to be able to verify the reserves are not presented fairly in accordance with GAAP.
c. Assess in writing Arnie’s responses to the issues raised by Traylor.
d. Demonstrate that Arnie and Voss were using the reserves to manage earnings.
5. Under Auditing Standard No. 7, if before you were removed as the engagement quality review partner, you determined that Pointer’s audit had a significant engagement
deficiency, which of the following conclusions might you have reached?
a. The engagement team complied with PCAOB standards.
b. The engagement team obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence.
c. The firm is not independent of the client.
d. The engagement team reached an appropriate conclusion on the subject matter
of the audit.
6. If after you analyzed all of Pointer’s reserve accounts, you conclude that nearly all the
estimated reserves were overstated, what action would you first be required to take?
a. Provide footnote disclosure concerning the new reserves.
b. Decide if the misstatements were material.
c. Inform the audit committee that Pointer has significant internal control deficiencies.
d. Reverse the reserves into income.
7. Assume that you and the vice chairwoman talk with the CEO, who immediately fires
Voss. The CEO and the audit committee chairman are willing to work closely with
MW&E to rectify any issues but want to know as soon as possible if Pointer needs
to issue a revised earnings release. If not, what should it disclose about the revision to
reserves? What would you advise Pointer to do, and why?
8. What qualitative factors would you consider in making an evaluation of the materiality of any misstatement of reserves by Pointer?
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9. Assume that your firm is organized in Louisiana and that the partners decide to give
Arnie a chance to explain his actions before the firm takes any action. Arnie points to
the language of the Louisiana’s Professional and Occupational Standards presented earlier
in this chapter and argues that he “did not place his own financial interests” nor the
financial interests of a third party “ahead of the legitimate financial interests of the client or the public” in a context when the public expected objectivity from him. In fact,
he argues that his conservative approach to reserves has “protected the public from
unanticipated future declines in earnings and/or collections.” How do you think the
MW&E partners should respond to this argument? Why? If you lived in Minnesota,
how would application of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, which appear
earlier in this chapter, affect the partners’ deliberations?

Suggested Readings
FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, includes a
discussion of qualitative factors the auditor must consider in making a materiality judgment.
AU section 312, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting and Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards), describes the auditor’s evaluation of quantitative factors that come to bear in making
a materiality judgment related to the financial statements as a whole and for particular items
of lesser amounts, as well as tolerable misstatement the auditor is willing to accept. SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 revisits many of the issues surrounding both quantitative
and qualitative factors that must be considered by an auditor when assessing materiality. SAB
No. 108 addresses the analysis of errors, regardless of whether your company uses the “iron
curtain” method or the rollover method in assessing materiality regarding the balance sheet
or income statement, respectively. FASB ASC 450 accrual requirements should also be consulted when an audit client establishes or modifies reserves in a material fashion.
Given the importance of reserves and the susceptibility of reserves to deliberate manipulation, it is all too easy for reporting companies to misstate financial results and violate GAAP
when temptation strikes. Readers may want to review paragraphs 61–67 of the complaint
filed by the SEC in the Xerox case (www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17465.htm)
to remind themselves of the inventive ways that management intent on manipulating earnings can do so by using reserves. The Xerox case shows that excess acquisition, corporate,
and vacation pay; FASB ASC 715, Compensation—Retirement Benefits; and even custom duty
reserves can be used to meet earnings expectations when management ignores GAAP and
engages in illegal and unethical behavior.
Readers should also review PCAOB Release No. 2011-008, dated December 20, 2011, for
a discussion of the PCAOB’s reproposed audit standard, Communications with Audit Committees, concerning required discussions with audit committees of critical accounting estimates,
the qualitative aspects of the client’s significant accounting policies and practices, and related
matters. The comment period for the reproposed standard expired on February 29, 2012,
and it is reasonable to assume the final standard will likely be adopted by the PCAOB in the
second or third quarter of 2012.
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Case 3—BAN&K Advisory
Services LLC—You Are the
Advisory Services Partner
Introduction
Because accountants are often called upon to assist their clients in an advisory role, the
purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the ethical dilemmas that can arise when audit and
advisory services are offered alongside each other. In these situations, the practitioner confronts threshold issues, such as independence impairments and the form of fees that can be
received, as well as after-the-fact issues, such as exposure to liability and damage to individual
and firm reputations. Clients who respect and value the practitioner’s opinion are generally
less concerned about these issues and more focused on closing their sale, financing, or other
transaction with the help of the practitioner. Unfortunately, a client’s lack of understanding
or sensitivity to the practitioner’s situation means that it falls to the practitioner to carefully
consider the land mines, both ethical and practical, that await in providing multiple services
that may impair independence.
It is important to keep in mind that fine distinctions among contingent fees, referral fees,
value-added fees, and commissions can place the practitioner in the uncomfortable position
of trying to defend a compensation arrangement that appears to be, or is, fundamentally
flawed. In the following case, ask yourself, How would you view the compensation arrangement if it were varied slightly (that is, would the arrangement appear more or less ethical if
the fees are characterized differently)? In addition, you should take this analysis one more
step and ask, notwithstanding appearances, if the practitioner should be involved at all with
the audit client in an arrangement of this nature. The lure of large fees can be a powerful
persuader, but it is important to remember that your professional reputation (and that of your
firm) rests as much on appearance as reality.

Focus Points
“It does not impair independence to reward a professional who excels in his or her performance,
or who exceeds reasonable expectations,” wrote Ray J. Groves, former chairman and CEO of
Ernst & Young, in testimony provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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Here are some relevant extracts from the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA
Code):
• Paragraph .05(a) of ET section 100-1, Conceptual Framework for AICPA Independence
Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards), requires a member to “identify and evaluate
threats, both individually and in the aggregate, because threats can have a cumulative
effect on a member’s independence.”
— If you are providing multiple nonattest services that would be permitted under
Interpretation 101-3 if the general requirements were met, you should still
assess if threats have grown to a point where you need to either not perform the
additional nonattest service or implement safeguards to reduce the threats to an
acceptable level.
• According to Rule 302, Contingent Fees (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 302
par. .01), “A member’s fees may vary depending, for example, on the complexity of
services rendered.”
• Interpretation No. 102-2, “Conflicts of Interest,” under Rule 102, Integrity and Objectivity (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 102 par. .03), states, “Certain professional
engagements, such as audits, reviews and other attest services, require independence.”
Independence impairments cannot be eliminated by disclosure and consent.
• A member who accepts a referral fee or permitted commission shall, according to
Rule 503, Commissions and Referral Fees (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 503
par. .01), “disclose that fact to any person or entity to whom the member recommends or refers a product or service to which the commission relates.”
Rule 302 provides as follows:
A member in public practice shall not
1. Perform for a contingent fee any professional services for, or receive such a fee from a
client for whom the member or the member’s firm performs,
a. an audit or review of a financial statement; or
b. a compilation of a financial statement when the member expects, or reasonably
might expect, that a third party will use the financial statement and the member’s
compilation report does not disclose a lack of independence; or
c. an examination of prospective financial information;
or
2. Prepare an original or amended tax return or claim for a tax refund for a contingent
fee for any client.
The prohibition in (1) applies during the period in which the member or member’s firm
is engaged to perform any of the services previously listed and the period covered by any
historical financial statements involved in any such listed services. Except as stated in the next
sentence, a contingent fee is a fee established for the performance of any service pursuant to an
arrangement in which no fee will be charged unless a specified finding or result is attained
or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise dependent upon the finding or result of such
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service. Solely for purposes of this rule, fees are not regarded as being contingent if fixed by
courts or other public authorities or, in tax matters, if determined based on the results of
judicial proceedings or the findings of governmental agencies.
A member’s fees may vary depending, for example, on the complexity of services rendered.
Avoid this pitfall: The AICPA Code prohibits members from permitting others to perform acts on behalf of the member that, if performed by the member, would result in the
member violating the AICPA Code. Accordingly, if a practitioner or firm is paid commissions from a third party who uses agents or resellers to actually make sales to an attest client,
the practitioner or firm will be considered to have violated the prohibition on receipt of
commissions if paid a commission for sales made by the third party or its agents.
Avoid this pitfall: Your spouse cannot receive a contingent fee for services provided to
an attest client unless two conditions are fulfilled: the activities of your spouse are separate
from your firm’s activities, and you are not significantly involved in your spouse’s activities.
Even if these conditions are met, Interpretation No. 102-2 states that the member must
consider whether a conflict of interest exists that requires you to evaluate how the arrangement would “be viewed by the client, employer, or other appropriate parties as impairing the
member’s objectivity.” Of course, the overriding factor is that you believe you can perform
the service with objectivity.

Regulatory Issues
One of the most significant recent independence cases was the February 28, 2011, settled
administrative (and cease and desist) proceeding brought by the SEC against KPMG Australia
(KPMG).This case involved three issues related to independence violations: (a) secondments
of staff to audit clients (secondments being an Australian term analogous to loaned staff engagements in the United States), (b) maintaining a direct business relationship with an audit client,
and (c) acting as an advocate for an audit client. KPMG settled this proceeding by agreeing to
pay $1.982 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $760,000 and agreeing to
an order of censure and to cease and desist from violations of Rule 2-02 of Regulation S-X
and Section 13(a), and Rule 13a-1 under, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
KPMG also agreed to the appointment of an independent consultant, not unacceptable to
the SEC staff, who was to review and report on KPMG’s quality controls and the adequacy
of its education and monitoring of personnel with respect to the independence requirements
concerning nonaudit services to, advocacy on behalf of, and business relationships with
SEC-registered audit clients.That review is to encompass compliance with Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) standards and SEC rules. Subject to a process for
resolution of disagreements, KPMG agreed it would adopt and implement all recommendations of the independent consultant.
The independence violations alleged by the SEC related to KPMG’s engagement as lead
auditor by two Australian companies identified by the SEC as company A and company
B. These companies had American depositary receipts or American depositary shares that
traded on the New York Stock Exchange from fiscal years 2001–04. As such, each company
was required to file annual reports on Form 20-F (the foreign private issuer counterpart to
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Form 10-K) with the SEC during this three-year period. Those filings are the source of the
SEC’s jurisdiction over KPMG.
What exactly did KPMG do to incur the SEC’s wrath?
• In 2001, KPMG allegedly implemented a business development drive that designated personnel to promote secondments.
• In 2001 and 2002, KPMG issued two Risk Alerts to all its professionals that noted
the SEC’s rules did not prohibit all secondments but only precluded acting as a
member of management while on secondment. The second Risk Alert introduced
several new policies concerning secondments, including preapproval of secondments
by lead audit engagement partners and other quality controls for nonaudit services
rendered to audit clients.
• In 2002, KPMG U.S. issued a Professional Practice Letter (PPL) that was distributed
to KPMG through KPMG International. That PPL specified how loaned staff engagements would preferably be structured as engagements under KPMG supervision but
noted that when loaned staff engagements not under KPMG supervision were necessary, those engagements should be subject to strict documentation, approval, scope
limitations, monitoring, and review processes and procedures. KPMG issued a Risk
Alert in 2002 to all professionals that repeated the preference for KPMG-supervised
engagements but that did not repeat the latter portion of the PPL guidance.
• During various times in 2001 and 2002, KPMG rendered at least 30 secondments to
company A and, from 2000–03, at least 20 secondments to company B that violated
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and the SEC’s independence rules.
These secondments involved, among other things
— the seconding of managers and assistant managers from KPMG who managed
or supervised company employees and, in one case, the seconding of a partner as
acting global IT audit manager that led to the partner reviewing internal audit
documentation that he himself had prepared.
— secondees preparing monthly reports.
— secondees providing guidance on accounting questions.
— implementing a general ledger system for company A.
— preparing financial statements for a subsidiary of company A.
— managing a portfolio of loan files, including appointing third-party advisers and
implementing strategies for loan recoveries.
— secondees having delegated credit authority in some cases.
— secondees being provided company B titles, business cards, and letterhead.
— certain secondees holding supervisory positions at company B.
From July 2000 to November 2005, KPMG received trailing commissions from an affiliate of company B for having recommended the affiliate’s products. Company B acquired
the affiliate in 2000. After an anonymous inquiry in 2005 about whether the payments had
impaired KPMG’s independence, KPMG returned to the company B affiliate all trailing
commission payments received from 2000–05.
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From March 2002 to March 2004, a legal practice then associated with a KPMG member
firm other than KPMG rendered litigation services to overseas subsidiaries of company B.
Company B’s audit engagement team noted the services and fees in a monthly chart of nonaudit services and fees prepared from 2002–04.
In determining KPMG violated the SEC’s independence standards, the order cited Rule
2-01 under Regulation S-X that prohibits (a) an accountant from acting as a manager or
employee for an audit client, (b) the maintenance of a direct or material indirect business
relationship of the accountant with an audit client, and (c) the accountant from acting as an
advocate for the audit client. The order also noted that each time KPMG signed an audit
report during the period in question, KPMG had violated Rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S-X
(which requires the report to state if the audit was made in accordance with GAAS and that
also included PCAOB standards in 2004 with respect to company B).
The order concluded that KPMG failed to adopt adequate quality controls to educate
and monitor personnel during the three-year period with respect to the SEC and PCAOB
independence standards and rules, citing the firm’s obligation to do so under paragraph .09
of QC section 20, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm’s Accounting and Auditing Practice
(AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Interim Standards) (“Policies and procedures
should be established to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that personnel maintain
independence [in fact and appearance] in all required circumstances.”). The order also noted
the provisions of paragraph .20 of QC section 20 that defines and outlines a firm’s monitoring activities, including obligations to perform ongoing evaluations of the adequacy, appropriateness, effectiveness, and compliance with firm policies and procedures.

Relevant Rules and Ethical Guidance
The SEC defined a contingent fee (consistent with Rule 302) in the final rule Revision of the
Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements as “any fee established for the performance of
any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no fee will be charged unless a specified
finding or result is attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise dependent upon
the finding or result of such service.”
Interestingly, in the proposed rule Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, the SEC cited value-added fees as another example of a contingent fee arrangement.
In the final rule Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, the SEC stated
that in response to comments on the proposed rule, it was deleting value-added fees from
the definition of contingent fees.
The SEC’s discussion in the final rule Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence
Requirements indicates that if a client, at the end of the engagement, determines
• the services are deserving of additional fees,
• there is no written or oral agreement for the additional fees to be paid, and
• in his or her sole discretion that the accountant provided services that have greater
value than the contracted amount,
then the accountant can be paid a value-added fee without impairing independence.
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The SEC noted that it would carefully scrutinize value-added fees to determine if such
fees were in fact disguised (and prohibited) contingent fees.
Interpretation No. 101-3, “Nonattest Services,” under Rule 101, Independence (AICPA,
Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .05), indicates that an accountant’s independence will
not be impaired if he or she “assists in developing corporate strategies, assists in identifying or
introducing the client to possible sources of capital that meet the client’s specifications or criteria, assists in analyzing the effects of proposed transactions … or participates in transaction
negotiations in an advisory capacity.” This description of services that would not impair an
accountant’s independence does not square completely with the SEC’s view of the impact of
the provision of services which are similar to those described in Interpretation 101-3. Consider in the final rule Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, in which
the SEC pointed out that independence would be impaired “by entering into preliminary
or other negotiations on behalf of an audit client, by promoting the client to potential buyers, or with respect to subsequent audits of a client if the accountant renders advice as to
whether, or at what price a transaction is entered into.”
The AICPA Code, the Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, and
state accountancy rules are generally consistent in their exclusion of certain fees from the
definition of contingent fees. These fees include those set by courts or other public authorities
or, in tax matters, those determined based on the results of judicial proceedings or findings
of government agencies. Interpretations of the AICPA Code make it clear that a contingent
fee is not appropriate if the accountant is merely called upon, for example, to claim a refund
for a client due to the inadvertent omission of a proper deduction from a return. Rather, the
accountant must have a reasonable expectation at the time the fee agreement is executed that
a substantive matter will be considered by the government agency.
In April 2004, the Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) of the AICPA asked
the PCAOB to address certain issues related to an audit firm’s receipt of contingent fees
for tax services. The SEC’s Chief Accountant, Don Nicolaisen, was copied on this correspondence and provided a response to PEEC on May 21, 2004. Without mentioning any
particular audit firm or client, Nicolaisen’s response appeared to relate to media reports that
a few audit firms previously provided tax advisory services to audit clients in exchange for
a fee based on a percentage of the taxes saved by the audit clients. The following are the key
points covered in Nicolaisen’s correspondence:
• In the Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements and Financial
Reporting Release (FRR) No. 56, 17-CFR-211-Subpart-A, the SEC noted that
fees fixed by courts or, in tax matters, that are based on results of judicial proceedings
or findings of governmental agencies are not contingent fees, as that term is defined.
• Interpretation No. 302-1, “Contingent Fees in Tax matters,” under Rule 302
(AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 302 par. .02), is to be narrowly construed (that
is, a fee based on the finding of government agencies is, in the SEC’s view, based on
the position that the fee is determined by a court or government agency acting in
the public interest, which does not create a mutual financial interest between the
auditor and client).
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• If an audit client and audit firm agree that the audit firm will get 30 percent of the
client’s tax savings based on the audit firm’s advice, even if a government agency
later challenges the tax savings, it is the audit client and audit firm that agreed on
the fee. This means the fee was not set by a government agency or court, so the
auditor’s independence has been impaired. In other words, this type of arrangement
creates an impermissible mutual financial interest between the audit client and
auditor.
• Nicolaisen’s correspondence noted that audit committees could not agree or even give
a wink and nod to any possible additional payment based on the results of an accounting firm’s tax or other services without impairing the audit firm’s independence. Also,
if the payment of a discretionary fee was delayed until after an event or information
came to the client’s attention indicating, directly or indirectly, that the fee was in any
way tied to the success of the advice or service provided by the accounting firm, then
the fee would be a prohibited contingent fee.
• As stated in the Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, valueadded fees are not contingent fees if the client determines at the end of the engagement that the services warrant an additional fee; there is no agreement, written or
otherwise, for the client to pay the additional fee; and the client determines in its
sole discretion at the end of the performance period that the services have greater
value than the amount due. All these factors must be present for the fee to meet the
definition of a value-added fee.
The position taken by the SEC makes it clear that audit firms and audit clients must take
extreme care to avoid having a value-added fee considered as an independence-impairing
contingent fee. Moreover, audit firms that rendered tax advice to public company audit clients are likely to face administrative sanctions if the SEC can demonstrate the audit firm’s
independence was impaired through receipt of fees based on a percentage of taxes saved by
the client. Even for nonpublic audit clients, accounting firms should very carefully consider
the independence implications of rendering tax and other services and the way in which any
additional fee is calculated or paid. The “trickle down” effect is bound to affect these types
of fee arrangements, however they are referred to, and caution is therefore advisable on the
part of both the audit client and accounting firm.

A Note Concerning When an Accounting Firm
Is Acting as a Broker-Dealer
In the final rule Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,
adopted in 2003, the SEC again reiterated the prohibition against accountants providing
merger and acquisition advisory services to audit clients but extended this line of thinking
one further step. In footnote 82, the staff noted that the “key determination required here
is a functional one (i.e., Is the accounting firm or its employee acting as a broker-dealer?).
The failure to register as a broker-dealer does not necessarily mean that the accounting firm
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is not a broker-dealer.” Among other ways a person can functionally be determined to be a
broker-dealer, in the same footnote, the staff noted
• “assisting an issuer to structure prospective securities transactions,”
• “helping an issuer to identify potential purchasers of securities,” and
• receipt of “transaction-related compensation”
can impair independence and also expose the accountant to liability for acting as an unregistered broker-dealer. These points are clearly important factors to consider in evaluating
both independence issues and those issues associated with the accounting firm or its affiliate
acting as a broker-dealer, regardless of whether it’s registered.

Recent Developments
In August 2011, PEEC adopted various revisions to ethics interpretations and rulings of
the AICPA Code that became effective on November 30, 2011, except as otherwise noted.
In addition to revising Interpretation No. 101-11, “Modified Application of Rule 101
for Engagements Performed in Accordance with Statements on Standards for Attestation
Engagements,” under Rule 101 (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .13), to clarify independence guidance when performing engagements under Statements on Standards
for Attestation Engagements (SSAEs) and agreed-upon procedures engagements performed
under SSAEs. PEEC also adopted new Interpretation No. 101-18, “Application of the Independence Rules to Affiliates,” under Rule 101 (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101
par. .20).
Interpretation No. 101-18 is effective for engagements covering periods beginning on
or after January 1, 2014, with early adoption permitted. Interpretation No. 101-18 provides
guidance on entities that should be considered affiliates of a financial statement attest client (FSAC) and, therefore, subject to the independence provisions of the AICPA Code.
An FSAC is defined in Interpretation No. 101-18 as an entity with audited, reviewed, or
compiled financial statements (when a compilation report does not disclose a lack of independence). An entity affiliated with an FSAC can be a company, corporation, subsidiary,
partnership, parent, or limited liability company, just to name a few examples. When control, controls, or controlled are used in Interpretation No. 101-18, those terms are as used in
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 810,
Consolidation, for commercial entities and FASB ASC 958-805-20 for not-for-profit entities.
Likewise, significant influence is as used in FASB ASC 323-10-15.
Interpretation No. 101-18 states the following should be considered affiliates of an FSAC:
• An entity an FSAC can control.
• An entity in which an FSAC or an entity controlled by the FSAC has a direct
financial interest that gives the FSAC significant influence over such entity and that
is material to the FSAC.
• An entity that controls an FSAC when the FSAC is material to such entity.
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• An entity with a direct financial interest in the FSAC when that entity has significant influence over the FSAC, and the interest in the FSAC is material to such
entity.
• A sister entity of an FSAC if the FSAC and sister entity are each material to the
entity that controls both.
• A trustee that is deemed to control a trust FSAC that is not an investment company.
• The sponsor of a single employer employee benefit plan FSAC.
• Any union or participating employer that has significant influence over a multiple or
multiemployer employee benefit plan FSAC.
• An employee benefit plan sponsored by either an FSAC or an entity controlled by
the FSAC. An FSAC that sponsors an employee benefit plan includes, but is not
limited to, a union whose members participate in the plan and participating employers of a multiple or multiemployer plan.
• An investment adviser, general partner, or trustee of an investment company FSAC
(fund) if the fund is material to the investment adviser general partner or trustee, and
they are deemed to have either control or significant influence over the fund. When
considering materiality, members should consider investments in, and fees received
from, the fund.
Interpretation No. 101-18 states that when a client is an FSAC, a member should apply the
independence provisions of the AICPA Code that apply to the client to the client’s affiliates,
with four exceptions:
1. A covered member may have a loan to or from an individual who is an officer, a
director, or a 10 percent or more owner of an affiliate of an FSAC unless the covered
member knows or has reason to believe the individual is in such a position with such
an affiliate. If the covered member knows or has reason to believe the individual is
an officer, a director, or a 10 percent or more owner of such an affiliate, the covered
member should evaluate the effect the relationship would have on the member’s independence by applying ET section 100-1, Conceptual Framework for AICPA Independence
Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards).
2. A member or his or her firm may provide prohibited nonattest services to entities
described under the third through last bullet points of the preceding paragraph, provided that it is reasonable to conclude that the services do not create a self-review
threat with respect to the FSAC because the results of the nonattest services will not
be subject to financial statement attest procedures. For any other threats that are created by the provision of the nonattest services that are not at an acceptable level (in
particular, those relating to management participation), such threats should be eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level by the application of safeguards.
3. A firm will only have to apply conditions (1)–(6) of Interpretation No. 101-2,
“Employment or Association With Attest Clients,” under Rule 101 (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .04), if the former employee, by virtue of his or her
employment at an entity described under the third through last bullet points in the
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preceding paragraph would put the employee in a key position with respect to the
FSAC. Individuals in a position to influence the attest engagement and on the attest
engagement team who are considering employment with an affiliate of an FSAC will
still need to report consideration of employment to an appropriate person in the firm
and remove themselves from the financial statement attest engagement, even if the
position with the affiliate is not a key position.
4. Immediate family members and close relatives of a covered member may be employed
in a key position at an entity described under the third through last bullet points of the
preceding paragraph, provided that the position does not put them in a key position
with respect to the FSAC.
A number of commentators noted that Interpretation No. 101-18 was much closer to
the SEC’s definitions and substantive treatment of affiliates contained in Rule 2-01(f)(4) of
Regulation S-X than to the International Federation of Accountants’ (IFA’s) International
Ethics Standards Board for Accountants’ Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (the IESBA
Code). This issue was raised in the context of how these differences may affect convergence
and globalization of ethical standards. For example, the IESBA Code applies its most stringent independence requirements only to audit and review engagements, and the IESBA
Code’s definition of an affiliate (which is based on direct or indirect control or a material
direct financial interest that provides the client or a subsidiary with significant influence over
the entity and is scoped to entities that are part of the group audit or review) is considerably
narrower than that in Interpretation No. 101-18.
Finally, Interpretation No. 101-18 states that a member must expend best efforts to obtain
the information necessary to identify the affiliates of the FSAC. If a member is unable to
obtain the information to determine which entities are affiliates of an FSAC after expending
best efforts, the member is required to
• discuss the matter, including the potential impact on independence, with those
charged with governance.
• document the results of that discussion and the efforts taken to obtain the
information.
• obtain written assurance from the FSAC that it is unable to provide the member
with the information necessary to identify the client’s affiliates.

Interpretation No. 101-17
Interpretation 101-17, “Networks and Network Firms,” under Rule 101 (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .19), became effective for engagements covering periods
beginning on or after July 1, 2011. The interpretation defines a network as firms that share
• a common brand name or initials within the firm name.
• common control (including firms controlled by a network firm or under common
control of a network firm and whether by ownership, management, contract, or
other means).
46

Chapter 3: Case 3—BAN&K Advisory Services LLC—You Are the Advisory Services Partner

• profits and costs (excluding the cost of operating the association and immaterial
costs).
• a common business strategy involving ongoing collaboration whereby firms are
responsible for implementation of, and accountable for, the common strategy.
• significant professional resources (broadly defined to include systems, partners, staff,
technical departments, audit manuals or methodologies, and training courses and
facilities).
• common quality control policies and procedures the firms are required to implement.
Interpretation No. 101-17 requires network firms to be independent of all other network
firms’ audit and review clients for which general use audit or review reports are issued. For
compilation clients, a network firm would be required to consider threats to independence
posed by other network firms’ relationships with the client and to apply safeguards to reduce
the threats to an acceptable level.
PEEC noted that Interpretation No. 101-17 is consistent with the IESBA Code and will
therefore further the AICPA’s objectives of harmonizing U.S. ethical standards with those
of the IFA. In this regard, ET Section 91.02(1) provides that auditors who comply with the
IESBA Code, whether as a member of a foreign engagement team working on a component
audit related to a group audit engagement or as a member of a foreign network firm, will
not be subject to discipline under the AICPA Code so long as he or she complied with the
ethics and independence requirements of the IESBA Code.
In the context of strategic alliances between accounting firms (or even, by extension,
between accounting firms and nonaccounting firms), Interpretation No. 101-17 demonstrates that independence must continue to be a primary focus of inquiry before client
representation commences. Although it is clear that an independence impairment due to a
network affiliation requires more than just a shared name association, it is equally clear that
the closer the economic and professional ties among firms, the greater the likelihood that
threats to independence may exist.

Relevant PCAOB Rules and Guidance
On April 22, 2008, the PCAOB adopted Rule 3526, Communication with Audit Committees
Concerning Independence (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Select Rules of the
Board), which was approved by the SEC on August 22, 2008.
PCAOB Rule 3526 requires auditors, prior to accepting an initial engagement, to discuss
with the audit committee any services the auditor has previously or is currently providing to
the issuer or a person in a financial reporting oversight role (FROR) that might be thought to
bear on independence.The rule requires the audit firm that is to be engaged to discuss with the
audit committee the potential effects of these relationships and to document those discussions.
The rule requires also that auditors annually describe in writing the relationships between
the audit firm and the issuer or FROR personnel that may reasonably bear on independence,
discuss the potential effects of those relationships and document those discussions, and affirm
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in writing that the audit firm is independent in accordance with PCAOB Rule 3520, Auditor
Independence (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Select Rules of the Board).
PCAOB Rule 3526 notes that the SEC’s final rule Revision of the Commission’s Auditor
Independence Requirements must be referenced when considering the relationships that could
reasonably bear on independence. That rule states that an accountant is not independent if
“the accountant is not, or a reasonable investor with knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances would conclude that the accountant is not, capable of exercising objective and
impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the accountant’s engagement.” As noted
in the rule, the SEC “looks in the first instance to whether a relationship or the provision
of service: (a) creates a mutual or conflicting interest between the accountant and the audit
client; (b) places the accountant in the position of auditing his or her own work; (c) results
in the accountant acting as management or an employee of the audit client; or (d) places the
accountant in a position of being an advocate for the audit client.”
The PCAOB earlier noted that auditors would also need to consider AU section 220, Independence (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Interim Standards), in determining
whether a particular relationship needs to be discussed with the audit committee. AU section 220 requires that “[i]n all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental
attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.”
In July 2005 and as amended in November 2005, the PCAOB adopted independence
rules related to, among other things, contingent fees. (See chapter 10, “Scrap Metal Aggregators, Inc.—You Are the Tax Return Preparer,” for additional information concerning ethics
and independence rules adopted simultaneously by the PCAOB related to tax services provided to audit clients.) The rules were approved by the SEC on April 19, 2006, and became
effective at various dates through April 30, 2007. In addition to adopting the SEC’s definition
of a contingent fee, as previously described (likewise subject to the exception for a fee fixed
by courts or other public authorities and not dependent on a finding or result), the PCAOB
first stated the basic premise underlying independence in Rule 3520: “A registered public
accounting firm and its associated persons must be independent of the firm’s audit client
throughout the audit and professional engagement period.”
PCAOB Rule 3521, Contingent Fees (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Select
Rules of the Board), states
A registered public accounting firm is not independent of its audit client if the
firm, or any affiliate of the firm, during the audit and professional engagement
period, provides any service or product to the audit client for a contingent fee or
a commission, or receives from the audit client, directly or indirectly, a contingent
fee or commission.

Note that the inclusion of “any affiliate” of the accounting firm encompasses parents, subsidiaries, departments, divisions, or associated entities of the accounting firm both inside and
outside the United States (a scope similar to that used by PEEC in Interpretation No. 10118).The adopting release, Ethics and Independence Rules Concerning Independence,Tax Services, and
Contingent Fees (AICPA, PCAOB Release No. 2005-014)(Ethics and Independence Release),
noted that a contingent fee includes any payment, service, or promise of other value for
services, taking into account any rights to reimbursements, refunds, or other repayments
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that could modify the amount received in a manner that makes it contingent on a finding
or result. The Ethics and Independence Release also stated that use of the term directly or
indirectly was meant to encompass the payment of a fee by any person that is contingent on
a finding or result attained by the audit client.
The Ethics and Independence Release specifically noted that the PCAOB was not including in PCAOB Rule 3521 the SEC’s exception for any fees “in tax matters, if determined
based on the results of judicial proceedings or the findings of governmental agencies.” As
previously noted, in the letter from Don Nicolaisen to PEEC, the PCAOB felt that the
“results of judicial proceedings or the findings of governmental agencies” language had been
given an overly expansive reading in the past and overlapped the language that permits “a
fee fixed by courts or other public authorities and not dependent on a finding or result.” In
effect, the PCAOB endorsed the SEC’s position that this exception would be given a narrow
interpretation both now and in the future.
The PCAOB indicated in the Ethics and Independence Release that it, like the SEC,
would monitor the payment of value-added fees by audit clients (specifically whether such
payments were in fact contingent fees) to evaluate whether additional rulemaking on this
topic would be necessary in the future.

Consequences
If a practitioner performs attest services during a time that his or her independence is
impaired with respect to a public company client, the SEC can bring a proceeding to suspend or permanently deny the accountant’s ability to practice before the SEC. Known as
a Rule 102(e) proceeding, the SEC only has to prove that the accountant has engaged in
improper professional conduct, meaning conduct that violates applicable professional standards constituting
• intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct;
• a single instance of highly unreasonable conduct in circumstances when the accountant knew, or should have known, that heightened scrutiny was warranted; or
• repeated instances of unreasonable conduct that indicate a lack of competence.
Although suspensions or bars are often the result of Rule 102(e) proceedings against individual accountants, the SEC also has the power to order a firm to engage an independent
consultant to review the firm’s practices, policies, and procedures for maintaining independence and preventing impairments. Once a review is completed, the SEC can order the firm
to implement the reasonable recommendations of the consultant and even order a subsequent follow-up review to ensure compliance has been achieved.This was among the penalties levied by the SEC in the KPMG action and was also featured in Release No. 34-41425.

Ethical Guides
Jerzy Lec Stanislaw, the Polish poet, wrote in More Unkempt Thoughts, “No snowflake in an
avalanche ever feels responsible.”
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Frank McKinney Hubbard, the American humorist, wrote in Hoss Sense and Nonsense,
“When a fellow says, ‘It hain’t the money, but th’ principle o’ the thing,’ it’s th’ money.”
C.S. Lewis, the Irish author, wrote in The Abolition of Man, “We laugh at honour and are
shocked to find traitors in our midst.”
Chuck Colson wrote in the March 2002 issue of Jubilee Extra, “Capitalism doesn’t work
without moral restraints.”
According to chapter 30-X-6-.05(5) of the Alabama State Board of Public Accountancy Administrative Code, “A person who is engaged in the practice of public accounting shall not concurrently engage in any business or occupation which would create a conflict of interest in
rendering professional services.”
According to Sec. 20-280-15a(d) of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, “The rules
of conduct are intended to have application to all kinds of professional services performed in
the practice of public accountancy, including tax and management advisory services, and to
apply as well to all licensees, whether or not engaged in the practice of public accountancy,
except where the wording of a rule clearly indicates that the applicability is more limited.”
According to Rule 401.02 of subchapter E, “Rules of Professional Conduct,” of the Idaho
Accountancy Rules,
Any licensee who directly or indirectly accepts or agrees to accept such form of
compensation [contingent fees] shall disclose the terms of such compensation to
the client. The disclosure must (a) Be in writing and be clear and conspicuous; (b)
State the amount of the compensation or the basis on which it will be computed
…; and (d) Be made prior to the time the licensee undertakes representation of or
performance of the service upon which a contingent fee will be charged.

Case Study Facts
BAN&K and Its History
Your firm has been serving clients in the greater Houston metroplex since 1992. Founded as
a diversified tax and audit services firm, it now boasts a lengthy list of private clients primarily from the transportation, oil and gas, and consumer goods industry. The firm developed a
national reputation for its oil and gas services but decided early on that it would not engage
in audits for public companies, even in the oil and gas arena. For many years, the firm was
focused on providing tax, audit, review, and compilation services to companies in the oil and
gas industry but found that the “boom and bust” cycles of the industry were often mirrored
in the firm’s workload and revenues. In an effort to diversify and offset some of this volatility, you and your partners decided some time ago to begin providing services that generated
income whichever way the market forces were driving demand for the firm’s services.
So, after giving this considerable thought and planning, in 2002, BAN&K opened BAN&K
Advisory Services LLC (Advisory Services) and staffed this new pass-through entity (owned
100 percent by BAN&K) with several well-qualified partners and staff people with expertise
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in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), financing of business purchases, due diligence, and valuations. Advisory Services was registered as a so-called “$25,000 broker-dealer” with the SEC at
the time of its formation and was a nearly instant hit, with a fast-expanding roster of new and
existing nonaudit clients, many of which sought counsel from Advisory Services when their
own audit firms were conflicted out or when the fees charged by the largest firms became
unbearable.With Advisory Services’ gross margins exceeding 50 percent and comprising over
20 percent of the combined service revenues of BAN&K, Advisory Services contributed
significantly to the panoply of services offered by BAN&K. In November 2011, the managing partner of Advisory Services finished her rotation in this position, and you were asked to
assume that role in December 2011. Happy to be given a great opportunity to expand your
investment banking knowledge and capitalize on the MBA you received after securing your
CPA designation, you agree to a 2-year stint as partner in charge of Advisory Services.
Shortly after assuming this position, you receive a call from one of your audit partners
in BAN&K’s attest services division asking if you have time to meet with her and a client
interested in selling his private business. The business is a well-regarded oil field services
firm, OGAnalyx, that provides land- and marine-based surveys and analyses of seismic data
collected using special geophones that are proprietary to OGAnalyx. Unlike typical geophones, the Big Ear digital geophones used by OGAnalyx receive audio signals over a broad
spectrum digital wavelength, thus delivering seismic data that is considerably more accurate
in pinpointing deposits of recoverable oil and gas. As the president of OGAnalyx, Martin
Lancet, is currently meeting with your partner in the conference room, you readily agree to
join them and discuss how Advisory Services might help OGAnalyx.
You are greeted as you enter the conference room by your partner, Evelyn Steel, who then
introduces you to Lancet. Lancet does not rise to greet you, but this is clearly not meant as a
slight because it is obvious to you that he is in the grip of a serious disease.Your conversation
begins on a lighter note but shortly turns to the future of OGAnalyx.
Addressing you, Lancet gets to the point. “Mr. Bradshaw, I’ve been a customer of BAN&K
since 1993, probably one of the first customers of the firm, tell ya the truth,” Lancet explains
with a pronounced Southern drawl. “I’ve always been treated real good by y’all and I trust ya,
which is more than I can say for some of them financial hustlers I’ve run into over the years.
I’ll let Evelyn fill you in on the details of our business, but here’s the bottom line: I’ve about
run out my string here on earth, and the Good Lord has seen fit to give me a short window
to get my affairs in order before I take that long elevator ride to the sky.Time’s runnin’ short,
shall we say.” Lancet chuckles, but the look on his face is a mixture of fear and uncertainty.
You nod understandingly, aware that the pallor of his skin is a good indication that time is
indeed short. “Mr. Lancet, we here at BAN&K will be glad to do everything we can to help
you sell OGAnalyx in quick order, and our Advisory Services people are tops in identifying possible buyers, helping you structure the sale to minimize your tax consequences, and
protecting your estate’s assets.”
“Well, that’s real nice n’all, but I’ve already got a buyer lined up, and all I really need y’all to
do is to walk them through those fancy financials y’all send me every year, help ’em understand all the stuff in our files, and get them to close within 30 days or so,” Lancet replies.
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At this point, Evelyn slides a copy of the OGAnalyx financial statements across the table
to you, and there is a pause as you scan the income statements. “OGAnalyx has generated
EBITDA topping $14 million in the last 2 years and net after tax of about $10 million,” she
explains. “With no debt, a 30-year operating history, and a solid core of land and marine
clients, a company like this should command a 5 times multiple of EBITDA in a sale transaction, don’t you agree?”Your quick appraisal of the income statements and Evelyn’s highlights
have you convinced that Lancet may talk like one of the Beverly Hillbillies, but he is obviously a very skilled operator in the oil patch. Lancet seems to be carefully observing you as
you reply.
I think that’s a good assumption, Evelyn, but of course, the big variable is how such
a company will do in the absence of the founder. If he is key to the marketing
because of his relationships in the industry, a potential buyer may be unwilling to
pay a premium price. Also, if the founder wants an all-cash transaction and isn’t
eager to carry back a part of the purchase price, a buyer might want to pay closer
to 3 or 3½ times EBITDA.

Avoid this pitfall: Although early in discussions with this client, the general reference
to pricing of a possible transaction could, in a strict interpretation, impair the audit firm’s
independence with respect to subsequent audits. The question, of course, is, How would the
partners and third parties interpret this statement (that is, was this statement advice about
the price a transaction might be entered into, or was it general advice more in the nature of
analyzing the effect of a possible transaction)? Although the position that this conversation
did not impair independence is certainly defensible, it may have been better to use other
transactions to demonstrate to Lancet the price other companies received, and let him draw
his own conclusions.
*****
“Mr. Bradshaw, I like your thinkin’,” Lancet interjected. “I’m due to meet with the boys
from CapSource Energy tomorrow mornin’, and that price is just a teensy bit higher than
the neighborhood they been talkin’ about. I’d be obliged if you’d come with me to that sitdown and help me work those boys over.” Lancet waved his hands expansively as he continued. “Heck, I’d be happy as a pig in slop to even give you all a bonus based on reaching that
magic 3½ times EBITDA if ’n you’d help me git there. Those cattle rustlers from CapSource
Energy won’t have a chance aginst us, you watch!”
Before you can reply, Evelyn breaks in. “Mr. Lancet, I need to spend some time with Mr.
Bradshaw before our firm can make a commitment to get involved on that basis,” she states
assertively. Turning to you, she cautions, “We’ve been auditing OGAnalyx’s statements for
about 10 years now, and we’ll need to visit about the independence issue and the degree to
which we can get involved.”
You nod your understanding, at which point Lancet rises and begins to head for the door
of the conference room. “Now, Evelyn, y’all give me that speech about bein’ independent
and all, and like I tol’ you before, we’all got our independence on July 4. I’d be mighty disappointed if Mr. Bradshaw here couldn’t lend me a hand, so I can go out a winner, ya’ know?”
With that, Lancet slowly departs, and you and Evelyn return to your chairs, knowing that
Lancet’s cavalier approach to independence is about as far from your reality as it could get.
52

Chapter 3: Case 3—BAN&K Advisory Services LLC—You Are the Advisory Services Partner

“Evelyn,” you begin
I know OGAnalyx has been a good audit client of the firm for years, and we don’t
want to lose it, but if CapSource Energy does buy it, you know the Reloitte firm is
going to take over the audit. If we are going to lose OGAnalyx anyway, perhaps we
ought to make a calculated business decision to accept our fate. On the other hand,
what happens if CapSource Energy doesn’t complete the buy? This could leave us
having impaired our independence and without any future with OGAnalyx.

Evelyn nodded her assent.
Yeah, and that’s not the worst of it. You see, Martin has had OGAnalyx on the
block 2 or 3 times over the last 5 years, always informally, of course. He’s been so
married to that business that he couldn’t bring himself to part with it, even at 4½
times EBITDA. He is also one tough son of a gun; he had cancer 4 years ago, and
the doctors gave him 6 months, but he’s still here. If he were to go tomorrow, his
son has worked in the business for approximately 12 years now and could take over,
meaning we would stay on as auditors.We’ve got a great working relationship with
his son, and he isn’t the one who wants to sell. The problem is that Martin doesn’t
think his son is up to running the company, and he’s the decision maker.

“So, what you’re saying, Evelyn, is that ‘maybe’ we stand to lose a client, ‘maybe’ not lose
one, and whatever we do with Martin at this point will or may dictate the result before we
know all the facts.”
You pause, thinking about the alternatives, as Evelyn replies. “Do you think we can get
10 or 15 angels to dance on the head of this pin and still have a client if OGAnalyx is not
sold? You know, the SEC tinkered with the independence rule to clarify the circumstances
under which investment banking services can be rendered to an audit client. Does that help
us at all?”
You shake your head. “Unfortunately, no. If anything, the clarification made our case more
difficult because advisory services in M&A and the receipt of transaction-related compensation put us squarely in the middle of an independence impairment.”
Avoid this pitfall: When you are faced with a client such as Lancet who does not appreciate the independence rules and the consequences you and the firm may be subjected to by
being too involved in a merger negotiation, it may be better to make a definitive choice early
in the process to avoid the almost inevitable result: your firm’s independence is impaired by
client actions outside your control. Although this may be the desired result if the audit client
is bound and determined to sell, the making of a conscious choice eliminates the likelihood
that your firm ends up in an independence quagmire from which you may not easily escape.
*****
After you and Evelyn ponder a few more minutes, you agree to meet up in the morning
and talk with the partner who is nominally considered in charge of independence and client
management issues, Ira Baskin. Ira is viewed by everyone at BAN&K as a wise old sage who
has seen many battles over the years and whose opinion is widely respected, but he is also a
progressive thinker who was not opposed to the creation of Advisory Services.
When you meet with Ira the next morning, he thoughtfully considers your plight and
offers a few suggestions. “First, is there any chance you could tell Martin to reward us after
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the fact if he is so inclined, and could you tailor our agreement with Martin to take that into
account?”
“Yes, I think I could,” you reply.
But here is where we could run into trouble. I can see Martin drawing me into
the negotiations, particularly with CapSource Energy, and basically causing me to
defend the valuation he wants to get. Even worse, I could see him asking for advice
about if he should agree to the last offer CapSource Energy makes or if I think he
should hold out for a better deal. He is not likely to be the most understanding
client when I tell him I can only participate in negotiations in an advisory capacity.

Shaking her head, Evelyn said, “The problem, Ira, is that Martin is unpredictable, and I
think Ken is right. We could have our independence impaired before we know it. On the
other hand, Martin is also an incredibly generous guy and would probably agree to pay us an
above-market advisory fee if we asked for it.”
“Which would,” Ira continued for Evelyn, “leave us in a position of having lost our independence and our audit client if OGAnalyx is not sold, which takes us right back to my first
question,” Ira said.
When it’s decision time in a situation like this, I always put myself in the shoes of
two people: someone working in enforcement at the SEC and my old Aunt Rose.
First, I ask myself how it would look to me if I was working at the SEC, and I
reviewed the facts of this situation in a complaint filed by Martin or someone else,
maybe his son.Then, I kind of take the approach to the situation that Warren Buffet
said he took when he wrote in plain English.You remember what he said? I think
it was something like, “I just act like I’m writing that 10-K for my two sisters to
read, Bertie and Dottie.” So, I just think about how my Aunt Rose would react if
I told her the facts, and if she would say it smelled like rotten eggs, I knew I had
my answer.

You and Evelyn laugh at that homespun piece of wisdom, knowing you still do not have
an answer. “Does this mean you aren’t prepared to give us an answer, Ira?” you ask.
Ira looks at both of you and replies, “Well, I’ve got an answer, but my guess is that you
two are knowledgeable and professional enough to have one of your own.Why don’t you all
come and share it with me when you decide?”
With that, Ira shoos you and Evelyn out of his office with instructions to come back with
your decision. “So much for consulting the oracle,” Evelyn says with a wry smile as she heads
back to your office. “Now what?”

Questions for Consideration
1. Assume that Lancet calls you the next morning, and you agree to attend the meeting
with CapSource Energy in a purely advisory capacity. During this meeting, Lancet
distributes a listing of sale transactions for companies comparable to OGAnalyx to the
meeting participants. At the bottom of this sheet, Lancet has put his handwritten notes
that come directly from your best guess (that you gave him right before the meeting)
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of what OGAnalyx should sell for. In your opinion, has BAN&K’s independence been
impaired?
a. Yes, the inclusion of the information I passed to Lancet is tantamount to advice
regarding what price the transaction will be entered into, and it impairs BAN&K’s
independence.
b. No, the notes constitute an analysis of the effects of a proposed transaction, and as
long as I didn’t render advice beyond the guess of what OGAnalyx should sell for,
the firm’s independence is not impaired.
c. No, because the advice I passed to Lancet was oral, not written, and did not amount
to advice about the transaction price.
d. No, I don’t believe the firm’s independence was impaired, but for the sake of being
conservative and protecting the firm, I would notify my partners that I felt our
independence had been impaired.
2. You and Evelyn conclude the next morning that you are going to tell Lancet that
the firm cannot ask for or receive any excess compensation tied to the sale price of
OGAnalyx but that Lancet is free to reward the firm in his discretion if the sale takes
place. Lancet’s response is to say that he is going to pay BAN&K 3 percent of the sale
price over $38 million as a value-added fee, but he states he understands that he can’t
put that in writing and won’t for your sake. Is this arrangement a prohibited contingent fee?
a. No, as stated by Lancet, he intends to pay the fee for the additional value that
BAN&K is creating for Lancet, who is not personally a client of BAN&K, so it
does not meet the definition of a contingent fee.
b. As long as the fee is only in an oral agreement, it is not enforceable and, therefore,
is not a prohibited contingent fee arrangement.
c. No, the fee has been specifically described by Lancet as a value-added fee, so it does
not rise to the level of being a prohibited contingent fee.
d. Yes, the proposed arrangement is a prohibited contingent fee.
3. Assume the same facts in question 2 and that the transaction is going to close tomorrow, with CapSource Energy paying a purchase price of $42 million. You have just
received a draft of the closing instructions that include a line item entitled “M&A Fee
to BAN&K—$120,000.”You contact Lancet’s counsel, and he informs you the fee was
added into the closing instructions at Lancet’s instruction. You
a. instruct the attorney to remove this reference and the dollar figure from the closing instructions and call Lancet to advise him that BAN&K cannot accept this fee.
b. send an e-mail to your partners describing the generosity of Lancet in rewarding
the firm and his success in selling his business.
c. instruct the attorney to remove the reference to “M&A Fee” and replace this with
a reference to “Audit and Advisory Services.”
d. contact Lancet and indicate the firm cannot accept this fee but would be extremely
pleased if BAN&K was paid $100,000 at closing.
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4. Assume that BAN&K and OGAnalyx were both headquartered in Birmingham, AL,
rather than Houston, TX. Under the Alabama State Board of Public Accountancy Administrative Code referenced earlier in this chapter, could BAN&K provide purely advisory
services at its customary hourly rates to Lancet at the same time it was auditing OGAnalyx’s financial statements?
a. Yes, because the audit would certainly be completed before the sale transaction
closed, which means the services are not rendered concurrently.
b. Yes, because no conflict of interest would exist so long as BAN&K did not accept
a contingent fee.
c. No, providing advisory services concurrently would create a conflict with the
audit services being offered.
d. Yes, because maximizing the client’s sale price would not create a conflict with
attest services.
5. Assume that BAN&K is rendering its services from its offices in Boise, ID. Under
Rule 401.02 of subchapter E, “Rules of Professional Conduct,” of the Idaho Accountancy Rules referenced earlier in this chapter, could BAN&K accept a contingent fee
to assist in the sale of OGAnalyx without compromising its independence, as long
as the fee was agreed to in advance of the sale, and the other conditions of the Rule
401.02 were satisfied?
a. Yes, BAN&K could accept the contingent fee.
b. No, the contingent fee could not be accepted.
6. If BAN&K was a public accounting firm registered with the PCAOB, could BAN&K
accept a contingent fee to assist in the sale of OGAnalyx without compromising its
independence?
a. Yes, BAN&K could accept a contingent fee.
b. No, a contingent fee could not be accepted.
7. Assume that OGAnalyx had an ownership interest in an oil and gas drilling contractor. Which of the following interests would not cause the oil and gas drilling
contractor to be deemed an affiliate of OGAnalyx for independence purposes under
Interpretation No. 101-18?
a. OGAnalyx has a contract right to appoint a majority of the board of directors of
the contractor.
b. The contractor is controlled by Lancet.
c. The interest held by OGAnalyx is 16 percent of the common stock of the contractor, and the remaining interest is controlled by another exploration company.
d. OGAnalyx and the contractor have multiple intercompany transactions, and the
contractor depends on the Big Ear digital geophones made by OGAnalyx to find
oil and gas deposits.
8. Assume that discussions with CapSource Energy did not work out, and Lancet asked
you to send a letter out to other prospective buyers describing OGAnalyx on a no56
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name basis. In your view, has BAN&K’s independence been impaired as a result of
sending this correspondence? Would your answer change if the letter named OGAnalyx? Would your answer change if BAN&K was only to receive its customary hourly
rates for these services?
9. Assume for a moment that Lancet had a change of heart and asked you to tell him
the circumstances under which he could pay BAN&K something in the nature of a
bonus for your services in the proposed sale. What are the key points you would want
to convey to him when describing what BAN&K could accept?
10. Let us assume that Lancet came to you the day after your meeting and made the following statement to you: “Mr. Bradshaw, I guess I understand that BAN&K has to be
independent from us to audit our books. Can you just explain to me, ’cause I’m a little
confused, why y’all can’t accept a commission without being dependent?” (Hint: Try
to cite to him some of the reasons that contingent compensation conflicts with your
independence.)

Suggested Readings
The AICPA and each state have rules of professional conduct that have generally similar
provisions on the offer or performance of nonaudit services for contingent fees, although, as
we have seen, some state provisions vary from the prescriptions mandated by the SEC or the
AICPA. Some states publish interpretive advice or the results of disciplinary hearings that
can illuminate specific fee-related issues.
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Case 4—Forensic Review
Services LLC—You Are the
Forensic Investigator
Introduction
This case study finds you in an entirely different situation from that described in the prior
two chapters in which you were a partner with an audit firm. In the situation at hand, you
have now been contacted by a private company’s counsel who engages you for the purpose
of assisting in an internal investigation. The private company is one that is being positioned
for a public offering or sale in the near future, thus providing a liquidity event for the two
venture capital firms that have provided a significant part of the company’s funding to date.
Your engagement relates to a forensic review of certain accounting matters that have come
to the attention of the board and an evaluation of audit procedures employed by the independent accounting firm that now audits the company’s books. There is also a question of
whether a restatement of the prior years’ audited financial statements may be required as a
result of your analysis and the case study facts.
According to a study issued by Audit Analytics in May 2011, 2010 Financial Restatements—
A Ten Year Comparison, restatements of financial statements increased 7.6 percent to 735
restatements in 2010, up from 683 in 2009. However, restatements peaked at 1,284 in 2006,
and the 2010 number is the fewest since 2001. The largest increase in 2010 restatements was
attributable to U.S. nonaccelerated filers: a 10.1 percent increase to 424 restatements in 2010.
The Audit Analytics study found that the top five accounting issues implicated in 2010
restatements were
•
•
•
•
•

debt, quasidebt, warrants, and equity (beneficial conversion feature) security issues.
expense (payroll; selling, general and administrative; and other) recording issues.
liabilities, payables, reserves, and accrual estimate failures.
deferred, stock-based, or executive compensation issues.
revenue recognition.

The study found that the number one issue implicated in 2010 restatements—accounting
for debt, quasidebt, warrants, and equity (beneficial conversion feature)—increased 34 percent
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from the number of 2009 restatements and represented a major portion of the increase in
total restatements from 2009–10. The difficulties of complying with Financial Accounting
Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification 815-40, which became effective on January
1, 2009, is believed to have contributed to the number of debt- and warrant-related 2010
restatements. The study also found that 2010 restatements comprised 62.3 percent annual
restatements and 37.7 percent quarterly restatements.The quarterly restatements have generally increased each year since reaching their 10-year bottom of 19.7 percent of total restatements in 2005.
Interestingly, Audit Analytics found that 2010 restatements comprised 193 negative restatements and 46 positive restatements, with the negative restatements reducing net income by
an aggregate (total) of $1.897 billion for companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ.The positive restatements resulted in a cumulative increase in aggregate net income for listed companies of approximately $479 million.
To put this figure in context, the 2010 positive restatements nearly equaled the dollar value
of the positive restatements for 2009 and 2008 combined.The average number of accounting
issues per restatement continued a declining trend since 2005’s 2.44 issues, having reached a
10-year low of 1.48 issues in 2010. As might be expected, the decline in the number of issues
triggering a restatement led to a further decline in the average number of days to file the
restatement, which dropped to a 10-year low of 4.95 days in 2010.
According to the article “Crisis of Ethics” in the June 2002 issue of CFO magazine that
covered the May 2002 Business Ethics Conference sponsored by the Conference Board,
100 senior ethics executives polled about Enron cited management’s ethical lapses as the
single greatest reason for that company’s collapse, followed in order by Arthur Andersen, the
lawyers, analysts, and regulators. According to Steve Priest of the Ethical Leadership Group,
“These findings show that an absence of ethical leadership and a culture of ‘anything goes as
long as it makes a buck’ will prevail over even the best training, code of conduct or hotline.
This emphasizes the critical importance of building integrity into the essence of the corporation.”

Focus Points
The 2011 National Business Ethics Survey, a national biyearly survey, revealed some interesting
findings concerning ethics in business, including the following:
• Of the employees who witnessed misconduct, 65 percent reported it, a record high
and far above the record low of 53 percent in 2005.
• Forty-two percent of employees said their company has increased efforts to raise
awareness about ethics.
• Twenty-two percent of employees who reported misconduct say they experienced
some form of retaliation as a result, a significant rise from 12 percent in 2007 and 15
percent in 2009.
• Thirteen percent of employees perceived pressure to compromise standards to do
their jobs, near the all-time high of 14 percent in 2000.
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• It seems that employees who are active social networkers are much more likely to
be subject to pressure to make ethical compromises and to be the subject of retaliation than employees who are less or not active in social networking, and these active
social networkers are also much more likely to tolerate ethically questionable behaviors (for example, it is acceptable to perform a little less work if pay or benefits are
cut, and it’s acceptable to use a company credit card to buy personal items, as long as
the money is repaid).
• Thirty-four percent of employees reported that their managers do not display ethical
behavior, the highest percentage ever.
• Forty-two percent of employees said their company has a weak or weak-leaning
ethics culture, a significant increase from 35 percent in 2009 and the highest level
since 2000.
The survey’s findings were described by the Ethics Resource Center as showing lower
levels of misconduct and higher levels of reporting than historical norms but also presenting
a number of warning signs about the future. Summing these up, the survey stated, “As the
economy gets better—and companies and employees become more optimistic about their
financial futures—it seems likely that misconduct will rise and reporting will drop, mirroring the growth in pressure and retaliation that have already taken place and conforming to
historic patterns.”
The creation of a strong value system in an organization is the foundation for ethical
behavior by all employees. As stated in paragraph .86 of AU section 316, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards), “Directors and officers of
corporations set the ‘tone at the top’ for ethical behavior within any organization.” Although
having a code of conduct is considered to be part and parcel of the ethical makeup of a corporation, codes of conduct and ethical standards carry little meaning if the tone at the top
is that anything (or everything) goes. AU section 316 points out that management’s ability
to circumvent or override internal controls is in inverse proportion to strong oversight of
senior executives by the board or audit committee and a top management’s commitment to
ethical values, financial reporting, and risk management.

Supporting Lavish Lifestyles: Small Town
Financial Officer and Large Company
Management Team Lose Their Moral Compasses
One of the recurring themes in financial fraud investigations is the desire of management
or principal shareholders to continue a lifestyle to which they have become accustomed.
Consider the following examples of management self-dealing:
• On April 17, 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that FBI agents
had arrested Rita A. Crundwell, 58, of Dixon, IL, for defrauding the City of Dixon
of $3.2 million in public funds since September 2011, as well as a total of over
$30 million since 2006. Crundwell had served as the Dixon comptroller since the
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early 1980s and was paid a salary of $80,000 annually at the time of her arrest. She
was also a significant presence in the quarter horse industry, described as a leading
breeder and exhibitor who owned hundreds of quarter horses stabled at ranches near
Riverside, CA, and in Beloit, IL. When the local citizenry spoke of Crundwell after
the arrest, most expressed disbelief, and when asked about why her lifestyle hadn’t
drawn attention, several citizens said they thought her money had come from being
a champion horse breeder and exhibitor.
• The DOJ alleged that the funds taken by Crundwell were used for, among other
things
— operating expenses of her horse farm.
— a top-of-the-line motor home at a cost of $2.1 million.
— seven trucks, trailers, and pickup trucks at a cost of over $500,000.
— payments of over $2.5 million on her personal American Express credit card
between January 2007 and March 2012, including more than $339,000 for
jewelry.
Crundwell has been charged with one count of wire fraud that carries a maximum penalty of 20 years and a $250,000 fine or an alternate fine of at least twice
the loss or twice the gain, whichever is greater. Given the amount of alleged misappropriation of city funds, it is likely that additional charges will be added to the
complaint as further evidence is developed by the FBI.
As frauds go, Crundwell’s appears to have been relatively simple, at least more
recently. The city maintains numerous bank accounts, including a capital development fund (CDF) account. From September 2011 to February 2012, approximately $2.8 million was electronically transferred into a city account that, in turn,
Crundwell eventually transferred to the CDF account. Checks were then written by
Crundwell from the CDF account to another city account that listed the city and
RSCDA as joint account holders. Checks written on this account list the account
holder as RSCDA, c/o Rita Crundwell. During the period from September 2011 to
February 2012, Crundwell wrote checks and made online withdrawals of $3.2 million from this account.
How was the fraud discovered? Again, in a fairly common way. When Crundwell
took an extended unpaid vacation for 12 weeks in 2011, the city employee who was
her replacement requested all the city’s bank statements and discovered an unknown
bank account. The employee brought the records of the account to the mayor’s
attention, who noted that withdrawals from the account did not appear to relate to
city business, and the checks written on the account listed RSCDA as the account
holder. The mayor took his concerns to the FBI. The FBI investigated the account
and then expanded its investigation right up to the time of Crundwell’s arrest.
As far as the city and its residents were concerned, the city had been under budget
pressures due to declining tax collections and state cutbacks or delays in municipal
aid, but the city of 16,000 had coped by closing the municipal pool and eliminating
raises for city employees for the past 3 years.

62

Chapter 4: Case 4—Forensic Review Services LLC—You Are the Forensic Investigator

The auditor for the city’s financial statements during at least the most recent year
was a solo practitioner from Sterling, IL. The city apparently used the services of
a national firm to prepare for the audit. The audited financial statements received
unqualified opinions in the years in question. At a town hall meeting on April 18,
the mayor was quoted replying to a question about the annual audit as follows: “The
results year after year disclosed no instances of noncompliance or other matters
required to be reported under government auditing standards.” The mayor was also
quoted as saying “the city got an annual audit by two independent certified accounting firms. One double-checked the information and found nothing,” and that he
was “frustrated the city spent half a million dollars a year for those audits while the
city was losing more money [to Crundwell].”
• In what sounds like a larger reprise of the City of Dixon’s fraud, the founder and
former CEO of DHB Industries (DHB), David H. Brooks, and the former COO of
DHB, Sandra Hatfield, were convicted on September 14, 2010, on charges of insider
trading, fraud, securities fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and obstruction of justice. Brooks was also found guilty of lying to the company’s auditors, for a
total of 17 guilty counts. Brooks has been in custody since January 2010 after his bail
was revoked when the government advised the trial judge that Brooks had concealed millions of dollars in San Marino, Italy, and London, England.
DHB was a public company manufacturer of body armor sold to the military
and police forces and was used as something of a personal piggybank by Brooks to,
among other things, fund his thoroughbred horseracing business. The defendants
were alleged to have generated almost $200 million in illicit proceeds from the fraud
that was executed through four primary methods:
— Paying a supplier, Tactical Armor Products (TAP), over $10 million for obsolete body armor plates. The supplier was alleged to be independently owned by
Brooks’s wife but was actually controlled by Brooks. To conceal this, Brooks created fraudulent multimillion dollar transactions and altered internal DHB documents. More than $16 million was funneled through TAP in this fashion and was
used to pay for Brooks’s horseracing business, jewelry, and investments.
— To increase DHB’s net income, Brooks and Hatfield falsely inflated the value of
DHB’s existing inventory, added nonexistent inventory to the company’s books,
and fraudulently reclassified expenses. Hatfield falsely increased DHB’s inventory
by $7 million in 2004, and both defendants fraudulently added more than $7 million of nonexistent inventory to DHB’s books in 2005’s first quarter. Brooks and
Hatfield also caused inventory of the main body armor product to be overvalued
by more than $7 million in 2003 and more than $7 million in 2004.
— Brooks and Hatfield submitted false reports to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) during an investigation of DHB’s executive compensation
and related-party transactions in 2003, and Brooks lied to DHB’s independent
auditors about the inventory inflation fraud. When the auditors attempted to
examine phony inventory, Brooks claimed it had been destroyed in a hurricane.
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— In November 2004, after DHB filed its Form 10-Q with the SEC and sent shareholders a third quarter report that contained many of the misrepresentations and
omissions previously described (reported operating income of $13 million for the
quarter and over $37 million for the 9 months then ended), Brooks and Hatfield
sold more than $72 million of their DHB stock. In December 2004, they sold
shares worth an additional $118 million, bringing Brooks more than $185 million
and Hatfield more than $5 million.
Among other things, Brooks is alleged to have used his ill-gotten gains to buy a
Bentley and Ferrari; many racehorses; artwork; jewelry; plastic surgery; the hiring of
prostitutes and setup of brothel tents at parties; and a $100,000 belt buckle; to pay
for his mother’s grave; to pay camp tuition for his children; to fund the $40,000 cost
of leather-bound invitations to his daughter’s bat mitzvah (at which rapper 50 Cent
and Aerosmith performed, also paid by the company); and to pay for vacations to St.
Barts and St. Tropez. Brooks and Hatfield face up to 25 years in prison, and in the
meantime, Brooks is also to be tried on tax evasion and contempt of court, and the
fraud case is continuing by the government seeking the forfeiture of Brooks’s assets.
On August 10, 2011, Brooks pled guilty to three tax-related counts in the separate
tax case. He has not yet been sentenced in the fraud case or tax-related case, and
his counsel stated that Brooks is now focusing on fighting the forfeiture action and
seeking a new trial based on allegations that Brooks was incompetent for a significant part of the fraud trial due to the medication he was then taking.

Latest Developments: In an Unusual Twist, The SEC Targets DHB’s
Audit Committee
On February 28, 2011, the SEC filed a complaint against Jerome Krantz, Cary Chasin, and
Gary Nadelman, the three outside directors who comprised DHB’s audit and compensation
committees during the years when the fraud at DHB was committed by Brooks, Hatfield,
and the then-CFO (who also is yet to be sentenced but who agreed to cooperate with the
government and was the star witness against Brooks and Hatfield). The SEC alleged that
Krantz, Chasin, and Nadelman were willfully blind to numerous red flags signaling fraud
and, among other things, ignored the obvious and merely rubber-stamped the decisions of
senior management while making substantial sums from sales of DHB’s securities. The SEC
further alleged that DHB’s lack of internal controls and the failure of the audit committee
to discharge its duties led directly to the filing of false and misleading public filings by DHB
with the SEC.
The SEC’s filing of this action against the audit committee was unusual as enforcement
cases go, and the directors did not agree to settle with the SEC at the time of the filing of
the action. Generally speaking, independent directors (although fiduciaries) are not named in
SEC enforcement actions because their duties do not rise to the level of those imposed on
executive officers—the customary defendants. However, in the case of DHB’s audit committee, the SEC went to great lengths to outline a broad spectrum of red flags that were ignored
by these directors, which had the effect of facilitating the continuance of the fraud, including
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• the existence of long-time friendships and business relationships among the directors
and Brooks.
• ignoring concerns raised by auditors, material weakness letters, and concerns raised
by the controller regarding the inventory system and valuations.
• when the auditor (Weiser LLP) informed DHB that it was not prepared to provide
a signed report before the filing deadline for 2004’s annual report on Form 10-K,
the audit committee chair left a hostile voicemail for the Weiser partner, and that
evening, DHB filed its Form 10-K with the SEC with an audit report with a forged
signature. The following day, Weiser delivered a signed audit report to DHB with
a material weakness letter that noted DHB’s filing of the annual report without
Weiser’s consent. In that letter, Weiser concluded the audit committee itself constituted a material weakness because its conduct did not demonstrate its understanding of its oversight role of the company’s external financial reporting and internal
control over its financial reporting processes.
• ignoring concerns about whether TAP was a related party that were raised by the
auditors and a union attempting to organize DHB’s employees, including failing to
conduct an internal investigation into the affiliation question and allowing Brooks to
control an investigation that was subsequently undertaken.
• failing to act when Grant Thornton resigned and submitted a material weakness
letter and failing to follow up with, and ask questions of, management once the SEC
began an investigation of DHB.
• participating in an attempt to opinion shop when DHB’s auditor (its fourth in the
three-year period from 2002–05) advised DHB, the audit committee, and the SEC
in a Section 10(A) report of likely illegal acts (inventory manipulations) the auditor
had detected in the first three quarters of 2005. That same day, the audit committee
chair signed an engagement letter on behalf of DHB to hire a new (fifth) audit firm
to reaudit DHB’s 2003 and 2004 financial statements, contemporaneous with the
fourth auditor’s engagement. Neither audit firm knew of the other’s hiring because
field work was conducted in two separate offices of DHB.
On November 10, 2011, the SEC announced that the three independent directors who
formerly comprised DHB’s audit and compensation committees had settled the SEC’s
charges. The settlements imposed permanent bars on Krantz, Chasin, and Nadelman serving
as officers or directors of a public company; required them to disgorge stock profits totaling
approximately $1.3 million; and required them to pay civil penalties of $100,000 each.
Avoid this pitfall: What steps do you believe the city management or audit committee or
auditors could (or should) have taken to identify the lavish lifestyle risks that seem inherent
in both of these situations? Do you believe that character assessment is now part of the duties
of the audit committee and auditor? These enforcement actions should give you a sense that
integrity assessment (if not character assessment) is now an important part of risk management for current and proposed financial officers and audit clients. If you are an elected city
or state official, financial officer, or member of the audit committee, the implications of these
cases are several:
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• You are personally accountable to the corporation for the reasonable protection of
its assets.
• You must have a system of checks and balances in place to identify efforts to circumvent or override internal controls.
• Even senior executives are placing their professional futures at risk if ethical breaches
(or breaches of the newly required codes of conduct) are found.

Why Did the Audit Fail?
In January 2003, the SEC released its report under Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002. The report examined the prior 5 years’ enforcement actions by the SEC to identify areas of financial reporting in which reporting companies are most susceptible to fraud,
manipulation, or earnings management.The following 4 categories represent the most common reasons cited for audit failures in these enforcement actions (all remaining categories
accounted for a total of 17 enforcement actions):

Frequency of Audit Issues in Enforcement Matters Against Auditors
Audit Failure

Number of Enforcement Matters

Failure to obtain sufficient, competent evidential
matter to support audit opinion

37

Failure to exercise professional skepticism on unusual, last minute, or related-party transactions

30

Failure to maintain independence

19

Failure to respond adequately to red flags

16

Between failures to respond to red flags and exercise professional skepticism regarding
related-party transactions, it is clear that audit firms must focus resources and emphasis on
audit methodologies designed to surface red flags and highlight related-party dealings.

Recent Developments
On September 8, 2006, the Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) reissued an
exposure draft of Interpretation No. 101-16, “Indemnification, Limitation of Liability, and
ADR Clauses in Engagement Letters,” under Rule 101, Independence. The portion of this
exposure draft dealing with indemnification, limitation of liability, and alternate forms of
dispute resolution clauses in engagement letters was not adopted. However, some of the
guidance on these topics was contained in Interpretation No. 501-8, “Failure to Follow
Requirements of Governmental Bodies, Commissions, or Other Regulatory Agencies on
Indemnification and Limitation of Liability Provisions in Connection With Audit and Other
Attest Services,” under Rule 501, Acts Discreditable (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 501
par. .09), that was adopted effective July 31, 2008.
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Even though Interpretation No. 101-16 was not adopted, consider the following significant points related to independence that PEEC addressed in the proposed interpretation and
that generated significant opposition from, among others, the Council of Institutional Investors, the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation:
• An indemnity or a liability limitation seeking to limit a member’s liability for actual
damages due to the member’s negligence, willful misconduct, or fraudulent behavior
or the client’s negligence would impair independence.
• An indemnity or a liability limitation seeking to limit a member’s liability for actual
or punitive damages due to the client’s knowing misrepresentation, willful misconduct, or fraudulent behavior would not impair independence.
• Independence is not impaired if a member and client agree the losing party in a
lawsuit or alternative dispute resolution (ADR) will pay the legal fees and expenses
of the winning party.
• A limitation of liability provision in which a member is not liable to a client for
punitive damages would not impair independence, as long as the member is liable to
the client for actual damages.
• Time limitations in the engagement letter concerning when a client can file a claim
or a limit on actual damages that applies prior to when legal rights lapse would
impair independence.
• An agreement between the member and client to use ADR to resolve disputes
between them or waive a jury trial would not impair independence, as long as these
provisions would not operate to limit the member’s liability for actual damages. The
exposure draft noted that some states limit or do not give effect to these provisions
and also noted that if the ADR clause incorporates a provision, procedure, or rule
that would impair independence, then the ADR clause would impair independence.
• An indemnification or limitation of liability related to nonattest services performed
for a client would not impair independence regarding that client.
The SEC has expressed concern about the trend toward inclusion in engagement letters
of waivers of punitive damage claims by the client and has asked for input concerning the
implications of such waivers from investors, companies, and accounting firms. This concern
has likely been enhanced by the information contained in the proxy statements filed by Silicon Graphics, Sun Microsystems, and a number of other public companies in which these
companies disclosed that the engagement agreements with their outside audit firm contained
both a waiver of punitive damage claims and an ADR provision. It is reasonable to assume
that more public companies may soon be providing similar disclosure, and as this disclosure
becomes common, accounting firms may come under increased pressure to curtail or eliminate the use of these provisions in engagement letters. Until that time, however, accounting
firms should carefully evaluate the reasons to use such provisions and consider how and to
what extent these provisions and any independence implications should be discussed with
audit committees of attest clients. For nonattest services, it is clear the interpretation does
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not consider independence to be impaired by indemnities or limits on liability; as a practical
matter, though, this may be more a business issue with the client than one with professional
responsibility implications.
On February 28, 2007, Interpretation No. 101-3, “Nonattest Services,” under Rule 101
(AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .05), became effective, and it relates to the
performance of nonattest, tax compliance, and forensic accounting services, as well as fact
witness testimony. The interpretation provides the following guidance:
• Independence would be impaired by performance of management responsibilities or
providing client advocacy services.
• When providing nonattest services, the member should establish and document in
writing the objectives of the engagement, the services to be performed, the client’s
acceptance of its responsibilities, the member’s responsibilities, and any limitations on
the engagement. These obligations do not apply (but the member may want to abide
by these rules regardless) when the services are performed before the client became
an attest client or when providing routine advice incidental to an engagement.
• Fact witness testimony when the member’s role is to provide factual testimony to
the trier of fact and when the member is not acting in any capacity for the client
or engaged by the client or its counsel to provide such testimony would not impair
independence. However, if the member has been engaged by the client or counsel,
the member will be considered to be performing forensic accounting services.
• Forensic accounting services encompass both litigation services and investigative
services. Within litigation services are three divisions:
— Expert witness services. Because an expert must testify to his or her own opinions
and understandings of fact, the nature of the services would generally impair
independence
— Consulting services. Within litigation services, these services are generally advice
from a member about facts, issues, and strategy and do not involve expert
testimony. These services are subject to the general requirements for nonattest
services described in Interpretation No. 101-3. However, if the individual subsequently agrees to serve as an expert witness, independence would be impaired.
— Other services. When a member serves as the trier of fact, a special master, a
court-appointed expert, or an arbitrator (or member of an arbitration panel).
independence would be considered impaired, regardless of whether the member
is subject to any restriction on communication of information uncovered in the
engagement. However, independence would not be considered to be impaired if
a member serves as a mediator or any similar role in a matter involving a client,
provided the member is not (i) making any decision on behalf of the parties but,
rather, is acting as a facilitator by assisting the parties in reaching their own agreement and (ii) complies with the general requirements.
• Investigative services are forensic services that do not involve actual or threatened litigation but may require analyses or investigations. Provided that the general requirements for performing nonattest services set forth in Interpretation No. 101-3 are
complied with, these services would not impair independence.
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Regulatory Issues
In October 2007, then-Secretary of the Treasury Paulson announced the formation of the
Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (Advisory Committee). The
Advisory Committee’s charge included the development of recommendations for a more
sustainable, transparent audit industry in the United States. The Advisory Committee issued
its final report on October 6, 2008, that contained a number of recommendations, including
the following:
• Develop and disclose key audit quality indicators. The key issue raised by the Advisory
Committee related to audit quality is if audit committees are considering engaging
a firm, or shareholders are considering ratifying the firm’s selection, and virtually no
information is available about a firm’s audit quality, how can audit quality drive the
selection or ratification process? The answer, as stated by the SEC, is that the lack
of information about audit quality undercuts any ability to rely on audit quality in
making selection and ratification decisions and may also undermine the ability of
smaller audit firms to compete with larger firms. The Advisory Committee referenced one United Kingdom audit firm’s disclosure of nine key performance indicators, including average headcount, staff turnover, diversity, client satisfaction, audit
and nonaudit work, proposal win rate, revenue, profit, and profit per partner. The
Advisory Committee suggested that such indicators could also include issues now
discussed with audit committees of public company clients, including engagement
team composition, the nature and extent of a firm’s training program, and the nature
and reason for client restatements. The Advisory Committee recommended that the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), in consultation with the
SEC, other regulators, audit firms, users of financial statements, academics, as well as
boards and audit committees, develop both output- and input-based quality indicators that would be publicly disclosed and that would be monitored by the PCAOB
through its audit firm inspections.
• Create a PCAOB national fraud prevention and detection center. The Advisory Committee
highlighted the reasonable assurance standard for the audit opinion but also received
testimony and comments concerning the auditor’s responsibilities related to fraud
prevention and detection. As the Advisory Committee noted, no forum is now available where audit firms can share their fraud detection experiences, detection methodologies, fact finding, or best practices. The Advisory Committee recommended
that the PCAOB establish such a center and that audit and forensic firms, certified
fraud examiners, academics and investors, and regulators work to improve fraud
detection and prevention practices with a goal of establishing best practices that
could then be extended to international use. In April 2010, the PCAOB announced
it was interviewing for the position of director of the Financial Reporting Fraud
Resource Center that the it is establishing in response to the Advisory Committee’s
recommendation.
• In a related recommendation, the Advisory Committee also asked that the PCAOB
address the content of audit reports, including the ways in which the audit report
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could be expanded to a more narrative version that would encompass a discussion
of estimates, judgments, sufficiency of evidence, and uncertainties, both to provide
more information to users of financial statements and to clarify the role of the auditor. This clarification would expand the report’s description of the auditor’s role
in fraud detection and limitations on fraud detection. In this regard, on June 21,
2011, the PCAOB issued Concept Release on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Standards
Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements and Related Amendments to PCAOB
Standards. The comment period closed on September 30, 2011, and since that time,
this release was the subject of discussion at the PCAOB’s Standing Advisory Group
meeting on November 10, 2011. Although this concept release generated “only” 155
comment letters (by comparison, the release on auditor independence and mandatory audit firm rotation generated 659 comment letters), the PCAOB has (as of
April 26, 2012) not yet taken further action on this concept.
Since July 15, 2003, every public company has been required to disclose in its annual
report whether it has adopted a code of ethics that applies to its principal executive officer,
principal financial officer, principal accounting officer or controller, or persons performing
similar functions. If it has not adopted a code of ethics, the company must explain in its disclosure why it has not done so. Any changes or waivers to the code of ethics, other than technical or administrative changes, must be disclosed on Form 8-K or the company’s website
if it has previously disclosed that it intends to use its website for this purpose. If disclosed in
this manner, the company must maintain the disclosure on the website for at least 12 months.
So long as the company posts its code of ethics on its website, the company is no longer
required to file a copy of the code of ethics as an exhibit to the company’s annual report.
The code of ethics must be reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and promote the following five objectives:
1. Honest and ethical conduct, including ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts
of interest in personal and professional relationships
2. Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in publicly filed reports and
other public communications
3. Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules, and regulations
4. Prompt internal reporting of ethics code violations to appropriate persons identified
in the code
5. Accountability for code adherence
As you might expect, the instructions to preparing this disclosure state that the code of
ethics can be part of a broader document that applies to a larger population of executives or
employees. Only the portion that applies to the designated officers has to be filed or made
publicly available.
Avoid this pitfall: Financial officers of companies that are adopting a code of ethics
are well advised to carefully consider two overriding issues when presented with a draft
code. First, is the code as written reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing? Savvy financial
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officers will want to evaluate the code of ethics carefully while keeping this question in mind
because the SEC’s final rule places great emphasis on this objective. Second, has the person
who prepared the code of ethics come at the code with a preexisting bias of some kind? In
other words, has the drafter somehow expanded on the duties of the principal financial or
accounting officer (or controller) while circumscribing the duties of the principal executive
officer? This might seem like a rudimentary question, but it helps keep in mind that whoever
first drafts the code of ethics can give the code a certain slant that has the effect, regardless of
whether its intended, of allocating responsibility among the identified officers.

Ethical Guides
Edward Ericson, once said, “The cosmos is neither moral or immoral; only people are. He
who would move the world must first move himself.”
Alan Simpson, the former Republican senator from Wyoming, stated, “If you have integrity,
nothing else matters. If you don’t have integrity, nothing else matters.”
Thomas Paine, the English-American author, once said, “Character is much easier kept than
recovered.”
Max Lerner, the American journalist, wrote in Actions and Passions: Notes on the Multiple
Revolution of Our Time, “When you choose the lesser of two evils, always remember that it is
still an evil.”
According to Section R4-1-455(B), “Professional Conduct: Independence, Integrity, and
Objectivity,” of the Arizona Administrative Code, “Integrity and objectivity: Certified public
accountants, public accountants, or firms shall not knowingly or recklessly misrepresent facts
when engaged in the practice of public accounting, including the rendering of tax and management advisory services.”
According to appendix A, “Generally Accepted Auditing Standards,” of Section 1430 of Illinois’s Public Accounting Act (Professional Conduct), “Standards of Fieldwork: (1) The work is to
be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly supervised …. (3) Sufficient
competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries and
confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements
under examination.”

Case Study Facts
You Get the Call
Arriving at work one Monday morning, you get a phone call from one of the lawyers with
whom you have worked on several forensic investigations. “Melinda, how are you?” you ask.
“I haven’t heard from you since we wrapped up the Biohelix investigation. Did you manage
to recover any assets from those two promoters who ran off to Canada?”
“Sue, all I can say is those two are probably in Switzerland by now, and the shareholders
probably aren’t going to see a dime in recovery for some time to come,” Melinda replies.
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“But, you and your team did such a good job of sorting through that financial nightmare
that the venture capital investor wants us to hire you all for a new problem child in their
portfolio.”
Smiling, you say, “We are happy to help as always, Melinda, you know that. Why didn’t
Samuel call us directly, though?”
“This situation is a little more complicated, that’s why. He asked me to call you because
he can’t have anything to do with hiring you directly because he is a member of the board
of directors of this company.”
“You have got to be kidding me!” you exclaim. “Samuel never sits on the boards of their
portfolio companies. What persuaded him to waive their policy on that?”
“Well,” Melinda explained, “Don’t quote me on this, but I think Samuel felt this company
was so well-run, and its prospects were so good, that this was a no-lose proposition, but it
didn’t turn out that way. Did you see their last portfolio company report and happen to
notice the investment in Mediageni?”
“No, I didn’t,” you reply. “But wasn’t that the company written up in the Broad Street Journal that had the adapter you could fit to your PC that would allow you to receive digital TV
broadcasts on your PC?”
“Yes, that’s the one, Sue. Threatening to make TVs obsolete or at least interfere with their
market. With a projected cost of $89.95, it makes buying a TV look a lot less attractive.
However, some recent events inside Mediageni could make it the loser in the race for PC
broadcast customers; you won’t believe what’s been going on inside the company for the
last month.”
Avoid this pitfall: If your firm also provides attest or other services, the ensuing conversation is not one you would want to have without performing a conflict check. Although
you might be aware of current attest clients, you cannot assume the information you are
about to receive does not relate to a former client nor can you assume the information is
necessarily confined to only the most recent 30 days. Be very sensitive to your receipt of
information relating to the subject of a forensic investigation before you have fully performed the necessary conflict check.
*****
Before she continues, you inform Melinda you have to run all appropriate conflict checks
and will get back to her later in the day. Having availed yourself of the firm’s quality control
and conflict check system, you resume your conversation later that morning.
“So, Melinda, now, let’s hear the scoop on what’s been happening at Mediageni. Please
don’t tell me Samuel did anything wrong!”
No, definitely not. We were retained a few days ago and have tried to get our
arms around recent events, so I can brief you. In a nutshell, here’s what happened.
Samuel and his firm brought in a new CFO about three months ago, and the two
founders felt somewhat threatened by his experience and knowledge. The new
CFO, a guy named Steele, asked to review all the minutes for board meetings over
the last three years. Somehow, Steele realized the board had authorized the signing of new employment agreements with the founders, but the form of the signed
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agreements didn’t match up to the form of the agreement attached to the minutes.
It turns out that the signed agreements, unlike the ones attached to the minutes,
contained golden parachutes giving the founders three times their annual compensation in a lump sum on any change of control.

“Did Samuel agree that what was signed was not in the same form approved by the board,
or did an old draft of the employment agreements just get attached to the minutes?”
“To tell you the truth,” Melinda responded, “the board members seem to have differing recollections, and even the corporate counsel is unsure if this issue is just one of poor
recordkeeping. He agrees the agreement was not approved with a golden parachute, but he
can’t explain how the golden parachute got into the agreement in the first place because it
was never discussed.”
“So, why didn’t they just execute new agreements, rescind the old ones, and let it go at
that?” you ask.
Because, in the meantime, Steele found some entries in the books that made him
start to dig a little bit, and before you know it, he found a series of checks that
had been written by one of the founders, Fulton, I think, to a company that turns
out to have been owned by Fulton’s girlfriend. What got Steele’s attention was
that the invoices were always one or two liners that had a remittance address in
Palm Springs. Turns out Mediageni has a West Coast office, so when Steele went
out there one month ago, he went by the vendor’s place that happens to be a very
nice half-million dollar house with two pools and a gardener. He didn’t meet the
girlfriend, but by then he didn’t need to. It looks like the down payment on the
house was made by Fulton, but the mortgage payments have been covered by
Mediageni’s monthly billing.

“I assume that once the board found out about that little arrangement, Fulton was fired,
and the second founder came under suspicion, right?” you ask.
“You would think so, but Steele wasn’t done digging yet, so he evidently put off going
to the board. Steele then finds expense reimbursements for Fulton and the other founder,
Chase, for their recent trip to London and Paris on their EU sales tour for $140,000.”
“What did you say? $140,000?!” you ask.
Chuckling, Melinda says, “When you fly first class and stay at the Dorchester in London
and the Raphael in Paris, those dollars add up quickly. It appears that Fulton and Chase took
their girlfriends with them and that some portion of the bill was for advances at the casino
cage in London.”
In a sarcastic tone, you comment, “Don’t tell me that Steele decides he’s just going to keep
on digging!”
Melinda responds
No, he decides to go to the board with this, and this is where things get really
interesting. Steele goes to the board meeting a few weeks ago, having prepped
two of the board members to fire Fulton and Chase. Steele’s asked to come in and
discuss the financials about mid-way through the meeting. When he gets done, he
launches into what he’s found since joining the company. Fulton and Chase had
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no idea this was coming, so they immediately tell Steele that he’s out of line and
slandering them, but the board members that Steele prepped are saying that Fulton and Chase should be fired. When Steele gets to the vendor payments made to
Fulton’s girlfriend, Fulton shuts up. Then, when Steele gets into the EU sales tour,
Chase goes nuts, claiming that three-fourths of the board knew his girlfriend was
going and that his compensation was supposed to include all of her expenses, so
there was full disclosure to the board. Not all the board members recollect things
this way, including Samuel, but they do recall some discussion of how Fulton’s and
Chase’s compensation was going to be adjusted to take into account their personal
expenses.

“Sounds like a fine mess, Melinda. Do you have a sense for where things stand now?”
The board has put Fulton and Chase on a paid leave of absence and asked Steele to
continue digging through the books, but Fulton and Chase have accused Steele of
being on a witch hunt and have asked the board to stop him.The compromise was
that we would get involved to investigate, and we would retain you all to do some
digging. The board is looking a little bipolar right now, torn between its need for
Fulton and Chase to push the EU sales and worried about what lurks beneath the
surface of all this. To make matters worse, Mediageni without Fulton and Chase is
like a ship without a rudder, and that is what has everyone hoping we can get to
the bottom of this FAST.

“Any other good news today, Melinda?” you ask.
Yeah, there is one other thing. I hate to tell you this, but the financial statements
for Mediageni have been audited to SEC standards for the last two years by JNP,
which, as you know, is one of the second-tier national audit firms. Even though
Mediageni was private, it was being groomed for a public offering planned for
next year. None of these issues surfaced in the audit reports, management letters,
or discussions with the audit committee.

You pause for a moment to digest that bit of news. “Have you seen JNP’s engagement
letter, and are you sure about the nature of the audit? They’re a great group of people, very
professional, so I’d be a little surprised if that turned out to be the case.”
Melinda’s reply confirms the worst.
Yeah, I’ve seen the letter myself, Sue. The audit was supposed to be full-blown
SEC compliant, and if most, or any, of this stuff is true, then Mediageni may have
a big problem, not to mention JNP. Samuel is beside himself, as you’d expect from
someone with $30 million at risk. He’s asked us and you, too, to expedite this
investigation so that the board can figure out what to do with Fulton and Chase.
The board also wants you to interface with JNP’s engagement partner and find out
what JNP will do to help. When can you get started?

The Investigation Begins
Shortly after this conversation, you and Melinda begin reviewing documents, including
receipts from the European trip taken by Fulton and Chase. There is no doubt about the
impropriety of the payments made to Fulton’s girlfriend, so your focus is on the other
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allegations. The document review supports the fact that the expenditures were made,
so the real issue is whether and to what extent the board had approved the expenditures and intended to have Fulton’s and Chase’s compensation increased by the amount
of their personal expenses. Before getting to the board interviews or talking to JNP,
you and Melinda decide to start by interviewing Mediageni’s controller, a man named
James King.
As it turns out, King is a fount of information; he is young, somewhat naïve, and nervous
when he sits down with you and Melinda. After filling you in on his background, including
the fact that he previously held only one other accounting position at his brother-in-law’s
company, the interview takes an unexpected turn.
“Are you familiar with the allegations made against Mr. Fulton and Mr. Chase, Mr. King?”
Melinda asks.
“Yeah, I heard from my boss, Mr. Steele, about what those guys have been up to. Actually,
this stuff wasn’t much of a surprise, to tell you the truth. Everybody here in the company
knew those guys were living high on the hog using the company’s money, and it seemed
like it was okay until Mr. Steele came along.”You and Melinda exchange glances, aware that
young Mr. King may have just blown open your investigation.
“When you say that, Mr. King, can you give us an idea about who knew this and what it
was that everyone knew?”
King replied
Oh, everybody in Mediageni knew about that stuff. Fulton and Chase used to
come in on Fridays before a holiday weekend asking for checks payable to cash,
and everybody used to laugh about it. Heck, even the auditors used to joke about
those guys. One time, I was in the back of the office kitchen area, and I heard one
of the managers and a staff person from the audit firm laughing about how Fulton
spent more money on his girlfriend than on marketing.

At this, your attention level rises dramatically. “Are you sure the two people you heard
were from the audit firm?” you ask.
“Oh sure,” King replies, “I worked with them pretty closely over the time they were out
for the field work, so I know it was them.”
“And did they ask you about these expenditures or about how they had been recorded?”
King said
No, not really. I think they knew we had a few general ledger accounts for our
excess marketing expenditures, but they never pressed real hard on those. It kinda
seemed like they and my old boss had some kind of agreement that they weren’t
going to look too hard into that stuff.You know, my old boss worked at JNP about
10 years ago, so I think he had a pretty good idea of what the audit plan looked like.

Avoid this pitfall: Predictable audit plans and cozy relationships make unwelcome bedfellows. You can see where a relaxed corporate atmosphere and the tone at the top can
establish a corporate culture that encourages a laissez faire attitude that may even permeate
the audit. If there is a lesson here, it is that audit team members must maintain a healthy
skepticism, all the more so when the company has a free-wheeling culture that invites these
sorts of abuses.
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*****
Following King’s interview, you caucus with Melinda. “If JNP’s staff people knew what
was going on, Melinda, then it’s clear there should have been disclosure of related-party
transactions, at a minimum,” you state. “This also raises the really ugly possibility that someone from JNP and the former CFO were working together to conceal this stuff, or maybe
the auditors saw what was going on but pretty much just signed off without looking too
closely. Either way, not what the board expected, unless it was compliant in this too.”
Melinda shook her head.
I can’t imagine the board knew exactly what was going on any more that I can
imagine the auditors knew. It sounds like maybe everyone was so happy with sales
growth, what a great job Fulton and Chase were doing, and the prospect of the IPO
right around the corner that they kind of let things slide. Maybe the board thought
Fulton and Chase were big spenders but not to the degree it turned out, and the
auditors just followed everyone else’s thinking.You know, Mediageni was a large client and getting bigger, so maybe the auditors were tempted to overlook a few things.

After some more discussion, you and Melinda decide you’ll contact JNP’s audit partner
to ask for access to the working papers on the most recent audit. In anticipation of a phone
conversation, you prepare a letter for Melinda’s signature requesting access to the working papers and indicating that Mediageni’s board approved this request. When you call the
engagement partner to discuss this request a few days later, however, you are referred to JNP’s
supervising national audit partner, Laura Levin.
Levin begins the conversation with the following: “Sue, I understand your firm has been
engaged to assist Melinda’s firm in this internal investigation. Is that right?”
“Yes, that’s correct.”
“And it’s my understanding that you all are looking into some expenditure issues on behalf
of the board. Can you tell me a little more?”
“Yes, it appears there may have been some related-party expenses that might have constituted compensation but were recorded as G&A expenses. We’re to look into this and report
back to the board.”
Laura responds
Well, you know our working papers belong to us, not the company, so that is
hurdle number one. The next issue is that if we give you access, we would have to
know exactly what working papers you wanted to see and why. Because we’re still
the auditor of record, we need to see anything you intend to report back to the
board because if there have been breaches of management representations, we have
to consider whether to pull our prior opinion and whether our resignation or a
restatement is called for.

Pausing, you decide to exert a little pressure of your own.
Laura, all of what you said is true, and we understand JNP’s position. If you want
to have your counsel talk to Melinda about this, that’s fine, but you should know
there seems to be some question about whether someone on the audit team might
have known what was going on inside the company. If so, the board would prob-
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ably look more kindly on your firm’s cooperation with this inquiry, and access to
the working papers would be a great step in that direction. All the board wants to
do is get to the bottom of this, so it can determine how to best deal with Fulton
and Chase. As a private company, there is no reporting requirement to the SEC so
that should lessen the visibility of this situation for all concerned.

Levin replies
I understand your point, Sue. Let me talk about this with our counsel and the
engagement partner and get back to you. In the meantime, you might want to tell
Melinda that our cooperation is subject to our receiving requests for specific working papers in our possession. We also had a firm policy in effect during those years
that required the destruction of all extraneous documentation not in the working
papers, which may lessen the likelihood that anything in our files will help you. Also,
we’ll require your firm to sign a confidentiality agreement that will prevent disclosure of any information you learn to anyone outside the board and Melinda’s firm.

You sign off by confirming you’ll get a specific list of working papers to Levin and her
firm that you want to review.You know the battle over the investigation has only just begun,
and where it will lead is anyone’s guess.

Questions for Consideration
1. Assume that you get access to the working papers, and no “smoking gun” confirms
the audit team members knew what was going on with Fulton and Chase. What further evidence would you want to review to try and answer the question of whether
JNP knew or should have known about personal expenditures of company funds?
a. Interview the former CFO of Mediageni.
b. Review checks made to cash, the endorsements on those checks, the amounts of
those checks, and how they were recorded in the company’s statements.
c. Determine the magnitude of amounts paid to Fulton’s girlfriend and third parties
compared with other amounts recorded in accounts payable.
d. Review all the marketing expenses to try and form a preliminary judgment about
the extent of any misappropriation.
e. All of the above.
2. Assume that a review of the expenses run up by Fulton and Chase in the course of
the European sales trip shows that only $4,000 was spent in the London casino. You
discuss this with JNP, and it argues this is immaterial. Knowing this and the fact that
Fulton and Chase are going to say they intended this amount be treated as compensation to them, how would you recommend that Melinda address this issue in her report
to the board?
a. Raise the issue, and conclude the amount was immaterial, but note that Fulton and
Chase did not have the amount included in W-2 income in spite of their claims
about this being chargeable to them as income.
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b. State the facts and indicate that materiality is irrelevant given the fact that the company’s financial statements are misstated, and indicate Fulton’s and Chase’s claims
are not supported unless such amounts appear in W-2 income.
c. Do not raise the issue in the report.
d. Raise the issue, and aggregate the $4,000 with any amounts spent by Fulton and
Chase on their girlfriends during this trip so as to establish materiality.
3. After the investigation is concluded, and Fulton and Chase are fired, you and Melinda
are asked to help Mediageni put together a code of ethics for the executive officers
and other employees. Given the facts of the case study, what points would you want
the code of ethics to stress?
a. Full, fair, and accurate disclosure in public reports and communications
b. Honest and ethical conduct, specifically including transactions with related parties
c. Compliance with governmental laws and regulations
d. Internal reporting systems for violations and accountability standards for violations
e. Both (b) and (d)
f. Both (a) and (c)
4. In your view, did Steele properly and timely report the ethical issues he unearthed to
the board members?
a. No, he should have reported the issues to the audit committee of the board.
b. No, he should have reported the issue concerning the payments to Fulton’s girlfriend when he found out those facts.
c. Yes, he reported these issues properly and as timely as could be expected given the
likely response.
d. No, he reported the issues without having sufficient facts in hand and should have
done so only after he completed more investigative work.
5. If you were in Levin’s position and evaluating where JNP might have exposure for a
busted audit, which of the most common reasons for an audit failure would give you
the greatest concern?
a. Failure to obtain sufficient, competent evidential matter to support the audit
opinion
b. Failure to exercise professional skepticism on unusual, last minute, or related-party
transactions
c. Failure to maintain independence
d. Failure to respond adequately to red flags
e. Both (a) and (c)
f. Both (b) and (d)
6. When considering the DBH fraud discussed earlier in this chapter, what, in your
opinion, is the principal reason why the SEC filed the action against the independent
directors who served on the audit committee?
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a. The vast extent of the fraud conducted by Brooks and Hatfield
b. The time period over which DBH funds were misappropriated by Brooks and
Hatfield
c. The simultaneous hiring of two audit firms to conduct reaudits of the same twoyear period
d. The lack of response to red flags by the committee members
7. What do you think about the statement you made to Levin of JNP that because
Mediageni is not public, there is no reporting requirement pertaining to these facts?
Does the fact that the financial statements were audited to SEC standards bear on this?
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5
Case 5—Bank of Little Beach—
You Are the Valuation Specialist
Introduction
Is valuation an art or a science? Or, as some have suggested, is it the work of a dark sorcerer?
In reality, valuation involves many disciplines and takes a variety of approaches in arriving at
an asset’s value.The asset itself may take on different forms (for example, a business, subsidiary,
minority interest, debt obligation, mortgage, derivative, or contingent claim), and the reasons
for a valuation may vary similarly (for example, purchase or sale of a business, buyout of a
minority owner, divorce, financial statement presentation, or estate taxes purposes). Thus,
the valuation process may be affected by the type of asset to be valued, the facts or situation
driving the need for the valuation, the methods chosen for the valuation, the comparable
companies or other assets used to arrive at comparable values, the discount rate used, and
the assumptions and uncertainties identified by management or others. In order to avoid
implying a degree of precision that may be unattainable, many valuations use ranges, bestand worst-case scenarios, or probabilistic statements to reflect the uncertainties of the “art”
of valuations.
As you know, some assets are extremely easy to value, such as publicly traded stocks that are
actively traded on a national securities exchange. Other assets, such as thinly traded securities,
present very different valuation challenges. In this chapter, we will focus on the key issues a
company and its valuation specialist face when presented with a thinly traded security that is
inherently difficult to value and, in turn, the impact of the valuation question on a financial
statement audit. For companies subject to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
valuation issues for thinly traded securities may also call into question the effectiveness of
internal controls and may result in the determination that material weaknesses exist related
to investments in securities or the impairment of that investment.

Focus Points
What Is a Thinly Traded Security?
A thinly traded security is defined as an inactively or infrequently traded security. As such, a
thinly traded security is generally illiquid, meaning that large sales may significantly depress
the security’s price, or large purchases may cause a substantial increase in the security’s price.
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In March 2012, the chief accountant for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) issued the latest edition of the Bank Accounting Advisory Series (BAAS) that provides accounting guidance to national banks and federal savings associations. In BAAS, the
OCC addressed several important topics concerning the ramifications of investments held
by banks, including municipal securities. The relevant guidance included the following
points:
• Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification
(ASC) 320, Investments—Debt and Equity Securities, describes six safe harbors for the
sale of held-to-maturity (HTM) securities by banks that will not taint the entire
portfolio of securities. Once a portfolio is tainted, all HTM securities are transferred
to the available-for-sale (AFS) category. At that time (and consistent with the treatment required by the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]), the bank will be
prohibited from using HTM classification for a two-year period.
• Securities transferred to AFS are carried at fair value rather than amortized cost.
Under FASB ASC 320, transfers out of HTM require disclosures of amortized cost,
realized or unrealized gain or loss, and the circumstances leading to the transfer.
Unrealized holding gain or loss, net of tax, is included in accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI). AOCI is excluded from the bank’s calculation of regulatory capital.
• The safe harbors from tainting a portfolio of HTM securities are
— evidence of a significant deterioration in the issuer’s creditworthiness.
— a change in the tax law that eliminates or reduces the tax-exempt status of interest on the debt security but not a change in tax rates.
— a major business combination or disposition that necessitates the sale of the securities to maintain the bank’s existing interest rate risk position or credit risk.
— a change in statutory or regulatory requirements that significantly modifies either
the definition or level of permissible investments that may be held.
— a significant increase in industrywide regulatory capital requirements that causes
the bank to downsize.
— a significant increase in the risk weights of debt securities for risk-based capital
purposes.

Fraud in Mortgage-Backed Securities Valuations
On April 7, 2010, the SEC brought an administrative cease and desist proceeding against
Morgan Asset Management (Morgan); Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. (Morgan Kennan); James Kelsoe, Jr.; and Joseph Thompson Weller, CPA. Morgan Asset Management was
a registered investment adviser, then a wholly owned subsidiary of Regions Financial Corporation, and Morgan Keegan was the principal underwriter and sole distributor of shares in
five closed-end funds and three open-end bond portfolios (funds). Kelsoe was an employee
of both Morgan and Morgan Keegan and the portfolio manager for the funds, and Weller
was an officer and a treasurer of the funds and signed the periodic reports filed by the funds
with the SEC.
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Hypothetically Speaking…
BAAS contained the following hypothetical:
Assume that a bank sells tax-exempt municipal securities that were included in
the HTM category but does so only because it is about to convert to an S corporation from a C corporation. The bank sold the municipal securities because it will
not derive any benefit from the tax-free nature of the securities, and the bank’s
investors do not need tax-exempt income. Does the bank’s sale of these securities
taint the HTM portfolio?
Answer—Yes, the sale will taint the entire HTM portfolio because a change in the
bank’s tax status is not within one of FASB ASC 320’s six safe harbors. The OCC
believes this situation resembles a change in tax rates more than tax law and is therefore not within the safe harbor for changes in tax law contained in FASB ASC 320.

The boards of directors of the funds were responsible for pricing the funds’ securities in
compliance with each fund’s valuation policies and procedures, but the boards delegated the
pricing of the funds’ securities to Morgan by contract. In turn, Morgan’s valuation committee delegated the fair valuing of securities to Morgan Keegan, employees of which comprised the majority of the valuation committee.
Each of the funds was required to obtain dealer price quotes for securities when readily
available and provide that data to fund accounting. In instances when market prices were not
readily available, the funds’ valuation committees were to arrive at fair value by determining the price the funds would reasonably expect to receive on a current sale of the security.
Those valuations were to be made in writing and good faith and periodically validated
through obtaining broker-dealer quotes. The broker-dealer price quotes were subject to
override only when there was a reasonable basis to believe the price provided did not accurately reflect the fair value of the portfolio security. The resulting values were to be communicated to fund accounting.
Among other allegations made by the SEC, it was alleged that Kelsoe actively screened and
manipulated the dealer price quotes that Morgan Keegan’s fund accounting and the funds’
independent auditor obtained from at least one broker-dealer. In the first half of 2007, Kelsoe
allegedly instructed his assistant to provide 262 price adjustments to fund accounting that
were entered directly by a staff accountant into the spreadsheets used to calculate the funds’
net asset values (NAVs). When the funds obtained month-end price quotes from brokers
to validate prior valuations, Kelsoe routinely determined if a new, arbitrary price should be
assigned to the security if the broker’s quote varied from the portfolio price by more than
5 percent.
As head of fund accounting and a member of the valuation committee, Weller allegedly
knew the valuation committee did not properly supervise fund accounting’s valuation processes; knew that Kelsoe was supplying price adjustments to fund accounting; and knew that
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certain members of the valuation committee were unaware of (a) Kelsoe’s role in supplying
fair values for certain securities, (b) the fair values, and (c) the fact that there was no documentation to support the fair value determination.
The SEC also alleged that Kelsoe contacted the broker-dealer that submitted price quotes
to fund accounting or the independent auditor for the funds. These contacts resulted in the
broker-dealer increasing its quotes from what it intended to send to fund accounting or the
independent auditor or caused it to submit interim price quotes for certain securities. Kelsoe
asked the brokerage firm representative to refrain from submitting certain price quotes to
the independent auditor that reflected actual bid prices that were substantially lower than
the reported NAV. In what was undoubtedly pure coincidence, Kelsoe also arranged to have
the funds purchase certain bonds held by the brokerage firm that supplied the price quotes.
Those bonds came with a guarantee from the brokerage firm that it would repurchase the
bonds from the funds in six months for the same price as the funds paid, less two intervening
coupon payments.
On June 22, 2011, Morgan and the other defendants settled this case. Morgan agreed to
a 3-year ban on being involved in, recommending, or determining the value of any portfolio security for which market quotes are not readily available and to hire within 30 days of
resuming this activity (for up to 3 additional years) an independent consultant to evaluate
and report to Morgan and the SEC on Morgan’s policies, procedures, and practices with
respect to valuations. Morgan and Morgan Keegan also agreed to pay disgorgement of $20.5
million, interest of $4.5 million, and a civil penalty of $75 million. Kelsoe agreed to pay a
$500,000 fine and a $250,000 civil penalty and was barred from association with a broker,
a dealer, an investment adviser, a municipal securities dealer, or a municipal adviser and also
from serving or acting as an officer, a director, or an employee of such entities. Weller, the
CPA, was barred from practicing before the SEC for a period of 2 years under Rule 102(e);
was also barred from associating in a supervisory capacity with a broker, a dealer, an investment adviser, or an underwriter for 12 months; and paid a civil penalty of $50,000.

What Does the Morgan Case Tell You?
Let’s reflect on the Morgan case and a few points inherent in what the proceeding described:
• Kelsoe’s actions could not have been effective in misleading the independent auditor unless he had enlisted the help of the outside brokerage firm in submitting false
quotes. Likewise, without Weller looking the other way, it is questionable how long
Kelsoe might have been successful in misleading the valuation committee. Therefore,
this case has within it one of the most common elements of a successful fraud: collusion among various participants.
• Assume for a moment that you were the engagement partner for the independent
auditor for the funds. As the credit crisis took hold in 2007 and 2008, you are concerned there is an increased risk that clients might overvalue their portfolio securities that are backed by mortgages or other debt instruments. What audit procedures
might you have instituted to address the increased risk of overvaluations of these
securities?
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• If you were in Weller’s shoes and realized the adjustments being made by Kelsoe
were inconsistent with fair value, what would you have done to expose the fraudulent valuations?
Where was the valuation committee in this case?
On December 1, 2011, the SEC filed an action against Michael R. Balboa, the fund manager for the Millennium Global Emerging Credit Fund (Millennium) and 2 affiliated feeder
funds, and Gilles T. De Charsonville, a purportedly independent broker. Millennium was an
emerging market hedge fund with reported assets of $844 million at the time of its collapse
in October 2008. The SEC proceeding was based on the scheme hatched by Balboa to have
De Charsonville and one other broker provide false mark-to-market quotes for 2 securities in Millennium’s portfolio. Those quotes were provided to GlobeOp Financial Services,
Millennium’s independent valuation agent, and Deloitte & Touche Bermuda, Millennium’s
independent auditor. By August 2008, Millennium’s NAV was overstated by approximately
$163 million as a result of the false price quotes. In addition, the SEC alleged that the fraudulent valuations allowed Balboa to attract an additional $410 million in new investments and
to deter close to $230 million in eligible redemptions from Millennium.
Balboa is a citizen of the United Kingdom but was arrested on December 1, 2011, while
traveling in New York. He was charged later that day in a companion criminal case for
fraudulently overvaluing Millennium’s assets. The criminal case encompasses securities and
wire fraud charges for which Balboa faces up to 20 years in prison.

Regulatory Issues
The real-life story of how, on December 1, 2011, the SEC came to charge Balboa’s fund
and two other investment advisory firms with fraud and initiated the case against Balboa,
De Charsonville, and four other individuals is worth noting, especially in view of the SEC’s
failure to detect the Madoff fraud:
• The SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit is now using proprietary
risk analytics to evaluate hedge fund returns. When performance appears inconsistent with a fund’s disclosed investment strategy or other benchmarks, the SEC
conducts further inquiries.
• This initiative, the Aberrational Performance Inquiry, is now being applied across
the investment adviser space, beyond performance and hedge funds, according to the
co-chiefs of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit. Among other
factors that this initiative will consider are whether the adviser consistently outperforms market, instrument, or commodity indexes, with special attention for those
that generate returns exceeding 3 percent above the relevant index or that generate
consistently high returns with low volatility during periods of market turmoil. (Such
an approach might have surfaced the Madoff fraud much sooner because Madoff ’s
returns were clearly aberrational in their amount and duration when compared with
other investment advisory firms.)
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• In late 2011, the SEC Enforcement Division apparently sent out a letter to a
number of private equity firms as part of an informal inquiry into the industry. In
particular, the letter asked the unidentified private equity firms to provide information about how they value their investments and report performance. According to
a February 12, 2012, article in the New York Times, unnamed sources believe the SEC
is concerned that private equity firms might overstate the value of their portfolios
to attract investors for future funds. Because private equity firms typically invest in
private companies rather than public companies or publicly traded securities, the
concerns identified by the SEC may have a colorable basis.
• Larger private equity firms often use outside valuation or financial advisory firms
and employ rigorous valuation processes. However, as was demonstrated in the Morgan and Balboa cases, collusion or manipulation can undermine the results of any
independent valuation.
• How rigorously these processes are applied may soon be tested because the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) empowered the SEC to begin collecting annual financial and other data from hedge and
other funds with more than $150 million in assets under management and the same
information on a quarterly basis from hedge and other funds with more than $1.5
billion in assets under management. The required data will include
— monthly performance for each fund under management, including gross and net
of fees.
— leverage and exposure information.
— assets under management by class, sector, and region.
— valuations for level 1, level 2, and level 3 assets.
— derivatives data.
• Assuming that the SEC begins to develop and apply proprietary analytics to private
equity performance, it is possible that private equity firms may have their portfolio
valuations called into question or subjected to regulatory proceedings, as did the first
of the hedge funds in December 2011.

The Municipal Securities Market Attracts
Regulatory Attention
On February 18, 2011, the Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC is investigating some
mutual funds over whether they overstated the value of thinly traded municipal bonds. The
inquiry apparently arose when some high-yield bond funds were forced to sell high-quality
liquid assets to meet fund withdrawal requests, leaving the high-yield bond funds with a
higher proportion of more risky, less frequently traded municipal bonds. In particular, the
SEC is believed to be investigating “dirt bonds” that were used to finance infrastructure for
housing developments in California and Florida.When the housing market hit its downturn,
some developments weren’t built, and cash flow to repay the “dirt bonds” dried up.The valuation issue was compounded by the fact that some “dirt bonds” haven’t been purchased or
sold for several years, leading to some real valuation questions.
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In this regard, consider some of the findings in the January 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study Municipal Securities: Overview of Market Structure, Pricing, and Regulation. The study, undertaken pursuant to a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, found
• the municipal securities market amounts to approximately $3.7 trillion, with individuals holding 75 percent of the total securities outstanding (either directly or
through investment funds).
• the municipal securities market has over 46,000 municipal issuers (states, counties, cities, towns, and government agencies); by contrast, approximately 12,000
public companies are in the United States (5,700 of which trade on major U.S.
exchanges).
• municipal securities trade infrequently. In 2010, approximately 99 percent of
municipal securities did not trade on a given day, meaning buyers and sellers of these
securities are not readily available.
• “the large municipal securities market, with its many issuers and infrequent trades
for a given security, does not have readily available, transparent information on the
prices of securities.”
• given the generally opaque market for municipal securities, a brokerage firm
trying to determine a price at which it will buy or sell an infrequently traded
municipal security will consider factors such as “(1) recent post-trade price
information on the same or comparable securities, (2) available pretrade price information on the security or comparable securities, (3) the characteristics and credit
quality of the security, (4) relevant market information, and (5) the cost of trading
the security.”
The findings from the GAO study confirm the difficulties facing investment funds and
other investors (or their valuation specialists) that must value municipal securities. For investment advisers, even a good faith error in valuing such securities can lead to regulatory or
investor lawsuits claiming overpayment of management fees, failure to abide by pre-established asset allocation policies, or underpayments of redemptions.
In an effort to bring further transparency to valuation issues, Accounting Standards Update
No. 2011-04, Fair Value Measurement (Topic 820): Amendments to Achieve Common Fair Value
Measurement and Disclosure Requirements in U.S. GAPP and IFRSs, added disclosure requirements with respect to fair value measurements and sought to narrow the differences between
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles and International Financial Reporting Standards by, among other things, requiring
• management to demonstrate its valuation approach is suitable for determining fair
value.
• disclosure of transfers among level 1, level 2, and level 3.
• identification and explanation of valuation techniques and inputs used in valuing
level 2 and level 3 assets.
• qualitative and, when relevant, quantitative discussion of level 3 asset valuation sensitivities to significant, unobservable inputs.
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To provide a sense of current valuation process disclosures, review the following sample concerning portfolio valuation taken from the Ares Capital Corporation (Ares) Annual
Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2011. Ares is a business development company (BDC) registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. It is one of
the largest BDCs in the United States, with $5.4 billion of total assets and $15 billion of
committed capital under management.
Debt and equity securities that are not publicly traded or whose market prices
are not readily available (i.e., substantially all of our investments) are valued at
fair value as determined in good faith by our board of directors, based on, among
other things, the input of our investment adviser, audit committee and independent third-party valuation firms that have been engaged at the direction of our
board of directors to assist in the valuation of each portfolio investment without a
readily available market quotation at least once during a trailing 12-month period,
and under a valuation policy and a consistently applied valuation process. The
valuation process is conducted at the end of each fiscal quarter, and a minimum of
50% of our portfolio at fair value is subject to review by an independent valuation
firm each quarter. In addition, our independent accountants review our valuation
process as part of their overall integrated audit.
As part of the valuation process, we may take into account the following types of
factors, if relevant, in determining the fair value of our investments: the enterprise
value of a portfolio company (an estimate of the total fair value of the portfolio
company’s debt and equity), the nature and realizable value of any collateral, the
portfolio company’s ability to make payments and its earnings and discounted cash
flow, the markets in which the portfolio company does business, a comparison of
the portfolio company’s securities to any similar publicly traded securities, changes
in the interest rate environment and the credit markets generally that may affect
the price at which similar investments may be made in the future and other relevant factors.When an external event such as a purchase transaction, public offering
or subsequent equity sale occurs, we consider the pricing indicated by the external
event to corroborate our valuation ….
Additionally, the fair value of our investments may differ significantly from the
values that would have been used had a ready market existed for such investments
and may differ materially from the values that we may ultimately realize. Further,
such investments are generally subject to legal and other restrictions on resale or
otherwise are less liquid than publicly traded securities. If we were required to
liquidate a portfolio investment in a forced or liquidation sale, we could realize
significantly less than the value at which we have recorded it ….
Our board of directors undertakes a multi-step valuation process each quarter,
as described below:
•
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•

•

•

for the portfolio investment in conjunction with our portfolio management
team.
Preliminary valuations are reviewed and discussed with our investment adviser’s
management and investment professionals, and then valuation recommendations are
presented to our board of directors.
The audit committee of our board of directors reviews these valuations, as well as the
input of third parties, including independent third-party valuation firms, with respect to
the valuations of a minimum of 50% of our portfolio at fair value.
Our board of directors discusses valuations and determines the fair value of each investment in our portfolio without a readily available market quotation in good faith based
on, among other things, the input of our investment adviser, audit committee and,
where applicable, independent third-party valuation firms.

Ethical Guides
Thomas Paine, the English-American author, once said,“A long habit of not thinking a thing
wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson, the American essayist and poet, once said, “Character is higher than
intellect.”
Charles Evans Hughes, the former governor of New York, once said, “A man has to live with
himself, and he should see to it that he always has good company.”
Arnold H. Glasow, the American humorist, once said, “Live so that your friends can defend
you but never have to.”
According to Article IV, “Objectivity and Independence,” of the California Society of CPAs
Code of Professional Conduct
Members often serve multiple interests in many different capacities and must
demonstrate their objectivity in varying circumstances. Members in public practice render attest, tax and management advisory services. Other members prepare
financial statements in the employment of others, perform internal auditing services and serve in management capacities in industry, education and government
…. Regardless of service or capacity, members should protect the integrity of their
work, maintain objectivity, and avoid any subordination of their judgment.

According to Interpretation 101-1 of the New York State Society of Certified Public
Accountants Code of Professional Conduct,
A member shall be considered to have knowingly misrepresented facts in violation
of rule 102 when he or she knowingly –

a. Makes, or permits or directs another to make, materially false and misleading
entries in an entity’s financial statements or records; or
b. Fails to correct an entity’s financial statements or records that are materially
false and misleading when he or she has the authority to record an entry; or
c. Signs, or permits another to sign, a document containing materially false and
misleading information.
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Case Study Facts
Introduction
Daydreaming at your desk in early February was easy, you thought, as you watched the snow
fall over Buffalo and wished you were far away in Florida or some equally sunny destination. Thinking you needed another cup of coffee, you were just about to head to the office
kitchen when your phone rang.
“Ms. Campbell, this is Andrew Williamson. I was given your name by Julia Hughes with
the accounting firm of Simpson & Drew. I serve on the audit committee of the Bank of
Little Beach. Julia told me you’ve worked with some of their clients before on valuation
issues, and we’ve run into one that I’d like to talk to you about. Do you have time to get
together later this week?”
After setting a meeting time and letting Mr. Williamson know you’ll run a conflict check
in the meantime, you ask if he can give you an overview of the situation that caused him to
call. He says
In a nutshell, we had a meeting with Julia and one of her staff people earlier this
week about a few of our municipal bond investments. Julia’s firm got price quotes
on the bonds back in the first week of January, but now, Julia and her firm are questioning those values and have asked the audit committee to get involved.We’re just
a small bank, so we’re not quite sure what to do here. However this plays out, we
want to do the right thing and make sure we’re not overvaluing or undervaluing
our bond holdings.

On that note, Williamson confirms he’ll be in your office at the appointed time to discuss
how your firm might help the bank resolve this situation.

Your Research
Before meeting Williamson, you decide to have a look at the bank’s Call Report filed with
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) for the quarter ended
December 31, 2011. That report shows the bank is a state member bank, one of the 900 or
so that are members of the Federal Reserve System that are state chartered.The Call Report
shows the bank’s total equity is approximately $28.1 million, loans and leases total $196
million, HTM securities are $0, AFS securities total $84 million, and total assets are approximately $280 million. When you look over page 1 of Schedule RC-B, you see the securities
listed on page 1 comprise approximately 96 percent of the total AFS securities held by the
bank and are reported in table 5-1 on the following page.

The Meeting With Williamson
When Williamson arrives at your office, you take in a man who is in his fifties, balding, and
dressed in a rumpled sport coat, a ready smile on his face with an open, friendly demeanor.
After spending a few moments on pleasantries, he gets down to business.
“So, Anne—if I may call you that—let me fill you in on what has been going on. Our
bank is a state-chartered bank and a member of the Federal Reserve System.” At this, you
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pull out a copy of the December 31 Call Report from a file on your desk, which draws a
compliment from him.
“Ah, I see you’re a step ahead of me. I should have expected as much, with what I heard about
you from Julia,” he said smiling. “Did you take a look at our RC-B schedule of securities?”
“Yes,” you reply. “I noticed you have approximately $36 million in securities issued by
states, counties, cities, and other political subdivisions that are fair valued. How much of that
is held in municipal bonds?”
Table 5-1
Schedule RC-B–Securities

BANK OF LITTLE BEACH

FFIEC 041

RSSD-ID ******

Quarter End Date 12/31/2011

Last Updated on 12/31/2011
Schedule RC-B – Securities
Dollar amounts in thousands

1. U.S. Treasury securities
2. U.S. government agency obligations
(exclude mortgage-backed securities)
a. issued by U.S. government agencies
b. issued by U.S. governmentsponsored agencies
3. Securities issued by states and political
subdivisions in the United States

(Column A)

(Column B)

(Column C)

(Column D)

Held-tomaturity
Amortized Cost

Held-tomaturity
Fair Value

Availablefor-sale
Amortized Cost

Availablefor-sale
Fair Value

0

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
3,496

0
4,567

0

0

15,676

36,588

0
0

0
0

0
6,642

0
8,084

0

0

0

0

0

0

3,055

3,173

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS):
a. Residential mortgage pass-through
securities
i. guaranteed by the GNMA
ii. issued by the FNMA and the
FHLMC
iii. other pass-through securities
b. Other residential MBS (include
CMOs, REMICs, and stripped MBS)
i. issued or guaranteed by U.S.
government agencies or
sponsored agencies
ii. collateralized by MBS issued or
guaranteed by U.S. government
agencies or sponsored agencies
iii. all other residential MBS
c. Commercial MBS:
i. Commercial mortgage
pass-through securities
1. issued or guaranteed by the
FNMA, the FHLMC, or the
GNMA
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For the first time since you met Williamson, you notice he seems somewhat uncomfortable or distracted. After looking down toward the floor, he returns his eyes to meet yours.
“Well, that’s kind of a long story, but if it’s alright, how about if I give you the short version?”
When you nod in agreement, he continues.
“The bank’s CFO is a guy named Jack Weingarten. Jack’s been with the bank for, oh, 11 or
12 years now. He’s a really great guy, you know, just as nice as can be.”You notice Williamson
is looking expectantly, so you nod understandingly. At that, Williamson continues.
“Well, Jack has always been real trustworthy and all. You know, we’ve never had a harsh
word for him, and he’s always on top of the numbers, always gets reports to us on time. More
important, he’s got integrity; you can’t buy that or fake it, that’s for sure.” You nod again,
wondering when Williamson will get to the point or if Jack has turned out to be the “too
good to be true” crook. As if reading your mind, Williamson continues.
“Sorry for the background, but I thought you should know how all of us on the audit
committee feel about Jack. Incidentally, we feel the same way about the CEO, Reed Smith,
but he’s really not involved in what happened.” Williamson looks down again, disturbed, but
goes on. “The bottom line is that Jack got pitched by a slick big-city broker at New York
Brokerage about investing our excess cash in Oswego County ‘dirt bonds’ about a year and
a half ago. From the sound if it, that broker could have sold ice to Eskimos 10 times over.
So, Jack moved about $6 million from cash and maturing bonds to the Oswego County ‘dirt
bonds.’”
“Are you talking about the Oswego County that’s been in the headlines the last week?”
you ask.
“None other than, I’m afraid.You’ve obviously read the news stories about the debate over
how much longer Oswego County can pay the coupon on those ‘dirt bonds,’ right?”
“Yes, I did. From what I read, it sounds like the county’s development plans outpaced the
growth in housing absorption, and when the community center wasn’t built, it discouraged
more folks from moving in. Sort of a domino effect that has the County Board of Supervisors in a tough spot,” you reply.
“You summed it up pretty well, Anne. I guess the only thing I’d add is that when Jack
started buying the bonds, they were priced at about 80, so the effective yield was close to 6
percent tax free. Pretty attractive rate, huh?”
“Yeah, but you know the old saying: risk equates to reward.”
At that, Williamson looks down again.
I guess that’s a lesson we’re learning the hard way. So, let me fill you in on the rest
of what happened. That silver-tongued broker called Jack in September and said
the bonds had traded down to 70; it was a fantastic buying opportunity; blah, blah,
blah. The yield was almost 7 percent tax free, and the broker kinda suckered Jack
in by saying he should average down his cost in the bonds while he could because
the county was on the verge of securing a corporate headquarters for a Fortune
1000 company that would drive housing prices up and bring in big gains for the
bondholders.You can probably hear the broker, right? Yada, yada, yada ….
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“I understand exactly what you’re saying, Mr. Williamson. But I’m still not sure exactly
how we can help.”
Williamson interrupted
Here’s the crux of our problem, Anne. After Jack had that conversation with the
broker, Jack figured this would be a golden opportunity to make the bank a lot
of money in a short period, so he liquidated 50 percent of our portfolio of other
municipals and had the broker buy more Oswego County ‘dirt bonds.’ At that
point, we owned about $24 million in principal amount of the bonds.

At this, you wince. “Did the bank not have policies in place to prevent that kind of concentration in the securities portfolio?”
Williamson replied
Yes, we did, but Jack violated that policy—plain and simple. Look, we know we could
blame Jack for all of this, but it wasn’t like he was lining his own pockets or stealing from the bank or a customer. As soon as we found out about it, Jack owned up
immediately to what he had done, and he apologized again and again. The bottom
line is that Jack got hustled by that broker and violated our investment policies, but
he did so because he thought it would be a great way to increase stockholder returns.

“Exactly how did you find out about what had happened?” you ask.
Well, we found out the hard way, I guess you’d say. Julia and her audit team came in the
first week of January to begin work on the audit and help us prepare the December
31 Call Report.When they got to the Oswego County bonds, they asked Jack to get
a price quote from the broker at New York Brokerage. Jack got the quote via e-mail,
77.50, and passed it along to Julia and her team. At that point, everything was hunkydory, you know, because we were actually at break-even or better on those bonds.”

Williamson paused to take a drink from his water glass, looking a little tired and stressed.
“Julia discussed the concentration with Jack, but she didn’t focus in right away on the concentration policy. Heck, I didn’t ask Julia about this, but I’d bet she thought Jack had gotten
authorization to purchase the Oswego County bonds from the investment committee.
He continued
Last week, the audit was almost done, and then, the article about the county was
posted on the Internet. Julia saw the article and asked Jack to get an updated quote
on the bonds. When the quote came back unchanged from New York Brokerage,
Julia told Jack she was skeptical about why the value wouldn’t have changed.
So, Jack went to a different brokerage firm for a quote, which is when he found
out the bonds hadn’t traded in almost three months, and the quote he’d been given
by New York Brokerage was the last trade data. When Jack asked the second brokerage firm for a quote, it came back with 48. Jack did the right thing by passing
that along to Julia, but as soon as Julia heard that, she asked to meet with us on
the audit committee to talk about the differing quotes, our responsibilities as audit
committee members, and the implications of the second quote. I guess you’d say
that Julia has put this issue firmly in our court, and she’s made it clear we have some
work to do before the audit can be completed.
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At this point, you interject with a question that’s been nagging at you as Williamson laid
out the situation. “So, Mr. Williamson, are you and the other audit committee members
familiar with the process of valuing illiquid securities, or did Julia take you through that
process?”
He replies
Not really. I was asked to join the board because my company is a good customer
of the bank, and the two other members of the audit committee are a local lawyer and the head of a nonprofit. We’ve pretty much depended on Jack for most
everything, and Julia said she can’t get involved in this valuation issue because of
independence concerns. Jack isn’t quite sure what to do now, so I came to see you
to find out what we on the audit committee should be doing.

Taking a deep breath, you begin to educate Williamson. Three hours later he leaves your
office.

Questions for Consideration
1. Assume that you are engaged by the audit committee to render a valuation on the
Oswego County bonds. Which of the following data sources would you consider to
be most relevant to your valuation, given the objective of the engagement?
a. The price at which the bank purchased the bonds in September.
b. The January price quote from New York Brokerage.
c. Recent pre- and posttrade price information for comparable securities.
d. The collateral value underlying the bonds.
2. During the course of your engagement, the members of the audit committee inform
you that they’re beginning to wonder if Weingarten is as innocent as they originally
thought. The idea has occurred to the audit committee that Weingarten might have
been colluding with the broker at New York Brokerage to overvalue the bonds.
The audit committee asks for your input on this subject because it doesn’t want
to approach Julia or other members of the audit team about this. How would you
respond?
a. I would ask the audit committee to provide me a copy of any documents or
e-mails that led it to this conclusion or idea.
b. The scope of your engagement would have to be redefined before you would be in
a position to respond to this request, so you prepare an addendum to your engagement letter that covers the additional services.
c. The valuation work you’ve been engaged to provide is inconsistent with a forensic
engagement, so you recommend the audit committee hire another firm to conduct
a forensic review.
d. I would refuse to answer the audit committee because the request is outside the
scope of my engagement.
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3. Assume the same set of facts described in the preceding question. If you agreed to
provide guidance to the audit committee, which is going to conduct its own investigation, which of the following would you suggest to the audit committee as a way to
expose potential collusion between Weingarten and New York Brokerage?
a. The committee should review all e-mails between Weingarten and the brokerage
firm from the first purchase of the bonds through the most recent practicable date.
b. The committee should get another brokerage firm to produce a price history
for the bonds from the time of the bank’s first purchase through the most recent
practicable date.
c. The committee should examine the trade confirmations for the bonds and compare the prices in the trade confirmations with the price history for the bonds
produced by another brokerage firm.
d. The committee should seek to determine if there have been recent lifestyle or
other changes in Weingarten’s personal life.
e. All of the above.
4. As the auditor for the bank, Julia is understandably concerned about this client and the
situation in which the bank now finds itself. What are some of the recommendations
that Julia might make to the audit committee after this situation is addressed?
a. The audit committee should engage a valuation firm to value, at least every 12
months, any thinly traded securities held by the bank.
b. Weingarten should be removed as CFO.
c. The audit committee should look to increase its financial expertise either through
contracted assistance or the addition of new members with accounting or finance
backgrounds.
d. Julia should not make any recommendations to the audit committee because doing
so could impair her firm’s independence.
e. Both (a) and (c).
f. Both (b) and (d).
5. Assume that the audit committee finds out that Weingarten had actually classified a portion
of the Oswego County bonds as HTM. The bank decides to cut its losses and get out of
the bonds.Which of the following offers the best safe harbor for the bank to rely upon to
avoid tainting the entire portfolio of HTM securities if it sells the Oswego County bonds?
a. The bank is converting to an S corporation, and its investors do not need tax-free
income, so it should rely on the change in tax law safe harbor.
b. The bank intends to complete an acquisition next year, so it should rely on the
major business combination safe harbor and sell the securities to maintain the
bank’s credit risk profile.
c. The bank should rely on the significant deterioration in the issuer’s creditworthiness safe harbor.
d. The bank is not going to have a safe harbor available, and the portfolio of HTM
securities will be tainted.
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6. If the audit committee asked you to recommend best practices the bank should adopt
in acquiring and valuing thinly traded securities, which of the following would you
recommend?
a. The bank’s valuation committee should be responsible for identifying all securities
without a readily available market quotation and should obtain independent valuations by outside valuation firms at least once every 12 months.
b. At least 50 percent of the bank’s fair-valued securities should be reviewed by an
outside valuation firm each quarter.
c. Trading and price information should be reviewed for securities owned by the
bank, and when appropriate or necessary, a comparable securities pricing analysis
should be obtained.
d. Multiple price quotes should be obtained from different brokerage firms or other
sources for these securities.
e. The bank’s approval policies for securities purchases and sales should be revised
such that the CFO or CEO could not commit the bank to an undue concentration in certain securities.
f. All of the above.
g. Both (a) and (e).
7. If the bank later determined that Weingarten was colluding with New York Brokerage to inflate the prices reported for the Oswego County bonds, what consequences
might Weingarten face? How would those differ if the bank was public?
8. Explain why municipal securities are considered thinly traded securities and what
facts will generally prevent municipal securities from being classified as level 1 assets
in the fair value hierarchy.

Suggested Readings
The GAO study of the municipal securities markets that is referenced earlier in this chapter
contains an analysis not only of the market itself but also covers (a) the important differences
in information available to institutional and retail investors that may affect retail investors’
ability to realize the same prices as those received by institutional investors and (b) the current
regulatory regime in the municipal securities market. This study may be found at www.gao.
gov/assets/590/587714.pdf and provides an excellent overview of these and related topics.
The FFIEC maintains a central data repository that includes financial and structural information covering most Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-insured institutions. The website includes bulk data in XBRL format, individual institution reports in PDF or XBRL
formats, and uniform bank performance reports. The website also points out that with the
effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act, thrifts are now required to submit Call Reports, effective
March 2012. The FFIEC website can be found at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/Default.aspx.
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6
Case 6—Megatron Corp.—You
Are the Corporate Controller
Introduction
The issue of personal exposure for nondisclosure of material information by one’s employer
is no longer one of small concern. The regulatory and political environments have evolved
from treating disclosure failures as strictly civil matters to a targeted effort to criminally
prosecute the “bad actors” in cases of intentional nondisclosure. The following case study
highlights issues related to nondisclosure at the corporate level that come to the attention
of nonexecutive financial managers and controllers, particularly those issues surrounding
the discovery, reporting, and resolution of disclosure issues created by the actions of other
employees or executive officers. Given the more frequent involvement of CEOs and CFOs
in conduct leading to active concealment or nondisclosure of material information, nonexecutive financial managers and controllers will increasingly be called upon to question both
judgments and information that portend personal liability if not correctly taken.
Intimately related to the content, quality, and timeliness of disclosure documents is the issue
of sales of securities by executive officers, directors, and control persons once disclosure has
been made publicly available.With insider stock sales subject to accelerated disclosure within
two business days of the transaction date and disclosure now required for option repricings,
regrants, and cancellations, insider stock sales are now scrutinized as never before. Financial
officers and managers must be cognizant of factors such as what constitutes material nonpublic information, when and how insider stock transactions must be disclosed, compliance
with trading window and other company policies, and how (through what route) information should be surfaced that may bear on insider stock sales or purchases. In those instances
when the reporting company has in-house counsel or an in-house compliance officer, certain of these duties may fall to others, but small companies often rely on financial officers
and managers to take some part in monitoring stock sales and disclosure. In some instances,
the CFO or general counsel is given a power of attorney to file insider trading reports on
behalf of the other officers and directors of the company. This works well when the CFO or
counsel knows of new option grants, option exercises, or stock sales; however, what do you
do when a director has shares in a brokerage account and forgets to tell the attorney-in-fact
that he or she sold or bought shares in that account?
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Focus Points
In a March 23, 2004, speech before the National Association for Business Economics, thenSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman William Donaldson said, “As we
move forward, companies, their management, their directors and the gatekeepers who serve
them must look beyond just conforming to the letter of the new laws and regulations. They
must redefine corporate governance with practices that go beyond mere adherence to new
rules and demonstrate ethics, integrity, honesty, and transparency.”
In a March 25, 2003, speech before the International Financial Law Review award dinner,
then-SEC Chairman Paul Atkins said
Revelations of corporate mismanagement, malfeasance, and/or incompetence have
undermined the world’s financial markets in a profound way …. We need to be
mindful of the fact that morality and ethics cannot be legislated into existence.
Government controls alone—too often paternalistic—will never be a solution if
individuals and individual firms are not upholding their own end of simple business ethics through their own effective compliance. Internal controls and the culture of an organization are basic structural aspects to reinforce the inherent nature
of most people to do the right thing.

In considering the excerpted portions of these speeches, ask yourself what message you
think the SEC is trying to send in these speeches. One answer: the SEC is firmly convinced
of the role that organizational structures, governance, and regulation play in defining corporate conduct; however, individual integrity and the demonstration of appropriate values are
ultimately determinative of organizational behavior.
On April 6, 2011, Anton Valukas, the bankruptcy examiner in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs concerning his views of the
auditor’s role with respect to public companies and the markets:
I want to emphasize at the outset that I did not make any finding as to whether
regulators or auditors necessarily could have prevented Lehman’s collapse. Lehman
failed in part because it was unable to retain the confidence of its lenders and
counterparties and because it did not have sufficient liquidity.
Nevertheless, and wholly apart from the claims involving Lehman’s auditors, we
must recognize the general principle that auditors serve a critical role in the proper
functioning of public companies and financial markets. Boards of directors and
audit committees are entitled to rely on external auditors to serve as watchdogs—
to be important gatekeepers who provide an independent check on management.
And the investing public is entitled to believe that a “clean” report from an independent auditor stands for something. The public has every right to conclude that
auditors who hold themselves out as independent will stand up to management
and not succumb to pressure to avoid rocking the boat.

Ask yourself the following: as a financial executive, an officer, a manager, an accountant or
an auditor, do I conduct myself (practice with) integrity, and do I demonstrate values that
have a positive impact on my company’s or firm’s actions as an organization? Have I lived
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up to my professional responsibilities as defined by the profession’s literature and regulators?
Have I met the legitimate expectations of third parties, whether those arise from legal, ethical, or other duties?
On the subject of insider trading, here are a few recent examples of the SEC’s more successful efforts in this area:
• On June 27, 2011, the SEC announced it had filed civil charges alleging accounting fraud against two former officers of Basin Water, Inc. (Basin): Peter L. Jensen, the
former CEO, and Thomas C. Tekulve, Jr., the former CFO. The SEC alleged that
in 2006 and 2007, Jensen and Tekulve had caused Basin to improperly recognize
revenue from 6 sales of water treatment systems. The SEC further alleged that the
water treatment system sales were not eligible for revenue recognition for various
reasons, including that the sale was not final, the customer was not permitted to
pay anything until the system was resold, the customer had not accepted the system, and the company had not shipped the system. Consequently, Basin overstated
2007 annual revenues by 74 percent and quarterly 2006 and 2007 revenues from 10
percent to 161 percent. During 2006 and 2007, when Basin’s financial position and
operating results were materially misstated, Jensen sold Basin stock for total proceeds
of over $9.1 million. He also donated shares to a university, an action that generated $763,000 in tax deductions. The SEC is seeking permanent injunctions against
Jensen and Tekulve, disgorgement, civil penalties, repayment to the Basin bankruptcy
estate of all bonuses and other incentive-based or equity-based compensation, and
officer and director bars.
• On January 4, 2012, the SEC filed civil charges against Life Partners Holdings, Inc.
(Life Partners) and its CEO, Brian Pardo; its president and general counsel, R. Scott
Peden; and its CFO, David Martin, in connection with an alleged disclosure and
accounting fraud. Life Partners is in the life settlement busines and generates revenue
by brokering so-called “life settlements.” In effect, Life Partners is the middleman
between a life insurance policy owner who wants to sell his or her policy while he
or she is still alive (thereby obtaining funds for living or other expenses) and investors who purchase fractional interests in the policies and who then receive the death
benefit when the policy matures (on death of the insured). At the time a policy
is sold, Life Partners collect funds from the investors to cover the future premium
payments that must be made during the insured’s estimated life expectancy and
escrows those funds with a third party. If the insured outlives his or her estimated life
expectancy, then the investors are obligated to continue paying the premiums, or the
investors will lose their entire investment.
As the SEC noted, life expectancy is a critical factor in establishing the price an
investor will pay to purchase a life settlement. If an insured lives longer than anticipated, the investors must pay more premiums, and as a result, the investors’ effective
rate of return will fall. Conversely, if an insured lives a period equal to or less than
estimated life expectancy, the premiums paid by investors will be equal to or less
than the projected amounts, and the rate of return will be equal to or greater than
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projections. For this reason, Life Partners was able to make more money by charging
investors a higher price for policies when life expectancies were short.
The SEC alleged that since 1999, Life Partners systematically used materially
underestimated life expectancies to inflate its revenues. To do so, Life Partners allegedly sent all its life expectancy assessments to Dr. David Cassidy, a doctor in Reno,
NV, who had no prior experience in making life expectancy assessments, who had
no actuarial training, and who never evaluated his track record on life expectancy
estimates. Dr. Cassidy’s selection by Life Partners was based on his sharing an office
with the physician who developed methodologies for, and performed, life expectancy assessments on behalf of Life Partners prior to the predecessor’s death in 1999.
The SEC has alleged that by 2006, Pardo and Peden knew, or were reckless in not
knowing, that 88 percent of the insureds under policies brokered by Life Partners
had exceeded Dr. Cassidy’s estimated life expectancies, and by 2009, Pardo, Peden,
and Martin knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that 90 percent of the insureds
under such policies had exceeded Dr. Cassidy’s estimated life expectancies. The SEC
noted that although Life Partners had included risk factor disclosure in its publicly
filed reports referring to the possibility that the life expectancies were in error, that
disclosure of a contingent risk was misleading and false. Peden is also alleged to have
misrepresented Cassidy’s methodology as consistent with industry practice, including
Cassidy’s reliance on the Valuation Basic Table rather than the census table.
In addition to the foregoing disclosure issues, the SEC alleged that Life Partners
and its officers engaged in a widespread accounting fraud that encompassed premature and improper revenue recognition for life settlement transactions, misleading
Life Partners’s auditor, backdating documents, and recognizing revenue based on
events occurring after period-end.
In August 2010, Peden and Martin provided Ernst & Young (E&Y), Life Partners’s auditor, with a spreadsheet of the 300 most recent policy maturities, but the
spreadsheet excluded 1,230 policies for insureds who had outlived their estimated
life expectancies developed by Cassidy. Shortly thereafter, in January 2011, the Wall
Street Journal published an article about the SEC having initiated an investigation of
Life Partners and raising questions about the accuracy of Life Partners’s life expectancies.
On May 16, 2011, Life Partners filed Form 12b-25 indicating it was unable to
timely file its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending February
28, 2011, because it had not yet completed an analysis of the noncash impairment
charges relating to its life settlements held for investment. On May 31, 2011, Life
Partners filed an amendment to this report indicating that although it had previously intended to file its Form 10-K within the 15 calendar day extension period,
it was unable to do so due to the impairment determinations, their implementation, and their review with the independent auditor and “unanticipated delays from
a reexamination of our revenue recognition policies with our independent auditor.
We believe our revenue recognition policies are appropriate and do not anticipate
retroactive changes at this time.”
100

Chapter 6: Case 6—Megatron Corp.—You Are the Corporate Controller

In June 2011, E&Y resigned as Life Partners’s auditor, withdrew its report covering the 2010 financial statements, and stated that a material weakness existed with
respect to the company’s recording of revenue in the proper period. The resignation
was triggered, according to E&Y, by Pardo’s memorandum to Life Partners’s sales
affiliates in June 2011 that threatened to take action against E&Y unless it signed off
on Life Partners’s financial statements as is. Although the audit committee disavowed
the contents of the memorandum, E&Y’s resignation cited the memorandum and
other recent events as evidence that it was no longer independent of the company
and no longer able to rely on management’s representations.
Like the case against the Basin officers, the SEC is seeking disgorgement of $11.5
million in proceeds of stock sales by Pardo’s holding company in 2008 and 2009;
$300,000 in disgorgement from Peden for 2007 sales by him; permanent injunctions;
civil penalties; officer and director bars; and reimbursement of bonuses under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).
Special Note: On November 22, 2011, Life Partners finally filed its Form 10-K for
the fiscal year ended February 28, 2011. What follows is an extract from the discussion of the restatement in that filing:
We have restated our Consolidated Financial Statements for fiscal 2010 and
fiscal 2009. The restatements relate to timing issues for revenue and related
brokerage fees, impairment expense for owned policies, deferred policy
monitoring costs, executive bonus expense, income recognition from an
investment in a trust, and state franchise tax expense. The adjustments for
these items affected our deferred income tax provision, which was also
restated for the proper periods.
Revenue and related brokerage fees were restated due to our change
in the date of revenue recognition from the date that purchasers commit
to buy policies to the date that policy closings are funded. This adjustment increased reported earnings before income taxes by $0.1 million and
decreased reported earnings before income taxes by $2.1 million, for fiscal
2009 and 2010, respectively.

• On May 29, 2008, James E. Gansman, a former partner in E&Y’s Transaction Advisory Services department, together with a friend and her father, were charged in an
insider trading scheme that netted the participants almost $600,000 in illegal profits.
The SEC complaint alleges that from mid-2006 through fall 2007, Gansman tipped
his friend, Donna Murdoch, about the identities of seven different acquisition targets
of clients that sought valuation services from E&Y. Acting on that information that
Gansman had provided to Murdoch in violation of the duties of confidentiality
owed to E&Y and its clients, Murdoch and her father allegedly traded on this information.
In May 2009, Gansman was tried and convicted on 6 counts of securities fraud,
for which he was facing a total of 120 years in prison. In February 2010, Gansman
was sentenced to 1 year and 1 day in prison. Perhaps somewhat ironically, Murdoch (having made most of the $600,000 in question) pled guilty to 15 counts of
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securities fraud but was sentenced on July 27, 2011, to just 2 years of probation
because of her cooperation in testifying as the central witness against Gansman.
According to the July 28, 2009, edition of the Wall Street Journal, Gansman met
Murdoch after logging on to a website for people in search of extramarital affairs in
November 2004.

Regulatory Issues
Nearly all public companies maintain trading window policies. These policies generally provide that executive officers, directors, financial officers, and managers with access to (or who
are aware of) financial and other material nonpublic information, together with control
shareholders who are privy to nonpublic information, cannot buy or sell the company’s
securities except when the trading window is open. The window usually opens approximately 72 hours after the company has made its quarterly or annual earnings release, so long
as the earnings release provides clear, complete, and customary earnings information. The
window closes within 20 days or less of its opening. This is the case because a later closing
would permit stock purchases or sales by insiders to occur at a point during the following
quarter when the insiders would, once again, be potentially exposed to inside information
concerning the company’s performance.Trading window policies exist to protect a company
from having its insiders appropriate what belongs to the corporation (the information about
its performance) and to protect insiders from being accused of trading on nonpublic information at times when the public typically would not be privy to such information.
Avoid this pitfall: The mere existence of a trading window policy cannot and will not
insulate insiders from liability for trading on nonpublic information.The SEC staff has reiterated time and again that the overriding question is whether the insiders had information in
their possession or were aware of information that was both material and nonpublic, regardless of whether the trading took place in a trading window. So, the question boils down to
what is material, assuming that the company insiders know information that has not been
shared with the public.
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the Supreme Court defined information as
being material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the fact … would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.” The Financial Accounting Standards Board defined materiality in the “Glossary of
Terms” of Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information (since
superseded), as a fact that, “in the light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that
the judgment of a reasonable person … would have been changed or influenced by the
omission or misstatement.” SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 asked reporting
companies and their auditors to reject 5 percent or other rules of thumb in favor of testing
both quantitative and qualitative factors when judging whether a financial misstatement is
material. Taken together, you could define material facts as those that, if known to an investor using reasonable judgment, would have probably affected his or her investment decision
in light of the quantitative and qualitative considerations then existing that relate to such
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facts. As the case study that follows illustrates, judgment calls inherent in these situations are
now much more fraught with peril, so nonexecutive financial officers and managers are best
advised to approach these determinations with a highly conservative mindset.
Note: Recognizing the potential for ever-expanding liability for insiders that buy and sell
shares even during trading windows, the SEC staff adopted Rule 10b5-1 in August 2000 to
provide an affirmative defense to charges against insiders of trading on material nonpublic
information. Under the rule, insiders can adopt a written trading plan; enter into binding
contracts; or provide third parties, such as brokers, with specific trading instructions, formulabased instructions, or complete discretion to trade in the company’s securities. As long as the
insider is not aware of nonpublic information at the time the plan is put into effect, and as
long as any party with delegated authority to trade is not aware of material nonpublic information, trades can take place regardless of whether the insider is aware of material nonpublic
information. Of course, the insider cannot exercise any discretion over the amount and timing of trades made under the plan.
Although the adoption of a Rule 10b5-1 plan provides an excellent defense against insider
trading charges and even may permit shares to be sold during the time a trading window is
otherwise closed, many companies have not encouraged insiders to use these plans. Why?
Simply put, the companies recognize that 10b5-1 plans will generally be used to facilitate
selling of shares, and companies that permit the adoption of such plans may be inviting more
pressure on already depressed stock prices. (As an aside, the adoption of a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan does not allow insiders to exceed the Rule 144 volume limitations and does not
provide protection if the trades result in short-swing purchases and sales within a six-month
period.)
Rule 10b5-1 plans have recently received some unfavorable attention as a result of several officers changing their 10b5-1 plans in ways that would seem to call into question if
the officer was then aware of material nonpublic information. The CEO of Countrywide
Financial is alleged to have significantly increased the number of shares to be sold under
his 10b5-1 plan in late 2006 at a time when he may have been aware of difficulties that
were developing in the subprime mortgage and Alt-A (borrowers with higher credit ratings
than subprime borrowers but not considered prime borrowers) mortgage markets. Executive
officers of other companies have allegedly set up 10b5-1 plans, terminated the plans when
material positive announcements were soon to be made, and then reinstituted the plans after
the stock rose. As you can see, the modification or termination of a 10b5-1 plan, if made
for the wrong reasons, can, to some extent, defeat the purpose for which the plan is at least
partially designed: to avoid insiders dictating to trustees when and how much of their stock
is to be sold.

Ethical Guides
The 14th Dalai Lama wrote in Ethics for a New Millennium, “Firstly, because our every action
has a universal dimension, a potential impact on others’ happiness, ethics are necessary as a
means to ensure that we do not harm others.”
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Michael Burke once said, “Good instincts usually tell you what to do long before your
head has figured it out.”
According to a French proverb, “There is no pillow so soft as a clear conscience.”
According to a Chinese proverb, “Laws control the lesser man. Right conduct controls the
greater one.”
Martin Luther King, Jr., the American civil rights leader, once said, “The time is always
right to do what is right.”
Harvey Fierstein, the American actor and playwright, once said, “Never be bullied into
silence. Never allow yourself to be made a victim. Accept no one’s definition of your life;
define yourself.”
According to Section 10:15-39-1(a) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, “The
Rules of Professional Conduct are based on the premise that the public and the business
community rely on sound financial reporting and on professional competence …. [The]
obligations which the Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to enforce include …
[maintaining] high standards of personal conduct in all matters affecting fitness to practice
public accounting.”
According to Section 10.1(d) of Part 10 of the Vermont Board of Public Accountancy Administrative Rules, “The rules of conduct apply to all public accountancy services.”
Under Rule 501.53(c) of the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy Rules of Professional Conduct, the following rules of professional conduct apply to and are required to be
observed by certificate or registration holders when not employed in the client practice of
public accountancy:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Integrity and objectivity;
Competence;
Acting through others;
Withdrawal or resignation;
Discreditable acts;
Reportable events;
Frivolous complaints;
Responses; and
Mandatory CPE.

Case Study Facts
Megatron Corp.’s Business
Formed initially to manufacture a small line of precision medical devices, including orthopedic screws and surgical staplers, in the United States, Megatron Corp. (Megatron) has
evolved into a multinational business that produces precision medical devices and joint
replacement products. As the trend toward production outsourcing for precision medical
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devices and joint replacement products became more pronounced, Megatron found itself
receiving orders from many of the largest health care, pharmaceutical, and medical device
companies in the United States and Europe. In the last few years, Megatron has made
a concerted effort to penetrate markets in the Far East, and in 2010, it opened a contract manufacturing facility in Singapore to serve its customers. This facility is now being
operated through a wholly-owned Singapore subsidiary, Megatron Manufacturing Pte. Ltd
(Megatron Manufacturing). Megatron’s U.S. facilities are registered in accordance with
good manufacturing practices established by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
and its international facilities, including Megatron Manufacturing, are ISO 9001 certified
as meeting strict requirements for quality assurance in design, development, production,
installation, and servicing.
By early 2011, Megatron Manufacturing had begun development of a new line of titanium hip, knee, and other joint replacements that promised significant weight savings for
patients needing knee, hip, and other joint replacements. Because weight savings translated
into reduced time for rehabilitation, word quickly spread among Megatron’s Far East customers and the hospitals they served about how Megatron Manufacturing’s new technology
represented a real advance in joint replacement and repair, not to mention rehabilitation
time. After favorable reviews of Megatron Manufacturing’s titanium joint replacements
appeared in several Japanese, Korean, and Chinese medical journals, a number of medical
device marketing companies and hospital chains began ordering titanium knee and hip
replacements.
Just as demand for these products was hitting its stride, a doctor in China reported to
Megatron and the Chinese government that one of his patients had developed a severe
immune response following a hip replacement. In essence, the patient’s body had begun
rejecting the titanium hip that had been used to replace an ailing hip, and the doctor had
been forced to perform another surgery in which a nonmetallic hip made of composite materials was substituted for the titanium Megatron Manufacturing hip. Megatron’s
senior management in the United States and at its Singapore subsidiary hired highly
respected orthopedic surgeons to review all the available data on the patient’s rejection
of the titanium hip replacement and asked for assistance from specialists in infectious
disease and immune response to evaluate the underlying causes of the rejection. Despite
these efforts, no definitive reason was found for the patient’s immune response, and
demand for Megatron Manufacturing’s titanium joint replacements continued to rise
at a record pace. By November 2011, Megatron Manufacturing’s facility in Singapore
was running near capacity, and the management, sales, and marketing departments had
received bonus pool allocations that exceeded nearly all other international bonus pools
set by Megatron.
In December 2011, the Chinese Ministry of Health sent the following memorandum by fax to Megatron’s U.S. headquarters and to Megatron Manufacturing’s facility in
Singapore:
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Chinese Ministry of Health
Beijing, China
To Megatron: Advise you that Dr. Thomas Yau of Beijing University Hospital has
notified the ministry of four patients with symptoms of immune rejection who
have received knee replacements using your titanium product. Ministry officials are
investigating. Symptoms appear to be similar to those of patient who rejected hip
replacement last year. Suggest you contact Dr.Yau to discuss this matter and advise
hospitals of issue. Cause currently undetermined but will notify you when further
information available.
CMH by Minister Chang

The Storm Arrives
The CEO of Megatron, Gareth Davis, is immediately informed of the fax from the Chinese
Ministry of Health and takes action to notify the medical committee of the board and the
advisory board and asks several physicians from the United States and Europe to immediately
proceed to Beijing to meet with Dr. Yau. Within 24 hours, Megatron has 4 doctors on the
ground, a team of researchers conducting comprehensive lab tests, and an intensive review
underway of all clinical and other data available to the Chinese Ministry of Health. Within
48 hours, Megatron personnel have taken action to advise the FDA, the SEC, and the stock
exchange on which its shares are listed of the Chinese inquiry and of the 4 new cases of
patients’ immune systems rejecting the titanium joint replacements.
Even before Megatron can provide a full report to the FDA, the media begins to pick up
rumors of some issue with the Megatron joint replacement products and tries to contact
senior executives and a spokesperson at Megatron. The company issues no comment in
response to the first call. By the time the second phone call is received from the media asking questions about rumored difficulties with its products, Megatron takes action to request
a trading halt in its shares and issues a full press release that describes the contact from the
Chinese Ministry of Health and the fact that an intensive review of all available medical
data is underway and that advises it will provide updates via press releases that will also be
posted on its website and filed with the SEC under cover of Form 8-K as soon as information becomes available. Later that day, Megatron advises the market in a press release that it
will be holding daily conference calls to update investors and the medical community on its
investigation and soliciting information from any other physicians who may have encountered similar patient reactions to the titanium joint replacement products. The following
day, Megatron is contacted by two more doctors from South Africa who indicate they had
patients who experienced moderate rejection reactions that were overcome by use of a suite
of anti-immune drugs. Megatron makes immediate disclosure of this information and offers
to retain the services of these physicians to assist in the investigation underway in China.
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As can be expected, Megatron’s stock price is hit hard in the first few days following its
disclosure of this information. Down as much as 41 percent, the market eventually begins
to stabilize, with a loss in value of approximately 30 percent from the predisclosure time
frame. Megatron’s CEO is unfazed, however, noting in the following conference calls that the
company is going to do everything in its power to assure the safety of patients and provide
updated and complete disclosure of whatever facts the investigation develops. The CEO also
undertakes to share all the information developed in the course of the investigation with
the FDA, the Chinese Ministry of Health, the South African regulators, and the health care
community. Although barraged by media questions and investor calls, Megatron’s investor
relations department and senior executives continue to hold daily calls and provide regular
updates on the investigation.
Avoid this pitfall: When faced with a crisis in confidence, many senior executives resort
to the “ostrich” approach of burying their heads in the sand. Adopting a “bunker” mentality
is generally not the best way to handle a crisis, particularly if the company is accountable to
outside third parties, such as industry regulators.The preceding example is not atypical; stock
price declines often result from questions about product performance, product recalls, and
similar events, and the company frequently learns of this type of information in a third-hand
fashion. It is the way in which the company responds to this information that is the key. If
investors, regulators, and the media believe the company is being candid, forthcoming, and
providing full disclosure, presumably because the company is doing so, the company will
often (not always, however) receive the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, if executives
clam up and offer repeated “No comment” responses and if internal company information
is not shared with regulators, it is almost inevitable that the company will be vilified by the
media and other constituencies.
*****
In the meantime, Megatron Manufacturing is conducting its own investigation of the
plant, quality control records, and production information relating to the time when the
titanium joint replacements were produced. Although minor discrepancies are found in the
course of this review, no facts come out that would explain or relate to patients’ rejection of
the products.
After two weeks of continued uncertainty, the Chinese Ministry of Health, Megatron
medical staff, and the doctors from South Africa announce their findings. To the great relief
of Megatron employees, the announcement of findings indicates the suite of anti-immunity
drugs used by the Chinese doctors had varied slightly from the drug combination used in
South Africa. The doctors attending the announcement indicated their belief that the use of
the specific combination of anti-immune drugs in South Africa had, in fact, prevented the
type of rejection experienced in China, and the Chinese doctors present stated they intended
to continue using Megatron’s joint replacement products with the new anti-immune drug
combination.
The next day, Megatron’s stock climbed 15 percent, and after conducting additional quality control checks and a thorough plant review, Megatron Manufacturing restarted production of its joint replacement products. Amid the uncertainty, however, some customer orders
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had been cancelled, and new orders began to materialize at a much slower rate than before
the announcement of the Chinese investigation. By the last 2 weeks of the March 31, 2012,
quarter, sales appeared to be headed for a 20 percent decline over the previous quarter
instead of the 20 percent increase that had been expected.
At this point, the president of Megatron Manufacturing called his executive vice president
of sales and marketing and instructed him to inform the sales force that all efforts were to be
used to secure sales before the end of the third fiscal quarter ending March 31, 2012, so as
to limit the extent of sales declines. One week later but one full week before the end of the
second fiscal quarter, Megatron Manufacturing received an order from a Hong Kong-based
hospital chain, KaeLoo Health, for joint replacement products. KaeLoo Health was given
generous payment terms and agreed to purchase sufficient products, so the sales decline for
Megatron Manufacturing for the March 31 quarter was only 10 percent rather than the
expected 20 percent. Megatron internal auditors reviewed the sale documentation and its
terms, after which Megatron Manufacturing was congratulated on making a remarkable
comeback by its U.S. parent.

You Get the Call—Now What?
Back in the United States, you have witnessed these events from your position as corporate
controller in charge of international operations. Having received the report from the internal
audit team that the March 31 numbers were verified for Megatron Manufacturing and the
other international operations that are consolidated in your reporting segment, you assemble
information from the other reporting segments and begin compiling the March 31 Form
10-Q for a review by your boss, CFO Maggie Snowdon, and the auditors. Megatron is just a
few days from releasing the quarterly numbers when you get a phone call from one of your
good friends who used to work with you.
“Tad, how are things back there in the old U.S. of A? Are you still working your way up
the corporate ladder, so you’ll be running Megatron soon?”
You reply
Now listen here, Linda, you may think you can get away with talking to me like
that just because you’re in marketing now instead of finance, but just remember
who still signs those paychecks. Besides, I’m not over 40 yet, so I don’t think I’ll
have to take over anytime soon, not unless both Maggie and Gareth keel over from
heart attacks, although I suppose that’s possible given their work schedules!”

“Well,” Linda said, “what I have to pass along might qualify you for the heart attack, not
to say that Maggie and Gareth won’t have one, too.”
Taking a long breath, you glance at the clock. “I guess it must be important for you to call
at this hour. Isn’t it about 11 p.m. over there now?”
“Yeah, actually it’s getting close to midnight, but I’m calling from home, because I wasn’t
sure I wanted to talk to you from the office. You’ve been following what’s up over here,
haven’t you?”
I sure have. Like everybody else over here, my work schedule just started to return
to the normal 60-hour week from what seemed like 80 or 100 hours per week. It
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seems like all we’ve been doing is dealing with the fallout from the titanium joint
replacement products for the last month, but we were happy to see things starting
to take a turn for the better. You’re not going to tell me that we’ve had a patient
rejection there in Singapore, are you?

“No, Tad, we haven’t had any patient problems that I know of.” Linda pauses and remarks,
“Maybe I shouldn’t have called you about this. I don’t know, maybe I’m just sticking my nose
where it doesn’t belong.”
“Linda, why don’t you let me decide that,” you respond. “If there is something on your
mind, I think you’d feel better sharing it, and I’ll feel better knowing I helped out, if I can.”
There was silence on the phone line for a moment. “That’s just it,Tad, I don’t know if you
can help or if you should, but I hear what you’re saying. Do you remember when Maggie
and you came in and talked to the international sales force about accounting for sales, how
sales had to be final, and all that stuff?”
“Yeah, I remember, Linda. More than anything else, I remember how many comments
we got about how nobody could believe how much the auditors and the SEC are cracking
down on what constitutes a sale.”
I remember too,Tad, and that’s the problem. Late this afternoon, I walked into Eric
Rogers’s office.You remember him, don’t you? He’s the executive VP in charge of
marketing for Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China. I was just dropping off
a contract I had to get him to sign, which I normally wouldn’t do because we get
all of that done electronically, but I was in the office anyway and thought I’d talk
with him about a new prospect. When I got to his office, he wasn’t there, so I just
threw the contract on his chair with a sticky-note. While I was writing out the
note to him, I glanced down and saw a letter that was sticking out from under his
calendar. I noticed the address that was on the top of the letter, which is what was
sticking out, and I just knew that address, even though it took me a moment to
place it. I guess my curiosity got the better of me, and I was thinking about taking
a quick look, when I realized the address at the top of the letter was for KaeLoo
Health, which is one of my accounts in Hong Kong. At that point, I thought
maybe I’d better look at it, just in case.

You interject, “You mean, just in case it said something about you?”
I guess so. When I read the letter, though, I didn’t know what to do. See, the letter
was addressed to Johnny Cookston, the president of KaeLoo, and it was from Eric.
When I saw it was signed by Eric, I kind of got scared because I thought maybe
Eric was trying to go over my head or maybe that KaeLoo had complained about
my handling of its account. But when I read the letter, that’s when I decided I’d
better call you.

You wait for Linda to go on, wondering what’s next.
I feel a little like a tattletale, Tad, but the letter said that Eric would personally see
to it that any joint replacement products that KaeLoo purchased before March
31 would be resold to another customer if we were notified of any more patient
rejections in the next six months that were traced back to the joint replacement
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products. It also referred to a conversation that Eric had evidently already had with
Johnny on this subject, but when I got the order, it didn’t have any qualifications
or subject tos, and I hadn’t even talked to Johnny about the order.

Avoid this pitfall: Just as revenue recognition tops the list of SEC enforcement matters, improper timing of revenue recognition is the single greatest reason for improper revenue recognition, topping even fictitious revenue and improper valuations.The SEC’s report
under Section 704 of SOX found that side letter accounting fraud cases were responsible
for 25 cases out of 126 enforcement matters that involved improper revenue recognition.
The most recent high-profile enforcement cases that cited use of side letter agreements that
modified contact terms were Xerox, Sunbeam Corporation, and McKesson HBOC Inc.,
although each year brings new cases involving smaller companies, as well.This is an issue not
easily found out or addressed but one that requires consideration by management, particularly when motive and opportunity are present.
Avoid this pitfall: AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(AICPA, Professional Standards), adopted October 15, 2002, points out that fraud risks are
increased in circumstances when there are incentives and pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations. The appendix “Examples of Fraud Risk Factors” and the exhibit “Management
Antifraud Programs and Controls” of AU section 316 give considerable guidance about what
auditors and management should look for when evaluating the risk of fraud. The following
circumstances are among those that apply here:
•
•
•
•

Financial stability or profitability is threatened.
Compensation in the form of bonuses may be threatened.
Transactions close to period-end.
An unusual transaction in the sense that the purchase was a sizeable one from a new
customer.

*****
Thinking quickly, you grasp at alternatives. “Are you sure the letter didn’t predate your
order, Linda, or is it possible there was a contract addendum? I can’t recall the internal audit
team mentioning it, but maybe Eric already has the alternative customer and was merely trying to accommodate KaeLoo because we’ve been trying to get it as a customer for so long.”
I am so sorry, Tad, but I’m afraid not. I already thought about the addendum or
alternative customer, but orders have been dropping so fast since the patient rejections that there’s no way Eric could have found another customer to take that dollar
amount of products. Just to be sure, I checked the file, but there are no addendums,
and I’m sorry to say, there isn’t a copy of Eric’s letter in the file either. And Eric’s
letter was dated two days after the day I got the order. If I hadn’t remembered you
and Maggie’s telling us about what constitutes a sale, I might have just blown it off,
but as I thought about it, I just knew that something seemed wrong.

You are silent, trying to catch your breath as you contemplate what this means. Linda
speaks up, “Tad, is there something we should do? Do you think I should have gone to Eric
with this? What does this mean for Megatron?”
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The tone of Linda’s voice echoes the fear you are feeling at the moment, but you maintain
a semblance of control. “Did you happen to pick up a copy of the letter, Linda?”
“No, I didn’t know where to go get an electronic copy, and it would have looked funny if
someone had caught me walking out of his office with something signed by Eric that wasn’t
even addressed to me. But I swear, Tad, I read the letter over two or three times, and I know
what I read.”
Linda, I don’t doubt you. This is a difficult situation, though, and I need to think
about the right way to deal with it before taking any action. If you had the letter, it
would’ve made things easier, but in spite of that, we can’t simply ignore this because
if we did, and it later came out, Megatron would be really exposed. Let me think
about this tonight, and I’ll give you a call in the morning, your time, to let you know
how I think things should go from here. Don’t worry, though, I will let you know
before I pass this along to anyone else, just in case you get a phone call from Eric, but
remember, because he doesn’t know you saw the letter, I think the best thing for me
to do is relay the information without identifying any source, for your protection.

Linda expresses her relief and gratitude for your help, at which point you hang up the
phone and begin to process your thoughts. Before you get too far, however, you are struck
by two issues. First, you realize that with Form 10-Q for the third fiscal quarter about to be
filed, the company’s trading window policy will allow insiders to begin selling in a few days
and that the recovery by Megatron’s stock may well result in several of the officers and directors wanting to sell some shares.You also realize the KaeLoo contract is certainly immaterial
to Megatron as a consolidated entity but may be material to the Singapore subsidiary and
the joint replacement business.You begin to wonder about these issues and where to go from
here as you pick up the phone to call for help.

Questions for Consideration
1. Assuming that you were asked to recommend new internal controls and monitoring
activities designed to expose this type of fraud before it took place, what means would
you suggest Megatron use to help identify this problem?
a. Review operating results of each significant subsidiary at the parent level on at least
a quarterly basis.
b. Place any product classes experiencing significant sales fluctuations, order cancellations, regulatory scrutiny, or media attention in a special review category.
c. Assign additional internal audit staff to review sales and reporting activities in highrisk areas, particularly those that are within product special review categories and
that occur within two weeks of period-end.
d. All of the above.
2. Set forth subsequently are several factors that appear to have contributed to the alleged
intent of Eric Rogers to commit fraud at the Singapore subsidiary. Rank these factors
in order of importance based on your judgment of the risk of fraud that each presents.
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a. The phone call from the president of the subsidiary asking Rogers to tell the
sales force to use all efforts possible to secure sales before the end of the quarter.
(Rank___)
b. The decline in sales attributable to the regulatory and media attention focused on
the joint replacement products. (Rank___)
c. An expected decline in the bonus pool at the Singapore subsidiary following
record bonus payments. (Rank____)
d. The resumption of production at the Singapore subsidiary shortly before quarterend. (Rank___)
3. What facts in the case study would you cite in favor of the argument that Megatron
is (generally) a highly ethical organization?
a. The example set by the CEO in responding quickly and in a broad fashion to the
situation once he received the notification from the Chinese Ministry of Health.
b. Megatron’s decision to respond with “No comment” to the first call from the
media after word leaked about the problems with the joint replacement products.
c. The announced decision of the CEO to share information about the medical
investigation with the FDA, the Chinese Ministry of Health, the South African
regulators, and the health care community.
d. The fact that the internal audit staff reviewed the documentation surrounding the
sale to KaeLoo.
e. Answers (a), (c), and (d).
f. All of the above.
4. After concluding your phone call with Linda, what steps would you take to address
the situation, given your position in the company?
a. I would send an e-mail to Eric Rogers asking him to confirm the existence of the
letter.
b. I would contact the outside auditors and ask them to review the transaction.
c. I would circulate an e-mail to the audit committee and Maggie, my boss, outlining
the facts as I know them.
d. I would contact the CEO and the board members and ask them to fire Eric Rogers.
5. Assume that you consult with Maggie, the CFO, about this situation, and the two of
you turn this over to the audit committee. The audit committee examines the paperwork that is available (no letter surfaces from Rogers to KaeLoo, and KaeLoo denies
ever having received such a letter) and interviews Rogers and Linda. Ultimately, the
committee decides there is insufficient evidence to fire Rogers, but it continues to
suspect something about the sale is not right, even though the evidence is thin. Before
Form 10-Q is filed, the audit committee should
a. complete an internal investigation.
b. suspend Rogers with pay.
c. reverse the sale from the December 31 quarter.
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d. inform the entire board of these facts.
e. All of the above.
6. If you were designing a training program for Megatron’s marketing and sales staff that
was supposed to sensitize these personnel to ethics and a code of conduct consistent
with the values demonstrated by the CEO, what points would you want the program
to cover and why?
7. Reflect for a moment on the qualitative factors the SEC asked auditors to consider in
conducting a materiality analysis under SAB No. 99. What qualitative factors would
you want to consider if a materiality analysis was being done on the KaeLoo sale,
regardless of whether it was immaterial to Megatron as a whole?
8. Assume that after Form 10-Q is filed, Maggie advises you that one of the directors has
told her that he is going to go ahead and sell some stock in the public market. There
has not yet been a full resolution of the situation with KaeLoo, but the sale was not
booked in the March 31 quarter. If you and Maggie had a chance to talk the director
out of proceeding with the sale, what points would you want to make in order to try
to dissuade the director from going ahead?

Suggested Readings
AU section 316 is a critical must-read for financial officers, managers, and auditors who
are dedicated to developing effective internal controls and the means to detect and deter
fraud. The appendix of AU section 316 also catalogs fraud risk factors arising from financial
reporting and misappropriation of assets, with examples of factors that enhance the risk of
fraud in the areas of incentives, pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations. AU section 316
also outlines the efforts required of the audit team and audit committee, including how audit
plans should be developed with a view toward potential fraud, discussions with management
and the audit committee about fraud risks, use of unpredictable audit tests, and procedures
to test for overrides of controls.
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Case 7—AA&C LLP—You Are
a Member of the Practice
Development Committee
Introduction
The following case study takes you away from the more serious and troubling aspects of
improper behavior in the accounting and auditing environment and instead asks you to
consider how to proactively deal with ethical issues raised by joint marketing arrangements.
These types of relationships are, of course, becoming more common as practitioners look for
ways to expand their service offerings and enhance client satisfaction.
Although not a joint marketing arrangement, per se, consider a prior announcement by an
accounting and auditing firm in Alabama that began offering new mortgage-related services
to its clients. The firm indicated it is now gathering required financial data, filling out the
paperwork, and shopping mortgage applications for its clients. Rather than billing the client
for these activities, the accounting firm provides this service free of charge. The accounting firm is not providing the services as a loss leader, however. The firm employs a licensed
mortgage broker to process paperwork with prospective lenders, and the accounting firm
receives from the selected lender the brokerage fee paid to any introducing mortgage broker.
If you were on the practice development committee for this accounting firm, what disclosure would you provide to your client about the commission received for brokering the
mortgage? Would you ask the client to sign an acknowledgment of the firm’s compensation
arrangement? What if one lender decided it would pay a higher commission than another,
but its rates were higher; do you see how the interests of the accounting firm and client
may diverge? How would you police the potential conflicts that might arise out of offering
services that are compensated by a nonclient? Many of the ethical issues that can arise in this
situation are similar to those presented in joint marketing relationships, as you will see in the
material that follows.

Focus Points
The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA Code) permits firms to render accounting and auditing services to clients and customers obtained by the efforts of third parties.
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However, Interpretation No. 502-5, “Engagements Obtained Through Efforts of Third Parties,” under Rule 502, Advertising and Other Forms of Solicitation (AICPA, Professional Standards,
ET sec. 502 par. .06), states that “the member has the responsibility to ascertain that all promotional efforts are within the bounds of the Rules of Conduct … [because] the members
must not do through others what they are prohibited from doing themselves.”
False, misleading, and deceptive advertising is conduct prohibited to members of the profession. Among other things, advertising of this nature is defined as that which
• creates false or unjustified expectations of favorable results.
• implies the ability to influence a court, regulatory agency, or similar body.
• refers to a stated fee for services that, when quoted, was likely to be substantially
increased, and the client was not apprised of the likely result.
• are other representations likely to cause misunderstanding or deception.
Rule 501.82 of the Texas Administrative Code (Texas Code) contains a more expansive
definition of false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statements or claims, including the types of
advertising previously described, as well as facts that
•
•
•
•
•

are misrepresented or not fully disclosed.
imply unsupportable education, professional achievements, or licensing.
consist of self-laudatory statements not based on fact.
make untrue comparisons with others.
are testimonials or endorsements not based on fact.

The Texas Code also includes a preamble that refers to the First Amendment rights of
members and the public and states that the Texas Code is not designed to restrict the availability of accounting services.As is the case with most attempts to regulate the ethical conduct
of professionals, the Texas Code represents a balancing of the rights of the licensed professional to publicly seek out clients, promote the professional’s expertise, and cite qualifications
and achievements, with the rights of the public and other practitioners to be protected from
unethical behavior engaged in by professionals who have lost their moral compass or the
ability to distinguish truth from fiction.
When considering joint marketing and similar arrangements, some of the following ethics rulings from the AICPA Code may apply to the activities of the member firm and its
partner(s):
• A member who has a partnership with a non-CPA is ethically responsible for all acts
of the partnership and is accountable for the non-CPA’s violations of the AICPA
Code (Ethics Ruling No. 141, “Responsibility of Non-CPA Partner,” of ET section
591, Ethcis Rulings on Other Responsibilities and Practices [AICPA, Professional Standards,
ET sec. 591 par. .281–.282]).
• A member who accepts or pays a referral fee for recommending or referring the
services of a CPA or to obtain a client must disclose the acceptance or payment to
the client (Rule 503, Commissions and Referral Fees [AICPA, Professional Standards, ET
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sec. 503 par. .01(C)]). If the member received the referral fee over time and was later
engaged to perform an audit, a review, or a compilation reasonably likely to be used
by a third party or to conduct an examination of projections, the continued receipt
of the referral fee would violate the AICPA Code (Ethics Ruling No. 188, “Referral
of Products of Others,” of ET section 591 [AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 591
par. .375–.376]).
• A member may purchase a product from a third party and resell it to a client
without violating the AICPA Code, and the profit from the sale is not considered a
commission or referral fee. This ethics ruling specifically cites the taking of title to
the product and the associated risks of ownership as differentiating a purchase from
a commissioned transaction (Ethics Ruling No. 185, “Sale of Products to Clients,” of
ET section 591 [AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 591 par. .369–.370]).
Avoid this pitfall: How would you look at a transaction in which a member firm had
a stock of marketing materials on hand, used those materials to sell a piece of hardware or
software to a client, and then had the product drop shipped from the manufacturer direct
to the client, but the invoice came to the member firm? Did the member firm assume the
associated risks of ownership if it never had the hardware or software in inventory? Is this
functionally different from having the piece of hardware or software in stock at the firm? You
can see why the ethical issues in this area can be interpreted in ways that are legally correct
but, perhaps, on morally unstable ground.
In contrast to the AICPA Code on the issue of commissions or referral fees, consider the
following excerpt from the Missouri Rules of Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and
Professional Registration:
Commission fee or referral fee shall include, but not be limited to, (B) [a]ny fee,
profit, or other thing of value required or received for referring a client to the
products or services of others, or (C) any fee, profit or other thing of value paid to
obtain a client. [20 CSR 2010-005(1)]

It is clear that in Missouri and several other states, the fact that a member firm took title
and assumed the risk of ownership of products sold to a nonattest client would not be
enough to insulate the firm from claims it violated the ethical rules unless it made full written disclosure to the client.
Section 56, “Commissions—Basic Disclosure Requirement,” of the California Code of Regulations prohibits a member from accepting a fee or commission unless a written disclosure
statement in 12-point font or larger is furnished to the client at or prior to the time the
recommendation of the product or service is made that states
• the fact that the fee or commission is to be paid for professional services and that
a fee or commission cannot be accepted solely for the referral of the client to the
products or services of a third party.
• a description of the product(s) or service(s) that the licensee is recommending to
the client; the identity of the third party that is expected to provide the product or
service; the business relationship of the licensee to the third party; and a description
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of any fee or commission that may be received by the licensee, including, but not
limited to, any supplemental fee or commission or other compensation allocable to
the client being provided with the product or service of the third party. When the
product(s) or service(s) cannot be specifically identified at the time of the initial
disclosure, this information shall be included in a supplemental disclosure within 30
days of receipt of the fee or commission.
• the dollar amount or value of the fee or commission payment(s) or the basis on
which the payment(s) shall be computed.
The disclosure statement must be on the firm’s letterhead, signed by the member, and
signed and dated by the client.The member must retain a signed copy of the disclosure statement for five years and provide a copy to the client.
Section 56.2, “Commissions—Disclosure Requirement and Other Rules of Professional
Conduct,” of the California Code of Regulations states that when a member receives a permitted fee or commission in conformity with Section 56, the receipt of such a fee or commission does not, in and of itself, constitute an impairment of the member’s objectivity or create
a conflict in rendering services.
Avoid this pitfall: Besides underlining the importance of familiarizing yourself with the
state rules of conduct in the state(s) in which you practice, the Missouri rule points out the
importance of basic definitions to an ethical construct. By encompassing any profit within the
definition of a commission, Missouri has significantly broadened the application of its prohibition on commissions without full written disclosure. Furthermore, California’s accountancy
rules demonstrate the extent to which required disclosure of a fee or commission is covered—
right down to the font size of the disclosure statement. If your firm is selling, or intends to sell,
products or services to nonattest clients, you should ensure the committee or partner responsible for risk management and outside business initiatives has a good command of the applicable
issues, definitions, disclosure requirements, and ethical prohibitions that apply to such activities.

Regulatory Issues
On January 28, 2003, as corrected on March 26, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted final rule Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence. Among other things, the rule
• prohibits accounting firms from setting an audit partner’s compensation or allocation
of partnership units based on sale of nonaudit services to the partner’s audit clients.
• other than with respect to specialty partners (partners such as tax or valuation specialists who consult with the audit engagement team), provides that an accountant is
not independent if, during the audit and professional engagement period, any audit
partner earns or receives compensation based on selling services other than audit,
review, and attest services.
The rule contains an exemption for audit firms with fewer than 10 partners and fewer
than 5 audit (public company reporting) clients.
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The Conceptual Framework
In addition to defining key terms such as impair (to effectively extinguish independence,
which means a member is not independent) and threats to independence (circumstances that
could impair independence), ET section 100-1, Conceptual Framework for AICPA Independence
Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards), outlines the seven broad categories of threats to
independence that should always be evaluated when independence is being assessed. These
include the
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

self-review threat.
advocacy threat.
adverse interest threat.
familiarity threat.
undue influence threat.
financial self-interest threat.
management participation threat.

ET section 100-1 explores common issues associated with these types of threats to independence and also addresses the types of safeguards (controls) that can be used to mitigate
or eliminate threats to independence. These safeguards fall into three categories: (a) those
created by the profession, legislation, or regulation; (b) those implemented by the attest client that would operate in combination with other safeguards; and (c) the firm’s own systems
and procedures, including policies and procedures to implement professional and regulatory
requirements.
Finally, ET section 100-1 establishes a two-step risk-based approach to analyze independence:
1. Identify and evaluate the threat to independence; and
2. Determine whether existing safeguards already eliminate or mitigate the identified
threats and whether threats not yet mitigated can be eliminated or sufficiently mitigated by safeguards.
When considering the effectiveness of a safeguard, a member should consider, among
other things
• the facts and circumstances specific to the situation.
• whether threats have been properly identified.
• whether the client is a public interest entity, which are defined as
— any listed entity, including non-U.S. entities with shares, stock, or debt quoted
or listed on a recognized stock exchange or marketed under the regulations of a
recognized stock exchange or other equivalent body;
— any entity for which an audit is required by regulation or legislation to be conducted in compliance with the same independence requirements that apply to an
audit of listed entities (for example, requirements of the SEC, PCAOB, or similar
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•
•
•
•

regulators or standard setters), subject to the proviso that members should refer to
the independence regulations of authoritative regulatory bodies when members
perform attest services and are required to be independent of the client under
such regulations; and
— other entities that should be considered as public interest entities based on the
number and range of stakeholders, by referring to factors such as whether assets
are held in a fiduciary capacity for a large number of stakeholders, the size of the
entity, and the number of employees.
whether the safeguard is suitably designed to meet its objectives.
how the safeguard is applied and by whom.
the party or parties subject to the safeguard.
the consistency with which the safeguard is applied.

The “Other Considerations: section of Interpretation No. 101-1, “Interpretation of Rule
101,” under Rule 101 (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .02), also states that
when safeguards must be applied, the independence threats identified and the safeguards
applied to eliminate or reduce the threats to an acceptable level should be documented. It
is also noted that a failure to document the threats and safeguards would be considered a
violation of Rule 202, Compliance With Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 202
par. .01) provided the member can demonstrate he or she did apply safeguards to eliminate
unacceptable threats or reduce them to an acceptable level. If the member is unable to demonstrate such was done, then independence would be impaired. Given this language, a CPA
or firm will be well-advised to document each threat, safeguard, and situation that arises
when an independence interpretation or ruling is absent.
Special note: A CPA who encounters an independence issue must apply ET section 100-1
when making independence decisions not otherwise addressed in the AICPA Code or its
interpretations or rulings, just as the Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) does
when issuing its own independence interpretations and rulings.
On August 22, 2005, PEEC adopted Interpretation No. 101-15, “Financial Relationships,” under Rule 101, Independence (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .17),
that defines financial interests, including both direct and indirect financial interests; provides
guidance about whether a member’s financial interests are direct or indirect; and discusses
exceptions when a member may hold a financial interest in an attest client without being
considered to have impaired his or her independence. In summary, Interpretation No. 10115 provides
• a financial interest is an ownership interest in an equity or a debt security issued by
an entity, including rights to acquire such an interest (including derivatives).
• a financial interest is beneficially owned when an individual or entity is not the
record owner of the interest but has a right to some or all of the underlying benefits
of ownership, such as voting rights or economic return.
• a direct financial interest is (a) concerning which an individual or entity owns such
interest directly or controls such interest, including those managed on a discretionary
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basis by others, or (b) the interest is beneficially owned by an intermediary when the
beneficiary controls the intermediary or has the ability to supervise or participate in
the intermediary’s investment decisions.
• an indirect financial interest is a financial interest beneficially owned through an investment vehicle, trust, estate, or other intermediary in which the beneficiary does not
control the intermediary or have authority to supervise or participate in the intermediary’s investment decisions.
Interpretation No. 101-15 notes that existing Interpretation No. 101-1 states that independence would be considered to be impaired if a member (and, depending on the relationships, immediate family or close relatives) had or was committed to acquire any direct or
material indirect financial interest in a client. However, Interpretation No. 101-15 contains
three specific exceptions to the general rule:
1. Receipt of an unsolicited financial interest in a client by gift or inheritance. As long as the
financial interest is disposed of as soon as practicable but not later than 30 days after
the member had knowledge of and the right to dispose of the financial interest, independence would not be considered to be impaired. If the member becomes aware
of the pending or actual receipt of the interest but lacks the power to dispose of the
interest, the member cannot participate on the attest engagement team and must still
dispose of the interest as soon as practicable but not later than 30 days after such right
exists.
2. Ownership in a diversified mutual fund. As long as the member owns 5 percent or less
of the fund’s outstanding interests, that ownership would not be considered to be a
material indirect financial interest in the fund’s underlying investments.
3. Section 529 savings plans. A member who owns a 529 savings plan account is considered to have a direct financial interest in both the plan and investments of the plan
due to the fact the member decides in which sponsor’s plan to invest and can access
information about the plan’s investments prior to making the investments. However,
if the member invests in a 529 savings plan that later invests in an attest client, the
member should transfer the account to another sponsor or transfer the account to an
owner who is not a member. If the transfer would trigger a penalty or tax significant
to the account, the member may own the account until the transfer can be made
without significant penalty or tax, provided that the member does not participate on
the attest engagement team and is not in a position to influence the attest engagement.
Interpretation No. 101-17, “Networks and Network Firms,” under Rule 101 (AICPA,
Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .19), became effective for engagements beginning on
or after July 1, 2011. The interpretation defines a network as firms that
• use a common brand name or initials within the firm name.
• share common control (including firms controlled by a network firm or under common control of a network firm).
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• share profits and costs (excluding the cost of operating the association and immaterial costs).
• share a common business strategy involving ongoing collaboration among the firms
whereby the firms are responsible for implementing the association’s strategy and
held accountable for performance pursuant to that strategy.
• share significant professional resources. Professional resources include common systems that enable firms to exchange information, such as client data, billing, and time
records; partners and staff; technical departments to consult on technical or industryspecific issues, transactions, or events for assurance engagements; audit methodology
or audit manuals; and training courses and facilities.
• share common quality control policies and procedures that the firms are required to
implement.
Interpretation No. 101-17 requires network firms to be independent of all other network
firms’ audit and review clients for which general use audit or review reports are issued. For
compilation clients, a network firm would be required to consider threats to independence
posed by other network firms’ relationships with the client and to apply safeguards to reduce
the threat to an acceptable level.
In the context of strategic alliances between accounting firms (or even, by extension,
between accounting and nonaccounting firms), Interpretation No. 101-17 demonstrates that
independence must continue to be a primary focus of inquiry before client representation
commences. Although it is clear that an independence impairment due to a network affiliation requires more than just a shared name association, it is equally clear that the closer
the economic and professional ties among firms, the greater the likelihood that threats to
independence may exist. The case study that follows posits the creation of a joint marketing
arrangement between a CPA firm and a valuation firm. Interpretation No. 101-17 may be
helpful when you consider independence-related issues with non-CPA firms.

Recent Developments
On August 16, 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued its
concept release on auditor independence and mandatory audit firm rotation. The original
comment period for this concept release closed on December 14, 2011, but was reopened
through April 22, 2012, likely due to the volume of comments received. Through the end of
the reopened comment period, the PCAOB had received 659 comment letters on this release.
Mandatory audit firm rotation is not in and of itself a new concept. As far back as 1978,
when the Cohen Commission’s Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission’s Oversight Role was issued, that commission concluded a new auditor’s lack of familiarity
with a new client in the early years of the engagement would actually harm, rather than
benefit, audit quality. The SEC staff ’s 1994 Staff Report on Auditor Independence concluded
there was not a need for rule changes or legislation to address mandatory audit firm rotation.
Many commenters on the PCAOB concept release noted the PCAOB had not provided
any evidence that audit firm tenure compromised independence, professional skepticism, or
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objectivity. Other commenters noted the 2003 Government Accountability Office study on
this topic, Public Accounting Firms: Required Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm
Rotation, that concluded
We believe that mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way
to enhance auditor independence and audit quality, considering the costs of changing the auditor of record and the loss of auditor knowledge that is not carried forward to the new auditor. We also believe that the potential benefits of mandatory
audit firm rotation are harder to predict and quantify while we are fairly certain
there will be additional costs. In that respect, mandatory audit firm rotation is not
a panacea that totally removes pressures on the auditor in appropriately resolving
financial reporting issues that may materially affect the public companies’ financial
statements. Those pressures are likely to continue even if the term of the auditor is
limited under any mandatory rotation process.

Many industry commenters also noted the difficulties they would encounter in engaging
a new auditor that was independent. These commenters noted that larger companies often
utilize the services of a number of accounting firms for internal controls, IT, tax, and other
nonaudit services that may make it difficult to identify a new auditor that is both independent and large enough to conduct the audit on a timely basis. Industry commenters also
noted that certain auditors have developed significant industry knowledge and experience
that, if lost via mandatory firm rotation, may increase audit costs without any corresponding
investor benefit.
On November 30, 2011, the European Commission proposed new regulations to govern
auditor-client relationships, including
• limiting auditor engagements to six consecutive years, with a cooling-off period of
four years before a firm could again audit the same client’s financial statements.
• prohibiting audit firms from providing consulting services to audit clients and
requiring large audit firms to separate their audit and nonaudit activities.
• requiring public-interest entities to use an open and transparent tender procedure
when selecting a new auditor.
• allowing audit firms to provide services across the European Union by introducing a
European passport for the profession.
The proposed new regulations must be approved by EU states and the European Parliament before they would take effect.
On March 27, 2012, a senior European Commission official informed parliament that the
Big Four have mounted a lobbying campaign to oppose the regulations that has been fierce
and excessive in European Commission’s view. Representatives of the Big Four declined to
comment on the record but were quoted off the record as saying they have a right to express
their opinions with respect to the proposed changes.
On March 28, 2012, the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises held a hearing at which mandatory audit firm rotation was the “hot” topic.
In response to questions concerning whether the PCAOB had done a cost-benefit analysis
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of the proposal, PCAOB Chairman James Doty noted that mandatory rotation was addressed
in a concept release, not a proposed rule or standard, and that a cost-benefit analysis wouldn’t
be appropriate until a rule or standard was proposed and its parameters determined. The
chairman of the subcommittee and several industry witnesses called to testify also questioned
whether the PCAOB was overstepping its authority in considering firm rotation, a point
echoing many comment letters received by the PCAOB on the concept release.

Can Shareholders Accomplish Indirectly What the
PCAOB Has Yet to Require?
On November 9, 2011, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Pension Fund, a shareholder
of GE, submitted a shareholder proposal that would have required GE to rotate its audit firm
every 7 years, with a 3-year cooling-off period. KPMG has been GE’s auditor for over 100
years. GE submitted this proposal to the SEC with a request that the SEC staff indicate it
would not recommend enforcement action against GE if GE omitted the proposal from its
2012 proxy statement. On December 23, 2011, the SEC staff advised GE that it appeared
the pension fund’s proposal was excludable based on the fact it dealt with the company’s
ordinary business operations, and the staff would not recommend enforcement action if GE
omitted the proposal from the 2012 proxy statement. Accordingly, it does not appear that
shareholders can use the proxy process to mandate audit firm rotation by a public company—at least as of now.
The debate over audit firm rotation is likely to continue to play out during 2012, both
here and in the EU. Where the merry-go-round stops may be anyone’s guess.

Is Ethical Corporate Behavior Its Own Reward,
or Are There Also More Tangible Returns?
Are companies that provide better disclosure rewarded in some way for their candid assessment of their business and operations, or is an ethical organization perhaps penalized for its
willingness to provide full and accurate disclosure to investors? Three studies conducted from
1993–97 reached the following conclusions:1
• Better disclosure allowed analysts to reach more accurate forecasts of the company’s
future performance, resulting in greater agreement among analysts. This led to a
more accurate consensus of the company’s value that, in turn, resulted in the company’s cost of capital being below that of companies with less effective disclosure
practices.

1

Sources: “Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior,” in the October 1996 issue of the Accounting
Review; “Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures,” in the autumn 1993
edition of the Journal of Accounting Research, 1993; and “Disclosure Level and Cost of Equity Capital,” in the
July 1997 issue of the Accounting Review.
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• Companies with higher returns on equity have a pattern of providing better disclosure; companies issuing equity, which could be expected to have a greater focus on
disclosure, generally provide investors with more and better-quality disclosure.
• Small companies not covered by analysts that provide better disclosure than their
peers enjoyed a lower cost of capital than their less-forthcoming brethren.
Although ethical behavior is indeed its own reward, the conclusions reached by these studies show that both large and small companies derive tangible benefits from implementing
disclosure practices that are above the norm.

Ethical Guides
Abraham Lincoln, the former American president, once said, “When I do good, I feel good.
When I do bad, I feel bad. That’s my religion.”
Isaac Asimov, the Russian-born American author and biochemist, once said, “Never let your
sense of morals prevent you from doing what’s right.”
Will Rogers, the American humorist and showman, once said, “Live in such a way that you
would not be ashamed to sell your parrot to the town gossip.”
Harper Lee wrote in To Kill a Mockingbird, “Before I can live with other folks I’ve got to
live with myself. The one thing that doesn’t abide by majority rule is a person’s conscience.”
Dr. Seuss, the American writer, once said, “Be who you are and say what you feel, because
those who mind don’t matter and those who matter don’t mind.”
According to Rule 7.13, “Offering Services Via the Internet,” of the Rules of the Colorado
State Board of Accountancy
Any CPA or CPA firm licensed or registered by the Colorado board and offering
to or performing professional services via the Internet shall include the following
information on the Internet:
1. Name of individual CPA or CPA firm licensed by the Colorado State Board of Accountancy;
2. Principal place of business;
3. Business telephone number; and
4. Colorado certificate number and/or Colorado firm registration number.

According to Rule 303.02 of the Idaho Accountancy Rules
An individual entering into an engagement to provide professional services via
a web site, pursuant to Idaho practice privileges, shall disclose, via their web site,
their principle state of licensure, license number, and address. A firm offering or
rendering professional services to Idaho businesses or residents via a web site shall
provide, in the web site’s homepage, a means for regulators and the public to contact a responsible licensee in charge at the firm regarding complaints, questions, or
regulatory compliance.
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Case Study Facts
AA&C LLP and the Practice Development
Committee
It is a beautiful spring morning, just a hint in the air of the hot summer weather lurking
around the corner, when you are headed to work on the Metro for that morning’s meeting of your firm’s practice development committee. As one of the younger members of this
committee, your opinions and those of Shauna Morris, another youthful partner in the audit
and attest department, are often sought out, because AA&C LLP (AA&C) considers itself to
be a firm of the future with a real commitment to growth and changing with the times.The
practice development committee is considered something of a plum assignment at the firm,
a progressive and dynamic group that is helping lead AA&C into its next 20 years of service.
AA&C prides itself on using leading-edge technologies in planning and executing audits; a
high degree of professionalism; and keeping abreast of regulatory, accounting, and auditing
trends that can affect its business and that of its clients.
As you read through the agenda for that morning’s committee meeting, your mind wandered back to the discussion you and Shauna had before the weekend about a proposal she
has on the agenda. She had come into your office, an excited look on her face that told you
something big was up, and began to fill you in.
“Neal, you remember I told you about that valuation firm that’s headquartered in D.C.?
The one with the e-business model that has made a specialty out of valuing patents and
intellectual property.”You nod, dimly recollecting such a conversation.
“Well, I’ve been working with it on the sale of Cryogenx, you know, having it do the
valuation work on the allocation of the sale price.When I talked to the partner the other day
in the D.C. office, she started asking me a few questions about our firm, the clients, how we
were positioning ourselves in the market, you know, that kind of stuff. It sure seemed to me
like she’d already done her homework on us, you know what I mean?” Nodding again, you
began to wonder where this was headed as your thoughts wandered to the stack of working
papers sitting on your desk for review.
Shauna must have sensed your drifting attention and got to the point.
Here’s the thing, Neal. The partner, Marybeth Tate, told me that e-Valuations was
exploring the possibility of putting together some strategic partnerships with audit
firms like ours so that we can cross-market each other’s services. She said our firm
was a natural for them, with our locations and clientele, and she said e-Valuations
was getting referrals for accounting and auditing work that isn’t its cup of tea.
She said what it had done in a few other situations like this with attorneys was
to hyperlink its website to the attorneys’ websites. When visitors to e-Valuations’s
website asked about getting legal advice on intellectual property, they were sent
to the attorneys’ website, and when clients of the law firms asked about valuation,
they were linked to e-Valuations’s website. She said e-Valuations has seen a 10 percent increase in its business from these hyperlinks, and she thought linking with us
would result in an even bigger jump in business than the legal links.
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You held up your hand to slow Shauna down for a moment. “Wait a second here. What
do we know about those guys, other than they are on the Internet and seem like good folks?
Where’s our due diligence? How many times have we worked with them?”
Avoid this pitfall: If your firm is considering a joint arrangement of any kind, but particularly with non-CPAs, intensive due diligence must be a part of the equation. Joint marketing arrangements have the potential to backfire, particularly if one party to the arrangement
gives the client shoddy services or an invoice that far exceeds the client’s expectations. In
rare instances, professional service firms have even been sued under a theory of making a
negligent referral by sending the client to a third party that is incompetent or itself negligent. Rather than losing a client due to someone else’s actions or even getting dragged into
a lawsuit, it is important to carefully investigate prospective partners and their other partners
and to understand all you can about your prospective marketing partner.
*****
Smiling, Shauna piped up with a quick retort.
I had a feeling you were gonna say something like that, and I’ll have you know I’ve
already beaten you to the punch. I got a complete list of their law firm strategic
partners, which includes some pretty prestigious names, and I had Marybeth send
me down a representative list of clients and transactions they’ve completed over
the past year. Not only that, but I pulled up the engagements we’ve worked with
them over the last two years and found a total of seven. A majority of those were
originated by us, but there were three that came from them. Marybeth said that was
just the tip of the iceberg in terms of the business they can send our way!

“I’m glad that’s just the tip of the iceberg, Shauna, because three engagements seems like
a lot to get so excited about,” you reply dryly.
Aaahhh, that’s only part of the story, Neal. Now we get to the really good part; not
only can we expect to see 20 or 30 new clients per year out of this, but here’s the
kicker: e-Valuations will pay us a referral fee of 9 percent of every dollar it gets
from new clients for 1 year that come through our hyperlink. I mean, think about
it, if we helped them land 10 valuation assignments per year, and they averaged
$10,000 each, we would get $9,000. If we sent them a few big ones, say $25,000
each, we could be looking at increasing our cash flow by $20,000 or $30,000 per
year, and at virtually no cost! We could have a link like that up and running in no
time, and e-Valuations provides us the tracking software for free, so we can tell
what traffic is coming our way from it!

Shauna’s animated pitch was definitely appealing, and the two of you parted ways that
afternoon looking forward to discussing the concept with the committee at next week’s
meeting. As you thought more about it, you figured it was hard to see any downside: associating the firm with a well-regarded valuation company, generating client referrals with no
effort, and being paid for it.Well, you thought to yourself, life could not get much better than
that.You were forced to admit to yourself that not only was this a great plan but, potentially,
might form the template for similar strategic partnerships that AA&C might enter into.
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The Meeting of the Practice Development
Committee
When the meeting convened, a few housekeeping items were cleared out of the way, and
Shauna was then called on to make her presentation about the e-Valuations agenda item.
True to form, she was passionate and convincing about what the strategic relationship could
mean to the firm, and you chimed in with an endorsement of how the firm might use this
as a model to follow in setting up other hyperlinks with law firms; financial institutions; and,
perhaps, other valuation firms. It was only when Shauna reached the issue of the referral fees
that one of the tax partners pointedly interrupted.
“Shauna, I don’t want to throw cold water on this, especially because hyperlinks among
service providers like us and e-Valuations are the wave of the future, but don’t we have a
disclosure obligation to our clients about the referral fees? What about independence? If one
of our audit clients uses e-Valuations, and we are hyperlinked to it and paid by it, aren’t we
at risk of impairing our independence?”
Shauna replied
Don, I know we’ll be required to disclose the fee arrangement to our clients, and I
understand from Marybeth that can be done with an e-acknowledgment form the
client has to complete as part e-Valuations’s engagement process. On the independence issue, I guess I’d say our firm isn’t performing the valuation services, so it’s not
as if we will have violated that rule, although I could see where we will need to revisit
this issue if an audit client, rather than a tax client, used e-Valuations for some work.

Avoid this pitfall: One of the lurking issues about commissions and referral fees is the
requirement of most states that the disclosure about the fees be made to the client before
the recommendation or referral of the product or service takes place. Likewise, most states
require that the accounting firm disclose the payment of a referral fee before the firm is actually retained. Merely placing the disclosure of such fees on the website may not be enough
to insulate the firm from questions about whether it made the disclosure on a timely basis.
This may be particularly true if the firm uses hyperlinks to make the referral, and there is no
disclosure of the commission or referral fee until after the client has already gone to the other
website. Again, best practices would appear to require the firm to include prominent disclosure on the relevant pages of its website and as an opening page to every hyperlinked website.
*****
A lively discussion followed among the committee members about the state code of ethics
requirements, independence, and whether AA&C was compromising its professional focus
by getting too tangled up with e-Valuations by getting into the referral business rather than
the auditing, accounting, and tax advice business. Before the meeting broke apart into a
completely disjointed series of one-on-one debates, the committee chair held up her hand
and asked for quiet.
“Listen, folks, I think we all know that Shauna’s idea has a lot of promise and that we
shouldn’t ignore it. However, we also know the partners won’t vote in favor of proceeding
down this road without knowing all the implications for this type of marketing relationship.
Are we all on the same page on that at least?”
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Heads nodded around the table in agreement.
Good. So here’s what I’d like to suggest. I’d like to ask Shauna and Neal to research
the code of ethics, independence, e-marketing, and compensation issues and come
back to us with a report one week from now. If you all agree, I’d also ask them to
offer alternative structures for strategic partnerships like this if they find that AA&C
can’t proceed with e-Valuations under the current proposal. Shauna, you and Neal
will need to give us chapter and verse for what may create issues for the firm and
how we should resolve those issues. That way, when we elevate this to the partners
for a vote, we’ll be able to reassure them the committee has considered all the
pluses and minuses of whatever arrangement we end up with. Do we all concur?

Again, heads nodded around the table. Shauna peeked over at you with a somewhat guilty
look, aware you had been dragooned into helping her without having much of a choice. On
the way out the door, you assure her you’ll lend a hand, within limits.
Shauna, because it looks like I’m going to end up working on this project, I’ll volunteer to do the research, but I’m going to leave the writing to you.You’re a better
writer than me anyway, and I’d rather just track down the info for you to write up,
if you don’t mind. I’ve got two 10-Ks on extension right now that need some work
on MD&A, and it’s all I can do to help the CFOs get those done before the filing
deadline. I’ll tell you what, you help me review the MD&A for one of those, and
I’ll promise to have the research done on this by next week. Deal?

Shauna’s head bobs up and down in relief. “You betcha’. I don’t think I’ve had to spend
time on the ethics code since the CPA exam, and I can’t say I’m real knowledgeable about
the ethical implications of doing business over the Internet. I do recall that referral fees can
be received by firms like ours, but I don’t recollect what restrictions apply to our payment
of those. Let me know when you’re done with the research, and I’ll write it up!” You give
Shauna a questionable look and get a chuckle in response as you turn down the hall toward
the information center to begin your research.

Questions for Consideration
1. Assume for a moment that you were in Shauna’s position and decided you wanted to
do more due diligence on e-Valuations before recommending it as a marketing partner for AA&C. What steps would you take?
a. Pull a credit report or Dun & Bradstreet report on them.
b. Call several of the law firms that are linked to the website and talk to the partners
in charge about their experiences with e-Valuations.
c. Ask Marybeth for permission to talk to some of e-Valuations’s clients on its representative client list, and then, talk with those clients about their assessment of the
work performed by e-Valuations.
d. Contact any trade or professional organizations of which e-Valuations is a member,
and obtain any information they have on e-Valuations.
e. All of the above.
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2. Let us say that AA&C concluded a marketing partnership with e-Valuations, and
e-Valuations put on its website the following introduction to AA&C: “We have a strategic partnership with AA&C LLP, one of the leading accounting and auditing firms
in the Northeast United States. AA&C has a roster of partners experienced in audit,
tax, and consulting practices who are unequaled in their ability to provide practical
financial solutions to complex problems and who can help you formulate tax planning
strategies that will maximize your company’s tax savings within the bounds of what is
acceptable to the IRS.” Do you believe this introduction violates any provisions of the
AICPA Code (refer to the information prior to the case study if needed)?
a. No, the fact that e-Valuations has put this introduction on its website does not
affect AA&C.
b. No, the language is merely sales “puffing” and does not violate the AICPA Code.
c. Yes, it violates the AICPA Code by creating false expectations or unjustified expectations of favorable results.
d. Yes, it violates the AICPA Code because AA&C could not make these claims itself
and cannot allow e-Valuations to do so for it.
e. Yes, because of answers (c) and (d).
f. No, because of answers (a) and (b).
3. If AA&C was practicing in Texas, which of the prohibitions of Rule 501.82 of the
Texas Code presented in this chapter would be violated if e-Valuations used the language in question 2 when introducing website visitors to AA&C?
a. Prohibitions on facts that imply unsupported licensing
b. Prohibitions on self-laudatory statements not based on fact
c. Prohibitions on unsupportable education qualifications
d. Prohibitions on endorsements not based on fact
e. Prohibitions on testimonials not based on fact
f. Answers (a), (c), and (d)
g. Both (b) and (d)
4. One of the issues raised by the tax partner on the practice development committee
was whether the hyperlink and receipt of a referral fee would impair AA&C’s independence with respect to an audit client of the firm. Assume that on June 1, 2012,
the hyperlink to e-Valuations is established and that you are the engagement partner,
and Shauna is the concurring partner on the audit engagement. Also, assume that the
audit client uses e-Valuations later in 2012 to perform a valuation as a result of linking
from AA&C’s website to e-Valuations’s website and that you and Shauna stand to get
a percentage of the referral fee in 2013. Has AA&C’s independence been impaired by
the link or payment?
a. The link and payment impair independence.
b. Neither the link nor payment impair independence.
c. The link impairs independence but the payment does not if disclosed.
d. The payment impairs independence but the link does not.
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5. Which of the following statements best describes the rewards you and your organization can derive from ethical behavior?
a. I and my organization can feel good about ourselves.
b. My organization can get a lower cost of capital than our competitors who do not
provide disclosure that is as good as ours.
c. I and our other officers can sign required certifications with more confidence
than companies that set the wrong tone at the top or that do not have an ethical
corporate culture.
d. All of the above.
e. There are no rewards for ethical behavior for me or my organization.
6. What would you rank as the most important issues about evaluating, entering into,
and monitoring a referral or commission arrangement with a third party?
7. Reflect for a moment on the material in this chapter concerning ethical prohibitions
that apply to joint marketing arrangements. Now, list out those prohibitions you feel
are most important to the CPA firm in the context of joint marketing arrangements,
and give a short summary about why.
8. In considering the case study, if you were in Neal’s shoes and were going to research
the ethical, independence, e-marketing, and compensation issues needed to be considered by the practice development committee, what resources would you consult?

Suggested Readings
Interpretation No. 101-15 contains additional information concerning the classification of
financial interests in retirement, savings, compensation, and similar plans; in Section 529
prepaid tuition plans; in trust investments; in partnerships; in limited liability companies; and
through insurance products. A CPA who may or does acquire any type of financial (record
or beneficial) interest in these or other entities or intermediaries should immediately consult
this interpretation, Interpretation No. 101-1, and the accompanying ET section 100-1 when
assessing independence; potential or actual impairments; and safeguards to prevent or eliminate, when possible, any potential threats to independence.
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Case 8—Precious Mining Inc.—
You Are the Audit Committee
Chair
Introduction
Today’s audit committees occupy a central role in the corporate governance process, as well
as one with overall responsibility for hiring, interacting with, and firing the outside audit
firm. Conversely, the outside audit firm will almost surely evaluate the effectiveness of the
audit committee as part of its work pursuant to Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and
Related Rules, Auditing Standards). In other words, the actions of the audit committee will in
the future be scrutinized by stockholders, regulators, management, and auditors, with each
constituency being vitally interested in the performance and capabilities of the audit committee. Whether you are in industry or public practice, it is important for you to know what
standards and duties apply to audit committees and the auditors who work with them.You
should also keep in mind one other key fact: as a CPA, you carry the license and certification
that will make you an attractive candidate (now or in the future) to serve as an audit committee financial expert. If you are asked to serve a public company in that capacity, you will need
to understand the responsibilities of an audit committee financial expert and be sensitive to
ethical and other issues that can impact your service or even your career.

Focus Points
The Securities and Exchange Commission
Charges Audit Committee Members: Willful
Blindness and Ignoring Red Flags
As was discussed earlier in chapter 4,“Forensic Review Services LLC—You Are the Forensic
Investigator,” on February 28, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a
complaint against Jerome Krantz, Cary Chasin, and Gary Nadelman, the three outside directors who comprised DHB Industries’ (DHB’s) audit and compensation committees from
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2002–05, during which time a massive accounting fraud was carried out at DHB by the
CEO, David Brooks, and the COO, Sandra Hatfield. The SEC alleged that Krantz, Chasin,
and Nadelman were willfully blind to numerous red flags signaling fraud and, among other
things, ignored the obvious and merely rubber-stamped the decisions of senior management
while making substantial sums from sales of DHB’s securities. The SEC further alleged that
DHB’s lack of internal controls and the failure of the audit committee to discharge its duties
led directly to the filing of false and misleading public filings by DHB with the SEC from
2002–05. The red flags cited by the SEC included
• the existence of long-time friendships and business relationships among the directors
and Brooks.
• ignoring concerns raised by auditors, material weakness letters, and concerns raised
by the controller regarding DHB’s inventory system and valuations.
• when the auditor (Weiser LLP) informed DHB that it was not prepared to provide
a signed report before the filing deadline for 2004’s annual report on Form 10-K,
the audit committee chair left a hostile voicemail for the Weiser partner, and that
evening, DHB filed its Form 10-K with the SEC with an audit report with a forged
signature. The following day, Weiser delivered a signed audit report to DHB with
a material weakness letter that noted DHB’s filing of the annual report without
Weiser’s consent. In that letter, Weiser concluded the audit committee itself constituted a material weakness because its conduct did not demonstrate its understanding of its oversight role of the company’s external financial reporting and internal
control over its financial reporting processes.
• failing to act when Grant Thornton resigned and submitted a material weakness
letter and failing to follow up with, and ask questions of, management once the SEC
began an investigation of DHB.
• participating in an attempt to opinion shop when DHB’s auditor (its fourth in the
three-year period from 2002–05) advised DHB, the audit committee, and the SEC
in a Section 10(A) report of likely illegal acts (inventory manipulations) the auditor
had detected in the first three quarters of 2005. That same day, the audit committee
chair signed an engagement letter on behalf of DHB to hire a new (fifth) audit firm
to reaudit DHB’s 2003 and 2004 financial statements, contemporaneous with the
fourth auditor’s engagement. Neither audit firm knew of the other’s hiring because
field work was conducted in two separate offices of DHB.
On November 10, 2011, the SEC announced that the three independent directors had
settled the SEC’s charges. The settlements imposed permanent bars on Krantz, Chasin, and
Nadelman serving as officers or directors of a public company; required them to disgorge
stock profits totaling approximately $1.3 million; and required them to pay civil penalties of
$100,000 each.
Although the case against DHB’s audit committee members is not the first case against
outside directors, it is particularly notable because of the SEC’s pursuit of all three outside directors who comprised the audit committee in an action separate from the primary
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wrongdoers and the company. This case also is important because of how the SEC framed
the issues: willful blindness; lack of independence; red flags galore; repeated failures to act;
and, in summary, a nonexistent audit committee.
Similarly, the corporate scandals at Adelphia, AIG, Brocade Communications, Dynergy,
Enron, HealthSouth, Monster Worldwide, Qwest, Sunbeam, Tyco, Worldcom, Xerox and
other well-known public companies provide a clear consensus: in nearly all these cases, the
board of directors and audit committee were apparently asleep at the switch. Allegations
ranged from board members profiting from and participating in the wrongdoing to simply
failing to make diligent inquiry of the auditors and management when presented with questionable facts or accounting. Media speculation focused attention on transactions between
the company and its management team, on the one hand, and “independent” directors who
were officers or directors of suppliers, investment bankers, service providers, venture capital
firms, and other companies with direct or indirect ties to the company.The clear implication
was that the directors and audit committee members had been inclined to look the other
way due to their financial and friendship ties to management even as revenue, expenses, and
earnings were being manipulated in discoverable ways by corrupt management teams. The
resulting crisis in confidence regarding public company financial reporting and consequent
job losses, retirement fund losses, and investor financial losses in the trillions of dollars combined to set the stage for dramatic change.

“Round-Trip” Transactions
The following case involves allegations of “round-trip” transactions in which purchases and
sales in approximately the same amount between two companies are alleged to have taken
place. The most common purpose of such “round-trip” transactions is to facilitate the participants’ achieving revenue or other financial targets set by the companies, analysts, or the
market. For example, on May 19, 2008, the SEC filed civil fraud charges against eight former
executives of AOL Time Warner Inc. for their roles in a scheme that caused the company
to overstate its advertising revenue by more than $1 billion. The SEC alleged that from at
least mid-2000 to mid-2002, John Michael Kelly, the former CFO of AOL Time Warner;
Steven E. Rindner, former senior executive in AOL’s business affairs unit; Joseph A. Ripp,
former CFO of the AOL division; and Mark Wovsaniker, former head of accounting policy,
engineered, oversaw, and executed fraudulent “round-trip” transactions in which AOL Time
Warner effectively funded its own advertising revenue by giving purchasers the money to
buy online advertising they did not want or need. Online advertising revenue was a key
measure by which analysts and investors evaluated AOL.
According to the SEC, the defendants made or substantially contributed to statements to
investors that included the company’s fraudulent financial results. Kelly and Wovsaniker, both
CPAs, also are charged with misleading the company’s external auditor about the fraudulent
transactions. Simultaneously, the SEC announced the filing of a separate action, which was
simultaneously settled, against four other former AOL executives, including James MacGuidwin, the former controller of AOL. MacGuidwin agreed to pay disgorgement, interest, and a
civil penalty totaling $2.4 million and agreed to an officer and a director bar for seven years.
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On September 6, 2011, the SEC settled the case against Kelly and Ripp, with each agreeing
to a permanent injunction from violating the securities laws; disgorgement of $200,000 and
$130,000, respectively; and civil penalties of $60,000 and $20,000, respectively. The SEC’s
case against Rindner and Wovsaniker is continuing, although in September 2011, the trial
judge dismissed claims for so-called “scheme” liability. However, Rindner and Wovsaniker
still face charges for aiding and abetting and recordkeeping and reporting violations and, in
the case of Wovsaniker, false statements to an auditor.

Syntax-Brillian Corporation: The Auditor’s
Compromised Relationship Partner
In another “round-tripping” case, on January 30, 2012, the SEC filed civil charges against
Robert Chiu, also known as Chi Hung Chiu, for his role in aiding and abetting a fraudulent
“round-trip” revenue recognition scheme at Syntax-Brillian Corporation (Syntax), a developer and distributor of high-definition LCD televisions under the Olevia brand name. Chiu
served as an audit and relationship partner for Ernst & Young (E&Y), which audited Syntax’s
fiscal 2006 financial statements.
At the end of fiscal year 2006, Syntax executives developed a fraudulent scheme to report
$22.7 million in sales to its Hong Kong distributor in order to meet analysts’ expectations.
The scheme was based on claimed sales of LCD televisions in China and was prosecuted
using fake shipping and sales documents and circular cash flows among Syntax, its Taiwanese-contracted manufacturer, and its Hong Kong distributor. (Five Syntax executives were
charged by the SEC in a separate action on August 31, 2011, four of whom simultaneously
settled with the SEC by paying civil penalties and consenting to bars and permanent injunctions.)
Chiu knew that E&Y’s audit team was concerned about the last-minute sales and the fact
that revenue recognition may have been an issue and was asked by the engagement team to
ensure that company executives understood the engagement team intended to look into this
issue. Chiu advised the executives what documents the engagement team would be interested in examining, including a distribution agreement. Using a personal e-mail account
between July 8, 2006, and July 10, 2006, Chiu instructed the Syntax executives about how to
create a backdated distribution agreement to support revenue recognition of the purported
sales. The executives apparently followed Chiu’s advice, and the audited financial statements
were filed with Form 10-K on September 13, 2006. Thereafter, from May to December
2007, Chiu received the Hong Kong distributor’s financial statements (also apparently an
E&Y client) and knew the distributor had recorded purchases from Syntax as agency or
consignment transactions, meaning that Syntax’s revenue recognition was improper.
Compounding this situation, after E&Y was dismissed as Syntax’s auditor, the Hong Kong
distributor engaged E&Y to audit its financial statements in preparation for an initial public
offering (IPO). While E&Y was conducting that audit in 2007, Chiu learned the distributor had only been acting as Syntax’s agent and recorded a commission on Syntax’s sales in
China and that the distributor was not Syntax’s customer (as Syntax had disclosed). Chiu
failed to raise these issues with E&Y, Syntax, or Syntax’s new auditor nor did he take any
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action to prevent E&Y from issuing its consent to the reissuance of the Syntax audit report
for the June 30, 2007, Form 10-K filed on September 13, 2007. Chiu also failed to take any
action to address E&Y’s consent to the incorporation by reference of the audit report with
the financial statements in Syntax’s Form S-3 registration statements filed on November 22,
2006; April 6, 2007; November 21, 2007; and December 7, 2007.
On January 5, 2007, Syntax’s stock closed at $10.74 per share, giving it a stock market valuation of over $644 million (based on the outstanding shares on February 9, 2007, the nearest date in time at which total shares outstanding are disclosed). On April 18, 2008, Syntax
announced that its financial statements for fiscal year 2007 and the first fiscal quarter of 2008
may require restatement and could no longer be relied upon. On July 8, 2008, Syntax and 2
of its subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11. The stock ceased trading on July 22, 2008.
Chiu consented to a permanent injunction from aiding and abetting violations of the
securities laws and was barred from appearing or practicing before the SEC as an accountant,
with a right to reapply after five years. The SEC noted the settlement with Chiu takes into
account his substantial cooperation with the SEC’s investigation.

Regulatory Issues
Implementing the Whistle-Blower Provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
On August 12, 2011, the SEC implemented the whistle-blower provisions of Section 21F of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) that were added by Section 922 of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and that (subject to certain
limits and guidelines) call for the SEC to pay awards to whistle-blowers who voluntarily
provide the SEC with original information about a violation of the securities laws that leads
to a successful SEC enforcement action or a related action in which money sanctions of over
$1 million are received by the SEC.The rewards are to range between 10 percent and 30 percent of the total amount recovered by the government in the SEC action or related actions.
Regulation 21F outlines the procedures for applying for whistle-blower awards, outlines
the SEC’s process for making claim determinations, and explains the program to the public.
The following are some of the highlights from Regulation 21F and the implementing rule:
• A whistle-blower must be a natural person, not a company or an entity, who reports
potential (rather than actual) violations of the securities laws.
• The whistle-blower must provide original information concerning a potential violation that significantly contributes to the success of the SEC’s enforcement action.
• The whistle-blower cannot receive a double reward if, for example, he or she previously received a reward from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
in a related action and cannot seek a reward from the SEC if he or she was previously determined not to be entitled to a reward by the CFTC.
• The whistle-blower becomes eligible for the reward only at the time the monetary
sanction is collected in the SEC or related action.
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• A related action is one brought based on the same allegations of wrongdoing by the
U.S. attorney general, a regulatory agency, a self-regulatory organization (SRO), or a
state attorney general in a criminal case.
• The whistle-blower can receive an award only if he or she voluntarily provides the
original information to the SEC (that is, is not in receipt of a formal or an informal
request, inquiry, or demand from the SEC, other federal or state authority, any SRO,
the PCAOB, or Congress, or his or her employer is not in receipt of same).
• Prohibits rewards being paid to those with a legal duty to report violations, including the SEC, the Department of Justice, any SRO, the PCAOB, a law enforcement
organization, or persons who obtain their information as a result of an audit of
financial statements and who are subject to Section 10A of the 1934 Act (that is,
auditors of public companies).
• Original information refers to information derived from the whistle-blower’s
independent knowledge or analysis that is not obtained from publicly available
sources (but with an acknowledgment that individuals can review publicly available information and, through their analysis, provide vital assistance to the SEC staff
in understanding and identifying securities violations); is not known to the SEC
from any other source, and is not exclusively derived from an allegation in a judicial,
administrative, hearing, report, audit or investigation, or from the news media, unless
the whistle-blower is the source of the information.
• Excluded from independent knowledge are
— attorneys and experts who assist on client matters.
— auditors of clients if the information relates to a potential violation by the client
or the client’s directors, officers, or other employees (including compliance audits
and other audit engagements required under the securities laws). Note, however,
that the auditor exclusion does not apply to the client’s employees who perform
an accounting function, even if such persons interact with the outside auditor.
— persons with legal, compliance, audit, supervisory, or governance responsibilities who receive the information in the reasonable expectation that the recipient
would take appropriate steps to cause the entity to respond to the violation or
persons with the legal, compliance, audit, or similar functions or processes for
identifying, reporting, or addressing potential noncompliance with applicable law.
Note that officers, directors, employees, and consultants who learn of potential
violations in the course of performing their duties will be encompassed by the
foregoing. Also note, however, that if the entity does not disclose the information to the SEC in a reasonable time or if the entity proceeds in bad faith, the
individual may be deemed to have independent knowledge.
• A person who benefits from the fraud cannot claim a reward (and is not immune
from prosecution) nor can a person who obtains his or her information from any of
the other excluded categories previously discussed.
• The SEC sought to balance the reward rights of the whistle-blower and the need
to support and encourage internal reporting of wrongdoing by incorporating a
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provision in the rule that protects the whistle-blower’s rights to a reward if he or she
first reports the wrongdoing internally and, within 90 days thereafter, informs the
SEC of the facts and circumstances. In this instance, the whistle-blower’s rights to
the reward will date back to the day he or she made the internal report. This has the
collateral benefit of giving the audit committee or board of directors the opportunity to first investigate the allegations, thus encouraging strong company compliance
programs.
• In evaluating how much a reward should be within the 10 percent to 30 percent
range, the SEC stated it will look to a number of basic criteria:
— The type of wrongdoing, including whether the subject matter is an SEC priority and involves regulated entities or fiduciaries and whether the violation is
isolated or repetitive.
— The danger to investors, the harm or potential harm caused, the type of harm,
and the number of persons harmed.
— The timeliness, degree, reliability, and effectiveness of the whistle-blower’s assistance, including the time and resources conserved by the assistance, whether the
whistle-blower encouraged or authorized others to assist the SEC, any hardships
experienced by the whistle-blower as a result of assisting the SEC, and the degree
to which the whistleblower took steps to prevent the violations from occurring
or continuing.
— The efforts of the whistle-blower to assist in the recovery of the fruits of the
violations and remediate the harm caused.
— Whether the whistle-blower’s information related to all the claims brought by
the SEC or only a portion of the claims.
— Culpability of the whistle-blower, if any.
— Whether the whistle-blower reported the wrongdoing internally before reporting to the SEC. The proposed rule states this point is not a requirement for
awards above the statutory 10 percent minimum, and whistle-blowers will not
be penalized if they do not report internally due to fear of retaliation or other
reasons.

Required Communications With Audit
Committees
On December 20, 2011, the PCAOB reproposed the auditing standard Communications with
Audit Committees that was initially proposed on March 29, 2010. The comment period on
the reproposed standard ended on February 29, 2012. The reproposed standard has several
important revisions from the initially proposed standard, including, among others
• recognizing that some brokers and dealers may not have boards of directors or audit
committees as part of their governance structure (and bearing in mind the SEC’s
proposed rule of June 15, 2011 [not yet a final rule as of May 6, 2012] that will
require reviews and audits of financial statements of brokers and dealers to be
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conducted in accordance with PCAOB standards), the term audit committee is
deemed to be the committee or the entire board, or when there is neither, the
auditor’s communications must be directed to those persons designated to oversee
the accounting and financial reporting processes of the company and audits of the
financial statements.
adding “receipt of information concerning the audit from the audit committee” as
one of the objectives of communications with the audit committee and deleting
“evaluation of the adequacy of the two-way communications between the auditor
and the audit committee” as an objective.
adding significant before discussions in reference to the auditor’s obligation to discuss
with the audit committee “any discussions regarding the application of accounting
principles and auditing standards.”
clarifying that the new standard requires the engagement letter be provided to the
audit committee annually and that it be acknowledged and agreed to by the audit
committee.
when making inquiries of the audit committee about matters that may be related to
the audit, including complaints or concerns regarding accounting or auditing matters, that line of inquiry was expanded to include, but not be limited to, knowledge
of violations or possible violations of laws or regulations and complaints or concerns
raised regarding financial reporting matters.
clarifying that the requirement for the auditor to communicate regardless of
whether persons with specialized skill or knowledge are needed to apply planned
audit procedures or to evaluate audit results will be limited to areas where the specialized skill or knowledge that is needed is related to significant risks.
when referring to the obligation of the auditor to communicate the names, locations, planned roles, and responsibilities of other independent public accounting
firms or other persons not employed by the auditor to perform audit procedures,
clarifying that this communication refers to other auditors, affiliates (including
network members), and nonaffiliated firms and clarifying that the auditor must
communicate the basis for determining the auditor can serve as principal auditor
only if significant parts of the audit are being performed by other auditors, whether
affiliates or nonaffiliates.
leaving the matters to be communicated and the level of detail to the discretion of
the auditor, even though some commenters suggested the standard identify certain
matters that should not be communicated to the audit committee to avoid compromising the effectiveness of related audit procedures.
retaining communication responsibilities for significant accounting policies and
practices, as well as critical accounting policies and practices (as defined by the SEC).
removing the requirement for the auditor to communicate how management subsequently monitors critical accounting estimates and to communicate when such
estimates involve a range and how different selections within the range would affect
the financial statements.
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• clarifying that when management communicates accounting policies, practices,
and estimates to the audit committee, a duplicate presentation by the auditor is not
required, but the auditor must participate in the meeting in which management
discusses such matters with the audit committee and must affirmatively confirm
management has adequately communicated such matters in a way that satisfies the
auditor’s communication requirement.
• eliminating the requirement that the auditor communicate his or her evaluation of
the reasonableness of management’s process to develop critical accounting estimates
but retaining the obligation to communicate concerning the reasonableness of critical accounting estimates.
• requiring the auditor to communicate matters that are difficult or contentious for
which the auditor consulted outside the engagement team and that the auditor
reasonably determines are relevant to the audit committee’s oversight of the financial reporting process, including complex or unusual matters or those in which the
auditor believes it is necessary to consult with the firm’s national office, an industry
specialist, or external parties.
Assuming the reproposed standard is adopted during the second or third quarter of 2012
by the PCAOB and approved by the SEC prior to the end of 2012, auditors are going to
want to carefully review all the changes this standard will bring to required communications
with audit committees and others. Likewise, audit committees should review the standard
to ensure their understanding of the new communications they should expect from their
auditors, the types of communications to be expected from management and the auditors
collectively, and the auditor communications that will be of particular importance to the
audit committee in discharging its duties.

Standards for Audit Committee Members
Briefly, let us cover the new standards that audit committee members must meet under the
exchange listing requirements the SEC previously adopted. These standards can be broadly
categorized as follows: who can serve on the audit committee; what the committee’s duties
encompass; what additional disclosure the audit committee, specifically, and the company,
generally, must provide; and what rights the audit committee has to use the services of third
parties and how such services are paid for.
In the following text, you will find a short summary of the duties of the audit committee
and auditor that were outlined in the final rule Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence. There is some overlap between the listing standards rules and
the independence rule, but each has differing, albeit equally unacceptable, consequences. If
the listing standards are violated, the company’s securities may be delisted from an exchange.
If the prohibitions of the strengthened independence rule are violated, the results could
include civil action by the SEC; civil litigation by investors seeking recovery for misrepresentation or omission of required information; or, perhaps, a Section 102(e) proceeding against
financial officers or auditors.
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• Audit committee—Who can serve?
— Each member must be independent; defined as nonaffiliates (no executive officers,
directors who are employees, or control persons) and persons not receiving any
consulting, advisory, or other fee from the company, excluding fixed retirement
plan distributions (also subject to certain exemptions for companies conducting
IPOs, foreign private issuers, dual holding companies, and sister issuers).
— Must be a member of the board of directors.
• Audit committee—What are its duties?
— Directly responsible for appointing, compensating, providing oversight (outside
auditor must report directly to the audit committee), and terminating the outside
auditor.
— Resolve disagreements between management and the outside auditor on financial reporting.
— Must determine that the audit engagement team has the competence to conduct the engagement in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS).
— Approve audit engagement fees and terms.
— Establish procedures for receipt, retention, and addressing of complaints regarding
accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing issues, including confidential and anonymous submissions by employees.
— Under PCAOB Rule 3524, Audit Committee Pre-approval of Certain Tax Services
(AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Select Rules of the Board), the
independent public accounting firm is required to disclose, discuss, and document when a firm seeks to obtain audit committee preapproval to provide tax
services to the issuer that are not prohibited by the rules of the SEC or the
PCAOB. Therefore, given the duty that PCAOB Rule 3524 imposes on the audit
firm, the audit committee must preapprove all permitted tax services provided by
the audit firm.
Avoid this pitfall: As you will see in the following discussion of how the strengthened independence rule affected audit committees and auditors, the audit committee can
preapprove audit and nonaudit services if it establishes detailed, preapproved policies and
procedures. Auditors and audit committee members alike should be cautious in using this
mechanism; it is the responsibility of both to ensure that approval has been given for the rendering of all audit and nonaudit services, except immaterial services and a few other narrow
exceptions. Because the SEC has stated the audit committee cannot delegate its responsibilities, audit committee members should be meticulous in documenting all approvals and any
preapprovals given. The auditors should carefully review any services that are preapproved
and likewise ensure, as the SEC requires, that the audit committee is informed of all such
services. Also, be aware that any preapproval processes adopted by the audit committee must
be disclosed in the proxy statement, thereby drawing even greater attention to any preapproved services.
*****
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• Audit committee—What are its disclosure obligations and in what documents?
— If the company uses an exemption (recent IPO, foreign private issuer, dual holding companies, and sister issuers) from the independence standards for its audit
committee members, it must disclose it relied on the exemption and how this
would materially adversely affect the committee’s ability to act independently
and satisfy the other requirements imposed on the committee.
— This information must be disclosed in the proxy or information statement relating to the election of directors and disclosed in (or incorporated by reference
into) the company’s annual report.
• Audit committee—Can it use third parties; if so, who pays?
— Has authority to engage independent counsel and other advisers in its discretion.
— Company must pay compensation, as determined by the audit committee, to the
outside auditor for audit, review, or attest services.
— Company must pay compensation to other advisers the audit committee deems
appropriate to retain.
— Company must pay all necessary or appropriate administrative expenses for the
committee to discharge its duties.
• Audit committee—What did the rule Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence affect?
— Obligates the audit committee to preapprove all audit and nonaudit services
(subject to very narrow exceptions, such as services valued at less than 5 percent
of total fees paid) rendered to the company by the outside audit firm, unless
detailed preapproved policies and procedures are established by the audit
committee.
the audit committee knows of each nonaudit service.
the responsibilities of the audit committee are not delegated to management.
— Must have its preapproval policies and procedures relating to nonaudit services, if
any, disclosed in its proxy or information statement.
— Must receive, prior to the filing of the audit report with the SEC, a report of the
audit firm regarding
all critical accounting policies and practices to be used by the company.
all alternative treatments under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) for policies and practices for material items, including implication of
such alternative treatments and treatments preferred by the outside audit firm.
all other material written communications with management, including the
management letter and schedule of unadjusted differences.
• Outside audit firm—What did the rule Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence affect?
— Further circumscribed the definition of independence of the outside auditor
in circumstances when a former member of the audit engagement team is
now employed in an accounting or a financial reporting oversight role at the
client.
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— Stated that permitted nonaudit services can be provided only if preapproved by
the audit committee.
— Expanded the scope of prohibited nonaudit services that can be provided by the
outside auditor.
— Mandated lead and concurring partner rotation every five years, with a five-year
time-out and seven-year rotation deadline and a two-year time-out for other
partners.
— Prohibited compensation of the audit partner based on sales of nonaudit products
and services to his or her audit clients.
— Required communication to the audit committee, as previously described, of a
report regarding
all critical accounting policies and practices to be used by the company.
all alternative treatments under GAAP for policies and practices for material items, including implication of such alternative treatments and treatments
preferred by the outside audit firm.
all other material written communications with management, including the
management letter and schedule of unadjusted differences.
— Expanded disclosure of audit and nonaudit fees, including
four categories of fees—audit fees, audit-related fees, tax fees, and all other—
rather than three categories.
disclosure of such fees during the two most recent fiscal years rather than one.
AU section 380, Communication With Audit Committees (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and
Related Rules, Interim Standards), covers many, although not all, of the other GAAS requirements for communications with audit committees. To the extent not related to accounting
policies and procedures, GAAS requirements, other than AU section 380, govern the auditor’s responsibilities, disagreements with management, consultations with other accountants,
major issues covered with management before a firm’s engagement, and difficulties that arise
during the audit.
As noted earlier in this chapter, the PCAOB’s reproposed standard, Communications with
Audit Committees, will supersede many of the interim standards in AU section 380 and AU
section 310, Appointment of the Independent Auditor (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related
Rules, Interim Standards).

Persons in a Financial Reporting Oversight Role
On April 22, 2008, the PCAOB adopted Rule 3526, Communication with Audit Committees
Concerning Independence (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Select Rules of the
Board), that was approved by the SEC on August 22, 2008.
PCAOB Rule 3526 requires auditors, prior to accepting an initial engagement, to discuss
with the audit committee any services the auditor has previously or is currently providing
to the issuer or a person in a financial reporting oversight role that might be thought to bear
on independence.The rule requires that the audit firm that is to be engaged discuss with the
audit committee the potential effects of these relationships and document those discussions.
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The rule also requires that auditors annually describe in writing the relationships between
the audit firm and the issuer or financial reporting oversight role personnel that may reasonably bear on independence, discuss the potential effects of those relationships and document
those discussions, and affirm in writing that the audit firm is independent in accordance
with PCAOB Rule 3520, Auditor Independence (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules,
Select Rules of the Board).
PCAOB Rule 3526 notes that the SEC’s final rule Revision of the Commission’s Auditor
Independence Requirements must be referenced when considering the relationships that could
reasonably bear on independence. That rule states that an accountant is not independent if
“the accountant is not, or a reasonable investor with knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances would conclude that the accountant is not, capable of exercising objective and
impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the accountant’s engagement.” As noted
in the rule, the SEC “looks in the first instance to whether a relationship or the provision
of service: (a) creates a mutual or conflicting interest between the accountant and the audit
client; (b) places the accountant in the position of auditing his or her own work; (c) results
in the accountant acting as management or an employee of the audit client; or (d) places the
accountant in a position of being an advocate for the audit client.”
The PCAOB earlier noted that auditors would also need to consider AU section 220,
Independence (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Select Rules of the Board), in
determining whether a particular relationship needs to be discussed with the audit committee. Paragraph .01 of AU section 220 requires that “[i]n all matters relating to the assignment,
an independence in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.”

Ethical Guides
In an April 7, 2003, speech before the National Economists Club, then-SEC Commissioner
Cynthia Glassman made the following observations:
[T]here are three components to achieving good corporate behavior:
1. an effective corporate governance process;
2. punishment of bad behavior—by the company, by civil and criminal law enforcement and the market; and
3. an ethical corporate culture.
We cannot legislate the third factor—an ethical corporate culture, so our efforts
have been directed at the first two: rules to incent good procedures and behavior,
and enforcement actions to disincent bad behavior.
In the current environment, companies have a strong incentive to adopt rigorous
governance procedures because those that fail to do so will be unable to attract top
quality directors and will pay a risk premium in terms of both director compensation and possibly officer and director liability insurance.
[T]he ultimate effectiveness of the new corporate governance rules will be
determined by the “tone at the top.” Adopting a code of ethics means little if the
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company’s chief executive officer or its directors make clear, by conduct or otherwise, that the code’s provisions do not apply to them.
Corporate officers and directors hold the ultimate power and responsibility for
restoring public trust by conducting themselves in a manner that is worthy of the
trust that is placed in them.

Avoid this pitfall: As pointed out by former-Commissioner Glassman’s comments, examples of behavior at the top have a lot to do with building a corporate culture with the right
values. In other words, it is important to put a code of ethics in place, but actions mean
more than words. Given a more common perception today that officers and directors of
public companies are simply hogs dining at the trough of investor capital, your own behavior
and that of your colleagues mean more than ever to rebuilding the trust to which formerCommissioner Glassman referred. In other words, you should first commit yourself to representing the organizational values and ethics that you, and presumably your company or firm,
most aspire to attain. Demonstrate this commitment with your actions, and ask that others
in the organization do the same.
*****
David Starr Jordan, the American educator, once said, “Wisdom is knowing what to do next;
virtue is doing it.”
Albert Schweitzer wrote in Civilization and Ethics, “Ethics, too, are nothing but reverence for
life. That is what gives me the fundamental principle of morality, namely, that good consists
in maintaining, promoting, and enhancing life, and that destroying, injuring, and limiting life
are evil.”
According to a Chinese proverb, “Laws control the lesser man. Right conduct controls the
greater one.”
According to 18 VAC 5-21-120(A) and (B) of the Virginia Board of Accountancy Regulations,“A
regulant shall exercise sensitive professional and moral judgment in all activities …. A regulant shall act in a way that serves the public interest, honors the public trust, and demonstrates
commitment to professionalism.”
According to Sections 3-04-01-02 and 3-04-01-03 of the North Dakota Administrative Code
“An accountant engaged in the practice of public accounting must observe all of the provisions of the code of ethics …. An accountant may be held responsible for compliance with
the code of ethics by all persons associated with the accountant in the practice of public
accounting who are either under the accountant’s supervision, or who are fellow partners or
shareholders or owners with the accountant.”

Case Study Facts
Precious Mining Inc. and Your Role
Founded in 1968, Precious Mining Inc. (PM) is engaged in exploring, developing, and expanding mining properties yielding precious metals, such as gold, platinum, and silver. Although
the company has occasionally developed mining properties that have significant deposits of
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minerals, such as nickel, cobalt, and antimony, production of these deposits typically occurs
only when found in conjunction with precious metals. Capitalizing on the run-up in precious minerals, PM has developed a reputation in the international mining community for
being a savvy minerals trader that is adept at forward-selling its production at times of prevailing high market prices.
Initially funded through equity contributions and debt from 2 institutional investors with
extensive mining experience, PM has been publicly traded on NYSE Amex Equities since
1996 and recently completed a follow-on offering that raised $85 million for additional
development work on 2 gold properties in Australia. Code named Comet and Titan, these
2 properties are expected to significantly increase PM’s production of gold as the mines are
expanded to new depths. The Comet property in particular has yielded high gold concentrations and significant quantities of antimony, which is generally found in association with
gold. When added to alloys, antimony is used in lead storage batteries, solder, sheet and pipe
metal, bearings, and castings and is also used as an additive to paints, ceramics, and fireworks.
Your involvement with PM began approximately 7 years ago when your work as a consultant in mining finance led you to introduce a Canadian mining service company to PM.
The Canadian firm was looking for a joint venture partner to share in the cost of developing a mineral separation technology. Although the technology did not pan out, PM ended
up with a 20 percent ownership interest in the Canadian mining service company that
appreciated nicely when it was sold 2 years later at a 45 percent increase in value over PM’s
cost. The chairman of PM, duly impressed with your introduction and the financial results,
contacted you 5 years ago to ask if you would consider joining the board of directors of PM.
Forming a quick friendship with the chairman, an Australian named Mick Stamford, you
found yourself nominated to chair the audit committee when your accounting and finance
background surfaced. With a CPA certificate and an intimate knowledge of accounting for
natural resources, you understand well the accounting issues a firm such as PM has to deal
with on a daily basis.

Your World Gets Turned Upside Down
One afternoon, as you are in the process of clearing out your e-mail inbox, you open up an
e-mail titled “Must Read—Precious Mining” that you assume came from Mick, the CEO,
or one of your codirectors. After opening up this item, the message you find is enough to
make your blood run cold.You read:
From: Perry Jacobsen

Cc: Amanda Hart, CPA

To: Raleigh Valmont, Audit Committee Chair
Subject: Must Read—Precious Mining
Message: Dear Mr.Valmont,
Until a couple weeks ago, I was the corporate controller of the Australian mining division
of Precious Mining. I was fired for insubordination by the division CFO, Rex Donnell,
after I discovered PM has been inflating revenues by making sales of antimony to Carbon
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Blue, a major player in the worldwide antimony cartel, in exchange for gold produced by
Carbon Blue at a few of its properties. Funny enough, the value of Carbon Blue’s purchases from us equaled almost to the penny our purchases of gold from Carbon Blue in
the last two quarters. Even funnier, it seems to me that Carbon Blue overpaid us for our
antimony. I don’t think that was an accident but was the quid pro quo for our division’s
agreement to keep our antimony off the world market. I respect Mick, you, and the rest
of the team at PM and hope you’ll take action to look into this because I’d hate to have
to hire a barrister there in the United States to sue PM to get my job back. I’ve copied
Amanda Hart at Global Accounting and Auditing because I think she needs to know
about this, too. I wish you all the best and just ask that you’ll straighten this out by getting
rid of Rex Donnell. He is the problem at Precious Mining.
Yours very truly,
Perry Jacobsen
While digesting this flood of unwelcome information, you call Mick, who quickly picks up.
“Top a’ the afternoon, mate. I don’t suppose ya’d be calling about a certain e-mail from me
good friend Perry down under?”
Taken aback and wondering if Mick was reading your e-mails, you manage to croak out a
reply. “Mick, if this meant to remind me of your mind reading skills learned in the Outback,
I’m convinced, okay? Now what the heck is going on down there?”
“Well, Raleigh, this is the lay of the land. I was just on the horn with that very nice lady
from Global Accounting who told me rather sternly that I’d better get me audit committee members hoppin’ like a bunch a’ roos, or she’d have to serve me up for supper at
the next stockholder meeting. She sounded about as nervous as one of those scarlet letter
types in a revival meetin’.” Exasperated, you interrupt Mick’s remarks with a lecture of
your own.
“Mick, whatever Amanda told you, believe it. Stuff like this is D-E-A-T-H, Mick, first for
the company and then for the auditor! Before you know it, we could have the SEC, the New
York Attorney General, and the Justice Department down our throats. I’m telling you, we’re
going to have to get to the bottom of this, double time, or someone will do it for us, and the
results will be a lot less pleasant under those circumstances.”
Mick responded in a correspondingly serious tone.
Raleigh, I’m not attemptin’ to make light of this, and I’m not dismissin’ it, but so
far all I’ve got is a forwarded e-mail that makes a bunch of accusations with not a
shred of support.You know, the first thing I think is, Why didn’t this Jacobsen send
the e-mail to me? Maybe ’cause he’s in league with those robber barons out of
London who want to take over our company, right? Maybe he figures if he raises
enough Cain, he can get me forced out, and PM becomes an easy takeover target.
Before you and Amanda get too concerned here, let me do some diggin’ and see
what I can find out about Perry Jacobsen and our CFO, Mr. Donnell, down under.
Who knows, maybe they’ve tussled before, and this was just the sore loser comin’
back for one last bite at the apple, right?
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Mick, I understand what you’re saying, and you’re right; this may be just that
simple. But now that it’s in Amanda’s hands, and the allegations involve our
accounting, we’ve got to respond quickly, and I’ll have to bring in the audit committee to consider what needs to be done. Like I was saying earlier, in today’s world,
everyone will assume the worst until proven otherwise, so if you can get some preliminary info on this situation, I’ll call the other audit committee members and get
them up to speed.You better call our esteemed counselor, as well, because we may
need some advice on how to go from here. Are you with me on this?

Unintentionally, you find yourself holding your breath, wondering if Mick is going to
argue with you about what needs to be done or if he’s going to try to stonewall.
Mick’s response is reassuring. “Raleigh, all I can say is, we’ll get to the bottom of this, and
we’ll do the right thing; don’t you worry. I didn’t grow up on roo steak and croc stew just to
get scared off by some wild accusations!” Micks rings off, and you start placing calls to your
two fellow audit committee members.

The Next Day
The following morning, you hear back from Mick who has definitely done some digging.
As he puts it, Jacobsen has gone “off the reef,” and has a history of problems with Donnell
of over 12 months. Mick has gotten a complete ledger of purchases and sales of antimony
and gold that PM has completed with Carbon Blue over the last 5 years, and he volunteers
to e-mail it over to you and to Amanda at Global Accounting right away. In the meantime,
Mick fills you in on what he has learned.
“You know, Raleigh, there’s never a simple explanation for situations like this, right?
According to Donnell, Jacobsen hired a barrister several months ago to, as Donnell put it,
‘threaten’ legal action if Jacobsen lost his job. It sounds like Jacobsen was just setting us up
for a wrongful termination suit and had even contacted U.S. counsel who had written our
in-house counsel about Jacobsen’s grievances.”
Avoid this pitfall: Situations such as this are, unfortunately, more common in today’s litigious world. Oftentimes, whistle-blowers are dismissed by management teams and even auditors as disgruntled ex-employees looking for revenge or a pay day. Because audit committees
must have confidential and anonymous means for receiving and dealing with accounting
complaints, it seems that instances of whistle-blowing are on the rise. Both audit committees
and auditors should be closely attuned to financial and disclosure questions raised by former
and current employees, even more so if the whistle-blower is identified and had (has) finance
or accounting responsibilities.
*****
“Did Donnell or our in-house people think Jacobsen had a basis for these threats?” you
ask.
“It doesn’t sound like it, Raleigh, but Donnell seemed to me to be a little concerned when
I asked him to send up the Carbon Blue information. I haven’t had a chance to look it over
yet, but maybe you and I can get together later today to see if there’s anything we should be
concerned about. Are you free around 2:00 p.m.?”
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You agree to meet Mick at 2:00 p.m., and before you can even contact your audit committee members to bring them up to speed, the receptionist announces a call from Amanda
at Global Accounting. Picking up the phone, you notice a distinct change in the tone of
Amanda’s voice since your last call, and her words serve only to increase your concern.
“Raleigh, we received the schedules on the Carbon Blue purchases and sales this morning
from Mick. Have you had a look at them yet?”
“No,” you reply, “I’ve been on the phone most of the morning and was just about to get
to them.”
“We’ve had a chance to look through them in some detail, and we’ve got some concerns,
Raleigh. If you’ve got a few minutes, Ray Travers and I would like to come down and brief
you on our view of things.” Amanda’s reference to her concurring partner, a supercilious
man with a pencil-thin moustache and penchant for thousand dollar suits, sets you instantly
on edge.
“Amanda, I’d be happy to sit down with you all, but give me an hour or so to put out some
of the fires on my desk first.”
Finishing the call with a strained exchange of pleasantries, you put everything else aside
to begin looking at the Carbon Blue schedules of gold purchases and antimony sales. A few
things jump out at you right away: the antimony sales to Carbon Blue, measured in dollars,
have increased every year but nearly doubled in the last 18 months. The schedule, unfortunately, lacks price data, so you ask your assistant to get you quarterly highs and lows for gold
and antimony over the last 3 years. The gold schedule shows a general uptrend in purchases
by PM from Carbon Blue but at a slower rate than the antimony sales going the other way.
Glancing over the last 2 quarters, you can tell the alleged offsetting purchases and sales of
gold and antimony appear to be nearly identical in dollar amounts, a disturbing fact that
tends to lend credence to the allegations made by Jacobsen. Before Amanda and Ray arrive,
you put in a quick call to Mick to seek his reaction.
Avoid this pitfall: “Round-trip” trading is not just an issue among energy or commodity firms but in any industry in which competitors (or potential competitors) buy from, or
sell to, each other. One of the tip-offs to “round-tripping” is the matching or near matching of purchases and sales in particular periods. Alert auditors and audit committee members for companies in industries that are susceptible to “round-tripping” should carefully
review relationships with suppliers and customers with which a company does business.
Without implying wrongdoing, closer scrutiny of transactions with suppliers and customers may reduce the temptation for officers or employees to use “round-tripping” to inflate
operating results.
*****
“Mick, Raleigh here. I’ve had a chance to look over the schedules, and it seems to me like
Jacobsen may be right at least about one thing: the nearly equal dollar amounts of purchases
and sales of gold and antimony in the last two quarters. Have you had a chance to ask Donnell about that?”
I did, Raleigh, and he pointed out that Project Comet was single-handedly responsible for doubling our antimony production in the last 18 months, which is the
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reason the sell side of the ledger is going up so fast. He also said that, although our
purchases and sales were awfully close in the last 2 quarters, we bought gold at spot
prices from a number of the antimony cartel members, and it was just coincidence
the numbers were so close; in fact, he said we have since bought 25,000 ounces
of gold from Carbon Blue and that they’ve only purchased a nominal amount of
antimony from us in the current quarter. Then, I called our VP of production and
asked him to get me the antimony production numbers from Comet. I didn’t like
what I heard, I’ll tell ya’. He said that antimony production has increased only 50
percent from the Comet property in the last 18 months, not 200 percent. I’m still
having the numbers run, Raleigh, but Jacobsen may not be all wet.

Mick’s last words are spoken in a sad tone, leaving you with a sense of foreboding as
Amanda and Ray’s arrival is announced.You mouth some reassuring words to Mick and ring
off, wishing you felt anything like the words you just spoke.
As you walk into the conference room, you paste a smile on your face, trying hard not to
let Ray’s preening appearance or the smug look on his face distract your attention. Amanda
is reasonably pleasant but launches into the subject matter without delay.
Raleigh, I guess what we’d like to do is summarize what we know and get some
input from you about where we, and you all, go from here. After I got Jacobsen’s
e-mail, we talked to Mick, the Australian CEO, and the CFO, Rex Donnell, and
reviewed copies of the schedules that Mick sent on to you and us. We understand
that Jacobsen may be just a vindictive ex-employee, but the similarity in the dollars for purchases and sales of gold and antimony in the last two quarters can’t be
ignored, particularly because “round-tripping” trades are such a hot topic these days.
Now, we’re not accusing anyone of anything because if we were, we’d have sent
over our resignation letter and notified the SEC of an illegal act under Section 10A.

You nod, intent on hearing Amanda out, before Ray interrupts. “I’m not sure I share my
colleague’s more optimistic assessment of the management team’s integrity at PM, but I’ve
assured her I will not rush to judgment. I’ve harbored my own suspicions about PM’s conduct in certain situations, but thus far, I’ve been unable to come up with any tangible evidence of wrongdoing.” Ray leans forward, almost seeming to relish the chance to rub your
nose in it, his moustache quivering like a mouse’s whiskers. “It seems that, at this point, that
tangible evidence may be forthcoming.”
Before you can unload on Ray, Amanda delivers a well-timed speech.
We are not going to reach any conclusions, Raleigh, until the audit committee has
a chance to retain counsel and a forensic team to examine the transactions with
Carbon Blue. We were hoping you might concur and agree to share with us any
report that results. If we agree on this, we’ll refrain from taking any action until
PM has a chance to investigate the facts. We can’t assure you of our continued services once we’ve seen the report, but our risk management committee has agreed
to consider the actions PM takes in response to the internal investigation before
making a final determination. Can we count on the audit committee to proceed
promptly with its inquiry?
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“I haven’t yet discussed an internal investigation with the other audit committee members,
Amanda, but I would expect we’ll want to get to the bottom of this more than anyone,”
you reply. “The one thing I don’t know is what our sharing the report with you does to our
attorney-client privilege. Although I know the SEC usually gets these reports through voluntary disclosure, I’d hate to see any questionable information fall into the hands of the class
action lawyers. If we can work that out, though, I’d say we’ll get going on an investigation
and share the results with you.” Amanda, looking somewhat relieved, takes her leave with
Ray before he can interject any further unpleasantness into the conversation.
When you return to your office, you pick up a few voicemails, among which is one from
Mick.
Raleigh, I just wanted you to know that Donnell has left the office, and the CEO
in Australia says he won’t be coming back. It sounds to me like Donnell as much
as admitted he’d been cooking the books in league with the CFO over at Carbon
Blue and that Jacobsen found out about this and was blackmailing him. Project
Comet’s production and sales numbers were evidently inflated somehow in order
to keep the scheme going and to allow us and Carbon Blue to book offsetting sales
amounts. I’m not sure yet if this means we’ve short-changed Carbon Blue or vice
versa, but I guess we’ll be looking into that, as well as if our production people were
somehow involved. I’m sorry to have to relay this news, but I knew you’d want to
know ASAP. Call me once you get this, and we’ll discuss what happens now.

Questions for Consideration
1. At the end of the first day, before your meeting with the auditors and the later call
and voicemail from Mick, the case study indicates you placed calls to your two fellow
audit committee members. What would have been your first priority in these calls to
the audit committee members?
a. Have a resolution adopted permitting an internal investigation.
b. Confer regarding how to deal with Mick’s role in the situation.
c. Seek their opinions on whether to contact Jacobsen to get further information.
d. Review the facts as you know them as of that time, and lay the groundwork for
action once further facts are known.
2. If Jacobsen’s e-mail was correct in asserting that Carbon Blue overpaid PM for its
antimony purchases in order to keep the antimony off the world market, did PM do
anything illegal or unethical?
a. No, PM’s conduct was both legal and within ethical boundaries.
b. No, the fact that Carbon Blue overpaid for the antimony was Carbon Blue’s choice,
and PM isn’t responsible for Carbon’s Blue’s actions.
c. Yes, PM’s actions were both illegal and unethical.
d. Yes, PM’s actions were unethical but not illegal.
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3. If Jacobsen’s charges of what was going on were substantiated, what are the consequences that PM might face for its role in these events?
a. Its auditors might resign and may submit a Section 10A report to the SEC.
b. PM’s financial statements might have to be restated.
c. PM might face penalties for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
and antitrust law, not to mention disclosure requirements.
d. Class action lawsuits brought by investors who bought PM’s stock while the overpayments were occurring.
e. A temporary bar from performing services under government contracts.
f. All of the above.
4. Assume that at the end of the first call you had with Mick following receipt of the
e-mail from Jacobsen, instead of Mick saying, “We’ll get to the bottom of this,” he
told you that you were overreacting and that he would handle this unless and until
the auditors said you’d have to get the audit committee involved. What would you do
under those circumstances?
a. Advise Mick that you and the two other committee members would have to be
involved, given the responsibilities of the audit committee.
b. Tell Mick that you would wait to hear from the auditors.
c. Call the auditors and ask for their assessment of the situation.
d. Tell Mick he was correct, and wait to hear more from him.
5. If former-Commissioner Glassman is correct in stating you cannot legislate an ethical
corporate culture, what would you want to have in place at PM to promote ethical
behavior?
a. Ineffective corporate governance
b. A comprehensive ethics policy for all employees with consequences for misbehavior
c. A wide variety of transactions between PM and Mick
d. An audit committee made up of only independent members with a charter that
gives the committee autonomy and power at least equal to that required by the
SEC and exchange listing standards
e. Both (a) and (c)
f. Both (b) and (d)
6. Assume for a moment that you were in the shoes of Amanda, the external auditor at
Global Accounting. If your firm’s resignation hinged upon the conclusions reached in
the internal investigation to be undertaken by the audit committee and its representatives, what are the most critical points you would want addressed before, during, and
after the investigation?
7. As the head of the audit committee at PM and without knowing any additional
facts, what changes in policies or procedures would you recommend be adopted by
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management and the audit committee in response to what evidently took place with
Carbon Blue?
8. The case study ends with you getting Mick’s voicemail that relays the bad news but
also says you and he need to discuss what happens next. Let’s assume that in the course
of proceeding, management and the audit committee, in consultation with counsel,
decide they are going to do everything they can to cooperate with the SEC in order
to lessen PM’s exposure. What are the steps the audit committee should recommend
be taken to minimize PM’s exposure?

Suggested Readings
Guidance for audit committee members, in particular, and board members, generally, is available from various online and hard copy sources. Among the more popular sources are the
National Association of Corporate Directors, Harvard Business School Executive Education
programs, and materials from Financial Executives International. In addition, the AICPA
publishes materials and offers seminars covering issues related to director and audit committee matters. The AICPA also makes available on its website the AICPA Audit Committee
Toolkits for private companies, public companies, not for profits, and governmental organizations that are designed to assist audit committee members in understanding and achieving
best practices in complying with their obligations for the various types of covered organizations.
The corporate governance requirements for NASDAQ, including definitions of independence for directors, board and committee obligations and restrictions, and independent
director oversight obligations, are set forth in the 5600 series of rules on the NASDAQ
OMX website.You will find all the NASDAQ OMX listing rules at: http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_2&manual=/
nasdaq/main/nasdaq-equityrules/.
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9
Case 9—Incisive Lasers
Corporation—You Are the
Outside Attorney for the Controller
Introduction
This case study asks you to put yourself in the position of serving as outside counsel to
a controller of a public company who has been accused by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) of participating in wrongdoing. The case seeks your evaluation of the
controller’s conduct from an outsider’s perspective and calls for you to apply your knowledge
of applicable professional standards and disciplinary outcomes that may come to bear. As you
consider the issues, keep in mind the discussion of Rule 102(e) and state disciplinary rules
that are covered in the following text.

Focus Points
The SEC separately categorizes and discloses accounting and auditing enforcement actions
it initiates, whether in court or administrative proceedings, as Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases (AAERs). In 2011, the SEC issued 127 AAERs, which was a record
low for the last 5 years. This trend may be continuing because the SEC disclosed it issued 22
AAERs in the first quarter of 2012. A total of 41 percent of the 2011 AAERs and 55 percent
of the first quarter 2012 AAERs were instituted under Rule 102(e) against auditors, accountants, and financial officers. Rule 102(e) allows the SEC to bar or suspend a professional from
practicing before the SEC for
• lacking qualifications, character, or integrity.
• having engaged in unethical or improper conduct.
• having willfully violated, or aided and abetted the violation, of federal securities laws,
or a finding of the same by a court or the SEC.
• having a state license suspended or revoked.
• conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
• the entry of a permanent injunction from violating, or aiding or abetting violation,
of federal securities laws.
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Rule 102(e) was amended by the SEC in October 1998 in Release No. 33-7593 to add a
definition of improper professional conduct by accountants. As amended, Rule 102(e) includes a
statutory definition of specific conduct by accountants, as opposed to professionals generally,
that will result in the SEC taking action against members of the profession. The following
types of conduct that violate applicable professional standards are defined as improper professional conduct by accountants:
• Intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct
• A single instance of highly unreasonable conduct in circumstances when the
accountant knows, or should know, that heightened scrutiny is warranted
• Repeated instances of unreasonable conduct that indicate a lack of competence to
practice before the SEC
Although the wording of the definition means that accountants will not be subject to
discipline for a single act of simple negligence, the SEC did state its view that even two
instances of negligent conduct occurring within one audit could meet the threshold for
action under Rule 102(e). Conversely, an accountant can be disciplined by the SEC if a
single act of negligence is highly unreasonable and occurs under circumstances when the
accountant knew, or should have known, that heightened scrutiny was called for. Release
No. 33-7593 indicated that heightened scrutiny is warranted when matters are important or
material or when warning signals or other factors should alert an accountant of a heightened
risk.
Many Rule 102(e) proceedings are brought against auditors and financial officers several
years after a financial fraud has been exposed. For example, five Rule 102(e) proceedings on
January 30, 2012, related to a financial fraud carried out at Thornton Precisions Components
(TPC), a British subsidiary of Symmetry Medical, Inc. In the words of the SEC
From 1999 through late September 2007, TPC’s management was engaged in a
scheme to improperly boost TPC’s revenues, net income and other performance
indicators by fraudulently manipulating TPC’s financial accounts. TPC booked
fictitious sales revenues, understated costs of goods sold, created fictitious inventories, improperly capitalized certain tool and die to reduce expenses, and engaged
in other accounting manipulations, resulting in material overstatements of net
income and material misstatements of other financial line items in Symmetry’s
financial statements.

The fraud involved the systematic understatement of expenses and overstatement of assets
and revenues and materially distorted the financial statements during its approximate threeyear life.
Three TPC officers were cited in the Rule 102(e) proceedings, and the other named the
former audit partner and former audit manager of Ernst & Young LLP (E&YUK), Christopher J. Kelly and Margaret Hebb. E&YUS served as Symmetry’s independent auditor from
2003, and E&YUK audited TPC’s financial statements from fiscal years 2004–06. Without
admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, the AAER noted that Kelly and Hebb
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• failed to properly audit accounts receivable. Again, in the words of the SEC
E&YUK failed to reconcile TPC’s accounts receivable general ledger account to
a detailed accounts receivable subsidiary ledger. See AU § 326.19. E&YUK was
told by TPC that this detailed ledger was unavailable, but did not adequately question this assertion. Instead, E&YUK reconciled the general ledger account to a
summary listing of aged debt by customer. Had E&YUK reconciled to TPC’s
detailed ledger, they would have seen that the general ledger balance, inflated due
to premature and fictitious revenue recognition, was far greater than the subsidiary
ledger balance.

Moreover, E&YUK relied on alternative procedures to confirm accounts receivable
in 2004 but only validated 7 percent of its sample through those procedures. For the
2005 and 2006 audits, 59 percent and 26 percent, respectively, of the confirmation
sample value was never validated through confirmations or alternative procedures.
• failed to adequately review journal entries. From 2004–06, TPC recorded monthly
top-side journal entries so that revenues met analyst estimates. Even though the
working papers indicated E&YUK had reviewed and agreed nonstandard or significant journal entries to supporting documentation, E&YUK failed to detect or
investigate the top-side journal entries.
• failed to properly audit inventories. TPC created fictitious work-in-process inventory and added that inventory to its inventory ledger to conceal the fraud. Before
leaving the physical inventory count, the audit teams failed to obtain a complete
list of all inventory tags issued in the physical count or copies of all the tag books
created as part of the physical inventory. Consequently, E&YUK did not determine
that fictitious items had been added to the final inventory listing. After the fraud was
discovered, it was determined that inventories were overstated by 114 percent in
2004, 176 percent in 2005, and 197 percent in 2006.
Kelly and Hebb were barred from appearing or practicing before the SEC for two years,
with a right to apply for reinstatement after that time.
Although the TPC fraud was committed by three TPC financial officers, each of whom
was subjected to a permanent bar under Rule 102(e), the CFO (Fred Hite) of Symmetry
(the parent company), was also named in a separate civil action as a codefendant with Symmetry. What is most disturbing about that action is set forth in the following extract:
In the Fall of 2005, Symmetry created an internal audit unit, headed by the IA,
who was to report to the Chairman of Symmetry’s Audit Committee. On July 17,
2006, the IA provided Hite and the Company’s independent auditor with a status
report for submission to Symmetry’s Audit Committee for consideration at its next
meeting, which was scheduled to be held at TPC on July 26, 2006. Hite was the
conduit for materials to be included in the board packets provided to Symmetry’s
directors in connection with their board and committee meetings. In that report,
the IA claimed to have identified problematic bill-and-hold transactions at TPC
and further asserted that TPC personnel had not provided requested evidence
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pertaining to the IA’s Q1 2006 sales cut-off, cash cutoff and monthly controls
testing. By July 2006, TPC was misstating its revenues and net income primarily
by booking top-side journal entries of fictitious sales revenue and overvaluing
inventory to conceal its understatement of costs of goods sold.These misstatements
had not been detected by the IA and were not included in the report. Rather the
IA’s report only implied the potential presence of deeper problems at TPC, since
the report sought permission to solicit outsourcing proposals from “Big Four”
accounting firms to provide, for the remainder of 2006 and 2007, internal audit
services at TPC to include “internal controls testing and financial audits” there,
saying, “The extent and severity of issues identified at [TPC] exceed the size and
ability of IA’s current staff and consultants from other firms.”

Hite is stated to have forwarded the internal auditor’s (IAs) report to Symmetry’s independent auditor (E&YUS) and the controller; however, the IA resigned on July 19, 2006.
According to the SEC, “Hite did not, however, include the [IA’s] report in the board packet
for the July 26 Audit Committee meeting. According to the minutes of that meeting, Hite
told the Committee that the IA had ‘tested all facilities and all were acceptable with a few
exceptions found at [TPC].’”

Continued Adelphia Fallout Via Rule 102(e)
On January 31, 2008, the SEC issued its opinion on In the Matter of Gregory M. Dearlove,
CPA, and barred Mr. Dearlove from practicing before the SEC as an accountant, subject to
the right to reapply after four years. Dearlove was formerly a partner at Deloitte & Touche
LLP (Deloitte) and while with Deloitte served as the engagement partner on the 2000
audit of Adelphia Communications Corporation (Adelphia). The SEC found that Dearlove
had engaged in repeated instances of unreasonable conduct, as defined under Rule 102(e).
Although Adelphia was on Deloitte’s high-risk audit client list, the SEC concluded that
Dearlove had failed to exercise due care and professional skepticism during the course of
Adelphia’s audit by, among other things, failing to ensure
• proper accounting and disclosure of related-party payables and receivables owed to,
and due from, entities related to the Rigas family (the controlling shareholders of
Adelphia) that had been improperly netted by Adelphia.
• coborrowing obligations of the Rigas family partnerships, regarding which Adelphia
was contingently liable, were appropriately accounted for and disclosed.
• those significant liabilities shifted from Adelphia to the Rigas family partnerships
were extinguished, which was the position taken by Adelphia.
With John and Timothy Rigas having been sent to jail and other members of Adelphia’s
management team having entered into settlements with the SEC, Dearlove’s position was
especially tenuous—the fraud at Adelphia caused billions of dollars in investment losses, and
the bankruptcy of the company left regulators with plenty of potential individual defendants.
The administrative law judge’s conclusions that Dearlove had engaged in repeated instances
of unreasonable conduct were affirmed by the SEC.
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Youth Is Not a Defense
On January 15, 2008, Gregory B. Raben, a 30 year-old former auditor for PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), and William Borchard, a 28 year-old former senior associate in PwC’s
Transaction Services Group, were charged with insider trading. According to the SEC’s complaint, Borchard learned of potential acquisitions by PwC clients in the course of his doing
due diligence for PwC’s Transaction Services Group, and on 6 separate occasions, he told
Raben about potential acquisitions that PwC clients were planning. By trading ahead of the
public announcements of the acquisitions, Raben allegedly netted more than $20,000, and
2 friends who he tipped off also made several thousand dollars. Borchard, a CPA, was permanently enjoined from violating the securities laws; paid a civil penalty equal to Raben’s
trading profits; and was barred from practicing before the SEC, with a right to reapply after
a period of 3 years.

And You Thought Municipal Audits Were
Relatively Risk Free
In December 2007, the SEC also announced the charging and simultaneous settlement with
the audit firm and engagement partner on the City of San Diego audits in 2002 and 2003.
During this period, the city conducted several municipal bond offerings while knowing
(and not disclosing) the existence of enormous unfunded pension and retiree health care
liabilities. The SEC’s complaint alleged that Thomas Saiz, the engagement partner at the
firm of Calderon, Jaham, and Osborn, played two key roles in the bond offerings. First, Saiz
drafted the financial statement footnotes that were included in the bond offerings in which
it was indicated that although the city’s pension obligations were underfunded, the city was
properly funding and reserving for its pension obligations and that the city’s actuary believed
the city’s pension funding method was an excellent method for the city’s use. The SEC’s
complaint also alleged that the financial statement footnotes prepared by Saiz indicated the
city recognized expenses for the retiree health benefits as they were paid.
The SEC’s complaint concluded that because Saiz and his firm had audited the city’s
financial statements and pension plan and because they also reviewed the bond offering
documents that were prepared and used by the city in 2002 and 2003, they knew, or were
reckless in not knowing, that the disclosure in the city’s financial statement footnotes and
bond offering documents was false and misleading. Unsurprisingly (given the SEC’s charges),
the firm’s audit reports for the years in question were unqualified and indicated the financial
statements had been presented in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and that the audits were performed in conformance with generally accepted
auditing standards (GAAS).
Although the financial penalty paid by Saiz was small ($15,000), the more important part
of this enforcement case laid in the fact that Saiz and his firm were charged as principals in
the city’s securities fraud rather than aiders and abettors.The distinction is important because,
in the civil lawsuits brought by bond investors, the fact that the SEC charged the accounting firm as a primary player in the city’s fraud makes it much easier for counsel to bond
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investors to obtain a recovery from the accounting firm and its insurer. In a December 11,
2007, speech at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments, then-Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement Linda Chatman Thomsen said,
“Charging auditors with primary violations is somewhat rare, but in this case it was justified
given the auditors’ direct participation in the false and misleading statements to investors ….
This is the first time that the Commission has obtained civil penalties against an independent
auditor for a municipality.”
If you are wondering why former director Thomson did not make reference to Governmental Accounting Standards Board financial reporting provisions in discussing the
charges against Saiz and his firm (but instead referred to GAAP), remember that (a) the
bond offering documents purported to state that the city’s financial statements had been
prepared in conformity with GAAP, and (b) the SEC’s concern in this case was that the
bond offering documents did not comply with federal securities laws, and it was that
noncompliance that led to enormous losses for purchasers of the city’s bonds. At the end
of the day, it is perhaps enough to know that San Diego (the eighth largest U.S. city) had
the resources available to it (and the audit firm should have been one of those resources)
such that its disclosure about its pension and health care obligations was robust and comprehensive, which it was not.

Regulatory Issues
Unfortunately, the rash of accounting frauds and restatements that preceded and accompanied the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is certain to engender Rule 102(e)
penalties for financial officers and managers, engagement partners, concurring partners, and
even engagement managers. Many lessons are to be learned from the misfortunes of others,
and perhaps the most important lesson that can be drawn from recent history is that no one
is above the law. When temptation crosses your path and you give even a second thought
to doing what you know is wrong, remember some of the following cases, all of which are
completed, rather than pending, Rule 102(e) or injunctive proceedings:
• On April 4, 2012, the SEC announced charges and a simultaneous settlement with
John M. Williams. Williams had passed the CPA exam but was not holding a CPA
license while he worked for Deloitte Tax LLP in Philadelphia, PA, as a tax manager. While providing tax services to Deloitte Tax LLP’s client Chemring Group
PLC (Chemring), Williams learned that Chemring was going to acquire Hi-Shear
Technology Corp. (Hi-Shear), a public company listed on NYSE Amex Equities.
Shortly before the announcement that Chemring would acquire Hi-Shear, Williams
purchased shares in Hi-Shear. Deloitte Tax LLP required Williams to self-report his
securities transactions, and he was terminated for cause in January 2010 when he
did not report these trades. In the related civil action, Williams was ordered to pay
$6,803.18 in disgorgement of his gains; a matching civil penalty; and interest of
$620.05. Williams was barred from practicing or appearing before the SEC, with a
right to reapply after 5 years. For $6,803.18, Williams lost his job and the ability to
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work for an audit firm registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB), or any public company, for at least 5 years. Does this make sense to
you?
• Also on April 4, 2012, the SEC issued a forthwith suspension of Bryan N. Polozola, CPA, from practicing before the SEC. Polozola was formerly an audit partner
of BDO USA LLP (BDO). He was found guilty on March 26, 2012, of making
false statements to SEC staff during investigative testimony. Although he was only
sentenced to probation and community service, the felony conviction entitles the
SEC to forbid Polozola from appearing or practicing before the SEC under Rule
102(e). The history behind this case is as follows. The SEC issued subpoenas to
BDO and Polozola in 2011 when it began investigating an investment adviser that
manages several hedge funds. Back in 2005, Polozola was the subject of a National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) action in which he neither admitted
nor denied NASD’s allegations that he had taken $49,350 in funds from a former
employer for his personal use. During his September 2011 deposition in front of
the SEC, Polozola stated under oath that he was unaware a $49,350 payment had
been made to his former employer. The SEC alleged that Polozola’s attorney had
repaid the funds to the former employer at Polozola’s direction and used funds
provided by Polozola. This case is, in some respects, similar to the obstruction of
justice charge that sent Martha Stewart to prison for 5 months in 2004. The moral
of the case: tell the truth! Polozola had the chance to do so and did not. As has
been heard before, sometimes it’s the cover-up that gets you in more trouble than
the crime.

Lack of Specific Accounting Knowledge and
an Inexperienced Acting CFO: An Explosive
Trap for the Unwary
On occasion, a small firm’s audit client will enter into one or a series of transactions
that present accounting issues that are complex or perhaps not within the partners’
prior experience. The December 14, 2011, Rule 102(e) proceeding against Kempisty & Company (K&C); Philip Kempisty, CPA; and John Rubino, CPA, presents
such a case.
Beginning in 2003, K&C was engaged to audit the financial statements of Kentucky Energy, Inc., a public company. There is no allegation that the 2003 or 2004
audits did not meet relevant PCAOB audit standards. For the 2005 audit, Rubino
served as the engagement partner and Kempisty as the concurring partner. During
2005, Kentucky Energy issued a series of convertible loans that were accompanied
by warrants. The consultant who was engaged by Kentucky Energy to prepare its
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financial statements (who was the son of an officer and a director) had no prior
experience in accounting for warrants or the beneficial conversion feature. Rubino
informed the consultant that he would need to value the warrants using the BlackScholes model, so the consultant found a Black-Scholes calculator on the Internet
and used that calculator to determine the value of the warrants. The consultant,
however, used the generic numbers for volatility and interest rate provided in an
example on the website rather than the actual volatility and real riskless interest rate
for Kentucky Energy.
The consultant recorded the value of the warrants as an expense on the draft
financial statements sent to K&C. Rubino told the consultant that the warrant
valuation should have been recorded as an asset and then amortized over the life of
the underlying notes.
As the SEC pointed out, this accounting treatment was incorrect because the
loan proceeds should first have been allocated to the notes and warrants, and from
the portion allocated to the notes, amounts should have been allocated to the notes
and beneficial conversion feature (BCF). Under GAAP, the proceeds allocated to
the warrants and BCF would be accounted for as paid-in capital and a discount
to the face amount of the notes, which would have been recorded on the balance
sheet net of the discount.The discount would then have been amortized to interest
expense in the statement of operations over the life of the notes.
In the first quarter of 2005, the consultant calculated the value of the warrants as
$15.69 million, amortization of $1.8 million, and a net warrant value of $13.8 million that was recorded on the balance sheet. The warrants were over 60 percent of
Kentucky Energy’s total assets in the first 2 quarters of 2005.
As the SEC also noted, the combined valuation of the warrants and BCF should
not have exceeded the proceeds the company received from the notes, which
totaled $3.1 million at the end of 2005, and should not have been recorded as an
asset. The end result: at year end, total assets were overstated by 43 percent, and net
loss was overstated by 197 percent (representing the warrant amortization expense).
The first quarter Form 10-Q overstated assets by 213 percent, and the second quarter Form 10-Q overstated net loss by approximately 174 percent.
The foregoing amounts tell you one thing: it would be difficult for K&C to
argue that the erroneous accounting was not material to the financial statements.
Kempisky agreed to a one-year bar (and Rubino a three-year bar) from appearing
or practicing before the SEC in the Rule 102(e) proceeding.

Where did the partners go wrong?
1. Rubino testified he did not realize that in accounting for the warrants, he was
dealing with a derivative. He did not seek outside advice on accounting for the
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convertible notes and warrants. Rubino also knew that the consultant who prepared the financial statements had limited accounting knowledge, but Rubino
failed to review the Black-Scholes assumptions and analysis the consultant used.
2. Unfortunately for Rubino, the SEC noted that AU section 332, Auditing
Derivative Instruments, Hedging Activities, and Investments in Securities (AICPA,
Professional Standards), provides specific guidance in planning and performing
audit procedures for assertions about derivative instruments and also states
the auditor may need special skills or knowledge to plan and perform auditing procedures for certain assertions concerning derivatives and securities.
3. The SEC stated Rubino failed to comply with PCAOB audit standards concerning derivatives that would have required him to understand the application of
GAAP to assertions concerning derivatives, understand the fair value of derivatives
and the reasonableness of key assumptions, consider the company’s inexperience
with derivatives when assessing risk and designing audit procedures, and evaluate
whether presentation and disclosure of the derivatives complied with GAAP.
4. The SEC concluded that Kempisty’s review of the significant accounting,
auditing, and financial reporting matters and his review of the statements
and management documentation should have alerted him to the mistakes
in valuing the warrants. Kempisty lacked the knowledge and experience to
understand the BCF and failed to seek outside advice on how to property
account for the warrants and BCF.

Avoid this pitfall: Thinking a company is too small, an amount is too little, or a period is
too short to cause regulatory interest in your firm’s audit work or your company’s financial
statements can be a fatal mistake.

Ethical Guides
According to §29.10 of the New York Rules of the Board of Regents, unprofessional conduct
in public accountancy includes
in expressing an opinion on representations in the financial statements that the
public accountant examined:

i. failing to disclose a material fact known to the licensee which is not disclosed in the
financial statements but disclosure of which is necessary to make the financial statements not misleading;
ii. failing to report any material misstatement known to the licensee to appear in the
financial statements;
iii. failing to acquire sufficient information to warrant the expression of an opinion …;
or
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iv. failing to direct attention to any material departure from generally accepted accounting principles or to disclose any material omission of generally accepted auditing
procedures applicable in the circumstances.
According to §09.24.01.06 of the Maryland Annotated Code
a licensee may not issue a report asserting that financial statements are presented
in conformity with [GAAP] if these financial statements contain any departure
from [GAAP] which have a material effect on the financial statements taken as a
whole, unless the licensee can demonstrate that by reason of unusual circumstances
the financial statements would otherwise have been misleading. In this case, the
licensee’s report shall describe the departure, the approximate effects thereof, if
practicable, and the reasons why compliance with the principle would result in a
misleading statement.

According to Interpretation No. 201-1, “Competence,” under Rule 201, General Standards
(AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 201 par. .02)
A member’s agreement to perform professional services implies that the member
has the necessary competence to complete those professional services according
to professional standards … but the member does not assume a responsibility for
infallibility of knowledge or judgment. Competence to perform professional services involves both the technical qualifications of the member and the member’s
staff and the ability to supervise and evaluate the quality of the work performed.

Henry David Thoreau, the American author and poet, once said, “Goodness is the only
investment that never fails.”
Lydia Child, the American abolitionist, once said, “Every human being has … an attendant
spirit …. If it does not always tell us what to do, it always cautions us what not to do.”
Irene C. Kassoria, once said, “You must have control of the authorship of your own destiny.
The pen that writes your life story must be held in your own hand.”

Case Study Facts
You Have a Prospective New Client
As a well-known securities defense lawyer in Rochester, NY, you have made a name for
yourself as a straight shooter who is a respected adversary of the SEC and state securities
administrators. Your practice has thrived through referrals from other lawyers and CPAs,
many of whom reside in New York City or its outlying environs. You principally represent
brokers, investment bankers, and company officers accused of trading on nonpublic information or other wrongdoings in regulatory proceedings. Recently, you were referred a potential
client by a Long Island-based law firm that indicated it could have a conflict in representing
the potential client and another company officer who has been subpoenaed to give testimony before the SEC. The potential client, Bill Peavey, is coming in to meet with you for
the first time today. Aware that the SEC has some kind of investigation underway of Incisive
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Lasers Corporation (Incisive), the company for which Peavey is controller, you have pulled
off the Internet and reviewed a number of Incisive’s filings before your meeting.
The available filings tell you a sobering story about Incisive. Early last year, the company’s
stock hit a 52-week high of $19.25 per share, and it completed a follow-on public offering in March in which it raised $62 million at over $18 per share. Many of the company’s
officers also sold stock in the follow-on offering, including Peavey, although his sales totaled
only 3,000 shares. In June, Incisive filed a Form 8-K that coincided with a 39 percent drop
in its stock price.When you review Form 8-K, the reason for the price decline is abundantly
clear: Incisive had reported that an internal inquiry had revealed that Incisive’s revenues had
been overstated by approximately $33 million in 2011. Incisive’s subsequent filings disclosed
that a restatement was being prepared for the 2011 numbers and that the audit committee
had engaged a new outside auditor. In the meantime, Incisive’s stock price had continued its
free fall and was now trading at $2.75 per share. With investor losses mounting, several class
action lawsuits had been filed against the company, as well as its officers and directors, and
Incisive had disclosed that the SEC had commenced a formal investigation of the company’s
accounting.The vice president of sales for Incisive is thus far the only casualty of the pending
restatement, having been summarily fired when Form 8-K was filed disclosing the overstated
revenues.
Your review of last year’s proxy statement reveals little information about your prospective client because he was not an executive officer whose biography appeared in either the
company’s registration statement or its proxy statement. Incisive’s annual report reveals that
Peavey is 56 years old and had been with a national accounting firm for at least part of his
professional career. He has been employed at Incisive for approximately 5 years, well before
the current difficulties began. You run an online check of his background and find he is
a CPA in good standing in New York, with no history of criminal or civil litigation. One
interesting tidbit surfaces in your background search: Peavey has run in the Boston Marathon
several times and placed sixth in the senior division 2 years ago.

Your Meeting With Bill Peavey
Having formed a mental impression of your potential client as a vigorous and an intelligent
man, you are surprised to greet a man who has obviously been worn down by the events of
the last few months. Appearing haggard, Peavey has the air of a beaten man, looking every
bit of his 56 years of age. After dropping into a chair across from your desk, he pulls out a
handkerchief and wipes his brow, a stray line of gray hair falling unseen over his forehead.
His appearance notwithstanding, Peavey’s voice is deep and steady. Following a series of
questions from you about his Boston Marathon experience that were designed to give him a
chance to get comfortable with his surroundings, you lead him to the subject at hand.
“Mr. Peavey, I understand you were referred to me by Lockwood & Levine, who are representing the CFO of Incisive Lasers, Georgina Mattingly, in the SEC investigation. Lockwood
said it might have a conflict in representing both you and Ms. Mattingly. Can you tell me
why it felt a conflict might exist between your interests and hers?”
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Peavey looked down at the floor, an unhappy look crossing his face. “Yeah, I can tell you
why, but the thing is I think I’m being set up to be the scapegoat here. See, Georgina was my
boss, and she micromanaged me, the financial statements, and the SEC filings all along, and
now it seems like she’s got amnesia or something; all of a sudden, she’s forgotten about how
involved she was in the entire financial reporting process, and she wants to pin this whole
situation on me.” Delivered in an angry tone and rapid-fire cadence, the last sentence was
interrupted by you holding up your hands, motioning for Peavey to stop.
“Bill, if I may call you that, please understand I am not here to pass judgment on you or
anyone else. Instead, my job is to gather the facts and then advise you about how you might
best be defended, given the circumstances and evidence, if you become or are a target of the
SEC investigation. So, if you can tell me, have you received any correspondence from the
SEC about its investigation?”
Bill Peavey reaches in his jacket and pulls out several sheets of paper that he dutifully hands
over to you. “Georgina’s lawyer told me that the CEO, Georgina, the vice president of sales,
and I have all received these letters that say the SEC is considering us targets of its investigation. I guess they’ve recommended charges be brought against all of us, but we’ve got a
chance to respond before they are actually filed. The thing is, I didn’t do anything wrong; I
only did what I was told!” Peavey’s face turns red as he blurts out this denial, his blood pressure clearly on the rise.
“Bill, listen, I want you to understand that I’m on your side, and as I said before, I’m not
sitting here in judgment. Before we get to what other people told you to do, can you just
give me some background on how the restatement came about and what happened around
that time?” Used to having clients under great stress, you adopt a soothing tone and get
Peavey a glass of water in order to give him a chance to gather himself.
Because you mentioned the restatement, I guess you know about the accounting
problems. Everything was going great for us at the beginning of last year. Sales of
our lasers into the industrial and health care markets were growing by over 20 percent per year, and our new Lasit II machine was getting rave reviews.That machine
was adaptable for use in removing cancerous skin growths, moles, even unwanted
hair, and we were getting inundated with orders at the time we decided to raise
money in the follow-on offering. That’s the worst part of this; if we’d just kept on
doing good business, we didn’t have any need to make up orders. Heck, we could
barely keep up with demand as it was.

Peavey stopped to take a drink of water and then resumed.
When I started with Incisive 5 years ago, I never thought we’d become such a
big player in our industry. Back then, we were barely doing $20 million in sales,
and our technology was kind of “me too.” I was just the assistant controller when
I started, and I thought working for Incisive would be temporary until I found
something better. About 4 years ago, our growth just took off when we caught the
laser hair removal trend, and doctors started putting our lasers in every clinic and
office complex they could find. That was about the time we hired Rory Vanders,
the vice president of sales.

You nod, encouraging Peavey to continue as you take notes.
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“Rory deserves a lot of credit for what he did, but he’s also the main reason why we’re
where we are today.” Peavey learns forward, his body language telling you he’s come to a
critical point in his story.
It all started to unravel back in April when we were trying to finalize the 10-K
for 2011. Rory and his department had come up with a huge number of orders in
December, and we kept following up with him on almost a daily basis in January to
try and get all the signed orders in our files before the auditors came in to do their
field work. The pressure to get everything in line for the audit and earnings release
was unbelievable, and it seemed like it was taking Rory a long time to deliver the
documentation for the orders.
Finally, after I called him one afternoon and really lit into him, Georgina came in
my office about a half hour later and told me to cool my jets, that Rory was doing
his best, and that she’d take care of it. The auditors completed their field work a
week later, and I never heard anything more about it, so I just concluded she had
taken over and gotten Rory to do his job. I seem to recall that Georgina had made
most of the late sales entries before the audit began, but at one point, I remember
she came in and told me she had the documents and it was okay to go ahead and
book them, so I guess I might have done some of them.

Avoid this pitfall: For controllers, accounting managers, and audit managers, there is
grave danger in ignoring or consciously or unconsciously making a decision not to follow
up on issues that arise in the course of preparing for an audit. It is unwise to do as Peavey did
here because a subsequent investigation by the SEC or even an internal investigation may
cause someone to conclude that failing to get the proper documentation was akin to participating in a cover-up. The lesson, of course, is to follow up, or if nothing else, you should
create a paper trail that confirms what you were told by another officer. However, even that
is not enough if your reliance on that officer is not considered to be reasonable or if you have
reason to question what is being done.
*****
The next thing I hear is a rumor that Rory’s going to be fired, and I get a bunch of
requests from the auditors and Georgina to dig up copies of paperwork that are in
our files.The only thing is the copies were placed in the files by Georgina or somebody else because I never was asked to do anything further on the open orders
after Georgina came in my office and told me to cool it. I sent them the copies of
what we had, and the next thing you know, there are a bunch of meetings with the
audit committee, and the auditors are combing through the books like nobody’s
business. Before I even had a clue, the press release came out, we announced that
the results for last year are going to be restated, and Georgina is hardly talking to
me. Then Rory gets fired, and now it looks like Georgina is somehow acting like
I’m responsible for what happened.

You pause for a moment, reflecting on what you’ve heard. “Bill, let me ask you a few questions. First, did Georgina ask you to make the sales entries in the ledger, or did she make
those herself after Rory came up with the orders?”
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Well, I seem to recall she came back and told me to make the entries once she
had gotten the paperwork from Rory, but I never actually saw the orders. I mean,
what was I supposed to do, question her, and ask if she had received them? She was
my boss, for Heaven’s sake. I wasn’t going to question her integrity when it was
clear she had the orders in hand or that she had given them to the auditors. Like I
said, I might have made the entries, but I just can’t remember.You know, we were
working 18 hour days week after week at that point, so I’m a little fuzzy about
what happened.

Avoid this pitfall: The difficulties with these statements by Peavey are obvious. It is
not necessarily the job of the controller to question the boss’s integrity, but it is the job of
employees to insist on having documentary evidence on which to rely when making entries
in the books. Moreover, if another officer has given the auditors the paperwork, it is clear the
controller should have a copy of what was received by the auditors. Relying on the word of
the officer in making the entry is precisely the step that can place you in jeopardy of losing
your license, career, and professional standing.
*****
“Has Georgina given you any indication that you’re on tenuous ground with Incisive? Did
she threaten you or imply your job was at stake if the entries weren’t made?”
“Not really, but I guess I felt like she had taken control of the situation when she said
she was going to deal with Rory.” Peavey looked down again, troubled. “I’ve worked with
Georgina for the entire five years I’ve been with Incisive, and now I feel like she’s using me
to cover for what she did. I guess you never know people until the chips are down, right?”
You nod understandingly, pondering your next question. “This may seem like a funny
question, Bill, but I’d like to know if the employees ever had any formal ethics training at
Incisive. How would you describe the company’s corporate culture while you were there?”
Looking a little puzzled, Peavey responds
Well, in the early years it was pretty conservative, and we worked together pretty
closely, so I guess you’d probably say it was kind of like a family. After Rory joined
us, though, and we began to grow so fast, things kind of became looser, more like we
were running a race and had to come in first every week. Even though we had good
internal controls, it seemed like we were always trying to keep up with the sales
department, and it was always trying to meet Wall Street’s expectations. I think we
did a darn good job of keeping the sales guys in line until Rory got out of control.

You take a few more notes and decide to move on to another subject.“I can read the target
letter you received from the SEC for myself, but I’m curious if the lawyers at Lockwood &
Levine discussed with you the language of your letter and that of Georgina or anyone else.”
No, all they said was it was pretty clear that the SEC was going after all of us
for insider trading—like we knew about the sales issue at the time of the offering—and that the CEO, Rory, Georgina, and I might be subject to administrative
penalties, too. They seemed to think we might be fighting a 102(e) proceeding
based on the fact that Georgina and I are both CPAs.You don’t agree with that, do
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you? I mean, I haven’t practiced in almost 10 years now. The SEC can’t come after
me under Rule 102(e), can it? Even if it can, you don’t think I’ve got any exposure
here, do you?

You decide to address only a portion of these questions for the moment.
It’s probably too early in the game for me to give you a meaningful answer to that
question, Bill. If you do have any exposure, though, we will need to think through
what the SEC’s likely charges will entail and what defenses are available to you,
including the extent to which Incisive created a corporate culture that encouraged your reliance on other officers. I have to tell you, though, that the SEC can
pursue you under Rule 102(e), even if you haven’t practiced as a CPA in the last
10 years, because you still hold your license. Even in those cases in which a license
holder has gone to inactive status, the SEC has sometimes elected to proceed with
administrative actions to prevent a CPA from going into practice or joining a
public company after having engaged in actions the SEC considers wrong. Before
that happens, an administrative law judge has to make a finding that you violated
Rule 102(e).

At this, Peavey’s head drops to his chest, and he seems to withdraw into himself. You feel
his pain, so to speak, but you also know that, to a great degree, he has called down the wrath
of the SEC by his own actions.Your attention turns for the moment to how you might seek
to defend him, knowing your job is not going to be a slam-dunk and that Peavey will likely
pay a penalty that will stay with him for the remainder of his life.

Questions for Consideration
1. What is the single biggest mistake that Peavey made during the course of events that
went directly to his professional responsibilities?
a. Not telling Georgina that he had to follow up with Rory no matter what she said
b. Failing to report an illegal act to the auditors
c. Failing to get for himself the proper documentary support for the sales entries
d. Buying into the corporate culture that was permissive
2. If you had been in Peavey’s shoes and were determined to protect yourself (and the
company) by properly discharging your professional responsibilities, what action(s)
would you have taken in the situation described in the case study?
a. Insisted on receipt of documentary evidence to back up the sales entries before
they were made
b. Confirmed by e-mail or in writing the need for this evidence
c. Carefully reviewed the documentary evidence prior to making the entries in order
to determine if anything unusual or out of place appeared in the documentation
d. All of the above
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3. What fact(s) in the case study lead you to believe that Peavey will probably face a Rule
102(e) proceeding before the SEC is finished investigating?
a. Peavey was on notice and should have been more conscientious in monitoring the
situation after making repeated requests for documents that were not delivered.
b. Peavey relied on Georgina in circumstances when he should not have done so.
c. The sales in question appear to have been material to Incisive and are suspect due
to the end-of-year timing and delays in procuring documentation.
d. There were heightened risks associated with these sales that warranted heightened
scrutiny by Peavey.
e. Peavey will likely not be facing a Rule 102(e) proceeding.
f. Answers (a), (b), (c), and (d).
4. The case study described Peavey as a CPA licensed in the state of New York. Although
the extract from the New York Rules of the Board of Regents presented in this chapter
refers to expressing an opinion on the financial statements, assume for a moment that
the extract simply refers to unprofessional conduct in public accountancy and then
lists the four criteria given. Do you believe Peavey may have violated any of the four
New York criteria under the facts given in the case study?
a. No, it doesn’t seem that he violated any of the criteria.
b. Yes, by failing to acquire sufficient information to warrant the expression of an
opinion.
c. Yes, by failing to report a material misstatement known to him that appeared in
the financial statements.
d. Yes, by failing to direct attention to a material departure from GAAP.
5. Assume for this question that you are employed by the SEC and are considering
whether to charge Peavey or Georgina, or both, with engaging in improper professional conduct under Rule 102(e). Select from the following options the most appropriate basis on which charges under Rule 102(e) should be brought.
a. Bill: intentional conduct; Georgina: reckless conduct
b. Bill: knowing conduct; Georgina: unreasonable conduct
c. Bill: repeated instances of unreasonable conduct; Georgina: single instance of
highly unreasonable conduct
d. Bill: reckless conduct; Georgina: intentional conduct
6. What aggravating factors are present in this case study that makes this situation more
likely to result in regulatory action against Peavey? Why?
7. Refer back to the discussion of the Rule 102(e) case against K&C, Philip Kempisty,
and John Rubino. If you are the engagement or concurring partner on an audit or
a review, and you are faced with a situation such as this (that is, an inexperienced
financial officer and a complex accounting issue that materially impacts the financial
statements [and an issue about which you have limited knowledge]), what would you
do differently than Rubino and Kempisty?
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8. Given the statements made by Peavey that Lasers had grown to the point that it was
hard to keep the sales guys in control and that the corporate culture seemed to indicate little ethics training, what suggestions would you make to the board about how
to go about changing the culture and atmosphere at the company after the SEC’s
investigation and class action lawsuits are concluded?

Suggested Readings
On April 5, 2011, the SEC initiated the AAER In the Matter of Lovelock & Lewes, Price Waterhouse, Bangalore, Price Waterhouse & Co., Bangalore, Price Waterhouse, Calcutta, and Price Waterhouse and Co., Calcutta. This action stemmed from the Satyam Computer Services Limited
(Satyam) fraud that came apart after the CEO acknowledged the company’s cash and revenue had been overstated by more than $1 billion. PW Bangalore was the auditor of record
for Satyam, and the other named firms were involved in the Satyam audits from 2005–08.
The SEC alleged that the firms had failed to conduct the Satyam audits in accordance with
GAAS and PCAOB standards and accused the firms of violating Section 10A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) by failing to report illegal acts. The firms settled
by agreeing to detailed undertakings that comprise 16 single-spaced pages in the AAER,
appointment of an independent monitor, a moratorium on conducting new SEC issuer
audits, a cease and desist order against committing further violations of Section 10A, and a
civil penalty of $6 million.
To review the content of Section 10A in its statutory form (as last updated through September 30, 2004), go to page 117 of the following pdf of the 1934 Act: www.sec.gov/about/
laws/sea34.pdf.
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Case 10—Scrap Metal
Aggregators, Inc.—You Are
the Tax Return Preparer
Introduction
Today’s tax practitioners must be familiar with three significant resources that contain ethical
standards and related information bearing on their practices:
1. The AICPA Statements on Standards for Tax Services (SSTSs), as enforceable under
the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA Code)
2. Treasury Department Circular No. 230, Regulations Governing Practice before the Internal
Revenue Service
3. Consequences for ethical violations as provided in the AICPA Code
This chapter and case study focus on the SSTS regime. The following chapter and case
study will cover Circular No. 230 and associated AICPA Code provisions. As you review the
SSTS provisions, keep in mind that there is some overlap with Circular No. 230, particularly
with respect to taking positions, preparing, and signing returns. The overlap, however, does
not mean the SSTS regime and Circular No. 230 are identical in their application; you may
encounter situations that require you to apply both before advising a client about a position
and preparing or signing a return.
There is one other important distinction between the SSTS regime and the ethical standards of Circular No. 230 and consequences imposed under the AICPA Code. Circular No.
230 and the AICPA Code apply only to federal tax practice, and the AICPA Code applies
only to income tax return preparation. In contrast to this, SSTSs apply to all types of tax
practices. Tax practitioners should keep the broad application of SSTSs in mind when considering their professional responsibilities.

Focus Points: SSTSs
Effective January 1, 2010, the seven revised SSTSs became effective as enforceable tax practice standards for AICPA members. Compliance with the seven standards is mandated by
Rule 201, General Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 201 par. .01), and Rule
202, Compliance With Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 202 par. .01).
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The rationale for adopting the seven SSTSs was well-described in the preface to the
statements: “Standards are the foundation of a profession …. Compliance with professional
standards of tax practice also reaffirms the public’s awareness of the professionalism that is
associated with CPAs as well as the AICPA.”
Here is a brief summary of the seven standards:
• SSTS No. 1, Tax Return Positions (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 100):
— A member should not recommend a position be taken on a taxpayer’s tax return
unless he or she has a good faith belief that the position has at least a realistic
possibility of being sustained administratively or judicially on its merits if challenged. If applicable taxing authorities have written standards with respect to
recommending a tax position or preparing or signing a tax return, the member
should determine and comply with such standards (referred to as the realistic
possibility of success standard).
Avoid this pitfall: Note that §10.34 of Circular No. 230 also contains the
realistic possibility standard but uses language that varies from that in SSTS No.
1. In general, §10.34 uses more objective language and measurements than those
in SSTS No. 1. Because these provisions coexist, members must consider the language of §10.34 and SSTS No. 1 when recommending tax return positions and
preparing or signing returns.
— Notwithstanding the preceding, a member may recommend a tax return position
if the member concludes there is a reasonable basis for the position and advised
the taxpayer to appropriately disclose that position, in which case the member
can prepare or sign a tax return meeting these criteria (referred to as the reasonable basis standard).
— When relevant, a member recommending a position or preparing or signing a tax
return on which a position is taken should advise the taxpayer regarding potential penalty consequences associated with the position and the opportunity, if any,
to avoid penalties through disclosure.
— The member should not recommend a tax position or prepare or sign a tax
return that reflects a position the member knows exploits the audit selection
process or serves as a mere arguing position advanced solely to obtain leverage in
a negotiation with a taxing authority.
— The following are key introductory or explanatory provisions appended to SSTS
No. 1:
A position is one reflected on a tax return on which a member has specifically
advised the taxpayer or about which a member has knowledge of all material
facts and, on that basis, has concluded whether the position is appropriate.
A taxpayer is a client, a member’s employer, or another third-party recipient of
tax services, meaning members in business and industry are subject to SSTS
No. 1 standards.
If applicable standards of a tax authority are higher than the realistic possibility standard, then the member is to comply with the tax authority’s standards.
Conversely, if the tax authority has no standard or a lower standard than the
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realistic possibility standard, the member is to comply with the realistic possibility standard.
Meeting the realistic possibility standard of SSTS No. 1 means the member
may consider a well-reasoned construction of the applicable law or articles or
treatises, as well as pronouncements issued by the taxing authority, whether
treated as authority under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6662 and
the related regulations. If the position is later abandoned for practical or procedural considerations in administrative or other proceedings, the abandonment will not affect whether the position met the applicable standard.
Avoid this pitfall: Note that for purposes of determining if the IRS’s substantial authority or more likely than not standards have been satisfied under
IRC Sections 6662 and 6694, the member cannot rely on well-reasoned treatises, articles in recognized professional tax publications, and other reference
tools and sources of analysis normally commonly used by tax preparers.
Although SSTS No. 1 notes that a member has both the right and responsibility to be an advocate for the taxpayer about a position that satisfies the
realistic possibility standard, the explanation also states that a member has a
duty to the tax system.
The explanatory provisions note that a member may discuss with the taxpayer
the likelihood that a position meeting the realistic possibility standard might
or might not cause a return to be examined or challenged in an examination
without violating the prohibition on recommending a position or preparing
or signing a return that reflects a position the member knows will exploit the
audit selection process or serve as a mere negotiating position.
The decision to disclose and how to disclose is the responsibility of the taxpayer.
If a member believes a taxpayer penalty might be asserted, the member should
advise the taxpayer of this fact and whether disclosure will avoid the penalty.
Preparing a tax return includes giving advice on events that have occurred at
the time the advice is given if the advice is directly relevant to determining
the existence, character, or amount of a schedule, an entry, or another portion
of a tax return.
• SSTS No. 2, Answers to Questions on Returns (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec.
200)
— This statement governs the standards for a CPA when signing the preparer’s
declaration if one or more questions on the return have not been answered. A
reasonable effort should be made to obtain information from the taxpayer that is
necessary to provide appropriate answers to all questions on a tax return before
signing as a preparer. The term questions includes information requested on the
return, in the instructions, or in the regulations, regardless of whether in the form
of a question.
— The following are key explanatory provisions appended to SSTS No. 2:
A reasonable effort to obtain information is advisable for three reasons: (i) a
question may be of importance in determining taxable income or loss or the
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tax liability shown on the return; (ii) a request for information may require
disclosure necessary for a complete return or to avoid penalties; and (iii) a
member signing the preparer’s declaration is stating the return is true, correct,
and complete.
Reasonable grounds to omit an answer to a question may include (i) the
information is not readily available and is not significant in terms of taxable
income or loss or the tax liability shown on the return; (ii) genuine uncertainty exists regarding the meaning of the question in relation to that return;
or (iii) the answer is voluminous, in which case a statement should be made
on the return that the information will be supplied on examination.
A member should not omit an answer merely because it might prove disadvantageous to a taxpayer but should consider if an omission may cause the
return to be deemed incomplete or result in penalties.
If reasonable grounds exist for omission of an answer to a question, a taxpayer
is not required to provide on the return an explanation of the reason for the
omission.
• SSTS No. 3, Certain Procedural Aspects of Preparing Returns (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 300)
— When preparing or signing a return, a member may in good faith rely, without
verification, on information furnished by the taxpayer or a third party. However,
a member shall not ignore the implications of furnished information.
— If information appears incorrect, incomplete, or inconsistent, either on its face or
based on other facts known to the member, the member should make reasonable
inquiries, including examining or verifying supporting data, including referring
to prior years’ returns whenever feasible.
— When tax laws or regulations impose a condition such as taxpayer maintenance
of books and records or substantiating documentation to support the deduction
or tax treatment, a member should make appropriate inquiries to determine to
his or her satisfaction whether the condition has been met.
— When preparing a return, a member should consider information actually known
to that member from the return of another taxpayer if the information is relevant and necessary to properly prepare the return. In using such information, a
member should consider any limitations imposed by any law or rule relating to
confidentiality.
— The following are key explanatory provisions appended to SSTS No. 3:
A preparer’s declaration (… is true, correct and complete) should be based on
all information known by the preparer, including information furnished by a
taxpayer or third parties.
A preparer is not required to examine or verify supporting data and may rely
on taxpayer-furnished information (including taxpayer-furnished lists) unless
it appears to be incorrect, incomplete, or inconsistent, either on its face or on
the basis of other facts known by the member (the III standard). However, the
member should encourage the taxpayer to submit underlying documents to
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permit full consideration of income and deductions. This includes information from a pass-through entity provided to a member by a taxpayer. Information provided by the pass-through entity may be accepted without further
inquiry by the member, subject to the III standard.
In some instances, it may be appropriate for the member to advise the
taxpayer to ascertain exposure to tax deficiencies, interest, and penalties by
taxpayer contact with management of a pass-through entity.
A member should make use of prior returns for the taxpayer whenever feasible.
• SSTS No. 4, Use of Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 400)
— Unless prohibited by statute or rule, a member may use taxpayer estimates if it is
not practical to obtain exact information, and the member determines the estimates are reasonable based on the facts and circumstances known to the member.
Taxpayer estimates should be presented so as not to imply greater accuracy than
exists.
— The following are key explanatory provisions appended to SSTS No. 4:
The application of accounting judgments are not estimates within the meaning of this statement.
Taxpayer use of estimates related to small expenditures may be appropriate. If
records are missing, or precise information about a transaction is not available
when a return must be filed, a member may prepare a return using taxpayer
estimates of missing data.
Specific disclosure of use of an estimate is not generally required; however,
that disclosure should be made in unusual circumstances, such as death or illness of the taxpayer, Schedule K-1 is missing, litigation is pending, or natural
disaster or computer failure has destroyed relevant records.
• SSTS No. 5, Departure From a Position Previously Concluded in an Administrative Proceeding or Court Decision (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 500)
— A CPA may recommend a tax position in a later year’s return or prepare or sign
a tax return that departs from the treatment of an item as concluded in a prior
administrative proceeding or court decision, unless the taxpayer is bound to a
specified treatment by a formal closing or other agreement, provided the requirements of SSTS No. 1 are satisfied.
— The following are key explanatory provisions appended to SSTS No. 5:
A member will usually recommend the same tax treatment in the current
year’s return when the specific tax treatment of an item in a prior year’s
return has been determined in an administrative proceeding or a court decision. However, a departure from consistent treatment might be justified when,
among other reasons, a lack of documentation led to the result of the prior
proceeding or decision; the taxpayer may have settled the prior proceeding
even though the position met SSTS No. 1 standards; or subsequent proceedings or decisions more favorable to the taxpayer’s position may have taken
place since the prior proceeding or decision.
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The member should consider the result of the prior proceeding or court decision in evaluating whether SSTS No. 1 standards are met.
• SSTS No. 6, Knowledge of Error: Return Preparation and Administrative Proceedings
(AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 600)
— A member who becomes aware of (i) an error in a previously filed return or a
return that is the subject of an administrative proceeding or (ii) a taxpayer’s failure
to file a required return should inform the taxpayer promptly and advise the taxpayer of the potential consequences of the error and recommend corrective measures to be taken. The member may provide the advice and recommendation orally.
— The term error includes any position, omission, or method of accounting that, at
the time the return is filed, fails to meet SSTS No. 1 standards, as well as positions
that do not meet the standard due to legislation, court decisions, or administrative
proceedings with retroactive effect.
— The only exception are errors that have an insignificant effect on tax liability.
Avoid this pitfall: A CPA cannot inform the taxing authority of the error
without the taxpayer’s permission, except when required by law.
— SSTS No. 6 applies regardless of whether the member prepared or signed the
return that contains an error.
— If a member is asked to prepare the current year’s return, and the taxpayer has not
corrected a prior year’s error, the member should consider whether to withdraw
from preparing the return and whether to continue a professional or an employment relationship with the taxpayer. If the member does prepare the current year’s
return, he or she should take reasonable steps to ensure the error is not repeated.
— If a member is representing a taxpayer in an administrative proceeding with
respect to a return that contains an error of which the member is aware, the
member should request the taxpayer’s agreement to disclose the error to the tax
authority.
— If the taxpayer does not agree, the member should consider withdrawing from
representing the taxpayer in the administrative proceeding and whether to continue a professional or an employment relationship with the taxpayer.
— The following are key explanatory provisions appended to SSTS No. 6:
It is the taxpayer’s responsibility to decide whether to correct the error.
Even though applicable law may not require the filing of an amended return,
a member should consider whether the taxpayer’s decision not to file an
amended return or correct an error may predict future behavior that might
require termination of the relationship.
When consent is provided by the taxpayer, disclosure should not be delayed
such that the taxpayer or member might be considered to have failed to act
in good faith or to have provided misleading information and, in any event,
should occur before conclusion of the proceeding.
Conflicts of interest may arise between the taxpayer’s interests and those of the
member for a variety of reasons, including Rule 301, Confidential Client Information (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 301); tax laws or regulations; laws of
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privilege; and the impact of withdrawal on the taxpayer’s interests. The member
should consider consulting with his or her own legal counsel before deciding
on recommendations to the taxpayer or whether to continue a relationship.
If a member believes a taxpayer may face possible exposure to allegations of
fraud or other criminal conduct, the member should advise the taxpayer to
consult with an attorney before the taxpayer takes any action.
If a member continues a professional or an employment relationship with the
taxpayer and is requested to prepare a tax return for a subsequent year, the
member should take reasonable steps to ensure the error is not repeated. If a
later return cannot be prepared without perpetuating the error, the member
should consider withdrawing.
If a member learns the taxpayer is using an erroneous method of accounting, and the date has passed to request permission to change to a method that
meets SSTS No. 1 standards, the member can sign a current year’s return,
provided that appropriate disclosure is included on the return of the erroneous method.
Determining if an error has a more than insignificant effect on the taxpayer’s
tax liability is a matter of professional judgment, based on all facts and circumstances known to the member. Regarding use of an erroneous method of
accounting, the member should consider the cumulative effect, as well as the
effect on the current year’s tax return or the return that is the subject of an
administrative proceeding.
If a member becomes aware of the error when performing services that do
not involve tax return preparation or representation in an administrative
proceeding, the member’s responsibility is to advise the taxpayer of the error’s
existence and recommend that the error be discussed with the taxpayer’s tax
return preparer. The recommendation can be given orally.
• SSTS No. 7, Form and Content of Advice to Taxpayers (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS
sec. 700)
— A member should use professional judgment to ensure tax advice reflects competence and appropriately serves the taxpayer’s needs; no format for providing
advice is specified.
— Written advice should comply with relevant tax authorities’ standards, if any,
regarding written tax advice. Professional judgment should be used in determining the need to document oral advice.
— A member should assume tax advice will affect the way in which matters or
transactions will be reported or disclosed on the taxpayer’s returns. Thus, the
member should consider, when relevant, return reporting and disclosure standards
applicable to a tax position and potential penalty consequences of the position.
The member should follow SSTS No. 1 in ascertaining applicable reporting and
disclosure standards.
— When subsequent developments affect earlier advice about significant matters, a
member is not obligated to inform the taxpayer except when helping the tax179
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payer implement plans or procedures associated with the earlier advice or specifically agreeing to do so.
— The following are key explanatory provisions appended to SSTS No. 7:
Oral advice may serve the taxpayer’s needs in routine matters or well-defined
areas. Written communications are recommended in important, unusual, substantial dollar value, or complicated transactions.
The form of advice (oral or written) is a matter of professional judgment and
should consider the foregoing and other factors, such as the nature of the
taxpayer’s inquiry; the time available for development and submission of the
advice; the existence of authority and precedents; the tax sophistication of the
taxpayer; the type of transaction; whether heightened reporting or disclosure
requirements apply; potential applicable penalties; and whether disclosure will
avoid potential penalties, and the member intends for the taxpayer to rely on
the advice to avoid potential penalties.
The member should inform the taxpayer that (i) advice reflects professional
judgment based on the member’s understanding of the facts and law existing
on the date advice is rendered, and (ii) subsequent developments may affect
previously rendered professional advice. The member may use precautionary
language to note that the advice is based on facts as stated and authorities that
are subject to change.
The member should be cognizant of applicable confidentiality privileges.
In December 2005, the Tax Executive Committee (TEC) issued proposed SSTS No. 9,
Quality Control. The exposure draft was never made effective, but the concept behind it was
to describe the attributes of a quality control system for tax practice or function that would
promote compliance with all other SSTSs. Although not adopted, firms may want to refer to
proposed SSTS No. 9 as a touchstone in implementing, evaluating, and monitoring a quality
control system for tax practice. As proposed, SSTS No. 9 provided that
• each firm should establish and maintain a system of quality control that incorporates
the five elements of quality control—integrity and objectivity, personnel management,
acceptance and continuance of clients and engagements (public practice only), performance of professional services, and monitoring and inspection—and that incorporates
all other matters essential to the design, implementation, and maintenance of the system.
• each system of quality control must take into account the unique aspects of the tax
practice or function, especially for members in industry.
• it is the responsibility of the supervising member to ensure that an appropriate quality control system is implemented.
• the firm must ensure the quality control system encompasses an organizational
structure, policies, and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that the firm’s tax
practice or function is in compliance with applicable professional standards.
• any tax advocacy services are provided with integrity, objectivity, and in conformity
with applicable professional standards, especially SSTS No. 1 and applicable federal,
state, and local laws.
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• in making assignments, the firm should have policies and procedures in place to
ensure that appropriate personnel assignments (staffing) and supervision are implemented so as to enable the firm to perform its work competently.
• appropriate performance review, professional development, compliance documentation, confidentiality procedures, and supervision functions are maintained by the
firm.

Updated Interpretations Nos. 1-1 and 1-2
TEC adopted updated Interpretation No. 1-1, “Reporting and Disclosure Standards,” of
SSTS No. 1 (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 9100 par. .01), and Interpretation No.
1-2, “Tax Planning,” of SSTS No. 1 (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 9100 par. .50), on
August 15, 2011. These interpretations became effective January 31, 2012.
TEC noted in the preface that the interpretations do not consider the economic substance
doctrine and associated penalties under IRC Section 7701(o) that were included in the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. Nonetheless, the interpretations do
emphasize the member’s obligation to consider business purpose and economic substance
issues, an issue made even more important by the strict liability provisions of IRC Section
7701(o). That section applies the 20 percent accuracy-related penalty under IRC Section
6662 to transactions that fail the economic substance test, eliminating the reasonable care
and good faith defenses of IRC Section 6664(c). If the relevant facts affecting the tax
treatment are not adequately disclosed on the return, a transaction failing the economic

So What Is the Economic Substance Doctrine?
The economic substance doctrine, as codified, states that a transaction will be treated
as having economic substance only if the transaction changes a nontax economic
position in a meaningful way, and the taxpayer has a substantial purpose for entering
into the transaction that is not related to the transaction’s federal tax effects.
Note: The IRS stated in Notice 2010-62 that it would rely on relevant case
law when applying the economic substance doctrine but indicated it would not
be issuing general administrative guidance or private letter rulings concerning the
doctrine or the transactions to which it may apply. On July 15, 2011, the IRS
Large Business and International Division issued a directive to assist examiners in
determining when it is appropriate to apply the doctrine and related penalties, but
that directive cannot be relied upon by taxpayers. Given the strict liability that now
attaches for taxpayers when the doctrine is applied, and the transaction fails the economic substance test, members should exercise very careful diligence in rendering
tax planning services, advising taxpayers on reporting and disclosure requirements,
and documenting that advice.
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substance test will result in a 40 percent penalty based on the applicable portion of the tax
underpayment.
The preface of TS section 9100 sets forth a brief description of standards now used by
the IRS and the SSTS regime, including more likely than not (“reasonable to conclude
in good faith that there is a greater than 50 percent likelihood that the position will be
upheld on the merits if challenged”), substantial authority (“generally is interpreted as
requiring approximately a 40 percent likelihood that the position will be upheld on its
merits if it is challenged”), reasonable possibility (“approximately a 1-in-3 [33 percent]
likelihood”), and reasonable basis (“approximately a 20 percent likelihood”). Based on
the approximate percentages assigned to each standard, it is clear that compliance with
standards imposed by the IRS (substantial authority or more likely than not) require
higher likelihoods of success than the realistic possibility of success standard, meaning that
in federal tax practice, the member will be required to comply with the higher standard
(pursuant to SSTS No. 1).
Interpretation No. 1-1 also provides guidance on determining if the required reporting
and disclosure standards have been satisfied. To make this determination, the member should
perform each of the following (referred to hereinafter as the evaluative criteria):
• Establish the relevant background facts.
• Consider the reasonableness of assumptions and representations.
• Consider applicable regulations and standards regarding reliance on information and
advice received from a third party.
• Apply the pertinent authorities to the relevant facts.
• Consider the business purpose and economic substance of the transaction if relevant
to the tax consequences (bearing in mind that reliance on a representation of business purpose or economic substance is generally not enough).
• Consider whether the issue involves a listed transaction or a reportable transaction
(or their equivalents), as defined by the applicable tax authority.
• Arrive at a conclusion supported by the authorities.
In this regard, the interpretation notes that the weight of each authority (and its type)
should be considered, including its source, relevance, and persuasiveness, and also notes that
a standard may be satisfied even in the absence of certain types of authority. The extent of
research to satisfy the required reporting and disclosure standards is left to the professional
judgment of the member, given known facts and circumstances. Interpretation No. 1-1
contains a number of illustrations that explore which standards are to be applied in defined
situations, including application of tax authority standards, the realistic possibility of success
standard, and the reasonable basis standard.
Interpretation No. 1-2 is designed to assist members by clarifying existing standards and
providing comprehensive guidance concerning a member’s responsibilities in connection
with tax planning services. The interpretation notes that tax planning encompasses a wide
variety of situations, emphasizing compliance with reporting, disclosure, and written advice
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standards under SSTS No. 1, SSTS No. 7, Interpretation No. 1-1, and Circular No. 230, as
applicable.
Tax planning also is defined to include, for prospective or completed transactions, recommending or expressing a written or an oral opinion on a tax return position or a
specific tax plan developed by the taxpayer, the member, or a third party. If issuing an
opinion or evaluating a third-party opinion at the taxpayer’s request, the member should
apply the evaluative criteria or consider whether the third party applied the evaluative
criteria.
When conducting due diligence to establish relevant background facts, the member
should consider whether it is appropriate to rely on a factual assumption in lieu of other
procedures or a representation from the taxpayer or a third party. Reliance on assumptions
or representations should be carefully assessed under a reasonableness standard. Members
should consider the source of the assumption or representation, including the knowledge
and expertise of the party making the assumption or representation, as well as whether the
assumption or representation is consistent with other information known to the member. A
third party’s assumptions should be considered in light of the facts of the taxpayer’s situation
known to the member, and the business purpose and economic substance of the transaction
should be understood by the member when relevant to tax consequences. It is insufficient
to assume a valid business purpose or economic substance without specifying the reasons or
basis for such an assumption.

Illustration and Question From
Interpretation 1-2
A member is assisting a taxpayer with year-end planning in connection with the
taxpayer’s proposed contribution of stock in a closely held corporation to a charitable organization. The taxpayer instructs the member to calculate the anticipated
tax savings assuming a contribution of 500 shares to a tax-exempt organization
and assuming the stock has a fair market value of $100 per share. The member
is aware that on the taxpayer’s gift tax returns for the prior year, the taxpayer
reported that her stock in the corporation, gifted to her daughter, was worth $50
per share. How would you approach this situation given the language of Interpretation No. 1-2?
Answer—The reasonableness of the taxpayer’s assumption should be considered,
along with whether the assumption is consistent with other information known
to you.You would also consider whether the discussions with the taxpayer should
be documented and the applicability of Statements on Standards for Valuation
Services.
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A member should consider the necessity for an engagement letter and be diligent in
applying appropriate procedures to understand and evaluate the entire transaction. These
procedures will vary with the scope and circumstances of the engagement. Like Interpretation No. 1-1, Interpretation No. 1-2 contains a number of illustrations that explore issues a
member may encounter in the course of rendering tax planning services.

Consequences, Consequences
On December 9, 2010, actor Wesley Snipes reported to a federal medium security prison in
Pennsylvania to begin serving a 3-year sentence for his 2008 conviction for willful failure to
file income tax returns under IRC Section 7203. According to published reports, Mr. Snipes
must pay approximately $17 million in back taxes, penalties, and interest. Douglas Rosile, the
former CPA who prepared paperwork for Mr. Snipes (not tax returns, however, because none
had been filed since 1998) and the Guiding Light of God Ministries (GLGM), an entity that
purported to assist members in legally avoiding paying taxes, was sentenced to 4½ years in
prison. GLGM relied on the so-called “861 argument” that U.S. citizens do not owe taxes on
wages they earn within the United States, a contention repeatedly rejected by U.S. courts and
the IRS. GLGM charged members, such as Snipes, annual dues and 20 percent of any savings.
The lead prosecutor in the case offered this after the verdict: “You gotta pay your taxes.
Rich or poor, it doesn’t matter.”
*****
On April 16, 2012, Stephen A. Favato, a former partner in BDO Seidman’s Woodbridge,
NJ, office, was sentenced to 18 months in prison for his August 2010 conviction on one
count of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the IRS and one count of aiding
and assisting in the preparation and filing of a false income tax return. Among other things,
Favato was alleged to have
• advised a client and his then-wife on how to include false items on the client’s
2002–04 tax returns.
• prepared and signed false tax returns for the client in these years, causing a $114,000
tax loss in connection with the 2002 return, and attempted to cause over $70,000 in
tax losses for 2003 and 2004.
• advised the client to reduce his salary payments and have those payments made to
Great Escape Yachts LLC in the form of purported lease payments (when in fact the
yacht had not been leaded by Great Escape Yachts LLC).
• advised the client to report inflated charitable deductions on the 2003 return.
*****
On November 8, 2011, the U.S. Attorney, a special agent of the Criminal Investigation
Division of the IRS, and an FBI special agent announced that Ronald L. Simons, CPA, of
Vestal, NY, had pled guilty to one count of delivering and disclosing a false federal income
tax return. Simons was with Piaker & Lyons, the largest CPA firm in New York’s Southern
Tier, during the period in question. He faces up to 1 year in prison and a $100,000 fine
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in connection with the charges. As part of his guilty plea, Simons admitted that from 1992
to 2008, he prepared audited financial statements for McGinn, Smith & Co., Inc. (MSC),
as well as tax returns for David Smith and other MSC entities. When he prepared the 2006
individual return for David Smith, Simons knew that
• Smith had characterized $350,000 as income before Simons prepared the 2006
income tax return for Smith.
• the MSC controller initially booked the $350,000 and another $57,000 as origination fees, but Smith later told Simons these were loans.
• the MSC controller later reclassified the $350,000 from origination fees to “Loan—
DLS.”
• at approximately the same time, the MSC controller reclassified the $350,000;
Simons then himself reclassified the $57,000 from origination fees to “Loans—
other” by making an adjusting journal entry.
As of May 12, 2012, Mr. Simons’s biography still appeared on the Piaker & Lyons website.
His sentencing was scheduled to take place on May 7, 2012, but no announcement was made
as of that date.

Ethical Guides
Noam Chomsky, the American linguist, once said, “States are not moral agents, people are,
and can impose moral standards on powerful institutions.”
Origen, the scholar and theologian, once said, “The power of choosing good and evil is
within the reach of all.”
Pearl S. Buck wrote in To My Daughters, With Love, “You cannot make yourself feel something you do not feel, but you can make yourself do right in spite of your feelings.”
Rule 202 states, “A member who performs … consulting, tax, or other professional services
shall comply with standards promulgated by bodies designated by Council.” The AICPA
Council designated the Tax Executive Committee as a standard-setting body on October 19,
1999, giving the SSTSs enforceable standard status when subsequently adopted by the Tax
Executive Committee. Similarly, Rule 201 requires members to comply with general standards, including professional competence, due care, planning and supervision, and obtaining
sufficient relevant data to provide a reasonable basis for conclusions or recommendations.

Case Study Facts
Last year, your small accounting and tax firm was approached by Danny Martin, the owner
of Sheet Metal Aggregators, Inc. (Sheet Metal), about doing that company’s federal and state
income tax return preparation work. Sheet Metal, as it’s commonly called, was referred to
your firm by a current tax client. Because you happened to do most of the partner-level
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work on the other client’s account, Danny called specifically for you when first contacting
your firm. After a short conversation with Danny to set up your first meeting, you do a little
research about him and Sheet Metal on the Internet. You also make it a point to call the
client who referred Danny to you to find out what you can about this prospective client.
Your inquiries tell you that Danny is a good old boy from Oklahoma who grew up in the
scrap metal business and who has a reputation for being a real negotiator. After working at his
father’s scrap metal yard until he was in his mid-20s, Danny decided to relocate to Minneapolis to start his own scrap metal operation. From all appearances, he was born to be in the
scrap metal business. After getting started collecting metal scrap from building construction
and renovation sites, Danny was able to add scrap aluminum and beverage can recycling, as
well as collection and reconditioning of auto parts. Now in his late 30s, Danny had a staff of
15 and a business that was grossing over $4 million per year, having become the largest scrap
metal dealer in the Twin Cities area.
When Danny comes to your meeting, you are greeted by a strapping 6’ cowboy in boots
and a Stetson, the very picture of a down-to-earth, successful businessman with no pretensions. Still holding on to a bit of his Oklahoma drawl, Danny is an engaging character who
is instantly likeable and a “horse trader” of the first order, so it is easy to see why he has done
so well in his chosen line of business. He spends the first part of your meeting relaying funny
stories of how he got bamboozled in his early days by peddlers who sold him chrome-covered iron and claimed it was stainless steel and who removed mill markings on aluminum to
“upgrade” the metal to the next best price point. Danny seems wise beyond his years, and you
quickly conclude he is not someone who fell off the turnip truck, in spite of how he talks.
When the subject of your services comes up, Danny explains that his current CPA is a
sole practitioner who is getting on in years and trying to wind down his practice, so Danny
is looking for a firm with a strong tax and planning background.You have heard of Danny’s
current CPA, a practitioner named William Nord, who was actively involved in structuring
a few tax shelters that caught the IRS’s attention over the years but who managed to avoid
any serious repercussions. When you ask Danny if he happened to be an investor in any of
these, he nods affirmatively.
Yeah, when Bill set up those tax shelters with the lawyers from that slick New York
law firm, he told me I’d be a fool if I didn’t invest.You know, he was my CPA, and
he knew my tax situation and all, so I thought he was steerin’ me right. Turns out,
though, that Bill got hoodwinked by those lawyers, too, and he helped me defend
the shelter when the IRS came looking for more money. Had to pay some more
taxes and interest, but I guess that’s the price you pay for making money, right?

You wonder if Nord was as innocent as Danny seems to believe but move on to talk over
the services your firm offers and how you can help him in his estate, financial, and business
succession planning. Danny is favorably impressed and relays how your existing tax clients
have spoken highly of your firm and its reputation. You and Danny talk about a few of the
thorny issues of the scrap metal trading business, such as recordkeeping, inventory valuation, and cost allocation, that Danny seems to understand pretty well. After a few more
minutes of discussion, Danny whips out a checkbook and writes out a $5,000 check to your
firm.
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“The way I look at things in my business, Mr. Lee, I’m really just in the business of judging
folks’ characters, whether it’s on the buy or sell side. I think you and me will git along just
fine. This check should be enough to get the ball rollin’, and you just bill me your regular
rates as we move on.” Pleasantly surprised, you express your thanks and make a note to call
your other client and thank him for the referral. Danny takes his leave with a wave and a call
for you to “have a happy holiday, pardner,” and heads out to a beat-up old pickup with a pair
of steer horns mounted on the grille. Laughing, you later relay this story to your partners,
who are happy to have the firm pick up another good client with plenty of prospects for
present and future work.
In January of the next year, you help Danny’s controller get Forms W-2 and 1099 out, and
in late February, you start work on putting together the tax returns and a compilation because
Sheet Metal has a revolver with the local bank. When you have a meeting with Danny at
Sheet Metal to cover some of the open issues on the return, you are impressed to see his
“junkyard” is actually extremely well-organized and neat as a pin. Far from the impression
you had in your mind of what a scrap metal operation would look like, Danny’s place has a
professional appearance; even the yard workers were dressed in matching uniforms.
When you and Danny meet, you spend a number of hours covering the issues needed to
finalize the return. Among other things, you ask Danny about what appears to be an ongoing
stock redemption from Dede Martin. It turns out that Dede, now Danny’s ex-wife, used to
own 25 percent of Sheet Metal, and the company started buying back her stock approximately 2 years ago. Now down to 15 percent ownership, Dede is clearly not Danny’s favorite
person, but Danny is looking forward to completing her buyout in the next year or two so
that, as he put it, “I don’t have to account to Dede for every dime that goes through Sheet
Metal.”You also discuss Danny’s compensation and distributions. Although Danny’s salary is
low at $60,000, and his distributions for the year are expected to be up in the $90,000 range,
you are comfortable that the figures are defensible and that Danny’s bank will be pleased to
see that Sheet Metal has continued its record of profitable operations.
In due course, you sign off on the return and compilation report, forward these to Danny
for filing, and move on to other clients’ returns. Danny asks that you forward a copy of the
return and compilation to the bank and Dede, who is entitled to get this information as part
of her stock redemption. During the following six months, you have a number of meetings with Danny to help him get some estate planning done and to help plan Sheet Metal’s
transition to a new, state-of-the-art software system for accounting and inventory tracking.
Throughout this time, you find yourself liking Danny more and more; he is just a salt of the
earth kind of guy who is a good businessman, great storyteller, and real jokester. You and
Danny eat dinner together every month or so, and he invites you to a poker game that is a
regular Thursday night event at a local tavern. Other than the occasional sarcastic comment
about Dede, Danny is a happy guy who’s truly fun to be around.You find yourself wishing
you had a few more clients like Danny!
As year-end approaches, you contact Danny and ask if you and he should be getting
together to discuss any year-end tax planning he should be doing for Sheet Metal. He agrees
that would be a good idea and volunteers to pick you up for the Thursday night poker game
a little early, so you and he can talk things over. When he arrives late that afternoon, though,
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you are in for something of a surprise. As you walk out the door, Danny’s beat-up pickup is
nowhere to be seen, and Danny swaggers over to a brand new Mercedes-Benz S600 sedan
with the sticker still in the window, a huge grin on his face.You are somewhat taken aback
when you see the price tag of over $160,000 on the sticker, and you exclaim, “Danny, you
must have sold one heck of a lot of metal to afford something like this!”
Danny laughs as you and he hop into the car, and he peels out of your parking lot, saying
“Hey, this is the reward for all those late nights and long stretches with no vacations and
some old country savvy; you don’t think I paid retail, do ya?”
You are still somewhat in amazement but manage to reply, “No, I’m sure you didn’t pay
retail, knowing your bargaining style. I guess it’s a good thing you and I were getting together
to do some tax planning because it sure looks like you’re going to need it!”
Danny nods and then drops the following bombshell on you. “Hey, listen, most of this
came from the ‘kitty,’ so we won’t have to worry about that when it comes to taxes.”
You pause, unsure where to go with this, but decide to tread lightly. “Danny, what do you
mean, ‘the kitty’?”
Danny laughs aloud, sounding amazed. “Hadn’t I mentioned the ‘kitty’ before? Come on,
you bein’ the CPA and all, you knew about my rainy day fund at Sheet Metal, didn’t ya?”
Getting more and more uncomfortable, you shake your head “No” as Danny continued.
“Heck, the rainy day fund was just my way of puttin’ aside some cash from the scrap we
couldn’t sell no place else. I found a buyer who’d take the odds and ends we’d usually throw
away, and it always paid in cash. Seein’ how I’ve been saving in the ‘kitty’ for about four years
now, I figured it was about time to enjoy some of the harvest from all this hard work!”
Danny looked over at you, taking in the frown on your face. “Now, com’ on, you’re not
angry about the ‘kitty,’ are ya? Shoot, everybody does it in our business, and I kind of thought
it was okay because our old accountant, Bill Nord, knew about it, and he said it was alright.”
The car was silent as you groped for something to say.“I don’t remember us ever talking about
this, Danny, but I’m glad you told me now.”You were largely silent for the rest of the evening,
and when Danny dropped you off at your house after an unusually quiet ride back, you watched
sadly as the new Mercedes-Benz headed down the street, shining silver under the moonlight.

Questions for Consideration
1. Based on the conversation you had with Danny about the “kitty,” and assuming you
know that Sheet Metal’s tax returns for the prior year did not include income from
the cash sales Danny referred to, what is your professional obligation at this point?
a. Contact the IRS, and inform it that Sheet Metal has filed incorrect returns.
b. Advise Danny that you are withdrawing from representing Sheet Metal.
c. Recommend in writing that Sheet Metal amend its prior years’ federal and state
returns.
d. Contact the attorney for Sheet Metal, and inform him or her that Danny has
committed a felony by misrepresenting Sheet Metal’s financial condition to Sheet
Metal’s bank, a federally chartered financial institution.
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2. You discuss this situation with one of your partners the next day, who points out that
not only has Danny misstated the income of Sheet Metal to the IRS but has also misled his ex-wife, Dede, who is still a stockholder of Sheet Metal. He suggests you have
an ethical obligation to disclose this information to Dede.You
a. contact Danny and ask him to set up a stockholder meeting for all the stockholders
of Sheet Metal, but you do not disclose the purpose of the meeting, which is to
make full disclosure of what you know.
b. contact Dede and tell her what you learned as a result of the conversation with
Danny.
c. call Danny and suggest he complete the buyout of his ex-wife’s stock before the
end of this year.
d. write Danny and inform him that, although you are not a lawyer, you believe he
has a fiduciary obligation to the other stockholder of Sheet Metal and that you
are recommending he disclose the information he discussed with you to the other
stockholder because you believe he is required to do at the same time he takes corrective action you are recommending with respect to the IRS.
3. Assume that Danny asks you to prepare the current year’s return for Sheet Metal but
has not corrected the error in the prior years’ returns. What are your professional
obligations at this point?
a. I need to consider withdrawing from representing Sheet Metal.
b. I have to take reasonable steps to ensure the omission from income is not repeated
in the current year’s return.
c. I must make a reasonable effort to get information from Danny on this subject.
d. I have to make reasonable inquiries to determine if information from Danny is
incorrect or incomplete.
e. Both (a) and (b).
f. Both (c) and (d).
4. After thinking over what Danny said, you realize your compilation that went to the
bank misstated Sheet Metal’s income, but you are not worried because it understated
the business’s income, as opposed to overstating it. Nonetheless, you advise Sheet
Metal to amend its prior years’ returns and the compilation to include the income not
previously reported. Danny ignores your advice and terminates your firm’s services.
The following year, Sheet Metal files for bankruptcy after business conditions deteriorate. The bank learns from the bankruptcy trustee that Danny had been diverting
company income to himself and threatens to sue your firm for failing to prepare an
accurate compilation. What is your response?
a. You tell the bank you did not know about the diversion of income.
b. You tell the bank that a compilation relies on information from the business and
that your firm fulfilled its professional responsibilities to the business by advising
Sheet Metal to amend its federal and state returns and the compilation for the years
in question.
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c. You tell the bank your firm had not intended for the bank to rely on the compilation in extending credit to Sheet Metal.
d. You tell the bank your firm would have informed the bank of the diversion of
income if it had had a significant effect on Sheet Metal’s tax liability.
5. Assume that the IRS had an open examination of the prior year’s tax return at the
time you learned about the “kitty” from Danny. What is your responsibility to Sheet
Metal at this point?
a. Ask for permission from Danny to disclose the income understatement to the IRS.
b. Our firm needs to immediately withdraw upon learning of the information relayed
by Danny.
c. Recommend corrective measures, and ask Danny to agree to disclose the understatement to the IRS.
d. Wait until the examination is closed, and then, inform Danny that Sheet Metal
should consider taking corrective actions you’re prepared to recommend.
6. Note that the case study indicates your firm sent the compilation report to the bank
and Dede at Danny’s request. Assuming the same facts as question 4, what additional
steps should your firm have considered taking when its services were terminated?
7. If your firm had only assisted tangentially in the preparation of Sheet Metal’s tax
return for the prior year and did not sign the return as a preparer, would your firm be
acting in accordance with the professional standards if you elected to simply withdraw
now? Why or why not?
8. If the scrap metal business had a reputation for cash dealings, and your firm was being
retained for the first time to prepare Sheet Metal’s tax return, what steps would you
be professionally obligated to take to verify or obtain information from the business?

Suggested Readings
On November 10, 2008, the AICPA issue issued its Guide for Complying With Rules 102–505
of the AICPA. These rules include
• Rule 102, Integrity and Objectivity (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 102,
par. .01).
• Rule 201.
• Rule 202.
• Rule 203, Accounting Principles (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 203, par. .01).
• Rule 301.
• Rule 302, Contingent Fees (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 302, par. .01).
• Rule 501, Acts Discreditable (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 501, par. .01).
• Rule 502, Advertising and Other Forms of Solicitation (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET
sec. 502, par. .01).
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• Rule 503, Commissions and Referral Fees (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 503,
par. .01).
• Rule 505, Form of Organization and Name (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 505,
par. .01).
The guide is not an authoritative document (unlike ET section 100-1, Conceptual Framework for AICPA Independence Standards [AICPA, Professional Standards], which is authoritative)
but is intended to provide members with guidance necessary to make decisions that are
unrelated to independence and that may not be explicitly addressed by interpretations or
rulings. Use of the guide is not mandated but is suggested to be a prudent step in achieving
compliance with the AICPA Code. Practitioners encountering the types of threats covered
by Rules 102–505, available safeguards to address those threats, and guidance on ethical
conflict resolution concerning those threats should consult the guide for nonauthoritative
guidance.
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Case 11—Radar One, LLP—
You Are the Amended
Return Preparer
Introduction
Treasury Department Circular No. 230, Regulations Governing Practice before the Internal Revenue Service, consists of five subparts incorporating regulations that govern practice before
the IRS. As noted in “The Reach of Circular 230,” in the February 2012 issue of the Journal
of Accountancy, “the breadth and scope of Circular 230 also affects day-to-day business operations of tax practitioners relating to fees, client solicitations, marketing and advertising, and
the management of client files and records.”
The following discussion omits subparts D and E of Circular No. 230 because these provisions relate to rules governing disciplinary proceedings and general provisions concerning
the availability of official records.

Recent Amendments to Circular No. 230
On August 2, 2011, a significant number of amendments to each subpart of Circular No.
230 took effect. Among other changes effected by the rule amendments are the following:

Subpart A
• Preparers: Establishment of new rules concerning tax preparers, including
— defining tax return preparer consistent with existing Internal Revenue Code Section 7701(a)(36) and confirming that preparation of a return is practicing before
the IRS in the same manner as a CPA, an attorney, an enrolled agent, an enrolled
retirement plan agent, and enrolled actuaries.
— requirements to register as a tax return preparer if a person, for compensation,
prepares or assists in the preparation of all or substantially all of a tax return or
claim for refund. Registered tax return preparers (RTRPs) must also pass the
competency exam, pass a suitability screen, obtain a Preparer Tax Identification
Number (PTIN), and comply with continuing education requirements after
registration. Federally authorized tax practitioners (FATPs), defined as any individuals
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who are authorized under federal law to practice before the IRS, if such practice
is subject to federal regulation under Money and Finance, U.S. Code 31, Section
330, are exempt from the competency exam, suitability check, and continuing
education requirements applicable to RTRPs. However, FATPs are required
to answer suitability questions on the PTIN application and subject to separate annual and enrollment cycle continuing professional education (CPE)
requirements.
— extending record retention requirements regarding CPE compliance for a period
of four years (formerly three years) from the date of registration renewal and
broadening the record retention requirements to include the qualified program
number obtained by the qualified continuing education provider.
— clarifying that qualifying continuing education programs are those designed to
enhance professional knowledge of federal taxation or federal tax-related matters,
such as accounting, tax return preparation software, taxation, or ethics, which is
consistent with the IRC and effective tax administration.
— setting up a new return preparer office that will share responsibility with the Office
of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for oversight of tax return preparers (this is a
change that runs throughout the other subparts of Circular No. 230, as well).

Subpart B
• Tax position standards: Section 10.34 now provides that a practitioner may not
willfully, recklessly, or through gross incompetence (a) sign a tax return or refund
claim the practitioner knows or reasonably should know contains a position or (b)
advise a client to take a position on a return or refund claim containing a position that
— lacks a reasonable basis.
— is an unreasonable position, as described in IRC Section 6694(a)(2) and related
regulations and guidance.
— is a willful attempt by the practitioner to understate the liability for tax or a reckless or an intentional disregard of rules under IRC Section 6694(a)(2), including
related regulations and guidance.
• Conduct: A pattern of conduct is a factor that will be taken into account when
determining if a practitioner acted willfully, recklessly, or through gross incompetence.
• Advertising: Section 10.30 added “designated as a registered tax return preparer by
the Internal Revenue Service” as an acceptable description of tax return preparers
usable in advertising or solicitations. RTRPs are subject to the same prohibitions as
other practitioners pertaining to false, fraudulent, coercive, misleading, or deceptive
advertising.
• Compliance procedures: A practitioner(s) who has (have) or shares principal
authority and responsibility for overseeing a firm’s tax practice must take reasonable
steps to ensure the firm has adequate procedures in place for all members, associates,
and employees for purposes of complying with Circular No. 230. A practitioner will
be subject to discipline if through willfulness, recklessness, or gross incompetence
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— he or she fails to take reasonable steps to ensure the firm has adequate procedures
in place to comply with Circular No. 230, and one or more members, associates,
or employees of the firm are or have engaged in a pattern or practice in connection with their practice with the firm of failing to comply with Circular 230.
— he or she fails to take prompt action to correct the noncompliance with Circular
No. 230 when the practitioner knows or should know that members, associates, or
employees of the firm are or have engaged in a pattern or practice in connection
with their practice with the firm that does not comply with Circular No. 230.

Subpart C
• Disallowed conduct: Includes incompetent or disreputable conduct, defined as a practitioner willfully
— failing to file on magnetic or other electronic media a tax return that must be
filed in that format, unless the failure is due to reasonable cause, not willful
neglect.
— preparing all or most of or signing a tax return or refund claim without the
preparer having a current or otherwise valid PTIN.
— representing a taxpayer before the IRS without being authorized to do so.
• Eliminates ambiguity concerning the right of the IRS to sanction a practitioner if
consented to by the practitioner.
On March 29, 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that a federal court
had permanently barred Robert Jensen, a CPA from San Diego, from providing tax advice
or preparing federal tax returns that illegally attempt to reduce customers’ taxable income.
Jensen, who neither admitted nor denied the allegations, had allegedly worked with tax
attorney Scott Waage, who was alleged to have assisted clients in evading taxes by using
bogus deductions. Those deductions were claimed on tax returns prepared by Jensen. The
fraudulent deductions included
• creating sham companies headquartered in the taxpayer’s residence that paid the
taxpayer’s personal expenses and deducted those on the corporate tax returns.
• unlawfully using employee benefit plans to pay taxpayers’ personal expenses.
• unlawfully using pension plans to increase and accelerate deductions and avoid
income taxes on plan pay-outs.

This Light Bulb Lasts a Long, Long Time…
One of the longest running tax shelter cases in litigation reached what may be its
final result in January 2012 when the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (appeals court) overturned a lower court’s ruling for a second time in the
case of TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States. TIFD III-E, a subsidiary of General Electric
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Capital Corporation (GECC), had contributed a fleet of fully depreciated aircraft
valued at $590 million to a partnership GECC formed in the early 1990s.The other
2 partners in the partnership were 2 Dutch banks that contributed $117.5 million
in cash. That partnership, Castle Harbour, operated under an agreement that gave
the 2 banks a reimbursement of their initial capital contribution, together with an
annual return of approximately 9 percent (referred to as the applicable rate).
Castle Harbour was structured so that GECC’s subsidiary received a majority of
the leasing income, but for tax purposes only, 98 percent of the taxable income was
allocated to the Dutch banks that were not subject to U.S. income taxes.
This case, in many respects, resembles a ping-pong match. In 2004, the district
court held that the banks were valid partners; the court of appeals reversed this
decision in 2006 by holding that the banks did not meet the totality of the circumstances test under Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).That test required
the court to examine the nature of the banks’ interests in the partnership that the
appeals court held were not bona fide equity participation but, instead, overwhelmingly in the nature of a secured lender’s interest.
The case was then sent back to the district court for more proceedings. In 2009,
the district court ruled that the banks were real partners for tax purposes, pursuant
to IRC Section 704(e)(1), and the IRS could not impose the 20 percent understatement penalty for 1997 and 1998 because the subsidiary’s treatment of the tax
shelter was supported by substantial authority. In its decision on January 24, 2012,
the appeals court reversed the lower court again, finding that the banks were not
valid partners and that the IRS could impose the 20 percent underpayment penalty.
The decision of the appeals court cited IRC Section 704(e)(1) that states, “A person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital
interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor,
whether or not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person.”
The court concluded that the same evidence that caused it to conclude the banks’
interests were not bona fide equity participation mandated the conclusion that the
banks’ interests were not capital interests under IRC Section 704(e)(1). The appeals
court also was unable to find any substantial authority for the subsidiary’s position
and upheld $62 million in underpayment penalties assessed by the IRS.
The key question: What provisions in the partnership agreement caused the
appeals court to conclude the banks’ interests resembled debt rather than equity?
The answer, in the words of the appeals court:
The banks’ recovery of their investment and receipt of a return at the
Applicable Rate was elaborately protected by three additional features of
the partnership agreement: (1) The taxpayer was required by the part-
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nership agreement to keep high-grade commercial paper or cash in an
amount equal to 110% of the current value of the banks’ Investment
Accounts. (2) The partnership was obliged for the banks’ protection
to maintain $300 million worth of casualty-loss insurance. And, most
importantly, (3) GECC—a large and very stable corporation—gave the
banks its personal guaranty, which effectively secured the partnership’s
payment obligations to the banks.

The appeals court concluded that the banks had no meaningful stake in the success or failure of Castle Harbour. Citing IRC Section 6662, the court noted that
the cases relied upon by the lower court and GECC provided no support for the
taxpayer’s treatment of the banks’ interests as equity participation.

Recent Developments
The case study at the end of this chapter concerns a son of BOSS tax shelter. Bond and
Option Sales Strategy (BOSS) shelters were used by several thousand taxpayers in the late
1990s to reduce or eliminate taxes on capital gains from the sale of a business or other
appreciated asset. In Notice 99-59, the IRS described one variation of how a son of BOSS
transaction might work:
[A] taxpayer purchases and writes options and purports to create substantial positive basis in a partnership interest by transferring those option positions to a partnership. For example, a taxpayer might purchase call options for a cost of $1,000X
and simultaneously write offsetting call options, with a slightly higher strike price
but the same expiration date, for a premium of slightly less than $1,000X. Those
option positions are then transferred to a partnership which, using additional
amounts contributed to the partnership, may engage in investment activities.
Under the position advanced by the promoters of this arrangement, the taxpayer
claims that the basis in the taxpayer’s partnership interest is increased by the cost
of the purchased call options but is not reduced under §752 as a result of the partnership’s assumption of the taxpayer’s obligation with respect to the written call
options.Therefore, disregarding additional amounts contributed to the partnership,
transaction costs, and any income realized and expenses incurred at the partnership level, the taxpayer purports to have a basis in the partnership interest equal to
the cost of the purchased call options ($1,000X in this example), even though the
taxpayer’s net economic outlay to acquire the partnership interest and the value of
the partnership interest are nominal or zero. On the disposition of the partnership
interest, the taxpayer claims a tax loss ($1,000X in this example), even though the
taxpayer has incurred no corresponding economic loss.
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By the early 2000s, son of BOSS transactions had made the listed transaction hit list, and
the IRS began investigating promoters of the shelters, among others. As the investigations
progressed, most taxpayers settled by paying back taxes and penalties. However, a few taxpayers decided they would fight the IRS in court, principally on the basis that the IRS could
not collect back taxes due to the three-year statute of limitations having expired. The IRS
responded by asserting that the six-year statute of limitations applied: the statute used in
instances when the taxpayer omits income from a return.

On April 25, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled in a five-to-four decision in United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC that the six-year statute of limitations does not
apply to an overstatement of basis.The Supreme Court’s decision noted first that the
“omits from gross income” language in IRC Section 6501(e) was identical to the
language interpreted in The Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), case that
held that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply when the taxpayer’s basis
in an asset was overstated. Although the government argued that minor language
changes in the IRC justified a different interpretation, the Supreme Court felt any
language changes in the six-year statute were insignificant or not substantive.
The case did not end here, however. In what has been characterized as an end run
around the Colony decision, after the government lost in two appeals on the statute
of limitations applied to son of BOSS transactions, the Department of the Treasury
(Treasury Department) issued regulations interpreting “omits from gross income”
as including a taxpayer’s overstatement of basis. The government then argued it
was merely exercising its power to issue regulations interpreting a statute, which
it could do so long as the Colony decision had not declared the statutory language
unambiguous in “redefining” the term omits from gross income.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, but two justices issued separate opinions on when Congress intended to allow (and the scope of any such alleged power)
an agency to adopt a different statutory construction than a prior court decision.
That said, the end result—a victory for the taxpayers and a finding that overstatement of basis does not invoke a six-year statute of limitations—is allegedly going
to deprive the IRS of almost $1 billion in collections from pending tax litigation.
The son of BOSS transaction in the Home Concrete case was one put together by
Jenkens & Gilchrist LLP, a Texas law firm later shuttered after the IRS investigated
its tax practice (2 partners were later sentenced on criminal charges, as well). In the
1999 sale of Home Concrete & Supply, the transaction was valued at approximately
$10.6 million, but the partnership only reported a gain of $69,000. Had the case
been decided otherwise, the taxpayers’ taxable income would have increased by
approximately $6 million in 1999, according to the government.The lawyer for the
2 taxpayers had the following comment about the 2 taxpayers after the Supreme
Court’s decision: “They’ve been fighting this one a long time. They felt they had
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done what they were supposed to do; they contacted tax professionals to help” and
had obtained favorable opinion letters from lawyers.
The Home Concrete case makes it clear that the IRS will generally face a threeyear statute of limitations on overstatement of basis cases, unless Congress enacts
legislation to broaden the reach of IRC Section 6501(e).With the IRS’s crackdown
on firms such as Jenkens & Gilchrist and the strengthening of Circular No. 230 in
the 2011 amendments, perhaps this issue is not a burning one, but only time may
tell.
What do you think? Did the taxpayers do all that they were supposed to do?
Should the taxpayer have any obligation to second-guess an opinion or get a second
opinion? Is it reasonable the taxpayers can reduce their taxable income by over $6
million in reliance on the opinion of Jenkens & Gilchrist?

Focus Point: Circular No. 230
By way of contrast to Statements on Standards for Tax Services, consider the following key
provisions from Circular No. 230. Note that provisions in the 2011 amendments to Circular
No. 230 that are previously discussed are not repeated here but certainly qualify as key portions of Circular No. 230 as it is now in effect.This discussion also omits the requirements for
covered opinions because few practitioners are now engaged in issuing reliance or marketed
opinions on tax avoidance transactions, a topic covered in § 10.35 of subpart B.The citations
following the subject matter headings are references to sections within the related subpart of
Circular No 230 where the related requirements are found:
• Privilege (§ 10.20 of subpart B): Records or information must be submitted on
lawful and proper request of the IRS unless the practitioner believes in good faith
and on reasonable grounds that the records or information is privileged. This same
standard applies to information requests by the OPR and to interference or attempts
to interfere with a proper and lawful effort on the part of the IRS or the OPR to
obtain records or information.
• Errors (§ 10.21 of subpart B): A practitioner who, having been retained by a
client with respect to a matter administered by the IRS, knows the client has not
complied with the U.S. revenue laws or has made an error in, or omission from, any
return, document, affidavit, or other paper the client submitted or executed under
U.S. revenue laws must advise the client promptly of the fact of such noncompliance, error, or omission. The practitioner must advise the client of the consequences,
as provided under the IRC, and regulations of such noncompliance, error, or
omission.
• Fee charges (§ 10.27[a] of subpart B): A practitioner may not charge an unconscionable fee in connection with any matter before the IRS.
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• Contingent fees (§ 10.27[b] of subpart B): Except as subsequently provided,
a practitioner may not charge a contingent fee for services rendered in connection
with any matter before the IRS:
— A matter before the IRS includes
tax planning and advice.
preparing or filing or assisting in preparing or filing returns or claims for
refund or credit.
all matters connected with a presentation to the IRS or any of its officers or
employees relating to a taxpayer’s rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or
regulations administered by the IRS. Such presentations include, but are not limited to, preparing and filing documents; corresponding and communicating with
the IRS; rendering written advice with respect to any entity, transaction, plan, or
arrangement; and representing a client at conferences, hearings, and meetings.
— Contingent fees are defined as
any fee that is based, in whole or part, on whether a position taken on a tax
return or other filing avoids challenge by the IRS or is sustained either by the
IRS or in litigation.
a fee that is based on a percentage of the refund reported on a return that is
based on a percentage of the taxes saved or that otherwise depends on the
specific result attained.
any fee arrangement in which the practitioner will reimburse the client for
all or a portion of the client’s fee in the event that a position taken on a tax
return or other filing is challenged by the IRS or is not sustained, whether
pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a guarantee, rescission rights, or any
other similar arrangement.
— A practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in connection
with the IRS’s examination of, or challenge to, an
original tax return.
amended return or claim for refund or credit when the amended return or
claim for refund or credit was filed within 120 days of the taxpayer receiving
a written notice of the examination of, or a written challenge to, the original
tax return.
— A practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in connection
with a claim for credit or refund filed solely in connection with the determination of statutory interest or penalties assessed by the IRS and for services rendered in connection with any judicial proceeding arising under the IRC.
• Best practices (§10.33 of subpart B): The practitioner should adhere to best
practices, including
— communicating clearly with the client regarding engagement terms. The example
given says the adviser should determine the client’s expected purpose for, and use
of, the advice and should have a clear understanding with the client regarding the
form and scope of the advice or assistance requested.
— establishing facts, determining relevancy, evaluating reasonableness of assumptions or representations, relating applicable law and potentially applicable judicial
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•

•

•

•

•

doctrines to relevant facts, and arriving at a conclusion supported by the law and
facts.
— advising the client about the import of the conclusions reached, including
whether a client may avoid accuracy-related penalties under the IRC if the client
acts in reliance on the advice.
— acting fairly and with integrity in practice before the IRS.
Documents (§ 10.34[b] of subpart B): A practitioner may not
— advise a client to (i) take a position on a document, an affidavit, or other paper
(documents) submitted to the IRS unless the position is not frivolous and (ii)
submit documents to the IRS that are frivolous.
— advise a client to submit documents, the purpose of which is to delay or impede
administration of federal tax laws or that contain or omit information in a manner that demonstrates an intentional disregard of a rule or regulation, unless the
practitioner also advises the client to submit a document that evidences a good
faith challenge to the rule or regulation.
Potential penalties (§ 10.34[c] of subpart B): A practitioner must inform a client of any penalties that are reasonably likely to apply to the client with respect to
— a position taken on a tax return if the practitioner
advised the client with respect to the position.
prepared or signed the tax return.
— any document, affidavit, or other paper submitted to the IRS.
The practitioner also must inform the client of any opportunity to avoid any penalties by disclosure, if relevant, and of the requirements for adequate disclosure, even if
the practitioner is not subject to a penalty.
Relying on client-furnished information (§ 10.34[d] of subpart B): A
practitioner advising a client to take a position on a tax return, a document, an
affidavit, or other paper submitted to the IRS or preparing or signing a tax return as
a preparer, generally, may rely in good faith, without verification, upon information
furnished by the client. The practitioner
— may not, however, ignore the implications of information furnished to, or actually known by, the practitioner.
— must make reasonable inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect, inconsistent with an important fact or another factual assumption, or incomplete.
Requirements for covered opinions (§ 10.35 of subpart B): A practitioner
issuing a covered opinion must describe if the opinion is unable to reach a conclusion on each significant federal tax issue and must reach a conclusion at the confidence level of at least more like than not with respect to the issues considered. In the
absence of such a conclusion, the covered opinion must prominently disclose this
fact and must state the opinion was not written and cannot be used by the taxpayer
for the purpose of avoiding penalties. A covered opinion is defined as
— written advice concerning a tax avoidance transaction that is identified as a listed
transaction.
— concerning federal tax issues arising from a partnership or another entity or
another plan or arrangement
201

Business Ethics: Real-World Case Studies

•

•

•

•

•

202

the principal purpose of which is avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed by
the IRC.
a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed
by the IRC if the advice is a reliance opinion, a marketed opinion, subject to
conditions of confidentiality, or subject to contractual protection.
Referral fees (§ 10.35[e] of subpart B): A covered opinion must disclose
— any compensation arrangement, including referral fees or fee sharing, between
the practitioner and any person (other than the client for whom the opinion is
prepared) with respect to promoting, marketing, or recommending the entity,
plan, or arrangement that is the subject of the opinion.
— any referral agreement between the practitioner and a person engaged in promoting, marketing, or recommending the entity, plan, or arrangement that is the
subject of the opinion.
Form and content of advice (§ 10.37 of subpart B): A practitioner must not
give written advice (including electronic communications) concerning one or more
federal tax issues if the practitioner
— bases the written advice on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including
assumptions about future events).
— unreasonably relies upon representations, statements, findings, or agreements of
the taxpayer or any other person.
— does not consider all relevant facts the practitioner knows or should know.
— in evaluating a federal tax issue, takes into account the possibility that a tax
return will not be audited, an issue will not be raised on audit, or an issue will be
resolved through settlement if raised.
All facts and circumstances, including the scope of the engagement and the type
and specificity of the advice sought by the client will be considered in determining
whether a practitioner has failed to comply with § 10.37.
In the case of an opinion the practitioner knows or has reason to know will be used
or referred to by a person other than the practitioner (or a person who is a member
of, associated with, or employed by the practitioner’s firm) in promoting, marketing,
or recommending to one or more taxpayers a partnership or other entity, investment
plan, or arrangement, a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of
any tax imposed by the IRC, the determination of whether a practitioner has failed
to comply with this section will be made on the basis of a heightened standard of
care because of the greater risk caused by the practitioner’s lack of knowledge of the
taxpayer’s particular circumstances.
Sanctions (§ 10.52 of subpart C): A practitioner may be sanctioned (including
censure, suspension, or bar) if he or she
— willfully violates any portion of Circular No. 230 except § 10.33 on best practices.
— recklessly or through gross incompetence violates §§ 10.34 (standards applicable
to tax returns and documents); 10.35 (covered opinions); 10.36 (compliance
procedures for covered opinions, as well as tax returns and documents); or 10.37
(requirements for written advice).
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Speaking of Tax Savings, Wandry v.
Commissioner Opens A New Window to
Tax-Free Ownership Transfers
Practitioners in search of the “holy grail”—tax-free transfers of a family business—
have a new method available to them sanctioned by the Tax Court in Wandry
v. Commissioner (T.C. Memo. 2012-88 [March 26, 2012]). To say this decision is
groundbreaking might understate its impact. David Kautter, a director of American
University’s Kogod Tax Center, called the ruling a “landmark decision, because it
allows tax-free ownership transfers from one generation to another with certainty
and in an orderly manner.”
Dean and Joanne Wandry formed a family limited partnership (FLP) in 1998,
contributing cash and marketable securities. In 2000, the Wandrys began a giftgiving program under which they gifted FLP interests to their children and grandchildren. Because the value of their gifts could not be known until a later date when
a valuation could be made of the FLP assets, the Wandrys’ tax attorney advised
them to give gifts of a specific dollar amount rather than a set number of units. The
adviser also counseled the Wandrys that gits should be made on December 31 or
January 1 to avoid the need for midyear closing of the books.
In 2001, the Wandry family started a family business in a new limited liability
company (LLC) into which the FLP’s assets were transferred in 2002. The giftgiving that started in 2000 was continued through the new LLC.
On January 1, 2004, the Wandrys executed gift documents that made gifts to
their 4 children and 5 grandchildren of LLC interests that were valued in amounts
that equaled the Wandrys’ available exemptions, which at the time were $1 million
lifetime and the $11,000 annual exclusion. The gift documents listed specific dollar
amounts of LLC interests to be received by each child or grandchild.The gift documents also contained the following language that was referred to as a defined value
formula clause or the adjustment clause:
Although the number of Units gifted is fixed on the date of the gift,
that number is based on the fair market value of the gifted Units, which
cannot be known on the date of the gift but must be determined after
date based on all relevant information as of that date. Furthermore, the
value determined is subject to challenge by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). I intend to have a good-faith determination of such value
made by an independent third-party professional experienced in such
matters and appropriately qualified to make such a determination. Nevertheless, if, after the number of gifted Units is determined based on such
valuation, the IRS challenges such valuation and a final determination
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of a different value is made by the IRS or a court of law, the number of
gifted Units shall be adjusted accordingly so that the value of the number
of Units gifted to each person equals the amount set forth above, in the
same manner as a federal estate tax formula marital deduction amount
would be adjusted for a valuation redetermination by the IRS and/or a
court of law.

The Wandrys obtained an independent appraisal of the LLC membership interest
that valued each 1 percent interest in the LLC at $109,000. After the IRS examined
the gift tax returns, it determined the value of the gifts exceeded the Wandrys’ gift
tax exclusions because the Wandrys had transferred gifts of fixed percentage interests to the donees that exceeded the available gift exclusions.
The IRS argued (a) the gift tax returns’ description of the gifts are admissions that
the Wandrys transferred fixed percentage interests to their heirs; (b) the LLC’s capital accounts controlled the nature of the gifts, and those accounts had been adjusted
to reflect the gift description; and (c) the gift documents themselves transferred
fixed percentage interests in the LLC to the donees. The IRS also argued that the
adjustment clause was void because it created a condition subsequent to the completed gifts, was an attempt to use a formula to transfer assets with uncertain value
at the time of transfer, and was contrary to public policy.
The Tax Court emphatically rejected these arguments, finding (a) the gift tax
returns reported gifts with a total value equal to $1.099 million, and the supporting
schedules listed net dollar value transfers to the donees, not percentages; (b) facts and
circumstances determine the capital accounts, and those accounts don’t determine
the nature of the gifts; and (c) federal courts have upheld formulas to limit the value
of a completed transfer (as opposed to formulas that would reverse completed gifts
in excess of the applicable exclusions). Because the gifts were equal to the Wandrys’
exemptions, no excess amount was gifted, and no tax was due.
Unsaid, of course, is that the appraisal undervalued the LLC interests, and that is
why the IRS assessed a deficiency. However, because the Wandrys didn’t actually
gift an amount in excess of the exemptions, no tax was payable.

The Important Conclusion From Wandry
The Wandry case points to a very important distinction: if the adjustment clause
in the gift documents is what is referred to as a savings clause (that is, a clause that
operates to undo a prior completed gift), the IRS will prevail in challenging the
clause.
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However, if the adjustment clause is a defined value clause that irrevocably transfers a fixed value to the donee, then Wandry stands for the proposition that the
taxpayer donor will prevail in a challenge by the IRS.
Note: Many commenters have suggested that Congress or the Treasury Department may take action in response to this case, given the potential revenue loss,
and the IRS may choose to appeal the Tax Court’s decision. Practitioners need to
ensure the proper adjustment clause is used in gift documents (based on defined
dollar values) and advise clients that defined value clauses may come under further
attack by the IRS, which may limit or eliminate their utility.

Ethical Guides
Bhikkhu Bodhi, the American Theravada Buddhist monk, once said, “In this world, everything changes except good deeds and bad deeds; these follow you as the shadow follows the
body.”
William J. H. Boetcker, the American religious leader, once said, “That you may retain your
self-respect, it is better to displease the people by doing what you know is right, than to
temporarily please them by doing what you know is wrong.”
Marian Wright Edelman, the American activist for children, once said, “A lot of people are
waiting for Martin Luther King or Mahatma Gandhi to come back—but they are gone. We
are it. It is up to us. It is up to you.”
Ethics Ruling No. 3, “Information to Successor Accountant About Tax Return Irregularities,” of ET section 391, Ethics Rulings on Responsibilities to Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 391 par . .005–.006), asks the following question: If a CPA withdraws from an
engagement on discovering irregularities in a client’s tax return, may he or she reveal to a
successor accountant why the relationship was terminated? The answer is as follows:
Rule 301 is not intended to help an unscrupulous client cover up illegal acts or
otherwise hide information by changing CPAs. If the member is contacted by the
successor he or she should, at a minimum, suggest that the successor ask the client
to permit the member to discuss all matters freely with the successor. The successor is then on notice of some conflict. Because of the serious legal implications,
the members should seek legal advice as to his or her status and obligations in
the matter.

Any CPA who communicates with a client or successor accountant about such matters
would be well advised to put such communications in writing.

Case Study Facts
On a crisp autumn day, you find yourself working on a particularly knotty tax issue for one
of your corporate tax clients when you get a call from a tax litigator you know.The attorney
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is a savvy lady named Iris Teague who’s represented many entrepreneurs and small businesses
in tax investigations, as well as civil and criminal proceedings, through the years.You and Iris
have a mutual earned respect and have worked together on a number of matters for common
clients who have needed specialized tax counseling and legal representation before the IRS.
Iris starts the conversation by asking if she and a client by the name of Dave Shattuck can
drop by your office in the next day or two to talk about a pending (and serious) IRS inquiry.
When you ask Iris about her firm’s role in the representation, she replies, “Well, we are representing Mr. Shattuck individually and in the capacity of white collar defense counsel. We’ve
advised Mr. Shattuck that the corporate and partnership entities involved in this must have
separate representation, and we thought your firm would be well-positioned to advise the
corporate and partnership entities about their obligations under the IRC.”
“Of course,” Iris continued, “Mr. Shattuck may ask you for an opinion on some of the
issues that bear on his personal responsibility, and we’d welcome your informal input on
those matters, but as you know, we may have to limit some of those discussions to the extent
the attorney-client confidentiality privilege could be lost.”You acknowledge Iris’s point and
schedule a meeting with her and Mr. Shattuck a few days out, wondering what Mr. Shattuck
might have done to incur the IRS’s wrath to the point that criminal charges appeared to be
possible, if not probable.
At the stated time, Iris arrives at your office with a bear of a man in tow. Dave Shattuck
appears to be over 6’6” and all muscle at that.With a shock of black hair and dark complexion,
he seems almost fearful at first glance. He greets you, shaking hands with a light grip that belies
his obvious strength, and smiles in a way that lights up his face in an innocent, almost boyish,
manner.You take a liking to this gentle giant, but as you walk back to the conference room,
you wonder where you’ve seen that face before. As the three of you get seated around the
table, Iris volunteers some information that answers your unasked question.“Harry, you might
remember Dave from his time spent playing college ball a decade or so ago when his face was
in the papers and on TV all the time around here. I know he won’t tell you, but Dave was AllAmerican and even played pro ball for a few years before he ran into trouble with his knee.”
Dave interjected in a light tone, “Iris loves to remind me of the old days, Harry, but I’m
just a working stiff now. I might get some good tickets to the NCAA tournament and get a
chance to visit with a few of the new pros for orientation sessions sponsored by the NBA,
but that’s about as far as my notoriety takes me these days.” You now recall some of the
details of his college and injury-shortened pro career and remember that Dave Shattuck was
a well-liked local boy made good, a favorite of the media, but someone who didn’t have a
sterling academic record. After dredging up a few recollections about his career and getting
a spur-of-the-moment lesson about life on the road in the big leagues from Dave’s time in
the NBA, you steer the conversation back to the issues at hand.
“So, Dave, can you fill me in on why we’re getting together today, or would you like Iris
to start the ball rolling?”
“I think I can probably give you a good summary of the facts,” Iris replied. “Dave, if you’d
interrupt if I get sidetracked, I’d like to fill Harry in on some of the history and then bring
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him up to date on where we stand today.” Dave nodded pleasantly, evidently content to sit
back and listen.
Harry, you might remember the press reports that after Dave’s retirement, he
bought a real estate brokerage firm and a small mortgage company he renamed
Shattuck Real Estate Development Group. The group was able to attract plenty
of capital from private investors because of Dave’s reputation, and Falcon Bank
provided a warehouse credit facility that led to Dave’s group becoming one of the
leading commercial real estate developers in the 4-state area. After one of the Wall
Street investment banks volunteered to finance a few of the group’s projects, Dave
was able to grow the business to the point it was grossing over $40 million and
netting almost $6 million per year from its property management services alone!

Impressed, you congratulate Dave on having assembled such a successful operation, but he
waves off your praise. “You better wait to hear the rest, Harry, before you give me any pats
on the back.”You gesture for Iris to continue.
“With success came tax bills, Harry, and approximately four years ago, Dave was contacted
by his CPA who wanted to introduce him to a partner at AXIS, the large accounting firm
headquartered in Miami. The AXIS partner had some tax planning strategies that Dave’s
CPA thought might be worth looking at.”
Dave added, “You know, my CPA’s been with me since I was in high school, and he was
best friends with my parents, so I felt I could trust him,.”
Iris glanced over in response and said, “Dave, I think your CPA was trying to help, and
referring you to AXIS, given its sterling reputation, was not something I think he did out of
ignorance.” Dave acknowledged the point with a nod, and Iris continued.
AXIS recommended two strategies, Harry. First, it suggested that Dave resign from
the group and enter into an employment agreement with a Grand Cayman leasing
company called Triton Leasing, under which Triton agreed to lease Dave’s services
back to the group through an entity called Radar One, which was a limited liability partnership. Radar One paid Dave a lot less than the $750,000 salary he used
to get from the group, but the group paid Radar One approximately $800,000 in
lease payments each year. Of course, the group paid 90 percent of that to Triton
and deducted that entire amount as a business expense, and it wasn’t treated as
wages.

“Dave, did you get any benefits of any kind from Triton, and did you control Triton?” you
ask.
Well, the AXIS partner said the lawyer in Grand Cayman would be the sole stockholder of Triton, so I don’t think I controlled it, but I did get to use my salary when
I went down there to the Caribbean. I remember the AXIS folks warned me not
to bring any of the lease fees back into the country, or it would be like undeclared
income.The lawyer down there in Grand Cayman told me he could help me get a
debit card I could use, and that’s how I made sure I never brought any money back
here into the United States.
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You look over at Iris, raising your eyebrows and beginning to get the picture. “Dave, did
AXIS give you any kind of opinion about this?”
Dave shook his head but said, “Harry, I don’t keep track of stuff like that, but my CPA
makes sure the paperwork is done right, and he has some kind of opinion from AXIS that
made him comfortable, I guess.” You are starting to get a little irritated with Dave’s ignorance but decide to give him the benefit of the doubt. At this point, Iris resumes.
The situation with Radar One starts to get a little more complicated at this point,
Harry. As I said, AXIS had 2 strategies it recommended, and the second was, shall
we say, even more “innovative.” What it proposed was that Dave borrow $5 million from Grand Cayman Bank and contribute it to Radar One, which Dave did.
The bank and the Grand Cayman attorney drew up the loan documents and put
in $3.5 million as the stated principal balance, but the interest rate was 22 percent.
Because the $5 million contributed to the partnership exceeded the amount of the
debt, AXIS advised Dave that he could generate a $1.5 million tax loss when the
partnership interest was sold. In fact, when Dave sold his partnership interest to his
mother in 2001, he took a tax loss in that amount.

“Did the partnership have any purpose other than these two transactions?” you wonder aloud.
“Oh, sure, Harry, the partnership was buying and selling stocks here in the United States
and Europe,” Dave replied. “My CPA took care of all the trading and stuff, and he made sure
the AXIS firm filed all the tax returns and everything for Radar One. We even made money
in those stocks, at least in three out of the last five years!” Dave seemed proud of that fact, but
you are more and more certain of where the IRS would be going with this.
Iris added
So, the IRS knows that Radar One had a business purpose.The real problem is that
in April 2003, the IRS added the employee leasing arrangement like the one Dave,
Radar One, Triton, and the group did to the list of abusive tax shelter transactions.
In September 2000, the IRS issued Notice 2000-44, that specifically highlighted
the use of transactions like the one Dave did with Grand Cayman Bank as being a
tax avoidance scheme used to generate artificial tax losses.

You nod your head, familiar with the son of BOSS notice and the continuing effort by
the IRS to add to the list of abusive tax shelters by identifying these as listed transactions
requiring disclosure and subjecting both the taxpayer and preparer to possible penalties for
failure to report the transaction.
“I believe I’ve got a pretty good understanding now of the background, Iris. Can you fill
me in on where the IRS is on this? What about a second opinion from AXIS on the bank
transaction?”
AXIS did give a second opinion on the transaction with Grand Cayman Bank,
Harry, but the problem is that Dave signed a confidentiality agreement with AXIS
that forbids him from disclosing either the transaction’s structure or its tax effects
except under subpoena. The IRS has threatened to issue a subpoena to Dave, but
Dave has been cooperating and has instructed his CPA to hand over everything
he has to the IRS. Before Dave’s CPA could hand over what he had, though,
AXIS went to court seeking an injunction against Dave and other taxpayers they
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advised to use this arrangement from disclosing the terms and seeking to enforce
the confidentiality agreement. In the meantime, the IRS has subpoenaed AXIS to
get the list of clients who’ve done transactions like this, but AXIS is fighting the
subpoena, claiming client confidentiality. The long and short of this is that Dave’s
trying to do the right thing, but AXIS is standing in the way, and it doesn’t look
like it’s going to back off.

“Iris, most of what you’ve described sounds like a problem for AXIS rather than Dave,”
you comment, “but I can see where the IRS might get pretty exercised over this and try to
throw the book at Dave.”
“Yeah, Harry, the IRS has told Dave and his CPA that it’s going to make a referral to the
Criminal Investigative Division, and the agent has been none too pleasant to deal with. I
think the agent believes that Dave’s holding out on him, and I’ve been working hard to disabuse him of that notion, but you know how these things go.”
Dave looked concerned and scared at Iris’s last comment. “The thing is, Iris, why should I
be getting into hot water with the IRS when it’s AXIS that told me it was okay to do this?
What did I do wrong? Shoot, it’s the bad guy here, not me. Now it’s saying the partner who
recommended this is no longer with the firm, and I’m out $300,000 in fees just for the work
the firm did on the bank loan transaction. A little steep, don’t you think?”
Iris looked at you and rolled her eyes slightly, and you decided now would be a good time
to change the subject. “By the way, Dave, one thing I’m a little curious about is how did you
come up with the name Radar One?”
Dave looked at you innocently. “I had nothing to do with that, Harry; that was AXIS too.
It told me these situations were so good, so bulletproof, that we’d be ‘flying under the radar’
and that we wouldn’t have to worry about the IRS. That’s why it told me to use the name
Radar One, and my CPA really liked that idea.”
Your assessment of Dave was turning somewhat sour at this point, and Iris saw the look
on your face. After some discussion about retaining your firm to amend the returns for the
group to reflect the compensation paid to Radar One and Triton, Iris escorted Dave out to
their next appointment with the IRS. You were left thinking that Dave never would have
made it in Hollywood.

Questions for Consideration
1. If AXIS has a chance of prevailing in withholding information about Dave or the
group, or both, from the IRS in the existing action, what standard must it meet under
Circular No. 230?
a. It must have a current relationship with the group or Dave and a confidentiality
agreement with either one.
b. It must believe in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the information is
privileged.
c. It must believe in good faith that the information is privileged.
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d. It must prevail in getting an injunction from a court that finds the information is
privileged.
e. AXIS has no basis to withhold information from the IRS.
2. Assume that when you review the AXIS opinion on the transaction with Grand Cayman Bank, you find the opinion does not reach a more likely than not conclusion.
If AXIS issued that same opinion today, what obligations would AXIS have to Dave?
a. AXIS would have to meet the best practices standard for tax practitioners.
b. AXIS could not issue such an opinion to Dave, given today’s rules and regulations.
c. AXIS would have to inform Dave if it paid any referral fee to Dave’s personal CPA
if his CPA recommended to Dave the Grand Cayman Bank transaction.
d. AXIS would have to disclose the opinion’s failure to reach a more likely than
not conclusion and advise that the opinion won’t be usable to avoid penalties for
understatement of income tax.
e. Both (a) and (b).
f. Both (c) and (d).
3. Put yourself in the position of Dave’s personal CPA and assume that you have just
discovered that the guidance under Revenue Procedure 2003-11 makes the employment leasing situation a listed transaction and that you now know that AXIS erred in
its advice to Dave. What should you do in response to these discoveries, assuming you
are still advising Dave on these or other tax matters?
a. I must advise Dave that he has not complied with the tax laws or has made an error
or omission in his return.
b. I must advise Dave of the consequences of noncompliance under the IRC.
c. I must advise Dave that disclosure of the transaction to the IRS may be required if
it is a reportable transaction in which he participated.
d. All of the above.
e. None of the above.
4. According to Dave’s comment during the meeting, the fee charged by AXIS for its
work on the bank loan transaction was $300,000. Given the proposed tax savings from
this transaction and the amount charged, what concerns do you think AXIS management might have about its fee under the standards of Circular No. 230?
a. Management may have concerns about the fee being unconscionable for advice on
a position taken in Dave’s original return.
b. Management may be concerned about the fee being contingent on tax savings.
c. Management should not have any concerns about its fees.
d. Management should only be concerned about its fees if it published a fee schedule
that differed from the fees it charged.
5. If AXIS was convinced the positions that Dave took in his return had a reasonable
basis, what standards would AXIS have to meet today in order to prepare and sign
Dave’s return?
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a. AXIS would have had to conclude the more likely than not standard was met in
the Grand Cayman Bank transaction, unless it advised Dave that the opinion could
not be used by him for the purpose of avoiding penalties.
b. AXIS would have to inform Dave of the accuracy-related penalties reasonably
likely to apply to the positions taken.
c. To sign the return, AXIS would have had to ensure that the positions were adequately disclosed to the IRS if it determined the return had positions that did not
meet the reasonable possibility standard.
d. All of the above.
6. If AXIS continued to threaten to enforce its confidentiality agreement with Dave,
would Dave have any kind of argument he could advance that might force AXIS to
let Dave make disclosure to the IRS?
7. If the IRS later suspected the former partner at AXIS had set up the transactions with
Triton and Grand Cayman Bank while knowing these transactions were an attempt
to avoid payment of taxes and were being done in an effort to generate enormous
fees, what sanctions would the former partner be subject to under Circular No. 230?
8. If your firm was planning on issuing covered tax shelter opinions today, and you were
interested in proposing steps to effect compliance with best practices provisions of
Circular No. 230, what steps would you want to emphasize in a compliance program?

Suggested Readings
The IRS has placed on its website examples of abusive tax schemes in which preparers, business owners, promoters of trust arrangements, and financial advisers were sentenced to prison
in 2012 for a variety of tax-related offenses.These offenses included failure to declare income,
promotion of abusive tax shelters, preparing false tax returns, tax evasion, and obstructing the
IRS, among other charges. Although occasionally repetitive, this portion of the IRS’s website
does provide a profile of the types of tax enforcement issues, including abusive tax shelters,
that are continuing to get attention from the IRS and the DOJ. The page in question can be
found at www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=246525,00.html.
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12
Case 12—Military
Communications Corp.—
You Are the Outside Tax Advisor
Introduction
With well over 200 companies having been investigated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice with respect to options backdating issues
and with the wave of criminal charges against former CEOs, CFOs, and general counsels at
companies involved in these investigations, it seems clear the options backdating scandal is
not quite ready to fade from the front pages of the newspapers. Behind each of these investigations lurk a number of issues, such as
• once discovered, what does backdating mean for individual employees who received
such options?
• what must the company do once the backdating is discovered?
• what are the reporting obligations of the company, and what are the implications for
the company’s previously filed tax returns?
The following case study asks you to analyze the tax and ethical implications of an options
backdating program that has just come to light, taking into account the focus points that
follow from Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sections 409A and 162(m).

Speaking of Stock Options and Taxes…
Consider the following disclosure from the “Corporate Income Taxes” subsection under the “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations” section in Facebook’s final prospectus related to its May
2012 initial public offering:
As of March 31, 2012, we also had vested ISOs outstanding to purchase approximately 40 million shares of our Class B common stock, but
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given the uncertainty in predicting whether the ISO holders will choose
to make disqualifying dispositions, we are assuming that no corporate
income tax deductions will be generated by these ISOs. Assuming all of
these vested nonstatutory stock options are exercised during 2012 and
assuming the value of our Class B common stock at settlement or upon
option exercise is the initial public offering price of $38.00 per share, we
estimate that this settlement and option exercise activity by U.S. employees would generate a corporate income tax deduction of approximately
$17 billion. The amount that this deduction exceeds our other U.S. taxable income will result in a net operating loss (NOL) that can be carried
back to the preceding two years to offset our taxable income for U.S.
federal income tax purposes, as well as in some states, which would allow
us to receive a refund of some of the corporate income taxes we paid
in those years. Based on the assumptions above, we anticipate that this
refund could be up to $500 million and payable to us during the first
six months of 2013. Any portion of the NOL remaining after this carryback would be carried forward to offset our other U.S. taxable income
generated in future years, which taxable income will also be reduced by
deductions generated from new stock award settlement and stock option
exercise activity occurring in those future years.”
While some (including Senator Carl Levin) are complaining about the
tax benefit realized at the corporate level, they forget that when employees exercise their nonstatutory stock options, they will pay income tax
on the difference between the exercise price and the fair market value of
the Facebook stock. According to California’s Legislative Analyst Office,
the State of California should receive $2.1 billion in additional individual
income taxes in the 13 months after Facebook’s IPO.

Focus Points: Internal Revenue Code
Section 409A and Why It Is Important
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 409A was crafted to address nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements and, somewhat ironically, passed into law before the options
backdating scandal became front page news in the business media. IRC Section 409A applies
to nonqualified compensation to which an employee obtains a contractual right in one
year but that is received in a later year and includes stock options, stock appreciation rights,
supplemental retirement plans, salary deferral plans, bonus plans, employment and severance
agreements, and even certain reimbursement arrangements. Excluded from IRC Section
409A’s broad reach (referred to subsequently as specified exclusions) are
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• stock options and stock appreciation rights (SARs) granted at fair market value
(FMV) by any corporation in a chain of corporations with at least 20 percent minimum common control that ends with the direct employer (so-called “service recipient stock”), which options or SARs are for any form of common stock without
preferential rights except on liquidation.
• extension of a nonstatutory option or SAR for up to the earlier of 10 years after the
grant date or the end of the option’s original term and the extension of so-called
“underwater” stock options for any period of time.
• severance paid to an executive who resigns for good reason, such as a material change
(read reduction) in compensation, duties, or responsibilities within the 2 years preceding
the resignation.The employee must notify the employer of such change; the employer
has at least 30 days to remedy the change; and the severance is equal in amount, time,
and form to what would be paid in an involuntary termination without cause.
• separation pay received as a result of an involuntary termination without cause if the
aggregate payments do not exceed the lesser of $500,000 (subject to annual adjustment for inflation for 2012) or 2 times annual compensation, and the compensation
is paid not later than the second anniversary of the date of termination.
• compensation paid within two and one-half months of the end of the calendar year
in which the compensation vested (otherwise referred to as the date on which a
substantial risk of forfeiture lapses) or, if later, the end of the company’s tax year in
which vesting occurred (which is deemed to include lump sum payments made on
an involuntary termination by the employer without regard to how large a payment
is made) (this is known as the short-term deferral or vest and pay exception).
• severance benefits that are otherwise nontaxable (such as health insurance) and
expenses that are reimbursed to the employee that could have been deducted if the
employee paid them directly.
• expenses reimbursed under an employment agreement if the expenses are incurred
and reimbursed before December 31 of the second year following termination.
The final IRC Section 409A regulations also note that different exemptions from IRC
Section 409A’s broad application can be combined (that is, an executive who receives involuntary severance pay, reimbursed benefits, and vested compensation could rely on three of
the preceding exemptions in combination for different parts of his or her severance package).
Deferred compensation is included in income when it is no longer subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture. In general, the determination of whether deferred compensation is subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture is done on a case-by-case basis. However, in Internal Revenue Bulletin 2007-32, the IRS made the following observations regarding substantial risk
of forfeiture under IRC Section 409A regulations:
• An amount of compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if
— entitlement to the amount is conditioned on the performance of substantial
future services.
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— the occurrence of a condition that is related to a purpose of the compensation
and the possibility of forfeiture are substantial (for example, attainment of a future
earnings or revenue goal).
If a service provider’s entitlement to the amount is conditioned on the occurrence of the service provider’s involuntary separation from service without
cause, the right is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if the possibility of
forfeiture is substantial.
An amount is not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture merely because the
right to the amount is conditioned, directly or indirectly, upon refraining from
the performance of services (for example, under a noncompete agreement).
• The addition of any risk of forfeiture after the right to the compensation arises or
any extension of a period during which compensation is subject to a risk of forfeiture (sometimes referred to as a rolling risk of forfeiture) is generally disregarded.
• An amount is not considered subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture beyond the
date or time at which the recipient otherwise could have elected to receive the
amount of compensation, unless the present value of the amount made subject to
a risk of forfeiture is materially greater than the present value of the amount the
recipient otherwise could have elected to receive absent such risk of forfeiture. For
example, an amount an individual could have elected to receive under a salary deferral election generally cannot be made subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture under
the rules of IRC Section 409A beyond the date or time the salary would otherwise
have been received.
The IRS has yet to reconcile the substantial risk of forfeiture under IRC Sections 409A
and 457(f) that, among other topics, addresses deferred compensation plans or arrangements
maintained by tax-exempt organizations established under IRC Section 457(b).
Deferred compensation that is paid at other than six specified payment dates is deemed
to violate IRC Section 409A. The six specified dates that are referred to subsequently as
permitted payment dates are
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

separation from service.
death.
disability.
a date or fixed schedule established at the time of deferral.
a change in control.
unforeseeable emergency.

One significant exception applies to separation from service payments: a top-50 officer or
significant stockholder of a public company cannot receive deferred compensation payments
until 6 months after separation of service, unless another exception applies to such payments.
The final regulations clarify that a tax gross-up payment under IRC Section 280G is not subject to the 6-month waiting period if paid by the end of the calendar year in which the executive has paid the IRC Section 280G tax to the IRS. Also, executives of a private company
who are terminated shortly after an acquisition by a public company are not treated as persons
subject to the 6-month cooling-off period under the final IRC Section 409A regulations.
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Compliance with IRC Section 409A is critical because noncompliance exposes a plan
participant or an employee to penalties under IRC Section 409A, including the imposition
of tax at vesting, the imposition of a 20 percent penalty tax, and interest at the underpayment rate plus 1 percent. Moreover, the imposition of the 20 percent penalty will, in many
circumstances, taint other payments or benefits received by the plan participant or employee,
thus subjecting those payments or benefits to the 20 percent penalty, as well.

Application of IRC Section 409A
IRC Section 409A applies in all situations in which nonqualified deferred compensation is
paid on other than a permitted payment date and that is not subject to one of the specified
exclusions or a special exclusion subsequently described.

When IRC Section 409A Applies
• Continuation of benefits, such as use of company-provided jets and automobiles,
legal services, offices, and similar postemployment benefits not paid on a permitted
payment date that are normally subject to tax.
• Options to acquire preferred stock, even if granted at FMV (the regulations specifically
stating the FMV exclusion for options only applies to options to acquire any form of
common stock). Note, however, that a class of stock that is guaranteed preferred distribution rights on a complete liquidation of the company (rather than any guaranteed return
or preferential dividend right) is permitted under the definition of service recipient stock.

Other Situations in Which IRC Section 409A Does Not Apply
• Acceleration of the exercise date of a stock option does not result in a deemed grant
of a new option for IRC Section 409A purposes.
• Stock appreciation rights granted at FMV, even when the rights are settled in cash
and regardless of whether the settlement is based on publicly traded stock.

What About Private Companies—How Do You
Know If an Option or SAR Was Granted at Less
Than FMV?
IRC Section 409A applies to both public and private companies. So, the question is how
does a private company determine the FMV of its common stock? The final IRC Section
409A regulations state that any reasonable application of a reasonable valuation method can
be used.To determine if a valuation method is reasonable, the regulations suggest factors that
need to be examined and considered, such as
• present value of future cash flows.
• the value of tangible and intangible assets.
• control premiums or discounts based on the lack of a market for the security.
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• recent arm’s length transactions involving the sale or transfer of stock or equity interests.
• comparable company valuations in publicly traded securities or arm’s length sale
transactions.
• whether the valuation is used for other purposes that have a material impact on the
option or SAR holder; the company; or other constituents, such as its stockholders
or creditors.
The regulations also note that a valuation that does not consider all material information
or that is more than 12 months old will not be considered a reasonable valuation method.
In order to provide private companies additional guidance about what constitutes a reasonable valuation method, the proposed regulations offer three safe harbor valuation methods:
1. An independent appraisal that meets the requirements for an employee stock ownership
plan.
2. A formula valuation, so long as the formula is also used for all noncompensatory valuations, including loan covenant compliance, third-party sales, and regulatory filings.
3. For companies not expected to complete an initial public offering within 180 days after
the valuation or to undergo a change of control in the 90 days after the valuation, that
are not currently public, and that have been in business for 10 years or less, the valuation
can be made by any person, whether inside or outside the company, who has significant
knowledge, experience, education, or training if a reasonable person would reasonably rely
on the valuation advice.The significant knowledge factor is deemed satisfied if the person
performing the valuation has at least 5 years of relevant experience in business valuation
or appraisal, financial accounting, investment banking, private equity, or secured lending
or other comparable experience in the line of business or industry of the company.
In order for a valuation to be made reasonably and in good faith, it must be performed by
a person(s) who is (are) qualified to do so. A person is considered qualified if a reasonable
individual, upon being apprised of the appraiser’s significant knowledge, experience, education, and training, would reasonably rely on the advice of the appraiser in deciding whether
to buy or sell the stock being valued. Significant experience generally means at least five years’
experience in business valuation or appraisal, financial accounting, investment banking, private equity, or secured lending or other comparable experience in the line of business or
industry in which the company conducts business.

Other Corporate and Individual Tax
Implications Related to Backdated Options
IRC Section 162(m) prohibits corporate tax deductions for certain compensation in excess
of $1 million paid to CEOs and the other four most highly compensated officers of a public
reporting company. Compensation not subject to IRC Section 162(m) includes commissions, performance-based compensation, and contributions to qualified retirement plans.The
term performance-based compensation refers to compensation paid on the company or recipient
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achieving one or more nondiscretionary, pre-established, objective performance criteria that
are set by a compensation committee comprising two or more independent directors under
a plan that has been approved by the shareholders of the company before the compensation
is paid. The performance criteria must
• be established no later than 90 days after the beginning of the period to which they relate.
• relate to an outcome that is substantially uncertain at the time the criteria are established and must be capable of assessment by a third party who, with knowledge of
the relevant facts, could determine if the criteria have been met.
• state the method for determining the amount of compensation.
• be contingent, meaning the facts and circumstances must not indicate the employee
would receive all or part of the compensation regardless of whether the performance
criteria are met.
Revenue Ruling 2008-13 noted that a plan will not meet the performance criteria requirements if the plan provides for a bonus payment on the employee’s involuntary termination
without cause, termination for good reason, or retirement. In other words, the inclusion of
this language will cause the entire plan to fail the performance-based criteria included in
IRC Section 162(m). Bonus payments actually made on the employee’s death, the employee’s
disability, or a change in control of the employer are nondeductible under IRC Section
162(m), but if the plan includes these provisions, such inclusion will not disqualify the entire
plan from satisfying IRC Section 162(m)’s performance-based requirement.
In regard to shareholder approval, it should be noted that IRC Section 162(m) requires
that the material terms of the performance criteria must be disclosed to, and approved by, the
shareholders. The company is not required to disclose specific targets that must be met, but
shareholders must be capable of determining the maximum amount of compensation that
could be paid to an executive during a specified period. Treasury Regulation § 1.162-27(e)
(4)(vi) requires that if the performance criteria are modified by the compensation committee
after shareholder approval has been obtained, the modified criteria must be reapproved by
the shareholders no later than the first shareholder meeting that occurs in the fifth year following the year in which shareholders previously approved the performance criteria. (However, if the company uses an umbrella plan under which a fixed formula was approved by the
shareholders or that only allows stock options and stock appreciation rights to be granted at
FMV, shareholder reapproval is not required.)
By way of example, if a compensation committee causes a publicly held company to
issue incentive stock options (ISOs) to the CEO and the CFO that carry nondiscretionary,
pre-established, objective revenue or net income objectives, those stock options would be
exempt from IRC Section 162(m). Keep in mind, however, that ISOs must be granted at the
FMV of the common stock as of the date of the grant in order to qualify as ISOs.
Accordingly, if ISOs were backdated to provide the recipient a below-FMV exercise price
as of the grant date, then the ISO no longer qualifies as an ISO, and the built-in gain achieved
through backdating removes the option from the performance-based exception to IRC Section 162(m). As a result, the ISO would be converted to a nonqualified stock option, and
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upon exercise, the spread between the FMV and the exercise price is taxable compensation
to the employee. In this event
• the employee would be responsible for amending his or her individual tax returns
to report such income, together with the 20 percent IRC Section 409A penalty, late
payment penalties, and interest.
• the company would face the loss of tax deductions previously taken under the
performance-based exception to IRC Section 162(m) and liability for failure to
withhold income taxes, Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) or Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxes, and excise taxes as of the exercise date.

Apollo Group Learns About IRC Section
162(m) the Hard Way
In its annual report on Form 10-K filed on May 22, 2007, Apollo Group—best
known for its ownership of the University of Phoenix online university—made the
following disclosures:
In response to a report published by an investment bank on June 8,
2006 that questioned whether the Company might have backdated
stock option grants during its fiscal years ended August 31, 2000 through
August 31, 2004, the Board of Directors authorized a special committee (the “Special Committee”) on June 23, 2006, to retain independent
legal counsel, who in turn retained forensic accountants, to assist them in
conducting an independent review of the Company’s historical practices
related to stock option grants (the “Independent Review”).
Based on the Independent Review and the Internal Review, the
Company determined that 57 of the 100 total grants made during this
time period used incorrect measurement dates for accounting purposes.
Of these 100 grants, 33 grants were issued to the Company’s management and other employees (“Management Grants”). The Company
determined that incorrect measurement dates were used for accounting
purposes for 24 of the 33 Management Grants. As a result, revised measurement dates were selected for many grants and resulted in exercise
prices that were less than the fair market value of the stock on the most
likely measurement dates.The Company recorded pre-tax compensation
expense of $52.9 million ($59.9 million after-tax) in the aggregate over
the fiscal years 1994 through 2005. The after tax amount is higher due
primarily to disallowed deductions pursuant to IRS Section 162(m) and
related penalties and interest. This incremental share based compensation expense results in cumulative decrease to pre-tax income of $21.1
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million ($34.2 million after tax) for the years ended August 31, 2002
through 2005.

Apollo then disclosed the following concerning its internal controls:
Management has determined that the Company did not maintain effective control over (i) the granting of stock options and the related recording
and disclosure of share based compensation expense under APB 25, SFAS
123 and SFAS No. 123 (revised 2004), “Share-Based Payment” (“SFAS
123(R)”), (ii) the recording of allowance for doubtful accounts, (iii) the
recording of impairments for goodwill and (iv) the deduction of compensation expenses under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(“IRC”). The control deficiencies identified constituted material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting as of August 31, 2006.

In its Form 10-K filed October 20, 2011, Apollo provided the following update
concerning its IRS audits:
In fiscal year 2007, the Internal Revenue Service commenced an
examination of our U.S. federal income tax returns for fiscal years 2003
through 2005. In February 2009, the Internal Revenue Service issued an
examination report and proposed to disallow certain deductions relating to stock option compensation and also proposed the additions of
penalties and interest. In March 2009, we commenced administrative
proceedings with the Office of Appeals of the Internal Revenue Service
challenging the proposed adjustments, including penalties and interest.
In November 2009, we executed a Closing Agreement with the Internal
Revenue Service Office of Appeals to settle this matter.
Prior to the settlement, we had a total accrual of $50.5 million included
in our reserve for uncertain tax positions relating to this issue. As a result
of this settlement, we paid $27.3 million during fiscal year 2010 and the
remaining accrual was reversed through a reduction in the provision for
income taxes, a decrease in deferred tax assets, and an increase in additional paid-in capital in the amounts of $10.2 million, $1.5 million and
$11.5 million, respectively.

Lessons Learned:
• Between class action lawsuits, IRS audits and assessments, and an SEC
inquiry (as well as the restatement of 2006 financial statements), stock
options backdating cost Apollo hundreds of millions of dollars in expenses
and tax payments over a period of five years or more.
• Apollo profiled stock option grant practices and deduction of compensation
under IRC Section 162(m) as among its material weaknesses in internal controls in fiscal year 2006. In other words, stock options backdating and related
IRC Section 162(m) issues affect more than just accounting and taxes.
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Solutions Now Being Used to Address
Backdated Options and Discounted
Stock Rights
Companies facing issues associated with options backdating or the grant of discount stock
rights are generally using three approaches to address, when possible, potential adverse consequences facing both the company and discount stock right recipient:
1. Replacing discount stock rights with FMV stock rights and giving the recipient a cash
payment for the difference between the original discounted price and the FMV (less
applicable tax withholding).
2. Canceling discount stock rights in exchange for a cash payment equal to the BlackScholes value of the cancelled rights that is calculated based on the average closing price of the common stock during a 10-day trading period ending immediately
before the cancellation (less applicable tax withholding).
3. Amending the discount stock rights to require fixed exercise dates, often during the
year in which an option (or portion thereof) vests. Although solving potential IRC
Section 409A issues, the problem with this alternative is that because the option
would be forfeited if not exercised, temporary market declines could make a brief
exercise window quite undesirable for the recipient.
The other point that bears remembering when considering any of these potential solutions is that the offer to amend or replace options or discounted stock rights may constitute a
tender offer under federal securities laws. If so (and as will be the case for public companies),
the company must file Schedule TO with the SEC and provide the plan participants with
disclosure documents filed pursuant to Schedule TO and at least 20 business days to consider
the offer. Private companies will need to consider providing Schedule TO-equivalent disclosure to plan participants if an exemption from the securities laws is not available due to, for
example, the number of participants in the plan.
Of course, none of these solutions will diminish the need to consider whether the company maintained effective internal controls related to option grants and compliance with
IRC Section 162(m) and, if not, proceeding with the required disclosure and determining
how controls should be remediated.

Regulatory Advisories on Options
On March 7, 2011, the SEC staff issued Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 114 that
focused on the interaction between Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 718, Compensation—Stock Compensation, and relevant SEC
guidance, rules, and regulations. The important topics covered in SAB No. 114 included
• interpretive guidance related to share-based payment transactions with nonemployees that is addressed in FASB ASC 505-50. SAB No. 114 noted that when nonem222
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ployee arrangements are not specifically addressed in other authoritative literature,
application of FASB ASC 718 will generally result in relevant and reliable financial
statement information.
• valuation methods (including assumptions such as expected volatility and expected
term). SAB No. 114 notes that FASB ASC 718-10-55-17 does not specify a preference for a particular valuation technique or model, but the model chosen should
meet the three requirements in paragraph 11: applied in a manner consistent with
the fair value measurement objective and other requirements of FASB ASC 718,
based on established principles of financial economic theory and generally applied in
that field, and reflects all substantive characteristics of the instrument. The SEC staff
indicated it will not object to a company’s choice of model or technique so long as
the fair value measurement objective is met. The SAB includes fairly extensive guidance on computing historical volatility, reliance on implied volatility measures from
traded options, disclosures expected by the SEC staff with respect to volatility and
critical accounting estimates, and estimating volatility for the newly public company.
The SAB also discusses when it is appropriate to use the simplified method for estimating the expected term of “plan vanilla” options.
• accounting for certain redeemable financial instruments issued under share-based
payment arrangements (which, as SAB No. 114 points out, may call for classification
outside of permanent equity under Accounting Series Release No. 268, Presentation
in Financial Statements of “Redeemable Preferred Stocks,” and related guidance).
• capitalization of compensation cost related to share-based payment arrangements
in instances, for example, when a company grants options to production employees and treats those services as an inventoriable cost, which would require the
company to initially capitalize the cost of the option grants to these employees as
inventory (and recognize the cost in the income statement when the inventory is
consumed).
In July 2006, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued Staff
Audit Practice Alert No. 1, Matters Related to Timing and Accounting for Option Grants (AICPA,
PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, PCAOB Staff Guidance, sec. 400). PCAOB Staff Audit
Practice Alert No. 1, Matters Related to Timing and Accounting for Option Grants, noted that
backdating stock options has a range of implications for audits of both financial statements
and internal controls over financial reporting and that auditors need to be vigilant in assessing the risks related to options backdating.
Among other things, the PCAOB Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 1, Matters Related to Timing
and Accounting for Option Grants, asked auditors to be aware that
• prior periods in which option compensation cost was recorded will, depending
on when a discount stock right may have been granted, require the recording of
additional compensation cost under FASB ASC 718 or will need to be taken into
account in determining fair value under FASB ASC 718 when examining option
valuation differences between the backdated date and actual grant date.
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• legal, regulatory, and other contingencies may require the recording of additional
costs or may need to be reserved for, pursuant to FASB ASC, 450, Contingencies.
• the prior grant of discounted stock rights may affect the company’s ability to deduct
for tax purposes those expenses related to such discounted stock rights.
• the assessment of materiality in evaluating backdated stock options needs to address
both quantitative and qualitative considerations (in accordance with SAB No. 99),
including whether a possible illegal act has been detected that would require the
audit firm to inform management, the audit committee, and perhaps even the SEC
of such backdating or its implications.
• audit risk may be increased in situations when, for example, option compensation
is a large component of executive compensation; stock prices have significantly
increased after reported option grant dates; option grant authority (to a greater or
lesser extent) was delegated to management; and tests of internal controls over the
granting, recording, and reporting of options are deficient or materially weak.
On October 17, 2006, the PCAOB issued Staff Questions and Answers, Auditing the Fair
Value of Share Options Granted to Employees (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules,
PCAOB Staff Guidance, sec. 100). Among other points highlighted in PCAOB Staff Questions and Answers, Auditing the Fair Value of Share Options Granted to Employees
• options exercise prices and expected volatility assumptions have the highest audit
risk due to those factors having the greatest amount of judgment being involved and
their significant effect on fair value. PCAOB Staff Questions and Answers, Auditing
the Fair Value of Share Options Granted to Employees outline procedures to be applied
to the expected term and expected volatility estimates by auditors.
• although historical experience is the starting point for developing the expected
term estimate, the auditor should verify a company’s calculations include options
that were not exercised during the contractual term (which if not included would
significantly understate the average time options that were outstanding).
• auditors should test the underlying data used by the company to develop historical
exercise experience, including, for example, the grant date and exercise date.
• the use of the simplified method of estimating expected term under SAB No. 107 is
available only for “plain vanilla” options in which more detailed external information about employee exercise behavior was not available before December 31, 2007
(which was later extended in SAB No. 110 to periods after December 31, 2007, if
companies do not yet have detailed external information about employee exercise
behavior).
• the auditor should evaluate whether the company officers, employees, or specialists
have experience in valuing options and should assess how that evaluation should
impact audit procedures.
• the use of peer company data to adjust historical volatility requires the auditor to
consider the makeup of the peer group, whether the company is reasonably comparable to that group, and whether blending of historical and peer group data was
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appropriate, keeping in mind that management overrides of adjustments to historical
volatility are an area deserving of heightened scrutiny.
• auditors should verify that the company’s use of combined historical and implied
volatility when estimating expected volatility considered the factors discussed in
FASB ASC 718 and SAB No. 107.
• auditors should consider whether the data on which fair value measurements are
based are accurate, complete, and relevant and should consider the controls
over such data, pursuant to paragraph 12 of AU section 328, Auditing Fair Value
Measurements and Disclosures (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Interim
Standards).

Ethical Guides
Warren Buffett, the American business magnate, once said, “Earnings can be pliable as putty
when a charlatan heads the company reporting them.”
Peter F. Drucker, the writer and management consultant, once said, “Management is doing
things right; leadership is doing the right things.”
Albert Einstein, the German theoretical physicist, once said,“Everything that can be counted
does not necessarily count; everything that counts cannot necessarily be counted.”
If your firm uses a third-party service provider (such as a tax service bureau) to assist in
the preparation of a client’s tax return, are you required to disclose that fact to the client?
Under Ethics Ruling No. 112, “Use of a Third-Party Service Provider to Assist a Member
in Providing Professional Services” of ET section 191, Ethcis Rulings on Independence, Integrity,
and Objectivity (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 191, par. .224–.225), the answer to that
question is an unqualified “Yes,” except with respect to purely administrative support services. As stated in Ethics Ruling No. 112
Clients might not have an expectation that a member would use a third-party service provider to assist the member in providing the professional services. Accordingly, before disclosing confidential client information to a third-party service
provider, a member should inform the client, preferably in writing, that the member may use a third-party service provider. This disclosure does not relieve the
member from his or her obligations under Ethics Ruling No. 1, “Use of a ThirdParty Service Provider to provide Professional Services to Clients or Administrative
Support Services to the Member,” of section 391, Ethics Rulings on Responsibilities to
Clients. If the client objects to the member’s use of a third-party service provider,
the member should provide the professional services without using the third-party
service provider or the member should decline the engagement.
A member is not required to inform the client when he or she uses a third-party
service provider to provide administrative support services (for example, record
storage, software application hosting, or authorized e-file tax transmittal services)
to the member.
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Case Study Facts
As a busy tax practitioner with too many years to count in public practice, you have had
the good fortune to have been a long-time partner with the former tax department of
a Big 8 firm that was spun-off some 10 years ago. Your firm avoided tax shelter work
when it became fashionable in the late 1990s and found itself with more tax consulting
and expert witness work than it could handle when many of the tax shelters your firm
advised clients to avoid went to the top of the IRS’s listed transaction archives. Out of
those engagements, your firm has developed a number of good client relationships with
companies that seek your advice on aggressive tax positions that can no longer be discussed with their auditors due to independence concerns. In addition, your firm provides
tax consulting services to audit committees of public companies that request tax guidance
from time to time.
Deciding you would get an early start on the day, you arrived at work this morning to find
the following e-mail waiting in your inbox:
From: Gene Roth, Audit Committee Chair, Military Communications Corp.
To: Sam Madden, CPA
Subject: Tax Problem—Need Help FAST
Sam, please call me AS SOON as you get this. I need your advice on a tax problem
ASAP!!! Thanks, Gene.
While dialing Gene, you wondered what his audit committee could need help with that
had such apparent importance. Military Communications Corp. had last consulted your firm
approximately one year ago concerning an inconsequential tax matter, and to your best recollection, it had filed its last annual report more than six months ago. Gene had been an audit
partner with the Big 8 firm from which your firm had been spun off and was known and
respected as a straight shooter who did not shy away from making tough calls when dealing
with clients who pushed the accounting envelope. In the last five years, Gene had semiretired
and devoted most of his time to chairing the audit committees of three public companies,
each of which was eager to have someone with Gene’s reputation, hands-on experience, and
accounting knowledge to interact with management, outside auditors, and other directors.
Gene did not waste time getting to the point after picking up the phone. “Sam, I was
wondering if you could join me for lunch today. An urgent issue has come up for Military
Communications, and I may need some tax advice on it. Can you meet me at noon at Paddy
O’Neal’s?”
After telling Gene you would be there, you ask, “Can you give me an idea what we’ll be
visiting about?”
Gene responded, “Sam, because Military Communications is in the satellite surveillance
and data encryption business, I know when not to discuss matters on the phone, and this is
one of those times. I’ll see you at noon, if that’s okay.”
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Hanging up and with your curiosity aroused, you pull up Military Communications’s last
annual report on the Internet to see if there is anything that might give you a tip-off about
what was on Gene’s mind. The business was rock solid, with customer contracts divided
up among the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, Department of Homeland Security, and
intelligence agencies that generated over $700 million in revenues last year. Revenues had
increased 18 percent on a year-over-year basis, and operating income had exceeded 8 percent of revenues in the last fiscal year. In looking over the tax provisions in the footnotes,
you notice that the federal tax provision increased sharply last year but that the effective tax
rate had decreased from the prior year due to, among other things, tax deductions related to
stock option exercises of over $25.5 million.
When you and Gene sit down for lunch later that day, you know immediately that whatever the problem is, it has to be serious. Gene looked like he had not slept in two or three
days, the dark circles under his eyes were pronounced, and his smile seemed strained. After
each of you had given the waiter your orders and he had left, Gene began to speak quickly,
the slight tremor in his voice underscoring the stress you had already seen written on his
face.
Sam, the audit engagement partner for Military Communications’s auditor, Susan
Trask, came in to meet with the audit committee about two weeks ago and
told us in executive session that she had some concerns about whether we had
looked at the grant dates of stock options to Charlie Sessions, the former CEO
who still sits on the board. We told her we had asked the general counsel to look
over the prior grant dates well before the last audit, and we reminded her we’d
even given her a written summary of his findings that went back to 2006. Her
response was something to the effect of “Not good enough,” even though it’d
been good enough six months ago, so I figured the daily barrage of bad news
about companies that’d engaged in backdating of options had increased the level
of scrutiny the auditors wanted paid to this issue. So after the meeting adjourned,
I told the general counsel to take a fresh look at the dates of all executive option
grants back to 2007, at which point the color just kind of drained out of his face.
When I asked him what was wrong, he hemmed and hawed, but eventually, he
came clean. He knew one of the largest option grants we’d made to Charlie Sessions in 2010 had been backdated, but he hadn’t mentioned it because Charlie
was still on the board, he didn’t want to rock the boat, he knew Charlie had been
responsible for a lot of the company’s success, he was sure it had happened only
once, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.

You wince, aware of the tax implications raised by this confession.
Gene paused to take a drink of water, shaking his head.
I wanted in the worst way to believe him, but something inside me just wasn’t
quite buying what he had to sell, so I asked to see the option documentation back
to 2007 for Charlie; the new CEO Lindsey Hamilton who joined us last year;
Roger McCallan, the CFO; and the general counsel himself, Phil Stevenson. I also
told Phil I wanted to see all the minutes and consents we’d signed on the com-
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pensation committee back to 2007, as well as another copy of his written report
we’d given to Susan Trask. Phil said he’d get right on it. One week later, I finally
got the documentation, and I spent the better part of the day trying to reconcile
the grant agreements, the minutes and consents, and Phil’s report. Long story short,
I couldn’t do it, at which point I went back to Phil and asked for some help in
reconciling the dates.

Gene paused again, wiping his napkin across his forehead that was now glistening
in sweat.
Phil gave it a half-hearted attempt, Sam, but he finally broke down, and when I
say broke down, I mean he actually started crying. Then, the truth came out, or at
least what might be the truth. Phil admitted he’d put down dates on the minutes
and consents that didn’t match up to when the compensation committee meetings
were held or when the option agreements were signed. Even worse, he said that
Charlie Sessions had agreed to transfer 100,000 shares of stock to Phil as a “bonus”
if Phil could find a way to “overlook” the date on which Charlie had actually
received his largest stock option grant in 2010, which was for something like 1.2
million shares.

You look at Gene, dumbfounded. “Are you saying that Charlie Sessions and Phil conspired
to conceal the backdating of the option grant in 2010 and that Phil agreed to take stock from
Charlie to do so?”
“I went back over everything, Sam, including my calendar for the past 5 years and the
calendars of the other audit committee members since 2007, and what I am saying is
exactly that. There’s nothing in writing to prove what Phil said about Charlie agreeing to
give him 100,000 shares of stock, but it’s clear he concealed in his report the backdating
of Charlie’s 2010 option grant from the compensation committee and auditors.” Gene
shook his head in disbelief. “If you’d told me something like this could happen at Military
Communications, I’d have told you that you had lost your mind. I’m still having trouble
believing it, but with what’s likely to happen now, it’s becoming a lot more believable,
let me tell you.” Gene’s face was a mixture of fear and sadness, tinged with more than a
little anger.
Reflecting silently on what you’d heard, Gene continued.
Sam, I wanted to talk to you about this because I’ve called a meeting of all the
independent directors for tomorrow morning, and I need to understand from
you the tax implications of this. To fill you in further, I went back and put
together the following schedule of option grants that were made in 2010, the
dates on the grant agreements, the prices as of those dates, my best guess about
when the options were actually granted, and the stock price on that date. You’ll
see that I think option grants to Charlie, Roger, and Phil were all backdated in
2010.

As Gene handed you a sheet of paper that contained the following table, he said, “For
obvious reasons, Sam, I can’t leave this with you, but here’s what I think we’re facing.”
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Year 2010

Option Holder

Shares Under
Option Grant

Recorded Grant
Date

Stock Price at
Recorded Grant
Date

Probable Grant
Date

Stock Price at
Probable Grant
Date

Charlie Sessions,
CEO

1,200,000
400,000

2/2/10
9/6/10

$18.50
21.75

3/22/10
11/4/10

$25.50
26.25

Roger McCallan,
CFO

400,000
200,000

2/2/10
9/6/10

18.50
21.75

3/22/10
11/4/10

25.50
26.25

Phil Stevenson,
General Counsel

125,000

2/2/10

18.50

3/22/10

25.50

Doing some quick calculations, you figure that Sessions’s options were discounted by
$10.2 million, McCallan’s options were discounted by $3.7 million, and Stevenson’s options
had been discounted by $875,000. “What were these options, Gene: ISOs or nonqualified
options?” you ask.
Gene grimaces like he has been punched. “They were ISOs, Sam. Am I right in recollecting that the tax deductions we took on those options are gone?”
You nod your head.“Yeah, under IRC Section 162(m), the company is going to lose the tax
deductions, although you may be able to mitigate some of that by amending the options and
increasing the exercise price to fair market value, unless some of these have been exercised.”
Gene replied, “Unfortunately, the options that were granted in February 2010 have been
exercised by Sessions, McCallan, and Stevenson, so those can’t be amended. The options
granted in September 2010 are all still outstanding, though, so maybe we can work quickly
to get those amended before December 31.”
You point out to Gene that the company is going to have to consider the implications of
IRC Section 409A, such as the fact that the 20 percent penalty and interest will be assessed
by the IRS with respect to those options that either can’t be amended because they’d been
exercised or have already vested.
At that, Gene gives a crooked smile.
Well, because that’s imposed on the recipients, and I’ve not got a lot of sympathy
for those guys, I can’t say that’ll break my heart, Sam. Because all I’ve been thinking
about for the last week or so is how many class action lawsuits we’re going to get
served with, how many investigations we’re in for, how many financial restatements
and amended tax returns we’re going to be preparing, and the possible indictment
of one or more of our former officers, I’m betting you can see why my empathy
is at low tide.

“Yeah, Gene, I understand. I know you didn’t sign up for this kind of brain damage when
you took on the job of chairing the audit committee, especially at a well-run company like
Military Communications.”
Gene gazes off into the distance before responding to your comment.
You know, Sam, this has really shaken me and not in a good way.You just said that
Military Communications is a well-run company, but is it? What about our com-
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petition? One of our primary competitors has already had to restate its financials
backdated options. So, are we really well-run, or have we been fooling ourselves
into thinking we are? What about our other options; if these ones were backdated, are there more? Are we going to find other financial reporting problems
that haven’t surfaced yet? I don’t know. All I do know is that I used to be so sure
about Military Communications, about it being a good company and all, and now
I’m not so sure anymore.

“How sad,” you thought to yourself, “that Gene had gotten wrapped up in this.”

Questions for Consideration
1. What are among the most significant concerns the former officers of Military Communications might have as a result of noncompliance with IRC Section 409A and the
fact they have already exercised some of the options granted in 2010?
a. The inability to amend or cancel those options.
b. The imposition of the excise tax may taint the other options or benefits the officers previously received, particularly those in 2010.
c. Failure to comply with IRC Section 162(m).
d. Failure to withhold income and FICA and FUTA taxes on the exercise date.
e. Answers (a) and (b).
f. Answers (c) and (d).
2. For options granted in 2010 but not yet exercised, which of the following steps would
Military Communications want to take in order to minimize the adverse tax consequences on it and the option recipients?
a. Cancel the option agreements, and inform the recipients of such cancellation.
b. Replace the non-FMV options with FMV options, and issue a cash payment for
the difference, with appropriate withholding being taken from the cash payment.
c. Reissue the options in the form of stock appreciation rights.
d. File an information return with the IRS describing the issues created by the nonFMV option issuances and proposing steps that Military Communications will
take to avoid IRC Section 409A issues.
3. If you were Susan Trask, what additional steps would you take in connection with
next year’s audit of the financial statements for Military Communications, given the
developments that are described in the case study?
a. I would pay special attention to whether the data on which fair value measurements were based are accurate, complete, and relevant.
b. I would carefully consider and evaluate the internal controls over the grant of
options, recording and reporting of options, and other fair value measurement data.
c. I would evaluate the extent to which option compensation comprised total executive compensation, as well as how often and to what degree the stock price rose
after significant option grants.
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d. I would be updating my evaluation of the legal, regulatory, and other contingences;
costs; and reserves that related to the prior backdating issues.
e. All of the above.
4. When you consider what Gene said to you about thinking that Military Communications was a well-run company when he joined the audit committee but now was having some doubts, which of the following rejoinders would have been most responsive
to Gene’s concerns?
a. “Gene, a lot of people do things like this, and Military Communications is no less
of a company for having backdated a few options.”
b. “Gene, you’re taking this too hard. The bottom line is that the regulators have just
carried this stuff too far, and the pendulum will swing back soon enough.”
c. “Gene, it’s unfortunate that senior executives at Military Communications and
other companies lost sight of their responsibilities to their stockholders, but by
working through this, the company can come out stronger and with a renewed
focus on maintaining best practices in business ethics.”
d. “Gene, how about if we order a few stiff drinks and see if we can forget this ever
happened?”
5. Which of the following apply when Military Communications is seeking to ascertain
the measurement date for compensation expense in 2010?
a. Delays incurred as a result of following established governance procedures to complete a grant are unimportant.
b. Required granting actions must be completed to ascertain the measurement date
accurately.
c. Grants in which the exercise price is subject to later adjustment do not interfere
with setting a measurement date.
d. If Military Communications changed the grant terms after the measurement date
because the awards were not expected to vest under the original service or performance conditions in effect on the modification date, the modification will result in
recognition of compensation cost for the fair value of the award at the modification date.
e. Answers (a) and (c).
f. Answers (b) and (d).
6. If a private company is intending to grant options to an executive officer, what does it
need to be concerned about in order to avoid the imposition of penalties under IRC
Section 409A?
7. What exemptions are available under IRC Section 162(m) to allow a company to
deduct execution compensation over $1 million paid to highly compensated executive
officers of public companies? Do these exemptions apply to backdated stock options?
8. What are some points that auditors should focus upon when considering the risk of
backdated stock options?
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Suggested Readings
The following guidance provided by the PCAOB and the SEC with respect to the auditing
and accounting implications of stock option grants and associated issues can be found at the
indicated Internet links:
• PCAOB Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 1, Matters Related to Timing and Accounting for
Option Grants—http://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/07-28-2006-APA_1.pdf
• PCAOB Staff Questions and Answers, Auditing the Fair Value of Share Options Granted
to Employees—http://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/Stock_Options.pdf
• SAB No. 114—www.sec.gov/interps/account.shtml
The complete text of relevant IRS guidance can be found at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/
n-08-115.pdf (Notice 2008-115) and www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-08-113.pdf (Notice
2008-113).
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Solutions to Questions for
Consideration
Chapter 1
1. Answer (a) is not your best choice because if, as Claudia asserted, the CEO is involved in managing earnings, your holding a meeting with him may result in your being fired immediately. Although
this could be your preferred result, this also could result in you being described as the wrongdoer
by Superlative, rather than Jaffe. In other words, if Superlative attacks your credibility, you have no
documentation with which to show that it was Jaffe, not you, who committed the fraud. Answer (c)
is incorrect because the sales documentation in the Arriba transaction was phonied up, and it is
not likely these documents will tell you who else was involved, particularly if Jaffe became adept at
covering his tracks. Answer (d) is a course of action you could seek to take at some point, but the
fact that the audit firm did not discover the alleged fraud may mean you will want to hire a new audit
firm to help in reauditing the books and doing a restatement, if required. Also, you do not know at this
point if one of the audit partners was in on the fraud with Jaffe and the CEO, so involving them prematurely could accelerate your firing and again result in you becoming the convenient fall guy. Answer
(b) is the correct choice. By pulling documentation surrounding sales and service contracts, you can
compare the purchase order terms and billed amounts for both software and services and begin to
track down discrepancies in what was supposed to be billed versus what was billed. You can also
begin to identify any patterns in billing practices that would help you identify suspect transactions
more quickly.
2. Answers (a), (d), and (e) are not your best choices for the reason that you do not yet know how far
the fraudulent scheme reaches into Superlative. Because you do not yet know if the CEO or the COO
was in on the scheme, and you do not know if the controller was working in concert with Jaffe or
simply being duped by him, bringing any of these three folks into your confidence could backfire.
Answer (b) is incorrect because, as discussed in the solution to question 1, you do not know if anyone
at the audit firm knew of, or was involved in, the scheme to inflate revenues, and you would probably
hire a new audit firm if the allegations prove out. Also, keep in mind that prematurely discussing this
with the audit firm whose personnel are innocent could place the firm in a position where it would
have to resign immediately, having become aware of illegal acts committed by Superlative, and could
result in the audit firm filing a Section 10A report with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Although this may be the end result, in any event, a premature filing could simply sow more
confusion and delay in getting to the bottom of what occurred. The correct answer is (c) because the
audit committee will be required to deal with retaining a new audit firm, authorizing an investigation,
consulting counsel, and perhaps even recommending to the board the termination of any executives
found to be involved with Jaffe.
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3. Given Jaffe’s apparent involvement in the effort to manage earnings, it is unlikely that further discussions with him would have been productive, so (b) is not your best choice. Also, to the extent the
sales staff was (or some members of the staff were) involved in the alteration of sales documents,
they are probably not the most reliable source of information, although you would not have known
this during the hiring process. However, some have argued that (c) is the best choice because a lack
of knowledge concerning revenue recognition on the part of the sales staff could be a tip-off that
revenue recognition policies aren’t widely known (and perhaps not widely followed). Answer (e) is
attractive, but a person at this level would be expected to have a good command of these policies.
Because the financial statements were apparently misstated during some period of time, a review
of the statements and schedules might have been helpful, but unless some adjusting entries caught
your attention, even this review may not have tipped you off to potential problems. Answer (a) may
arguably be the best choice because you might have been able to press the issue of revenue recognition with the audit partners or seniors and perhaps had the fortune of hearing a concern expressed
(or maybe statements about a reversal of an adjustment made by the company). Also, the conversations with the audit committee might have illuminated a revenue recognition issue or at least provided you with an opportunity to question the audit committee and compare its answers with those of
the audit partners and staff. Unfortunately, hindsight is 20/20, and even in the best case, none of these
actions might have alerted you to problems at Superlative before you joined the company.
4. As described in the answer to question 2, a discussion with the auditors may trigger an immediate Section 10A filing with the SEC and result in more confusion and finger pointing than would be
the case if you understand the magnitude of the issues. Hence, answer (a) is not the best choice,
particularly if your understanding of the CEO’s position amounts to a tacit or an implied endorsement.
Likewise, answer (b) implies that a joint appearance before the audit committee may be either an
acknowledgment that the CEO has a point or even an endorsement by you of his position. If you could
avoid that result, answer (b) might be a good way to progress, but waiting for even one day without
taking some type of action could, in hindsight, make it appear you are complicit in the wrongdoing.
Answer (c) is obviously an even greater compromise (about as compromising as possible) to your
integrity than answers (a) or (b). Not only are you overlooking the fact that the financial statements
are materially incorrect as filed, your netting of the adjustments to an amount of less than 3 percent
does not allow for accepting the status quo. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 cautions that
the practitioner cannot use materiality rules of thumb or netting of misstatements to “cure” materially
misstated financial statements. Anyone electing this course is not only compromising their integrity
but will inevitably become part of the problem rather than the solution. The correct answer is clearly
(d) (unless [b] can be accomplished on a timely basis and offer the opportunity for you to distance
yourself from what the CEO proposes). If (d) was your choice, you’re recognizing you must take
immediate steps to inform the audit committee and let the chips fall where they may. As CFO, you are
accountable to the CEO, but more importantly, you owe a duty to the audit committee and stockholders to do the right thing. By rejecting his assertions, you have made an ethical stand that needs to be
made.
5. Because you still do not know if the COO is involved in the earnings management scheme, answer (a)
is probably not the most effective thing you can do. Conferring with the audit committee is an excellent idea under these circumstances but probably after you outline for the CEO what the possible
consequences of his actions may involve. Assuming the CEO is telling you the truth, his overreaction
in deciding to immediately fire the audit firm (which, by the way, he lacks the authority to do in any
case) and Ms. West could trigger a substantial drop in Superlative’s market price (because investors
will infer the worst if the company cannot articulate the reasons for the firing, which the company
may not be able to do at this point without having all the facts) or deprive the company of a valuable
source of information (Ms. West) for the ensuing investigation. Ms. West could also contact a lawyer
and claim she was fired for blowing the whistle (through her discussion with you) and end up suing
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the company for retaliation and wrongful termination. Answer (c) is, therefore, probably the best
course of action for you to take in the near-term, although answer (b) is hardly incorrect. Answer (d)
is an invitation to cause yourself many more problems because the audit firm will want to know why
you think you can countermand the CEO. If the CEO hears this, he could also overreact and fire you.
Additionally, your call to the audit firm gives it a basis to ask you questions about why it is being fired,
who authorized the firing, and so on. Although you may know the answers to these questions, this is
not the best time for you to be sharing confidences about the financial statements with the audit firm.
Counsel would probably advise that you not contact the audit firm (regardless of whether it is fired)
until you have researched the issues and determined the truth of the allegations. If litigation is probable, you will want to remind the CEO of this fact and ask that he restrain his initial impulses until the
company has its arms around the facts.
6. Answer (a) is not the correct answer for several reasons. First, if you always take the most conservative approach, your company may end up understating revenues and, eventually, face the charge
of having set aside “cookie jar” reserves. If so, your approach may not be the most honest and
trustworthy for revenue recognition, especially if your conservatism ultimately distorts revenue. The
correct answer is (b): both the form and spirit of ethical standards are considered when dealing with
revenue recognition. This answer gives full effect to the meaning of integrity because your application of both the form and spirit of ethical standards means you will not be bound by a strict construction of the words in the revenue recognition standard. Another way to look at this is that an honest
and a trustworthy approach to revenue recognition inevitably means you will consider the spirit
of revenue recognition and ethical standards, not just their form. Answer (c) does not necessarily
follow because independence in and of itself does not mean you can (or will) make an honest and a
trustworthy assessment of revenue recognition. Furthermore, the term independence could be read
as a reference to an outside audit firm that is not responsible for determining a company’s revenue
recognition practices. Finally, answer (d) is incorrect because, contrary to this statement, the SEC
explicitly stated that more disclosure is not necessarily better when dealing with critical accounting and disclosure issues. Because overdisclosure can obscure information about material trends,
events, or uncertainties, a company that overdiscloses can unwittingly or intentionally bury important
information about revenue recognition that is meaningful to investors.
7. An officer of a public company may be subject to all the penalties previously described, meaning
answer (d) is the correct answer. The range of penalties to which an officer may be subject will
depend on the facts and circumstances of the overstatement; the officer’s rank (for example, CFO,
controller, or other financial manager); individual culpability; and the degree to which investors or
outside stakeholders are injured by the conduct in question. Because the question asks what individual penalties you might be subject to, it is appropriate to select answer (d).
8. Given the fact that the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA Code) and the state code will
contain rules and regulations pertaining to integrity and ethics rulings related to integrity issues, the
correct answer is (d). Answer (b) is incorrect, making answer (e) also incorrect, because the code of
conduct of your company’s largest competitor may or may not have information about integrity, and if
so, that code of conduct may not resemble your company’s code of conduct. Your answer would be
different if the question asked what resources you would want to consult if you were putting together
a new code of conduct for your company, in which case an examination of competitors’ codes of
conduct might be very relevant.
9. The correct answer is (c). Each of answers (a), (b), and (d) is enough at variance with the language of
SAB No. 104 that a close reading will cause you to eliminate these responses. In answer (a), the test
of more likely than not is not as strong as the actual language of SAB No. 104 that calls for reasonable assurance that the receivable will be collected. Answer (b) is consistent with SAB No. 104 in
calling for shipment, but the customer is required to take ownership and assume the risk of loss in
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order to meet the relevant criterion under SAB No. 104. Therefore, the fact that the customer is about
to assume risk of loss is not enough to permit revenue recognition. Answer (d) is similarly close, but
not enough, to permit revenue recognition because the selling price must be fixed or determinable
rather than reasonably estimable. Answer (e) cannot be the right answer due to answers (a), (b), and
(d) being incorrect.
10. The correct answer is (d), meaning that both answers (a) and (c) are factors you would consider as
increasing the likelihood that the company might be inclined to overstate revenues. Under answer
(a), the short-term pattern of earnings shortfalls means the company may have some bias toward
trying to repair its image with analysts in the short term by meeting the current quarter estimates.
Answer (c) is likewise correct because putting the company’s securities on a credit watch may place
significant pressure on management to try to enhance earnings and avoid a downgrade, which would
increase the company’s borrowing costs. Answer (b) is incorrect because a period of declining interest rates would presumably decrease borrowing costs.
11. The case study does not give you much data about what internal controls were in place before you
came on board, so you could say that answering this question is difficult, if not impossible. However,
keep in mind the data cited in the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997—An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies that stated
that over 83 percent of the instances of fraudulent financial statement reporting involved the CEO
and the CFO. Looking at this issue from that point of view, you can argue that adding more internal
controls would have been an exercise in futility because the CEO’s and CFO’s knowledge of those
controls could give them the ability to circumvent them. This goes back, to some degree, to the fact
that integrity in an organization must come from the top down. A corporate culture that encourages
cutting corners or emphasizes making the numbers no matter the consequences will eventually invite
officers or other employees to do what they have to do. On the other hand, a corporate culture with
integrity and a focus on doing things the right way will encourage realistic reporting and honest dialogue with employees, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders. If you are a financial manager
or an accountant, you should remember that others will look to you to set an example of what the
culture should be.
12. Unfortunately, you do not appear to have done so. Knowing misrepresentation of facts should (and
would in most people’s minds) include not passing along material information you possess. As the
quote from Ms. O’Connor states, integrity lies also in what you are not able to do (that is, in this
instance, not walking away from what you know to be wrong). Another way to analyze this situation
is to keep in mind the definition of materiality. As the SEC stated in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99,
“The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light of surrounding
circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable
person relying upon the report would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction
of the item.”
Looking at the facts through the lens of materiality, there is no doubt that what you learned was
material information that any investor would want to know. Moreover, by walking away with this
knowledge, you have deprived the company of the opportunity to correct its past misdeeds and set
itself out on the right path. Arguably, you have subordinated your judgment to others with a lesser
moral standing but have, in effect, lowered yourself to their level by being complicit by your silence.
Judged by the Florida ethical rule, you have not upheld your professional duty to practice with integrity and objectivity.
13. Although there is no one or right answer to this question, discussions among class participants
should suggest some or all of the following:
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a.

Develop an attack plan to identify all instances of premature or improper revenue recognition.

b.

Undertake efforts to identify all participants in the scheme both within and outside Superlative.

c.

Have the audit committee retain counsel, who, in turn, will retain a forensic firm to conduct
an internal investigation and assist in identifying transactions and players.

d.

Until the CEO is cleared (if in fact he is) of the allegations, place him on paid leave.

e.

Have the board determine what action to take regarding firing employees or the audit firm.

f.

If a change in audit firms is expected, the audit committee should begin the process of
interviewing prospective successor audit firms (the successor firm will need to consider the
factors in AICPA Practice Alert 2002-3, Reauditing Financial Statements).

g.

The forensic firm’s results should be discussed at the board level so that the board can
determine if a restatement is necessary.

h.

The board and counsel should discuss whether the company wants to voluntarily bring the
fraudulent accounting to the attention of the SEC and volunteer to share the independent
counsel’s report, thus hopefully earning the company some leniency under Section 21A of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).

i.

You and the (new) audit firm need to determine if the company’s restatement will cause
the company to fall below the maintenance standards of NASDAQ or the New York Stock
Exchange and to prepare to respond to any notice of pending delisting until the restated
financial statements can be filed.

j.

The board and counsel will need to determine what action the company will take against
ex-employees, the predecessor audit firm, and any other culpable parties.

k.

The board will need to notify its insurance carrier of possible claims against the company;
the board; and, perhaps, present or ex-officers.

l.

Attempt to trace Jaffe, and help the authorities bring him to justice.

Chapter 2
1. Knowing in advance that you may face some tough questions from the chairman or others at the firm
who might view your challenging Arnie as being motivated by your removal as the review partner,
you must have your ducks in a row. For this reason, answer (d) is correct because it is imperative for
you to marshal all available information to show the partners you talk to that you are not overreacting
or taking this personally. The Traylor memo by itself does not show that the current year’s accounting
is in error, which is why you must have the credit report and the current year’s schedule of reserves.
Using these documents to help the partners understand that what began in the prior year has now
only gotten worse (that is, more pronounced) is critical to your ability to demonstrate that Pointer has
overstated reserves and that this is a continuing problem, not a one-time event.
2. Answer (a) is not an adequate basis for questioning his objectivity and is too simplistic. Answer (b)
is good evidence of the fact that Arnie was on notice of the reserve issues but does not say that
Arnie was necessarily lacking in objectivity. This answer may, however, be the right one if compelling
evidence means in writing. Answer (c) is the best answer if your audience is willing to take your oral
statements as compelling evidence because Arnie’s reaction seems to imply that Traylor had no rea-
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son to be uncomfortable. The very existence of the memo is reason enough for an outside observer
to believe that Traylor had reason to be uncomfortable; otherwise, he would not have written it. Arnie
also asks where you got the memo, which at least implies the possibility that he thought the memo
was no longer in existence. Finally, Arnie says that Rider went over this with Traylor, not that he
(Arnie) had done so. Given the memo’s subject matter, wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that Arnie
would have gone over this with Traylor rather than having the engagement quality review partner do
so? Answer (d) is perhaps additional evidence of Arnie’s lack of objectivity, but your reliance on this
fact could be interpreted by others at the firm as sour grapes from you due to your removal. This is
not compelling enough evidence without your having more to back up your position that Arnie has
gotten too close to this client.
3. This question is really directed at one of the most difficult decisions you (and whomever you have
enlisted to help you—in this scenario, the vice chairwoman) must face. You first need to think about
whose interest you are charged with protecting. If you were to choose answer (a), you face the difficulty of what to do in the event you cannot convince MW&E’s chairman there is a problem. Even if
you succeed in that effort, this does not necessarily result in the problem being addressed in a way
that protects the interests of the client and public investors. Answer (b) is justifiable but might be
compared to using a bazooka to kill a fly (or perhaps a small animal). In other words, there may be
a basis for arriving at this result, but doing so this early in the process may be more injurious to the
interests of the client and public than a more judicious approach.
This leaves you with the choice of answers (c) or (d). Although either answer is acceptable, a
meeting with the audit committee chairman may not be as effective as conferring with the CEO of
Pointer first. Why? If you meet with the audit committee chairman, and then, he informs the CEO,
the CEO may ask why you did not inform him first. This is a legitimate question because if Arnie and
Voss were engaged in wrongdoing together, it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion the CEO was
involved. If not, the CEO would probably prefer to deal with the management integrity issue by firing
Voss himself. If the CEO was involved, any hesitation in taking action against Voss could provide the
audit committee chairman with the impetus to act. Furthermore, if the CEO was involved but fires
Voss anyway in the hopes that Voss becomes the scapegoat, the inevitable internal investigation that
will follow should provide the audit committee with a basis for deciding if further housecleaning is in
order. Your answer would obviously be different if there was any evidence the CEO was privy to the
questionable dealings.
4. Again, like the last question, this question can be answered using several of the alternatives
presented, but it asks you to select the best solution. Answer (a) is the correct answer in that a
complete analysis will result in you developing information concerning the revenues derived from
hardware sales, rates of return, distributor sales, distributor returns, and whether the reserves meet
the accrual criteria of FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 450, Contingencies. Although
the case study provides you with rates of growth and the aggregate size of the reserves, you do not
yet know the total revenues from hardware sales or each distributor. Once you finish a complete
analysis, you would also have this information at your fingertips and be able to determine if Pointer
has established excess reserves. By focusing on producing a complete analysis of the reserves, you
are really able to encompass the actions described in answers (b) and (c), but taking either of these
actions alone is probably not enough. For example, answer (b) does address the hardware reserves
but does not get at the issue of whether the reserves set up for receivables from the two distributors
(and the new distributor) are excess and, therefore, should be released into earnings now. Answer
(c) might likewise be something you are eventually called upon to do, but the historical nature of that
exercise is not going to help you get at today’s issue of whether Arnie has lost his objectivity. The
better answer is to examine today’s reserves, and use Traylor’s memo to demonstrate that Arnie was
all too aware of the issue when he initiated this year’s audit.
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Answer (d) is something of a jump ahead of the facts as you now know them (that is, it may appear
that Voss and Arnie were both involved in an effort to manage earnings using the reserves, but if anything, it looks like earnings might have been understated rather than overstated). You may well end
up showing that earnings management was the end result of their actions, but you do not yet have
enough information about what their motivation might have been to do so. If further investigation
indicated the hardware returns were understated, and the reserves from Australia and New Zealand
were overstated, you could end up concluding that Voss was trying to cover up the hardware situation by over-reserving elsewhere. However, at this point, further work is necessary before you will be
able to decide if earnings management was their objective, albeit this would be a natural conclusion.
Because of the explosive nature of such an allegation, you would be wise to undertake a full forensic
review of the reserves and hardware returns before making such an assertion.
5. This question asks you to assume that you determined a significant engagement deficiency existed
and asks you to consider the conclusion you might have reached. If there was a significant engagement deficiency, then, clearly, answer (a) would not be the best choice because it is likely (if not a
certainty) that one or more Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) standards may not
have been complied with. Likewise, answer (b) is unlikely to be the case given the assumption of a
significant engagement deficiency. Answer (d) is similar to answers (a) and (b), so the only remaining
choice—answer (c)—is the only logical choice that supports the existence of a significant engagement deficiency. Thus, answer (c) is correct.
6. Answer (a) is incorrect because disclosing the existence of a misstated reserve does not “cure” the
misstatement. Answer (b) would be a proper course of action but misses the point of the question,
which is that nearly all the reserves were overstated. Answer (d) is obviously a possible end result,
but the decision of reversing the reserves still has to be discussed with Pointer, and it must concur
in the treatment of the reserves. Answer (c) is correct because the pervasiveness of the misstatements seem to call into question whether Pointer’s internal controls are deficient. If so, the content of
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 112, Communicating Internal Control Related Matters Identified
in an Audit and AU section 380, The Auditor’s Communication With Those Charged With Governance
(AICPA, Professional Standards), require you to consider communicating a possible bias to the audit
committee and to communicate any significant internal control deficiencies, as would the reproposed
PCAOB audit standard Communications with Audit Committees.
7. This question involves the application of some subjective judgments, particularly because Pointer
and MW&E may not yet have all the information needed to issue a revised earnings announcement. If your firm is not yet in a position to tell Pointer the exact effect on earnings as a result of the
reversal of the reserves, Pointer’s issuance of a press release that says Pointer will be revising its
earnings upward could be an invitation to speculation in Pointer’s stock. Additionally, if Voss’s firing is
announced at the same time, Pointer could invite speculation that its books are open to question. This
is not a simple question, however, because Pointer’s failure to promptly announce this information
could later be called into question by regulatory authorities who conclude that Pointer knew some
upward adjustment in earnings would be made. If material (and the facts seem to support materiality), it may be that Pointer has no choice but to proceed with some type of announcement.
The ideal situation would allow you and your partners sufficient time to calculate and work with
Pointer to come up with the proper adjustment to reserves so that the first announcement could be
the definitive announcement of final, audited numbers for the year. Regretfully, this could expose
Pointer and MW&E to further questioning in the event that hasty work results in an adjustment that
is later revised. Rather than risk such a result, this situation is probably best handled with some type
of interim announcement that indicates year-end earnings will likely come in slightly higher than
previously reported. This will provide your firm and Pointer with a chance to conduct a comprehen-
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sive evaluation of the reserves without additional time pressure and give the market what material
information Pointer now knows.
The release of excess reserves will need to be discussed in management’s discussion and analysis
(MD&A) of Pointer’s annual report on Form 10-K, and the alteration of the existing reserves will need
to be discussed in the financial statement footnotes. The disclosure could also be made under item 9
of Form 8-K (Regulation FD disclosure) and by attaching the press release as an exhibit to Form 8-K.
If Pointer elected to go this route, however, the MD&A and financial statement footnote disclosure
would still be sufficiently material so as to merit inclusion in Form 10-K in order for the reader to be
able to fully appreciate the impact of the release of reserves on full year earnings.
8. Among other factors, you should begin with an analysis of whether the misstatements have the effect
of masking a trend in returns of the fiber optic cameras or, perhaps, in historical or current collection
of receivables. Ironically, due to Pointer’s excellent financial performance, it is highly unlikely the
misstatement changed a loss into a profit or had a material effect on segment information. Likewise,
unless the reserve numbers are grossly in error, it is unlikely the misstatement would affect Pointer’s
compliance with loan covenants, contracts, or regulatory compliance. With respect to management
compensation, it is not likely that management’s current compensation was impacted favorably (and
materially) by the misstatement, but if the misstatement resulted in deferral of income into future
periods when performance might not be as good, it is possible management could then benefit from
the taking of reserves into income.
The circumstances surrounding the misstatement imply that fraud or illegal acts may have been
involved. The financial statement element affected by the misstatement (reserves) also appears to
involve recurring events rather than a one-time event. Although Pointer exceeded earnings expectations before the reserve treatment was reversed, it is not yet clear if the change in earnings will be
significant to public company investors. The misstatement of reserves involved amounts that were
objectively determinable to a great degree rather than subject to inherent uncertainty. Although
Pointer may have reasonably concluded that some reserves were appropriate, it is clear from the
case study that the reserved amounts had very little relation to the facts and circumstances that
pertained to the reserved amounts. Rather, it appears the excessive reserves were pervasive and
reflected a bias of Voss and, perhaps, others. If the excessive reserves pertaining to Australia and
New Zealand were used to net out the hardware returns that Pointer was experiencing, this too
would be a very relevant consideration. Finally, it is possible the misstatement, if continued, would
build over time and have a cumulative effect that would perpetuate the misstatements of Pointer’s
financial results and condition. It is unlikely that the cost of correcting the misstatement would not
have been cost beneficial.
The foregoing factors are set forth in, among other places SAB No. 99.
9. The Professional and Occupational Standards of the state of Louisiana do not say that a lack of
objectivity is defined as placing the member’s own financial interests or those of a third party ahead
of the client or public. Rather, it states that the member shall be objective and then goes on to discuss
ways in which a lack of objectivity may be determined. The MW&E partners might find Arnie’s argument to be somewhat novel but not very persuasive. Remember that the public has a right to expect
Arnie to be objective and that protecting the public from future declines in earnings or collections is
not the job or professional obligation of the member. Although Arnie may not have placed his financial interests above those of Pointer or the public, he is obliged to be objective in this context, and
the public has a right to expect this objectivity. By not being so, Arnie is contributing to the creation
and continuation of misstatements within Pointer’s financial statements that will almost inevitably be
discovered, as they were in the case study.
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Section 1100.4500B, “Integrity and Objectivity; Conflict of Interest,” of chapter 1100, “Board of
Accountancy Licensing and Practice,” of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct is more
definitive in that it states the member will be considered to have knowingly misrepresented facts
if he or she “permits or directs another to make false and misleading entries in an entity’s financial
statements.” This language does not tie a knowing misrepresentation to a lack of objectivity, but it is
difficult to imagine how one could knowingly misrepresent a material fact without having lost (or not
had) objectivity. In terms of the partners’ deliberations, the application of Section 1100.4500B seems
to provide a solid foundation for the firm taking whatever action it deems appropriate against Arnie.
Although Arnie may not have directed Traylor or others to make false or misleading entries, he apparently permitted the entries to be made, even after he became aware of Traylor’s memo. This should
not be read as implying that Arnie has a better chance of demonstrating objectivity in Louisiana,
though, because MW&E will have a reasonable basis for concluding that Arnie failed to meet his
professional obligations.

Chapter 3
1. This question calls for you to consider a real hair-splitting issue: whether your guess of OGAnalyx’s
sale price is enough to impair independence. Assuming the wording you used was a guess about a
potential sale price, and you did not advise Lancet to accept or reject that guess or otherwise advise
him about the transaction price, it is more likely that answers (b), (c), or (d) are correct, rather than
answer (a). Of course, picking either answer (a) or (d) is the easy and conservative course of action
but may result in the firm losing an audit client due to the independence impairment if the sale does
not occur.
Answer (c) is obviously flawed because whether the advice was rendered orally or in writing is
not dispositive of whether an independence impairment has been created. Answer (b) is, at least in
the author’s view, an acceptable and a defensible answer. Although hair splitting, the use of the term
guess, the lack of advice about whether to enter into the transaction at that price, the fact that you
told Lancet that you would attend solely in an advisory capacity, and the lack of any other indications
that would weigh in favor of an impairment conclusion work in your favor if you selected this answer.
To be fair, it is difficult to say answer (d) is wrong, however. If Lancet’s notes also made reference
to your conversation the previous day or if his notes had “BAN&K’s recommendation” next to them,
the conclusion that an independence impairment exists becomes much easier. As noted in the case
study, making a conscious choice of your firm’s role is often the better result than leaving you and
your firm open to an impairment charge.
2. Answers (a) and (c) are incorrect for several reasons. First, whether the promise of the additional fee
is coming from the client or a third party, such as the client’s principal stockholder, the fee is clearly
tied to Lancet receiving a purchase price over and above the $38 million threshold. The fee payable to
BAN&K is, therefore, clearly contingent on a specific result that meets the definition of a contingent
fee. Furthermore, both of these answers are flawed because of the ostensible reliance on the client’s
description of the fee as value added, as opposed to the facts that have been given. However the
client may want to define a fee, it is incumbent on the audit firm (and its advisory affiliate) to evaluate
and determine the true nature of the fee.
Answer (b) poses an interesting debating point, but choosing that answer is favoring form over
substance. Although the oral promise to pay a fee of some indeterminate amount may in fact not be
legally enforceable, that overly technical response does not address the fundamental problem that
has been created by Lancet’s statement. That problem is one that still ties the payment to BAN&K to
achievement of some purchase price over and above the threshold of $38 million. Legal enforceability
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or the lack of enforceability does not help BAN&K change the contingent nature of Lancet’s proposal.
Therefore, answer (d) is correct. This is a prohibited contingent fee arrangement based on the fee
being contingent on a specific purchase price and payable as a percentage of the purchase price
obtained.
3. The proper answer to this question lies in first concluding that Lancet has obviously arrived at the
fee amount by applying his 3 percent formula to the purchase price over $38 million; therefore, you
know that BAN&K has a problem. Answer (b) is an attractive choice on its face, but it requires you to
ignore the ethics of what is right in this situation. Likewise, answer (c) is morally and ethically wrong
because changing the description of the fee ignores both the reality of what the fee is being paid for
and that you know the fee has been calculated on a percentage basis.
Answer (d) is not so obviously wrong on its face, but careful analysis will reveal this answer is
flawed, as well. Among other issues created by this answer, Lancet has been given the fee figure by
BAN&K, thus suggesting that Lancet did not determine the value-added fee in his sole discretion.
Furthermore, the fact that Lancet appears to have applied his 3 percent formula prior to its suggested
modification implies there was a preexisting arrangement, as opposed to the fee being determined
at the end of the engagement. An after-the-fact modification of a prohibited contingent fee arrangement does not alter its original character nor does it leave BAN&K in a defensible position if it is
later determined that a partner of BAN&K was the one who suggested the fee modification. Answer
(a) is the correct answer to this question. Although a difficult result to accept financially, it would
seem reasonable that BAN&K could inform Lancet (again) of the circumstances under which a
value-added fee could be paid. If the firm did nothing more than this, perhaps Lancet would be able
to arrive at a value-added fee (on his own and without formulas or results tied in any way to the purchase price) that BAN&K could accept. However, given the scrutiny such a fee would receive, it is
not inconceivable for BAN&K to refuse the fee altogether as one way of avoiding the questions that
would surround this arrangement. In other words, Lancet’s actions and words may have so “poisoned
the waters” that the firm would decide it was better off forgoing any additional fee.
4. This question requires you to consider the interaction of the state accountancy rules with the
independence rules and, to some degree, to evaluate how you would feel about relying on the
independence rules to justify ignoring or even fighting a complaint concerning violation of the state
accountancy rules. Absent information about how the state accountancy rule in question has been
applied or interpreted in similar instances, it is possible to answer this question by selecting answer
(b), the more risky course, or answer (c), the more conservative course. Accepting that the services
to be rendered are purely advisory in nature and that there is no contingent fee arrangement, you can
certainly argue that no conflict of interest is created that would prevent BAN&K from rendering advisory services while providing attest services. The more conservative answer would be (c) because it
requires you to assume that the concurrent advisory services would create a conflict that cannot be
waived while the audit is ongoing. If there is a reason for this answer to prevail, it is the wording that
indicates the advisory services are going to be provided while the audit was being conducted.
Answer (a) is incorrect because it reaches an answer based on an assumption that may or may
not be true (that the audit will be completed before the sale transaction) and that exalts technical
compliance over common sense. To say the services are not being rendered concurrently is a very
narrow and erroneous view that would be difficult, if not impossible, to justify to an outside observer.
Knowing the likely timeline for these services to be rendered, it is hard to say they would not be performed concurrently. Likewise, answer (d) reaches an acceptable result but one based on dubious
reasoning. Maximizing the sale price is language that, on its face, would seem to create a conflict
with the role of the independent accountant in providing attest services and further implies the
accountant is somehow advocating for the client. Although this answer is not wrong on its face, it is
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important to realize that if these words were used by an outsider to describe what BAN&K had done,
questions about the firm’s independence would certainly be created.
5. The correct answer is (b). Again, this question asks the reader to focus on the state rule, but the
independence rules cannot be ignored when evaluating this question. Keeping in mind that OGAnalyx
is an attest client of the firm, Rule 401.02 of subchapter E, “Rules of Professional Conduct,” of the
Idaho Accountancy Rules would, on its face, seem to conflict with the independence rule. However,
the Rule 401.02 was clearly implemented to address situations that do not involve attest clients, or the
rule would be void on its face and would create an untenable conflict with the independence rules.
The bottom line is that when you are cited state rules as justification or a basis for a certain course
of action, remember that the AICPA Code, the independence rules, and other professional and ethical
considerations cannot be ignored.
6. Answer (b) is correct because BAN&K could not accept a contingent fee under these circumstances.
In fact, were BAN&K a registered independent accounting firm, it is unlikely that Advisory Services
could have ever accepted a contingent fee. For example, in the enforcement action In re PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, & PricewaterhouseCoopers Securities LLC, available at www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/34-46216.htm, PricewaterhouseCoopers and the affiliate under its control were found to have
violated the SEC’s requirements because the affiliate performed investment banking services for the
firm’s audit clients for contingent fees. Answer (a) is incorrect because BAN&K would be prohibited
from accepting a contingent fee under any circumstances as a registered public accounting firm
(except in the narrowly construed exceptions applicable to substantive tax issues or amended return
positions).
7. Although this question asks you to apply the criteria in Interpretation No. 101-18, “Application of the
Independence Rules to Affiliates,” under Rule 101 (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 101 par. .20),
to a situation not involving an accounting firm, the application of Interpretation No. 101-18’s criteria
to determine whether a third party is an affiliate is fairly straightforward. Thus, you would begin your
analysis by referring to the interpretation and the related provisions of FASB ASC 810, Consolidation, in
order to determine if OGAnalyx had control or the ability to exercise control of the drilling contractor.
Answer (a) is incorrect because a contractual right to appoint a majority of the board of directors of
the contractor is the ability to exercise control. Answer (b) is also incorrect because if both OGAnalyx
and the drilling contractor are controlled by Lancet, you have each entity under common control and a
sister entity situation that would cause you to conclude the drilling contractor is an affiliate of OGAnalyx. Answer (d) is incorrect because the drilling contractor’s dependence on, and multiple transactions
with, OGAnalyx are indicative of significant influence or the outright ability to exercise control. It is
tempting to conclude that answer (c) is incorrect (given the 16 percent interest held by OGAnalyx), but
this is the correct answer because the remaining stock, as stated in answer (c), is held by one other
company. The ownership of 84 percent of the drilling contractor’s stock by another company means
that OGAnalyx cannot control the drilling contractor unless other factors are present.
8. This question again focuses on the issues surrounding the management of a difficult client who does
not, and may not ever, appreciate the issues you face as an independent public accountant. The
SEC’s independence announcements and the professional standards are clear that promoting a client
to prospective buyers will impair independence. As the Supreme Court said in The United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984), “If investors were to view the auditor as an advocate for the
corporate client, the value of the audit function itself might well be lost.”
In adding another point of view on this subject, Senator Sarbanes said in his floor statement on
July 25, 2002, “A public company auditor should not be a promoter of the company’s stock or other
financial interest …. To do so places the auditor in a position of serving as an advocate for his or her
audit client.”
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Even though Lancet suggested use of the no-name approach to allow BAN&K (or its advisory affiliate) to contact prospective buyers, this fact does not change the underlying, irreconcilable conflict
that would be created by BAN&K (or its advisory affiliate) sending the correspondence that solicits
potential buyers. Again, recall that what is prohibited to BAN&K is also prohibited to its affiliate, at
least in respect of independence issues or concerns. As such, BAN&K or its affiliate could only do so
if it was not providing or intending to provide attest services.
The follow-up question about whether the result would change if OGAnalyx was named in the
correspondence is something of a red herring. If the answer is that BAN&K’s independence was
impaired by sending a no-name solicitation, it should be readily apparent that the inclusion of OGAnalyx’s name in the letter only makes a bad situation worse.
The last question is similarly a red herring because the method of compensation is not determinative of whether the services to be rendered would impair independence. Rather, by focusing on the
nature of the services to be rendered, you know that BAN&K would impair its independence by sending the solicitation, regardless of how it was paid. (Of course, the receipt of a contingent fee would
only make matters worse for the firm if it continued to provide attest services.)
9. The following are key points you would want to convey to Lancet:
a.

The bonus would be best described by him as a value-added fee, and its substance would
be consistent with that description.

b.

The value-added fee would be determined by him in his sole discretion.

c.

The value-added fee could not be agreed to in writing or orally.

d.

The value-added fee would have to be determined by him at the end of the engagement.

e.

The value-added fee could not be calculated as a percentage of the transaction value or in
any other manner that reflected the purchase price paid for OGAnalyx.

10. In no particular order, here are some thoughts on this subject:
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a.

Contingent compensation creates a financial self-interest that could threaten objectivity.

b.

Contingent compensation motivates the auditor to focus on nonaudit services rather than
audit services.

c.

The perception (or reality) of auditors compromising accounting or auditing judgments in
order to retain or obtain nonaudit service fees.

d.

Objectivity in fact and appearance is impossible to maintain given contingent fee arrangements.

e.

Compensation paid or earned for nonaudit services provided to an audit client compromises
independence, even more so if paid on contingency.

f.

Auditor independence is critical to maintaining confidence in the attest function.

g.

High-quality audits depend on objectivity, professional skepticism, and unbiased judgments
by the auditor that are inconsistent with contingent fees.

h.

Economic incentives, such as contingent fees, can transform the auditor into an advocate
for the client, which is not the defined role for auditors.

i.

Having a stake in the outcome of the sale of OGAnalyx places BAN&K in conflict with the
objectivity required of an auditor and identifies BAN&K too closely with OGAnalyx, which
adversely affects the confidence of a potential purchaser in the audited statements.
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Chapter 4
1. As a matter of forensic practice and particularly when assertions are being made that reflect upon
an audit firm, this situation cries out for more investigation. Each of the possible answers may provide
some further indication of the extent to which JNP’s audit team knew of improper practices or should
have reacted to red flags that were somewhat or readily apparent. For these reasons, answer (e) is
correct. Answer (a) has the potential to illuminate further the relationship of the former CFO to JNP’s
personnel, including how his prior employment at JNP could bear on these issues. This interview also
may provide some indication about whether the CFO can confirm that the JNP personnel knew what
was going on inside the company. Keep in mind that the former CFO may be concerned about his own
liability and may prove a willing source of information about what JNP knew. Answer (b) is also correct because the recording of this information in different accounts may increase the likelihood that
the auditors should have come across the information in the course of the audit. Answers (c) and (d)
are also correct and are designed to get at the issue of materiality (that is, were the amounts involved
so material to be red flags for an audit team)? Answer (d) also gets at another issue present in this
case study: without significant additional investigation, you may not uncover other misappropriations
by Fulton and Chase. As a forensic investigator, you would be obligated to pursue a more comprehensive examination of accounts payable, vendor payments, and marketing expenses given the knowledge you already have at hand about abuse of company assets.
2. This question asks you to consider two related issues: materiality and the characterization of the
amounts paid on behalf of Fulton and Chase. Answer (a) is not the best choice because you are raising an issue you have conceded (in the answer) is immaterial. When examining this issue through the
lens of SAB No.99, it is hard to say this is immaterial, given the fact it appears that Mediageni’s financial statements intentionally misstated the nature of the expenditure. Answer (c) likewise requires
you to conclude the issue is either immaterial or was properly included in income by Fulton and
Chase, which presupposes facts that are not in the case study. Answer (d) could allow Melinda to
raise the issue and ignore JNP’s materiality argument but has the potential to distort the conclusions
of the report and may open an avenue for Fulton and Chase to question the report’s fairness. In other
words, if the report seems to be stretching the facts to fit a certain conclusion, it may appear to the
board that the report is biased. The best answer is (b) because by stating the facts and indicating the
amount was intentionally misstated, the materiality argument is defeated. (Note: Fulton and Chase
have not argued they were unaware of how Mediageni recorded the $4,000; if they made this claim, it
could facilitate an argument about whether there was an intentional misstatement. That claim would
be weakened, however, by the fact that Fulton and Chase undoubtedly signed the management letter
and are charged with knowledge of the recording of expenditures in accordance with Mediageni’s
accounting policies and procedures.) Because you do not have the Form W-2 information at this point
in the investigation, this answer also allows you to address Fulton’s and Chase’s position in the report
without assuming facts that are not yet known.
3. This question asks you to consider the facts of the case study when making a decision about what
points you want to stress in the code of ethics. Although all the answers are points you would want
in a code of ethics, you have to remember that Mediageni is not yet public and is not yet filing reports
with the SEC under the 1934 Act. For these reasons, answers (a) and (c) are not necessarily the best
answers, especially given the facts in the case study that revolve around related-party transactions
and an apparent lack of internal reporting systems or accountability. The best choice, given the facts
of the case study, is answer (e) because this answer focuses the code of ethics on establishing
proper ethical standards, as well as monitoring and reporting systems that are designed to reinforce
these standards. Although answer (f) is not quite as good an answer, the reader who is inclined to
anticipate future events will want to have ethical standards in place for postpublic reporting and
compliance with laws. To the extent that Mediageni is already subject to governmental regulations
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other than the 1934 Act, answer (c) must be considered; however, because the question is asking you
to determine which factors you would stress in the code of ethics based on the case study, you must
keep those facts uppermost in your mind.
4. This question is susceptible to different responses and really requires the reader to make a subjective judgment about how he or she would respond in similar circumstances. That said, here are a few
points that should be considered when evaluating your answer and the possible responses. Answer
(a) is technically correct but, to some degree, elevates form over substance. Because issues of this
nature would eventually reach the board in any event, this answer may not be your best. Answer (b)
is correct, also; the question is, Did Steele have enough of the facts at that point to go to the audit
committee or board? One way to look at this is to say he had enough on Fulton to go to the audit
committee or board. If you assume Chase would or could have reacted to this by somehow covering his tracks or attempting to undermine Steele or have him fired, you likely would not have chosen
this answer. This gives you a sense of how answer (c) may be the best answer because it takes into
account the probable response that Chase and Fulton will make when presented with evidence of
their wrongdoing. By waiting until he had more of the facts in hand, Steele may have made the best
choice, and for that matter, he obviously strengthened his position. Again, as a relatively new CFO
asserting claims against one or more of the founders that could cost them their jobs, you can assume
the more evidence Steele has, the better. Answer (d) takes that position to its illogical conclusion
(that is, Steele holds the information even after uncovering enough information to raise serious
management integrity issues in the hopes that he finds more). The case study facts arguably indicate
that Steele had enough information at hand to go to the board when he did. Although caution is an
appropriate watchword in this situation, undue caution in addressing these issues to the board could
actually cause the company greater harm. The bottom line is that this situation requires a subjective
judgment that is difficult to second-guess under these facts. If anything, this emphasizes the need for
a code of ethics, a reporting mechanism, and accountability to identify and address these types of
issues before they reach this point.
5. The facts of the case study clearly raise the greatest concern about the issues covered in answers
(b) and (d), meaning the correct answer is (f). Although not discounting the failure to obtain sufficient
evidence to support the audit opinion, the facts of the case study do not really raise material independence issues. Clearly, if the controller is to be believed, the audit team failed to respond adequately
to red flags and failed to exercise professional skepticism about the related-party transactions that
appeared to permeate the corporate culture at Mediageni.
6. The correct answer is (d) because it was abundantly clear the SEC chose to pursue the case against
the members of the audit committee in view of their longstanding and repeated failure to respond to
red flags. Answer (a) states an important reason why the audit committee should have discovered
the fraud earlier, as does answer (b). The problem for both answers (a) and (b) is that each describes
a fact that should have resulted in earlier discovery of the fraud, but in reality, the audit committee’s
failure to respond to the red flags is what enabled the fraud to become so large and extend for so
long. Answer (c) is incorrect because the simultaneous hiring of two audit firms was just one aspect
of the conduct in which the audit committee engaged. When faced with multiple material weakness
letters, multiple changes in independent auditors, continuing related-party transactions, and a domineering CEO (the initials “DHB” in the company’s name are those of David H. Brooks), the failures of
the audit committee members do come back, in the words of the SEC, to “willful blindness.”
7. The statement Laura made is technically correct in that Mediageni is not public, and there is no
requirement that a restatement or withdrawn opinion be communicated to any regulatory authority
if the company is not publicly reporting. However, there could be circumstances in which Mediageni
would be subject to other reporting requirements, such as those imposed by a senior lender, a subordinated lender, or perhaps the Federal Trade Commission or a state regulatory authority if Mediageni
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were in the business of offering and selling franchises. The fact that JNP’s engagement letter called
for JNP to audit the financial statements in accordance with Regulation S-X does not impose a
reporting requirement on Mediageni or JNP that is otherwise absent.
This series of questions requires you to first analyze what Fulton and Chase did. If what was done
is properly characterized as fraud that was undisclosed at the time the private placements were sold,
it would appear that Mediageni either has to offer the investors rescission or disclose the existence
of rescission liability in the financial statement footnotes and on the face of the balance sheet. (The
stock sold in the placements would be reclassified above the stockholders’ equity section as “Common Stock Subject to Rescission” or substantially similar language.) If you concluded that what
Fulton and Chase had done was merely negligent and lacked fraudulent intent, the analysis becomes
more difficult, but the case study facts are not consistent with the conclusion that their actions
lacked intent.
The question of whether Mediageni has to “tell our investors about this mess” is more a legal
issue than an accounting issue, but it is incumbent upon you to explain to the director that these
issues are going to appear in the restated financial statements or in a new set of audited statements
prepared by a successor audit firm. From a strict disclosure perspective, it is possible that Mediageni
could put off the day of reckoning by not furnishing its investors with copies of the audited statements if it was not required to do so, but to what end? The investors in the placement will, sooner or
later, learn the facts, and Mediageni’s management team is probably better off being proactive with
disclosure. A new management team would have a keen interest in making a clean start and letting
the investors know that the old regime with its old problems had been removed. It is easy to imagine
that later disclosure of these facts (for example, in a registration statement for an initial public offering [IPO] that disclosed the company’s rescission liability) would simply magnify the negative reaction
of Mediageni’s investors and, perhaps, raise more disclosure issues at exactly the point in time when
the company would not want to be perceived as being less than forthcoming.
Some or all of the following are concrete steps you might consider to set the right tone:
a.

Build a code of ethics with integrity at its center.

b.

Establish a stringent set of internal controls, as well as antifraud controls.

c.

Populate the audit committee with knowledgeable, competent members who understand the
financial, accounting, and auditing issues encountered in your business.

d.

Provide ethics training at hiring and on an ongoing basis.

e.

Demonstrate a commitment to corporate responsibility by implementing company-wide policies that encourage ethical behavior.

f.

Establish well-publicized means inside the company for anonymous and other means of
reporting suspected ethics violations.

g.

Create a system of accountability that penalizes behavior that is at odds with the corporate
culture you seek, and ensure that all employees know that accountability begins at the
executive suite.

h.

Test end-of-month and related-party transactions for reasonableness, fairness, and full
disclosure.

i.

Appoint independent directors who understand their responsibilities and take them seriously.

j.

Obtain the service of knowledgeable and competent professionals who are not afraid to
challenge management and who understand their obligations to other constituencies, such
as shareholders, regulators, and the corporate entity.
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k.

Conduct yourself in a manner that demonstrates integrity and commitment to the ideals you
wish others in the organization to follow.

Chapter 5
1. This question asks you to make a judgment about which data sources would be most relevant to your
valuation of the bonds based on the objective of your valuation engagement. Answer (a) is incorrect
because if the objective is to arrive at a valuation for the bonds, the purchase price from five or six
months previous would not be as relevant as current data. For the same reason, answer (b) is incorrect because that information may also be several months old. Answer (d) is tempting, but because
these are “dirt bonds,” the collateral value may be very limited due to dependence on further housing
developments that are not being built. Answer (c) is the correct answer because pre- and posttrade price information for comparable securities is the most relevant information that would play
a critical role in valuing the bonds today. If recent trade information was available for the Oswego
County bonds, that information would be of even more relevance, but that answer was not among the
choices provided. Hence, you would choose answer (c).
2. In a word, your response would be “delicate.” The audit committee asked for your input on this
subject, not for you to initiate a forensic investigation. For this reason, answer (b) seems like overkill
and, perhaps, an inappropriate response, absent a specific request from the audit committee for you
to investigate the matter. Answer (d) may seem somewhat attractive on its face, but many directors
would find such an answer offensive or look on that answer (outside the scope) as a way for you to
duck a tough issue. Answer (a) is an excellent answer in that this answer throws the burden back on
the audit committee to give you whatever evidence led them to this conclusion and would allow you
to form a judgment based on facts, not speculation. However, as the question indicates, this is just
an idea that has occurred to the audit committee, and it is reasonable to assume it doesn’t yet have
any such evidence. This leaves answer (c), which is the response most people would be comfortable
with. Although it does allow you to avoid dealing directly with the issue of Weingarten’s involvement,
you have given advice to the audit committee that is consistent with your professional responsibilities: you recommended the hiring of another firm to conduct a forensic review. One open issue in
answer (c) is whether the valuation work is inconsistent with a forensic engagement. If Weingarten
is to be intimately involved in supervising or reviewing the valuation work your firm is to undertake,
you can see that a dual role with your firm as forensic investigator and valuation specialist would be
at odds. For that reason, professionally, it is the right thing to recommend the hiring of another firm to
undertake any forensic work.
3. The emphasis in this question is on potential collusion, and you are now providing guidance to the
audit committee in its own investigation, not an investigation by your firm. The question, therefore,
really goes back to how any forensic investigation would proceed in determining if the company and
a third party colluded in creating fraudulent price quotes for the bonds. The correct answer to this
question is (e) because a comprehensive forensic investigation would delve into all these sources of
information: all e-mails between Weingarten and the brokerage firm for the duration of the relationship (answer [a]), a price history for the bonds from another brokerage firm (answer [b]), comparison
of trade confirmations to the bonds’ price history obtained from another brokerage firm (answer [c]),
and a lifestyle review of Weingarten (answer [d]).
4. Consistent with the sample disclosure in the chapter from Ares Capital Corporation, answer (a) is
correct. Answer (c) is also correct because the audit committee appears to now be populated by
directors who have very limited accounting and financial reporting experience. To increase its effectiveness, the members of the audit committee should either increase their own expertise in these
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areas or add new members with the requisite experience in accounting and financial reporting (lest
they end up like the DHB audit committee members). Because both of these answers are correct, the
correct answer to the question is (e). Answer (b) may be an eventual outcome, but Julia is not likely
to recommend Weingarten’s removal or retention because that is the board’s and audit committee’s
decision. Also, answer (d) is incorrect because Julia’s firm is not prohibited by independence or other
ethical considerations from making recommendations, so long as the firm is not making management
decisions, implementing those recommendations, or auditing its own work. A wise auditor would be
able to maintain objectivity, independence, and healthy skepticism without impairing independence
by making recommendations. For this reason, answer (f) is also incorrect.
5. The correct answer is (d), although some may choose answer (c) on the basis that there has been a
significant deterioration in Oswego County’s creditworthiness. If you chose answer (c), the complication is that the time frame from the first purchase of the bonds to the discovery of the problem is short
enough that there may not have been a significant deterioration. Without additional information (such
as a credit rating downgrade for the county, a renouncement of the obligation, or a payment default),
the bank may not find support for the proposition that there has been a significant deterioration in
the county’s creditworthiness. In other words, news reports alone about potential interest payment
reductions would not seem like much to depend on if the bank wanted to use the county’s creditworthiness as a safe harbor. Answer (a) is clearly incorrect because this is the example covered in the
materials that noted conversion from a C corporation to an S corporation is more akin to a change
in tax rates rather than a change in tax law. Answer (b) is also incorrect because a planned acquisition next year would be difficult to cite as the reason for bond sales today. Put another way, if the
bond sales occurred in conjunction with (or immediately before or after) the acquisition and could
be shown as necessary to maintenance of the bank’s existing interest rate risk or credit risk position,
then this answer might be defensible.
6. The correct answer to this question is (f). Each of the answers to this question are measures you
would recommend as part of a complete overhaul and updating of policies and procedures related to
acquiring and valuing thinly traded securities. These policies and procedures would entail setting up
a valuation committee and obtaining an independent valuation by an outside valuation firm at least
once every 12 months (answer [a]); having at least 50 percent of the bank’s fair-valued securities
reviewed by an outside valuation firm each quarter (answer [b]); having trading and price information
reviewed and, when necessary or appropriate, obtaining a comparable securities pricing analysis
(answer [c]); obtaining multiple price quotes from different brokerage firms or other sources (answer
[d]); and revising the bank’s approval policies so that the CFO or the CEO could not cause the bank to
have an undue concentration in certain securities.
7. The consequences that Weingarten may face would include termination as an officer and employee,
possible claw back of any incentive or equity-based compensation, and possible criminal charges for
filing false financial statements or reports with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
or conspiracy to do so. If the bank was public, the SEC could initiate civil charges against Weingarten for filing fraudulent financial statements, and the Department of Justice could bring criminal
charges for conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, lying to or misleading auditors,
and perhaps wire fraud if the collusion took place over telephones or the Internet. The SEC could also
seek to impose on Weingarten an officer and a director bar, a bar under Rule 102(e) from practicing
or appearing before the SEC, civil money penalties, and disgorgement of any proceeds of stock sales
while the fraudulent financial statements were on file at the SEC.
8. Municipal securities are considered to be thinly traded because, as the Government Accountability
Office study Municipal Securities: Overview of Market Structure, Pricing, and Regulation found, (a)
municipal securities trade infrequently, with buyers and sellers not readily available for many of these
securities; (b) the municipal securities market lacks available, transparent information on the prices of
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municipal securities, and (c) the municipal securities market is dominated by individuals who hold 75
percent of municipal securities, meaning that institutional participation in this market is low, and thus,
volatility may be higher than other, more liquid and active markets. In contrast to municipal securities,
level 1 financial assets are those for which quoted prices are available in active markets, readily available, and normally obtainable from multiple sources. Because municipal securities trade infrequently,
quoted prices are not always available and, if available, may not be obtainable from multiple sources.
For these reasons, municipal securities would not normally be classified as level 1 financial assets.

Chapter 6
1. In a large organization, such as Megatron, it is possible that some or all the measures listed in the
answers are being used, but your recommendation for preventive action would almost assuredly be
directed at implementing all the measures listed, meaning the correct answer is (d). An ongoing periodic review by upper management, such as that described in answer (a), would presumably act both
to deter wrongful conduct at significant subsidiaries and surface troublesome areas sooner rather
than later. Answer (b) is clearly designed to focus detection resources on those areas of the business
that are most susceptible to fraud based on changes in the business, regulatory, political, and media
environments. Given the importance of significant changes in these areas, a special review category
would again tend to surface potential problems early in the review process. Answer (c) is merely an
extension of answer (b) because the assignment of internal audit staff would be a natural adjunct to
special reviews for high-risk areas and to undertake a closer examination of transactions that took
place near period-end.
2. Although susceptible to different responses, this question is designed to get at the three-tier hierarchy of fraud risks that is outlined in AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards): incentives and pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations.
Viewed within this context, answer (c) would appear to offer the greatest incentive for Rogers to
commit fraud because a reduction in the bonus pool will have a direct impact on his pocketbook.
Answer (a) would appear to rank next because the phone call from the president of the subsidiary
would likely create the kind of pressure that would be hard to resist, particularly given his statement
about “using all efforts” to secure sales. (Incidentally, many class participants vote for answer (a)
to be ranked first rather than second because the perception is that this phone call would provide a
greater incentive than the decline in the bonus pool.) The next factor, at least in the author’s opinion,
would be the resumption of production shortly before quarter-end: answer (d). Because Rogers
was not responsible for manufacturing and might have been able to point to the delayed resumption of production as a factor that contributed to customer order cancellations before the end of the
quarter, you can argue that this factor is less important. Conversely, if inventory levels were low,
and the start-up in production right before quarter-end gave Rogers an even more compressed time
frame to finalize sales and save the quarter, you could argue that this factor may deserve a higher
rank. Answer (b) would appear to deserve the lowest rank because, if anything, this factor justifies a
considerable reduction in sales and, to some extent, provides Rogers with a very good explanation
for why sales fell below expectations. The fact that business and other conditions are unfavorable is,
however, one of the indicators of heightened fraud risk, so it cannot be ignored.
3. The correct answer to this question is (e), and your analysis should have begun by focusing on the
greatest factor of all: the chief executive setting the tone at the top by creating an example of the
type of behavior he (and the organization) stood for. Thus, answer (a) is correct and of the utmost
importance in arguing that Megatron is generally a highly ethical organization. Answer (b) is incorrect due to the fact that a “No comment” response is somewhat inconsistent with the image of
Megatron that is otherwise portrayed by the facts. It is important to note, however, that although
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Megatron might have been reluctant to comment on an isolated instance of a reporter having heard a
rumor of this kind, Megatron took prompt and appropriate action to inform its investors and the public
once it was clear that more than one media source had heard rumors of problems with the joint
replacement products. As a result, Megatron leveled the playing field for investors and the public by
ensuring that information reached all market participants simultaneously (as required by Regulation
FD) and that the disclosure was timely.
In regard to answer (c), the willingness of the CEO to open up the information channel to both Megatron’s regulatory constituency and the entire health care community, in spite of criticism that may
have been forthcoming based on that information, says volumes about the integrity of the man at the
top. Too often, companies caught in similar circumstances clam up and offer up information grudgingly, leaving the inevitable impression they are hiding something, even if that is not so. Answer (d) is
also correct, even if the internal audit staff might have taken one or two additional steps to check the
sale terms, such as through contacting the customer. Setting aside the issue of whether the internal
audit staff might have done more, though, the fact remains that either someone asked the internal
audit staff to look into the sale, or Megatron’s internal control and monitoring procedures were such
that a review resulted. In either case, it is clear that Megatron’s internal control procedures were
good enough to focus attention on the sale, which is something not every company would be able or
willing to do. A few other facts are indicative of the generally good ethical makeup of Megatron:
a.

The fact that Linda was willing to contact you about her having seen the letter and seemed
genuinely concerned about the company, which, given your conduct and the conduct of
almost all the other employees, indicates the employees have a positive feeling about the
company

b.

The willingness of the CEO and the entire company to open up the channels of communication through daily conference calls, press releases, and website postings

c.

The fact that Megatron conducted its own internal investigation of the plant and went to
great lengths to try and identify the source of the patient rejections, even at the risk of the
company appearing incompetent or worse

4. The key to this question lies in your position with the company because whatever action you take
should be consistent with your responsibilities and the chain of command. The best answer here
is (c) because of the fact you are keeping your direct superior informed at the same time you are
discharging your responsibility to the audit committee members by informing them of information
that, at a minimum, may impact the financial statements and the company’s reported (or about to be
reported) operating results. (Note: Many participants have said they would send the e-mail only to
Maggie, rather than Maggie and the audit committee, to maintain adherence to the chain of command. Even though that is not among the answers provided, anyone who answers in this way is
certainly not wrong.)
Answer (a) suffers from several deficiencies, not the least of which is the fact that giving Rogers
advance notice of your knowledge could actually hinder an internal investigation or permit him to
cover his tracks. This, in turn, could actually make it appear to an outside investigator that you were
complicit or even assisting Rogers by putting him on notice that someone had uncovered what he
had done. If you answered with (b), you would certainly get an “A” for effort but might get fired as
a result. Because the auditors have, based on the facts, not yet been given a copy of Form 10-Q to
review, it seems premature to go to them without raising the issues with your immediate superior
and the audit committee. Likewise, answer (d) is aggressive and certainly has to be respected for
seeking the right result, but the failure to go through proper channels seems obvious here. Moreover,
by asking the board to fire Rogers, you are staking out a position that seems somewhat risky in view
of the lack of proof and corroborating information. If instead you only state the facts to those you are
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accountable to, and let them determine the appropriate course of action, you are conducting yourself
in a responsible but prudent fashion.
5. This question is best answered with answer (e) that recommends the audit committee take a number
of actions, each of which individually is a good idea but that together offer the best chance of protecting the company. Answer (a) is clearly a correct response because the question assumes the audit
committee has only looked at the paperwork and conducted two interviews. The lingering suspicion
may be put to rest by the internal investigation that could use counsel and a forensic investigator to
conduct a more intensive review of facts and conduct additional interviews. Based on the lingering suspicion, it would also seem appropriate to suspend Rogers with pay, as described in answer
(b), because the suspension would protect the company from a charge of letting “a bad apple stay
on the tree” if it turns out that Rogers was engaged in wrongdoing. By suspending him with pay, the
company is indicating it has not reached a conclusion about his conduct, which may help forestall a
wrongful termination suit that might otherwise be filed if Rogers was fired. (Note: A number of participants have argued that once Rogers is suspended, regardless of whether he’s suspended with pay,
his future effectiveness will have been compromised because people talk. This point is a valid one,
and anyone who uses that rationale would likely choose answers [a] or [d] as the correct response.)
Answer (c) is more problematic, but if the amount of the sale is immaterial to Megatron as a whole,
then the conservative approach would be to reverse the sale pending the receipt of the results of the
internal investigation. This also has the advantage of letting the auditors know that the company has
approached the issue in a prudent and conservative way rather than trying to push the envelope and
book sales that may be questionable. Answer (d) is generally a good course of action, particularly
because the filing of Form 10-Q and the opening of the trading window might result in uninformed
directors seeking to sell shares at a time when they should not be doing so. Although the directors
could potentially fall back on the materiality argument, the possibility that Rogers may have engaged
in other fraudulent acts that could later come to light must be considered. In that event, the board
members should all be apprised of the risks inherent in selling at a time when their actions could later
be questioned with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.
6. Although this question gives plenty of room for a wide-ranging response, the following commentary
gives you some ideas to consider. Keep in mind that the question asks you to focus, at least in part,
on the values demonstrated by the CEO:
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a.

The company stands for the proposition that open communication both inside the company
and with outside constituencies is essential to fostering a healthy organizational culture.

b.

The company maintains channels to support open communication inside the organization.

c.

The company expects its employees to conduct themselves in the best interests of society
as a whole, as well as the industry in which the company operates and the company itself.

d.

The company is committed to being the type of corporate citizen that is best exemplified by
the honest and ethical conduct of its employees.

e.

The company will appropriately enforce its code of conduct, and both accountability and
discipline are part of this enforcement regimen.

f.

The company will comply with laws, rules, and regulations applicable to it, and employees
are expected to facilitate such compliance above all else.

g.

The company will promptly inform investors, regulatory agencies, and others to which it is
accountable of all material information that may bear on the company, its operations, and its
financial condition.
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h.

The company will maintain such records and data that permit the accurate and timely
reporting, monitoring, and testing of information upon which management, investors, and
regulators depend.

i.

The company will reward employees in appropriate and responsible ways for their efforts,
taking into account performance and the demonstration of values such as honesty, integrity,
transparency, individual initiative and accountability, and support of appropriate organizational values.

j.

The company will apply appropriate resources to the training necessary to instill and support values among its employees that are consistent with its objectives as a good corporate
citizen.

7. The types of qualitative factors you would want to consider might include the following:
a.

The impact on meeting already reduced sales or earnings expectations

b.

The impact on Megatron’s share of the company bonus pool

c.

The impact on sales trends for joint replacement products

d.

The impact on the overall results of Megatron or its segment

e.

The possible effect on patients or hospitals if exposed to risk as a result of such sale

f.

Whether the misstatement of the financial statements that may result would be considered
intentional

8. This is a question open to some creative responses, but the following points might be among those
you would want to make:
a.

This information is not public; we do not know the extent to which other sales, if any, may
soon become questionable.

b.

If you go ahead and sell stock, regulators could interpret the sale as having been made to
avoid losses you otherwise might have taken in the value of your stock.

c.

Consider how your trade will look with 20/20 hindsight if it turns out that Rogers has created
a bigger problem by issuing other side letters.

d.

The sale of stock now may create the appearance, even if this is not reality, that your conduct fell short of the corporate ethics we stand for.

e.

Even though Megatron did not book the sale to KaeLoo in this quarter, you cannot assume
that each other sale is good, given Rogers’ actions. Allowing time for investigation may let
the company give you reasonable assurances you are not opening yourself up to regulatory
and market scrutiny.

Chapter 7
1. In a situation like the one the case study describes in which you are effectively putting your firm’s
reputation on the line by entering into a joint venture with e-Valuations, you can never do enough due
diligence. The correct answer, based on that proposition, is answer (e). Each of the other answers
are steps that, if Shauna had not taken them beforehand, should be done as a matter of course. A
credit or Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) report will address payment histories, financial status, ownership,
and other financial data that can reveal a lot about the nature of e-Valuations’s business. D&B and
a number of Internet-based search engines also provide fee-based services, allowing you to search
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criminal and civil litigation, judgments, and tax liens nationwide. Also not to be forgotten, even though
not in the answers provided, is a search of regulatory filings with federal, state, and local regulatory
agencies, such as the SEC, state securities divisions, and state accountancy boards.
The type of due diligence discussed in answers (b) and (c) is often invaluable but sometimes overlooked. Discussions with existing partners and clients can say a lot about a firm’s performance and
client satisfaction (or lack thereof), reveal patterns of disagreements, and even produce information
about how effective a firm’s marketing partnerships have been. Even holding these types of discussions with former partners can be instructive in helping identify areas where the prospective partner
may have previously failed to live up to expectations and why. Answer (d) is also a good idea, even
if less effective than other ways of checking out the prospective partner, because you never know
what filings, complaints, kudos, or other information might materialize out of contacting professional
and trade organizations.
2. This chapter began by introducing some relevant provisions of the AICPA Code, including what is
defined as false, misleading, and deceptive advertising. Additionally, the first paragraph under the
“Focus Points” section pointed out that it is the member firm that is responsible for ensuring that
promotional efforts are within the bounds of the Rules of Conduct, and the member firm cannot do
through others that which it is prohibited from doing itself. Neither answers (a) nor (b) are good
choices because the location of the introduction is irrelevant for purposes of ascertaining if AA&C is
in compliance with the AICPA Code, and sales “puffing” language is actually what the AICPA Code is
intended to address if it is false, misleading, or deceptive. Because AA&C cannot permit e-Valuations
to place language on its website that AA&C cannot put on its own website and risks violating the
AICPA Code by letting e-Valuations do so, you must evaluate the language used if you are to reach
the right conclusion.
It could be argued that the reference to AA&C being one of the leading firms in the Northeast
United States may be permissible if this statement was somehow supportable through use of statistics, rankings, or other means that would demonstrate a factual basis for the claim. Without more
facts, it is hard to say this claim alone would be enough to mislead or deceive someone who read it.
The language that follows, however, is much more problematic. A reference to the partners being
unequaled in their capabilities would clearly seem to overstate the partners’ qualifications, and the
reference to the ability to maximize tax savings would clearly seem to create an unjustified expectation of favorable results. Furthermore, the reference to maximizing the tax benefits within the bounds
of what is acceptable to the IRS comes dangerously close to representing some type of special
knowledge or relationship with the IRS. The net effect of these statements would clearly seem to
constitute false or misleading advertising that AA&C would be prohibited from doing on its own
behalf and that e-Valuations likewise cannot do.
For the reasons given, answer (e) is the correct answer because both answers (c) and (d) are correct, and answers (a), (b), and (f) are all incorrect.
3. The correct answer is (g). Although the other prohibitions listed are included within the Texas
Administrative Code, this question is designed to get you to review the language that e-Valuations
used and to make a judgment of where it has gone wrong. In the case of answer (a), the statement in
the introduction does not claim that AA&C’s personnel have any unsupportable licensing. Likewise,
the reference to education qualifications in answer (c) is not directly implicated in the statements
made by e-Valuations. Because answers (a) and (c) are incorrect, you can also eliminate answer (f)
because it incorporates answers (a) and (c). Answer (d) is a closer question, however. The dictionary
definition of endorsement is to express approval in a public and definitive manner. Because the website posting is public, the only real question is whether what e-Valuations placed on the website is
expressing approval of AA&C. The sales type of language that is used, as well as the laudatory terms
that e-Valuations included, would seem to give an implicit, if not explicit, endorsement of AA&C.
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Moreover, to the extent answer (d) deals with an endorsement, the case study and prior question do
not really give you facts on which e-Valuations could have based its own endorsement. That is to say,
maybe a client of e-Valuations that had worked with AA&C could have given such an endorsement,
but there does not appear to be a basis for e-Valuations to have given one like this.
The answer given in (b) is also a close question. To the extent you consider AA&C to be responsible for what e-Valuations has said on its website about AA&C, you may have interpreted those
statements as, in effect, self-laudatory statements. If so, you would be correct if you chose answer
(g) as the correct answer to the problem. If you believe that AA&C may be responsible for the statements made about it but that the statements are not self-laudatory because they were made by a
third party, you may have concluded the correct answer to this question is (b). Ultimately, the issue of
whether the correct answer is (b) alone or (g) may be a question that would only be solved when the
state accountancy board took up the issue.
4. This question requires you to consider a number of facts and how these interact to affect independence. Let us begin our analysis by taking a closer look at a few of the facts. First, under Rule 503,
Commissions and Referral Fees [AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 503 par. .01, the receipt of
the referral fee during a time when AA&C is engaged to perform an audit, a review, or a compilation
of a client’s financial statements or an examination of projections is prohibited. Even though this is
the case, however, the question is not asking whether the payment is permitted; rather, it asks you to
consider the implications for independence. With a cautionary reminder about Rule 503, now let us
focus on independence.
Nothing in the AICPA Code or state codes of ethics restrict the ability of a member firm to link to
a nonmember’s website. Much like the Texas Administrative Code’s preamble that refers to the First
Amendment, it would seem unlikely that the mere creation of a link, without more, would create an
independence impairment for a member firm. The firm might be responsible, ethically or perhaps
legally, for what appears on the linked website, but it is hard to see how the link itself would constitute an independence impairment. Given this fact, answers (a) and (c) are not your best choices.
(Moreover, keep in mind that disclosure of the payment, as described in answer [c], does not in any
way cure an independence impairment if one has been created. This should also serve as a tip-off to
you that answer [c] is not the right choice.)
On the other side of the coin, it is clear that AA&C’s independence was impaired if you and Shauna
stand to receive compensation based on the selling of nonaudit services through e-Valuations to an
audit client. Because you and she are identified as the engagement and concurring partners, and
both of you will receive a percentage of the referral fee after the 2012 fiscal year, as disclosed in
the problem, it is clear that AA&C’s independence can be considered impaired by the receipt of this
compensation for selling nonaudit services. For all these reasons, the correct answer to this problem
is answer (d).
5. If you answered (e) to this question, you need to start over again at chapter 1, “Superlative Software Corporation—You Are the CFO” ! That said, keep in mind that one of the principal objectives of
these materials is to remind everyone that ethical behavior has its own rewards, among which are
the ability to sleep at night and feel good about yourself. If an organization has a corporate culture,
it seems reasonable that an organization can feel good about itself, meaning answer (a) is correct.
The tangible benefits were those disclosed in the results of the studies discussed in this chapter that
clearly demonstrated that ethical organizations are rewarded by the capital markets through a lower
cost of capital. So, answer (b) is also correct, as is answer (c).
If your position requires you to sign certifications for auditors, regulators, or even internal purposes, it is easy to understand that your comfort level in doing so will directly relate to the kind of
company or firm you work for. If you work for a company that pays excessive executive compensa-
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tion or has a huge number of related-party transactions that benefit the insiders at the expense of
the company, you can see how the culture of the company might become “It’s okay to do because
the guys at the top are doing it.” That sends the wrong message to employees and sets up an easy
contrast to the organization in which the right kind of culture is demonstrated by the officers and
directors doing the right thing and putting the company’s interests first. Ask yourself which company
you would rather sign a certification for? The answer is pretty plain. Therefore, answer (c) is correct,
and of course, that makes answer (d) the right answer for the problem.
6. For ease of discussion, let us break down the issues into three categories that track the question.
This question asks for the most important issues, so many of the possible responses are presented
subsequently, ranked in subjective fashion and chronologically:
Evaluation Phase
a.

Due diligence about the third party.

b.

How the relationship is proposed to be structured.

c.

How to limit exposure of the member firm for what nonmember does.

d.

How to track audit and nonaudit client usage and disclosure and nondisclosure obligations
of the member firm.

e.

How to prevent independence impairments before they happen.

f.

Impact on client perceptions about the member firm.

g.

Marketing potential.

h.

How to gauge effectiveness of arrangement (feedback).

i.

How will arrangement be modified or updated; who has control.

j.

How can member firm exit arrangement gracefully should that be necessary?

Execution Phase
a.

Arrangement must be properly documented.

b.

Documents must clearly reflect responsibilities for each party.

c.

Limitations on actions and words of non-CPA party must be clearly spelled out.

d.

Assurance of full disclosure and implementation of all necessary systems and processes
necessary to achieve proper disclosure and acknowledgments.

e.

Right of member firm to confirm timely disclosure to clients, refuse compensation, or take
other remedial action to avoid unintended consequences.

f.

Right of member firm to terminate arrangement if third party violates agreement, violates
applicable laws, or is convicted of a felony (or principals are convicted of crime of moral
turpitude or felony or if public disclosure appears of other actions that reflect poorly on
member firm in its sole judgment).

g.

Economic arrangements and how they will work must be spelled out.

Monitoring Phase
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a.

Are the systems and procedures performing as required; any difficulties with clients or
professional obligations?

b.

Checking on services performed and measuring client satisfaction.

c.

Can systems be improved to provide more or better feedback?

d.

Is arrangement benefiting both parties; how are benefits measured?
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e.

Are professional obligations of member firm being fulfilled fully and completely.

7. Again, using subjective judgment about which prohibitions are more important than others, here is a
list of the prohibitions relating to joint marketing arrangements and a short discussion of why they are
important:
a.

Prohibition on receipt of commissions or referral fees. Related to audit, review, compilation,
or review of projections engagements. This is most important because it can impair independence and result in civil or regulatory action against the member firm.

b.

Prohibition on false, misleading, or deceptive advertising. This is critical to maintaining the
firm’s professional standing, reputation, and client relations.

c.

Prohibition on doing through third parties that which the firm cannot do. This is important for
the firm because it avoids exposing the firm to liability created by third parties.

d.

Prohibition on misrepresenting facts. When a partnership does not exist, two CPAs cannot
appear to represent a partnership. Education, licensing, testimonials, and endorsements
must be factual. When facts are not disclosed or represented properly, the firm and individual can be held responsible.

e.

Timely disclosure of referral fees and commissions to clients. The member firm has to
provide timely disclosure of referral fees and commissions that are properly paid; when
applicable, that disclosure must be consistent with state professional rules of conduct.

f.

The profit on the sale of a nonaudit product is not or may be a referral fee or commission.
The AICPA Code and state codes may conflict on this point. The taking of title and associated risks of ownership will be required if the state code permits receipt of profit.

g.

Prohibition on audit or concurring partner receiving compensation or partnership units for
sale of nonaudit products or services by audit firm. The future of independence determinations in some joint marketing arrangements may rest on compliance with this directive from
the SEC.

h.

Mandated disclosure on websites. Although not technically a prohibition, the required
disclosures by member firms on websites can also be tied to joint marketing arrangement
disclosure.

8. Here is a compendium of the resources you would want to review, in no particular order:
a.

Relevant provisions of the AICPA Code and accompanying rulings

b.

State code of ethics provisions and accompanying rulings

c.

Independence rules and guidance issued by the SEC and the PCAOB

d.

State accountancy board rulings and interpretations on ethical, marketing, and independence issues

Chapter 8
1. The correct answer is (d). The case study makes it clear that you need more facts as of that time
and that you can’t really take any action until more facts become clear. For this reason, having the
committee adopt a resolution, as is suggested in answer (a), is not the best course of action or, at a
minimum, is likely premature. Answer (b) is not the best answer given the facts that are then known
because any role that Mick seems to be playing in the events at issue is minimal at best. Answer (c)
is a red herring because this answer would take you far outside the role of an audit committee and,
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in fact, could compromise Precious Mining’s (PM’s) position in any litigation that followed. Arguably,
answer (c) could be correct if an internal investigation was authorized or if Jacobsen hadn’t disclosed the basis for his claims, but the case study gives you sufficient facts so as to eliminate those
possibilities at this stage. Also, seeking the opinion of your fellow audit committee members might be
comforting, but on the issue of whether to contact a party likely adverse to the company, talking to
counsel would probably be a better choice.
2. Even though you are not rendering legal advice in your capacity as a member of the audit committee,
it should be obvious that some legal issues are lurking in the information that Jacobsen passed along.
For example, if the overpayment by Carbon Blue was considered to be a bribe, commission, fee, or
another payment made in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), PM may well
face action by the SEC or private litigants. Also, under U.S. antitrust law, payments made to facilitate
anticompetitive behavior or in furtherance of a scheme to dominate or control a market could be
assumed to be illegal. The issue of whether PM knew what it was being paid for (that is, it had intent
to participate in and further the scheme) is also implicated by the facts because, presumably, PM
was in a position to know the prevailing market price at the time it was overpaid for its antimony. For
these reasons alone, answer (a) is not correct. Answer (b) is attractive on its face, but it forces you
to ignore the ethical issues surrounding PM’s participation in what took place. Although it may be
true that PM is not responsible for what Carbon Blue does, PM’s acceptance of a payment over the
market price makes PM responsible for what likely are illegal and ethically challenged transactions.
Looking at this another way, an unethical choice of which you are aware that is made by a third party
does not allow you to look the other way, particularly if you are benefiting by that unethical choice.
Answer (c) is the correct answer because it acknowledges both the illegal and unethical nature of
PM’s conduct and involvement in whatever went on. Answer (d) requires you to speculate on the
nature of PM’s legal responsibility for these events, but if you concluded that PM’s situation likely
violated the FCPA or antitrust laws, you can see that answer (c) was the more obvious choice.
3. If the answers given appear to be a litany of all the horrible things that can happen to a company
engaged in “round-trip” transactions designed to increase revenues and earnings, there is a reason
why: these answers include many of those potential nasty results. Although not an exhaustive list,
all the answers given are possible outcomes to PM’s involvement in “round tripping.” If you were to
review the consequences visited on Enron, Williams Energy, and Qwest, among others, you would
find that answers (b), (c), and (d) are common results in these situations. Answer (a) is also correct
because it does not require you to conclude the auditor will resign, only that it might. Likewise, this
answer doesn’t say a Section 10A report will result, only that it may.
One of the questions about whether a Section 10A report would be required relates to the issue
of whether the involvement of the division’s CFO (or others at the divisional or subsidiary level) is
enough to cause the auditor to reach a conclusion about management integrity for the parent company. Absent some demonstration of complicity at senior levels of the organization, neither resignation nor a Section 10A report would seem to be required, although these remain obvious possibilities.
Therefore, the phrasing of both the question and answer lead you to accept that answer (a) is also
correct. In regard to answer (d), if PM were found to be criminally liable for its role in the scheme,
either under the FCPA or antitrust laws, the possibility of a bar from performing work under government contracts is also a possible result. Taken together, all the answers are consequences that PM
might face, meaning answer (f) is the correct answer to the problem.
4. This question is designed to remind you of the audit committee’s role, as well as its responsibilities.
The correct answer is answer (a) because this acknowledges that the audit committee’s responsibilities rise above whatever position management or the auditors take with respect to an issue involving
financial reporting and a complaint involving accounting. If you think back to the exchange listing
standards highlighted in this chapter, you’ll recall that the audit committee is responsible for provid-
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ing oversight of the outside auditor; resolving disagreements between management and the outside
auditor; and addressing complaints concerning accounting, internal controls, and audit issues. If you
answered this question by selecting answer (b), this would have placed you in the position of deferring an issue to the auditors that is clearly within the purview of the audit committee. Keep in mind
that no matter what the auditors do, you must still fulfill your responsibilities as an audit committee
member, which means you cannot simply defer difficult issues or complaints by referring them to the
auditor.
Similarly, answer (c) might be something you would want to do but does not really result in the
audit committee taking appropriate action, given what has occurred. This is not to say you would not
want the auditor’s assessment; rather, getting that assessment does not, in and of itself, discharge
your duty, given what has happened. This is the same reason why answer (d) is incorrect. Deferring
to management, like deferring to the auditor, does not allow the audit committee members to say they
have discharged their duty to the company or its stockholders. In this case study, as in life, you must
focus on your duty and to whom you owe that duty. Secondarily, you can take into account the input
of others about what information they have that will help you discharge that duty.
5. The correct answer to this question is (f), meaning that both answers (b) and (d) are correct. Answer
(b) points out that an ethics policy is always a good idea, but without consequences, the ethics policy
would lack teeth. For this reason, you would want to have legislated the ethics policy but also made
sure everyone knew you would back up the policy with action, when necessary. Answer (d) is also
correct in that it highlights the most desirable composition for the audit committee (all independent
members), as well as empowering it with authority that exceeds today’s legal requirements. Although
it is possible to carry a good thing to excess (at least from management’s point of view), it is difficult
to argue today with an audit committee with expanded powers that might exceed those required by
the SEC and the national stock exchanges.
Answer (a) is incorrect because it refers to ineffective, rather than effective, corporate governance. Obviously, ineffective governance is exactly what you do not want. In regard to answer (c),
it is incorrect because the existence of a wide variety of related-party transactions between the
company and the CEO is more descriptive of a poorly governed corporation rather than one in which
there are minimal related-party transactions. In effect, the presence of a great number of these
transactions is arguably linked to companies in which management has a compliant board rather
than companies in which the board and audit committee seek to avoid transactions with inherent
conflicts of interest.
6. Approaching this question in the three stages of before, during, and after the investigation, here are
some suggestions for the most critical points:
Before
a.

What is the scope of the investigation? Is the investigation limited? If so, by what and whom?

b.

What is the budget for the investigation; is it adequate to do the job?

c.

Who will be retained to conduct the investigation? What are their qualifications?

d.

To whom will the report be furnished? Will Global Accounting get a copy?

e.

To whom will the investigators report?

f.

How long will the investigation and report preparation take?

During
a.

What evidence is uncovered of wrongdoing, and what is the company’s response?

b.

Thorough use of investigative techniques consistent with investigative scope and budget.
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c.

Progress reports—to whom, when, and what will be included?

d.

Assurance of independence of investigation and lack of interference with investigation from
third parties.

e.

Calculation of impact on financial statements, reporting obligations, and previously filed
disclosure.

f.

Demonstrated willingness to pursue information unearthed to the fullest extent.

After
a.

Consequences are visited on all responsible parties in proportion to wrongdoing.

b.

Curative actions—what steps are implemented to reduce likelihood of a repeat performance?

c.

Curative disclosure—what type of disclosure is proposed and filed; what are the responses
given by the company to regulators’ inquiries?

d.

What penalties are imposed on the company and management by regulators and third parties?

e.

Assessment of investigation’s achievement of objectives, future risk assessment, and
whether management integrity is implicated.

f.

Evaluation of report conclusions, recommendations, and factual inquiries.

g.

Evaluation of civil versus criminal culpability and evidence of same.

h.

After-the-fact monitoring of effectiveness of curative actions and effectiveness of changes
in policies and procedures.

7. Perhaps the overriding issue this question should prompt you to consider is whether PM’s internal
controls are adequate. If not, what changes should be made? If PM has a practice of doing business
with other mining companies or mineral trading firms, the possibility clearly exists for “round-trip”
trading to occur in the future. Accordingly, as head of the audit committee, you (and the auditors)
would want management to adopt procedures and systems that are designed to highlight unusual
trading patterns, offsetting purchases and sales, and variations from prevailing market prices (collectively referred to as trading practices), to name just a few. Strengthening the company’s ethics
policies and the consequences for deviating from these policies when dealing with suppliers and
customers would also seem to be an appropriate response. The audit committee would also have
to examine its procedures for receipt of (and action taken in response to) employee complaints to
determine if Jacobsen might have approached the situation differently if another avenue for dealing
with the issue was available.
Because the audit committee would be under a heightened degree of scrutiny after the facts in
the case study became public, the audit committee might want to undertake an ongoing independent review of reports and analyses prepared by management with respect to trading practices.
In addition, the audit committee would want to put the issue of trading practices front and center
when holding discussions with the outside auditors about accounting policies, internal controls, and
significant or unusual transactions. Similarly, meetings with management to discuss compliance
with internal codes of ethics, financial reporting, and internal accounting controls would need to
address trading practices, monitoring, and reporting. Under its obligation to oversee the internal audit
function, the audit committee would also want to review the internal audit plan in detail, as it related
to trading practices; discuss the internal accounting controls governing trading practices with the
internal audit staff; and discuss efforts to uncover irregularities in trading practices. The audit committee would then need to follow up by reviewing any findings made by the internal audit staff and
evaluating what actions were taken by management in response to the findings.
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Management would want to undertake many of the same actions as the audit committee that are
previously described, perhaps only at a greater level of detail and scrutiny. In other words, Mick
and the CFO would want to evaluate, monitor, and upgrade internal controls with respect to trading
practices, including how data is generated, evaluated, and aggregated; how trading operations are
supervised; and who is responsible for trading practices oversight. The reporting and disclosure
function is first and foremost the responsibility of management, so senior executives would have to
put policies and procedures in place for their own protection, much less the protection of the board,
audit committee, and outside auditors. However, as recently demonstrated by JPMorgan Chase, even
the best-designed trading policies and procedures can go awry when those trades or policies are
poorly designed and implemented.
8. The following are the steps that have been cited by the SEC as demonstrating intent to cooperate
when a company is faced with self-reporting and rectifying illegal conduct:
a.

Prompt reporting up the ladder, from internal audit staff, to management, to the board, and to
the audit committee

b.

Hiring of counsel or forensic auditors to conduct a prompt and thorough inquiry

c.

Dismissal of responsible employees or officers, including those with oversight responsibility

d.

Prompt disclosure publicly and to the SEC of the need for restatement of financial statements

e.

A pledge of complete cooperation with the SEC enforcement staff that is followed up with
action

f.

Providing the SEC with a comprehensive internal investigative report, including detailed
notes, transcripts of interviews, and other supporting information

g.

Determining not to rely on the attorney-client, work product, or other privileges to avoid
making full disclosure of facts

h.

Strengthening the company’s financial reporting processes and internal controls to address
the conduct that took place, including developing new processes or controls, adding to
internal accounting or auditing staff, redesigning the internal audit plan, and more intensive
supervision of internal accounting personnel

The SEC issued Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release Report of Investigation Pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship
of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions on October 23, 2001, that discusses these factors. This release also discusses the fact that the SEC determined not to initiate enforcement action
against a parent company that undertook to cooperate by taking the actions previously described
when it discovered wrongdoing in a significant subsidiary.

Chapter 9
1. The correct answer to this question is directly tied to the professional responsibilities that Peavey
had as a CPA. Although answer (a) might appear tempting at first glance, keep in mind that a CPA’s
professional responsibilities do not require him or her to question one’s superior in a way that almost
guarantees the CPA’s firing. This is not to say that following up with Rory might not have been a good
idea, but telling Georgina this is not a required communication per se. Answer (b) is also incorrect,
primarily because it assumes facts that are not apparent in the description of events that Peavey
gave you but also because Peavey did not have evidence of an illegal act to report. In addition, the
reporting obligation about an illegal act would undoubtedly be up the ladder to the CFO and audit
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committee well before any reporting obligation would exist to the auditors. The facts of the case
study support an inference of an illegal act(s), but Peavey does not appear to have the evidence of
such acts within his grasp. Answer (c) is the correct answer. The making of the entries on the books
without having received proper documentary support is tantamount to an admission that Peavey
failed to live up to his professional responsibilities. You should remember, in particular, that reliance on Georgina does not relieve Peavey of his responsibilities that exist independent of whatever
Georgina says or does. Answer (d) also assumes facts that are not necessarily ascertainable from
the case study. First, there is not much evidence that Peavey bought into the culture or that, if he did
so, this was a mistake that went directly to his professional responsibilities. Additionally, the lack
of formal ethics training does not support a conclusion that the corporate culture was necessarily
permissive.
2. The correct answer for this question is clearly (d). Answer (a) is correct and obvious because, as
previously discussed, the single biggest mistake that Peavey made was to fail to insist on receipt
of documentary evidence. The confirmation discussed in answer (b) is always a good step to take
because it creates a record of your request for the information that is necessary for you to discharge
your professional responsibilities. Of course, asking for this information is not good enough in and
of itself; rather, as described in answer (c), you must carry your inquiry to the next logical step and
undertake a review of the documents to confirm what you have been told or otherwise learned about
the sales in question. This step is particularly important given the fact that the case study makes it
clear that you asked for the information on a number of occasions, and it was not forthcoming. In
other words, professional skepticism would almost require you to undertake a thorough review of
these documents, even perhaps to a greater extent than usual, because of the fact that the documents were so late in being produced by Rory and his department.
3. This question and the answers that are provided are intended to focus your attention on two very
important points: the facts that will likely support a Rule 102(e) proceeding and the language of Rule
102(e) as it relates to improper professional conduct by accountants. With this introduction, it should
be clear the correct answer is answer (f). Answers (a) and (b) are facts set forth in the case study
that support the conclusion that Peavey will face a Rule 102(e) proceeding. Peavey was clearly on
notice of unusual delays in the delivery of the supporting documents, and he should not have relied
on Georgina when she told him that she would get the documents, and he should not worry about
this. Answers (c) and (d) are also correct and nearly direct quotes from Rule 102(e) discussed at the
beginning of this chapter. The case study discussion of the amount of the sales in question and the
market reaction, even without more evidence, should lead you to the conclusion that materiality is
likely, if not a foregone conclusion. The facts that accompany the assertion of materiality in answer
(c) merely support the conclusion that warning signals were apparent to someone who was sensitive
to their presence. Answer (d) recites the conclusion that the facts discussed in both the case study
and answers (a), (b), and (c) did, in fact, warrant heightened scrutiny by Peavey. Answer (e) is difficult, if not impossible, to endorse, given the facts in the case study and the language of Rule 102(e).
Without speaking for the SEC in cases with similar circumstances, it is highly likely that a CPA in a
situation such as this would find himself or herself dealing with Rule 102(e) issues.
4. This question is subject to some interpretation, given the potential answers provided. Answer (a) is
least likely to be correct because it is safe to assume that Peavey engaged in some type of unprofessional conduct in the course of the events outlined in the case study. Answer (b) is correct if you
assume, for the sake of this answer, that the reference to an opinion does not necessarily mean that
Peavey himself is giving the opinion in question. Based on the assumption in the question that you
should disregard expressing an opinion, you also might have chosen this answer under the theory
that Peavey had failed to acquire sufficient information to warrant his inclusion of the information in
the financial statements. If that was your rationale, you might have been better off picking answers

262

Appendix: Solutions to Questions for Consideration

(c) or (d) because each of those answers goes to Peavey’s obligation to report or direct attention to
the material misstatement known to him or by failing to note the material departure from generally
accepted accounting principles. If you took the position that Peavey did not actually have knowledge
of the misstatement at the time it was originally made, answer (d) would have been the better choice.
Although a close call, answer (d) would appear to be the best choice of the options given.
5. The correct answer to this question is (d). In analyzing why, let us take a look at why the other
answers are not as good as answer (d). Answer (a) actually has reversed the types of conduct in
which Peavey and Georgina engaged (that is, it appears that Georgina is the one who engaged in
intentional conduct, and Peavey is the one who engaged in reckless conduct). In particular, Georgina evidently collected the paperwork and must have either made the entry or instructed someone
else to do so. She appeared to act with intent; Peavey’s conduct was not intentional but clearly did
not meet the professional standards, given the facts. For the same reasons, answer (b) is incorrect
because intent and knowledge are effectively the same when measuring Peavey’s conduct. Answer
(c) is also incorrect because if unreasonable conduct is the standard, it appears that Peavey may
have only engaged in one act of highly unreasonable conduct, and Georgina is the one who likely
engaged in multiple instances. Answer (d) is, however, the best choice because it points out that
Peavey was reckless in discharging his duties, and Georgina appears to have intentionally violated
her professional duties.
6. The case study includes at least four factors that would be considered aggravating factors that
would increase the likelihood that Peavey would be subject to civil action, at a minimum. First, the
fact that Incisive Lasers Corporation (Incisive) raised capital in the public market immediately prior
to uncovering the accounting issues is likely to raise the specter of the company taking advantage of
the public at a time when it knew or should have known of these issues. Second, the fact that the officers, including Peavey, sold stock in the offering is also going to be considered an aggravating factor
because it appears the officers profited personally from their wrongdoing. Not to be forgotten, either,
is the fact that investors suffered what appear to be enormous losses as a result of the stock price
decline that followed the announcement of the restatement. Assuming that the amount of investor
losses plays a role in what cases are allocated more resources by the SEC and state regulators, it is
fair to conclude that the losses suffered by the stockholders of Incisive will cause greater regulatory
scrutiny of the company and all the major players in this debacle. As a final point, the announcement
by the company that it plans a restatement is, if nothing else, likely to result in the company and its
officers getting more regulatory attention rather than less. When you add to this the fact that the new
auditors were also asked to examine the quarters in the current year, as well, you can assume that
Incisive and Peavey will get more than their share of attention from the SEC.
7. The thrust of this question is to determine what you would have done differently so as not to have
ended up in the shoes of Rubino or Kempisty. You might have taken a number of actions to avoid that
result. First and foremost, if you had concluded that the complex accounting for the warrants, notes,
and beneficial conversion feature (BCF) was not a topic with which you were familiar, you might
have chosen to advise the company that it was time to engage another firm with more expertise
in the new financing arena in which the company was now venturing. Although loss of the client
might seem a poor outcome, that outcome is obviously a better one than the one that was visited
on Rubino and Kempisty. Taking a somewhat more risky approach, if you recognized at the time of
the transactions that you and your partner lacked sufficient knowledge concerning the accounting for these instruments and the BCF, you could have elected to undertake a self-education effort
through research, consulting with colleagues outside the firm, or even engaging a specialist with
the requisite knowledge to guide you through this minefield. Alternatively, your self-education effort
could have been accompanied by direction to the company that it would need to engage an outside
valuation specialist to work with the acting CFO so that the proper accounting was made. Lastly, if
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you had been caught up in this situation and had adhered to generally accepted auditing standards,
you would have focused very clearly on the material impact of the valuation of the warrants and
carefully reviewed the Black-Scholes analysis and assumptions used by the consultant, thus uncovering the use of the generic volatility and interest rate numbers by the acting CFO. Once those errors
were detected, you would have been on notice that this area was one in which the acting CFO was
not competent and needed assistance. Although this may not have resulted in the correct accounting
(given the lack of knowledge of Rubino and Kempisty about accounting for these instruments), your
discovery of these errors would hopefully place you on notice that you and the company had much
more work to do.
8. From the response that Peavey gave in the case study that really failed to answer the question about
formal ethics training but from which you can draw some conclusions, here are some ideas you
might suggest to the board:
• Adopt a formal code of ethics, as required under the SEC’s rules, with all employees being subject
to the code.
• Institute a formal ethics training program, with special emphasis on training for executive, sales,
and financial personnel.
• Publicize the consequences of violating ethics policies and the ethics code, with a special emphasis on accountability for each person and his or her action.
• Convene meetings of departments in order to have senior company officers explain why Rory was
fired and what other actions were taken by involved personnel who constituted wrongdoing, how
they were punished, and the impact on the company and all employees.
• Instituting more effective internal controls and procedures that will force accountability within the
sales department, with a special emphasis on procedures to be followed for the proper recording
of sales.
• Demonstrate cooperation with regulatory authorities and stock exchanges, including evaluating
and upgrading the company’s disclosure practices to the highest standards.
• Establish a substantial budget for the audit committee and its advisers, with adequate funding for
the use of outside, nonaudit CPA consultants and outside counsel in order to upgrade the capabilities of the audit committee.
• Require the board and audit committee members to obtain minimum continuing education hours
each year concerning accounting and governance matters implicated in this situation.

Chapter 10
1. The place to begin when considering how to answer this question is Statement on Standards for
Tax Services (SSTS) No. 6, Knowledge of Error: Return Preparation and Administrative Proceedings
(AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 600). The conversation with Danny and the statement in
the question that indicates you know the information was not in the prior years’ returns indicates
you know there has been an omission from a filed return. The question, of course, is what do you do
with that information? Answer (a) is incorrect because, absent permission from the client, a CPA is
not able to communicate this information to a taxing authority. In fact, such a communication would
violate the duty of confidentiality you owe to Sheet Metal Aggregators, Inc. (Sheet Metal) Answer (b)
is also incorrect because although withdrawal from representation may be a good choice in the end,
your firm has professional obligations that must be fulfilled before withdrawing. Those obligations
are actually set forth in answer (c), which is the correct answer to the question. Under SSTS No. 6,
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the CPA must inform the taxpayer promptly of the error (which Danny already is aware of, but written
confirmation would not hurt); advise the taxpayer of the potential consequences of the error; and
recommend corrective action.
Finally, answer (d) is incorrect for several reasons, not the least of which is that your statement
that Danny has committed a felony presumes way too much knowledge of the law and could well
expose you to legal action by Danny for defamation. Also, although Danny may have misrepresented
Sheet Metal’s financial condition, it is arguable the bank extended credit in the absence of that
additional income, so the bank may not have been damaged in any way. Also, the attorney for Sheet
Metal is subject to attorney-client confidentiality rules. So, making that contact, if it was intended by
you to put the burden of corrective action on someone else, will not accomplish that goal either.
2. The purpose of this question is twofold: to cause you to focus on your client and to consider what
disclosure obligations you have to a third party, such as a stockholder, when you learn information of
this nature. Answer (a) is incorrect for several reasons, not the least of which is that a stockholder
meeting must be called with an agenda, and without an agenda of items to be considered at the
meeting, the meeting itself may be invalid. It is also unlikely that Danny would call such a meeting
unless he knew the purpose for which you had asked it to be called, so common sense tells you
this answer will not make the grade. Answer (b) presents a little closer case, but it is still flawed. If
you divulge the information in question to Dede, and she is not considered your client, you will have
violated the duty of confidentiality you owe to Sheet Metal. Although your duty as a CPA runs to the
stockholders of a company and even to public investors (in the case of a public company), the client
is still the corporation. This situation involves an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of the
client and the interests of the other stockholders. Providing Dede this information without Sheet
Metal’s consent would likely expose you to an ethics complaint, if not a legal liability.
There is one other possibility when this answer could be different. Under Ethics Ruling No. 16,
“Disclosure of Confidential Client Information,” of ET section 391, Ethics Rulings on Responsibilities
to Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, ET sec. 391 par. ..031–.032), is a hypothetical about the disclosure of confidential tax information from prior years’ returns to a spouse who is getting divorced
and has asked the CPA for such information. Because the prior years’ returns were joint and signed
by both spouses, the spouse seeking the information is entitled to obtain it because he or she is
considered a client. If Dede had signed Sheet Metal’s return in some capacity, it’s possible she could
be entitled to claim a right to the underlying information if it was necessary for her to, for example,
defend herself in an audit setting. Calling Dede and informing her of this information would, however,
seem well beyond what the AICPA Code contemplates. Also, even in the hypothetical, it is suggested
the member consult legal counsel to review the legal implications of such disclosure, which is a good
rule to follow in any disclosure situation.
Answer (c) is appealing on its face but may not be possible as a practical matter. If Danny had the
funds available, he undoubtedly would have bought out Dede; if anything, the case study suggests
that Danny spent those funds on his new car. Also, Danny’s execution of the buyout solves this year’s
problem but leaves you with the knowledge that the prior year’s return prepared by you has an error
that is likely not insignificant.
Answer (d) is the correct answer. Once you have taken the action of advising Danny to make
disclosure, of the potential consequences, and to take corrective action, you have discharged your
professional obligation. Of course, you should consider whether to withdraw if Danny does not take
that advice, and if you do not withdraw, you must take reasonable steps to ensure the error is not
repeated. Given the facts in the case study, taking reasonable steps may be a very high standard
that will not be easily met. Does this mean you get a representation letter from Danny? What is that
worth? Do you have to conduct surveillance of the facility? You can see that the question of what
would be reasonable here is not a simple issue.

265

Business Ethics: Real-World Case Studies

3. This question takes up where the last question left off, and the correct answer is (e) (or both answers
[a] and [b]). As mentioned in the solution to question 2, the question of what are reasonable steps is
certainly an important one. If you take those steps, and you have considered withdrawing, you have
fulfilled your professional obligations. Making a reasonable effort to get information from Danny, as
described in answer (c), sounds good but does not give you a defensible position if someone later
asks what reasonable steps you took. Likewise, answer (d) is incorrect because making reasonable
inquiries to see if the information from Danny is incorrect or incomplete is not taking those reasonable steps either.
4. The correct answer to this question is (b). Answer (a) is wrong because you obviously knew about
the diversion, and unless committing perjury is on your agenda (with concomitant jail time or liability),
you would be very unwise to lie. Answer (b) is correct because this gives recognition, once again, to
the principle that you owe a duty of confidentiality to Sheet Metal. Answer (c) might seem attractive,
but this is a little like waving a red flag in front of a mad bull. If the compilation contained disclosure
about the existing bank debt, it would be hard to argue that the bank was not entitled to rely on the
compilation in extending credit. It is also important to realize that the case study facts indicate you
sent the compilation to the bank at Danny’s request, meaning you had direct knowledge of the bank’s
reliance on the compilation. Whatever your firm may have intended is moot at this point because the
bank will be likely to prove that it relied on the compilation to its detriment. Answer (d) is incorrect
because whatever the impact of the diversion of income on the company’s tax liability, the bank is
going to be concerned about the effect on Sheet Metal’s liquidity and ability to continue in operation.
In other words, this answer misses the point about what the bank’s concerns will focus on.
5. This question asks you to consider the implication of the second portion of SSTS No. 6 because the
open audit will be considered an administrative proceeding. The correct answer is (c) because it’s
clear that Danny is aware of the error (although confirming he is informed of the fact that it is an
error would be appropriate), and by recommending corrective measures and asking Danny to make
disclosure, you will meet the obligations imposed on you by SSTS No. 6. Answer (a) is not a bad
answer, given the facts, but by asking for permission, your firm has not discharged its responsibilities to the client. Furthermore, because it is reasonable to expect that Danny would refuse your
request, you still would have to act to meet your responsibilities under SSTS No. 6, even after asking
him for permission. Answer (b) is similar to answer (a) in this respect—an appealing alternative, but
even if you withdraw immediately, your firm should take action as required by SSTS No. 6 and then
withdraw. Answer (d) is also incorrect because advising Danny after the examination is closed does
not result in him having the opportunity to address the error while the examination is still open. The
other problem with this answer is that if the examination turned up the issue, and you had not already
advised Danny to correct the error, your firm could potentially be responsible for failing to give him
the advice on a timely basis.
6. This question is focused on the issues of who is relying on your compilation report and what steps,
if any, you should take to address the reliance issue. Because your firm provided a copy of the compilation to the bank and Dede at the client’s request, it is clear that either the bank or Dede, or both,
may have relied on the report. The bank’s reliance on the report is a more important issue, however,
because it may claim it relied on the report in extending credit to Sheet Metal. Reliance by Dede may
not involve any potential liability if she did not sign the return, but if the purchase price of her stock
was contingent on Sheet Metal’s financial performance in whole or part, her reliance on the report
could be at issue. The question about steps to take is one we have already explored from the client
confidentiality perspective (that is, you are obligated to maintain client confidentiality, regardless of
your inclination, if any, to contact Dede or the bank).
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What about notifying the bank, Dede, and Sheet Metal that your firm is withdrawing its compilation
opinion without stating why? The argument in favor of withdrawal is that by doing so, the users of the
financial statements will no longer be able to rely on the statements and will be forced to ascertain
the facts. The argument against this is that the compilation opinion is so limited that perhaps the bank
or Dede could not claim reliance on your work in any event, it being clear on the face of the opinion
that the compilation relies exclusively on information furnished by Sheet Metal. By analogy to the
standards set forth in SSTS No. 6, one way to approach this issue would be to first advise Danny
that the firm is going to have to withdraw the opinion unless Sheet Metal is willing to have a restated
compilation issued. This would put Danny in the position of having to notify the bank and Dede or face
your firm and notify it that the compilation opinion could not be relied upon. One could argue that any
restatement would be unnecessary because the understatement of corporate income would mean
that increasing the income would only incline the bank to offer more credit to Sheet Metal. However, given the issue of reliance and your inability to forecast the future results of the company, your
knowledge should be enough to cause you to question leaving the status quo unchanged. Obviously,
no matter the choice you made, your firm would be wise to consider withdrawing from the representation after advising Danny of his obligation to notify the bank and Dede that the financial statements
could not be relied upon.
7. Under SSTS No. 6, it is clear the CPA is obligated to inform the taxpayer of an error and promptly
recommend corrective action, even if the CPA did not prepare or file the return in question. Again, the
only exception to this is if the error has an insignificant effect on tax liability. If your firm was going
to prepare this year’s return, the prior year’s error must be corrected, or your firm must consider withdrawing from the relationship.
8. Under SSTS No. 2, Answers to Questions on Returns (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS sec. 200),
a reasonable effort must be made to obtain information from the taxpayer in response to questions.
Although SSTS No. 2 addresses questions not answered on the return, it is also instructive regarding
what effort your firm would be required to exercise in seeking out information to prepare the return.
SSTS No. 3, Certain Procedural Aspects of Preparing Returns (AICPA, Professional Standards, TS
sec. 300), is also relevant in this regard. This statement requires you to examine or verify supporting
data and to make reasonable inquiries if information appears incorrect, incomplete, or inconsistent.
SSTS No. 3 also obligates your firm to make appropriate inquiries to determine if the taxpayer has
met recordkeeping or documentation requirements.
9. The steps you would want to take would involve reasonable effort to get and verify the information
Danny gave you; exercise due diligence and professional judgment to ensure your advice reflected
professional competence under SSTS No. 7, Form and Content of Advice to Taxpayers (AICPA,
Professional Standards, TS sec. 700); and make those appropriate inquiries about the records and
documents that Sheet Metal had to support the return entries. Because the return preparation is
obviously not an audit, the exercise of professional competence in preparing the return would not
necessarily result in your firm identifying any errors, particularly those arising from willful actions
meant to defraud the United States.

Chapter 11
1. In order to answer this question, you must refer back to the relevant parts of Treasury Department
Circular No. 230, Regulations Governing Practice before the Internal Revenue Service, dealing with
privilege. You also have to read the question carefully, though, because it mentions withholding information in the current action. Because the IRS has only threatened, rather than brought, a criminal
proceeding, it is clear that a privilege of some type applies; therefore, answer (e) is not correct.
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Answer (a) is incorrect because a former client may be entitled to the protection offered by the CPAtax client privilege, unless it has been waived, in the same respect as a current client. In other words,
a current preparer-client relationship is not a prerequisite to asserting the privilege. Answer (b) is
the correct answer and can be referenced to §10.20 of Circular No. 230. Because both good faith and
reasonable grounds are needed to assert a privilege, answer (c) is incorrect because it incorporates
only one of the two tests in §10.20. Answer (d) is also incorrect because its conclusion that a court
proceeding is required to determine the existence of the privilege is not an accurate summary of
what Circular No. 230 requires. Keep in mind, however, that a court proceeding may be brought by
the IRS challenging the existence of the privilege once it has been asserted by a CPA.
2. The correct answer to this question is (f), and it highlights the requirements of §10.35 of Circular No.
230 pertaining to covered opinions that do not meet a more likely than not conclusion. This question
also points out that disclosure about the opinion is not the only disclosure that would be required
(that is, AXIS would also have an obligation to disclose any referral fee it paid to Dave’s CPA under
§10.35). Answer (a) is not correct because the failure to adhere to the best practices standard is not
an event that triggers any obligation to Dave. Although the client (or the IRS) could raise such a failure as evidence that AXIS did not discharge its professional obligations to its client, the obligations
that AXIS owes to Dave when issuing an opinion that does not meet the more likely than not standard
are less related to best practices and more related to the covered opinion disclosure requirements.
This is not to say that AXIS would be excused from exercising best practices; rather, this answer
points out that exercising best practices would involve making the required disclosures to Dave.
Answer (b) is factually incorrect because the revisions to Circular No. 230 do not forbid issuing an
opinion that does not reach a more likely than not conclusion. To the contrary, such an opinion is contemplated by the revisions but obligates the practitioner to make the required disclosures. For these
reasons, answer (e) is also incorrect.
3. The best answer to this question is (d). If you chose to answer (e), the position you would be taking is
that you did not do the work in question, and the obligation to properly advise Dave rests with AXIS.
However, the provisions in §10.34 of Circular No. 230 that refer to advice and the 2007 additions to
§10.34 on documents, affidavits, and other papers that also refer to advice are so broad that they
almost surely expose a CPA to potential advice liability if the CPA has any kind of continuing professional relationship with a client. Also, Circular No. 230’s provisions on errors do not say that a CPA
who becomes aware of an error committed by a client only on the basis of his or her own advice has
the obligation to so advise the client. Instead, the language of Circular No. 230 states that a CPA who
becomes aware of an error or omission must advise the client of that fact and the consequences of
the error or omission under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and regulations. On that basis and the
basis of the import of the additions to §10.34 having to do with advice on tax positions in a return or
any other document submitted to the IRS, Dave’s personal CPA has an obligation to advise Dave of
these facts, as described in answers (a) and (b). Indeed, it may be that by doing so, Dave’s personal
CPA will be exercising required diligence that, if not performed, would subject him to possible penalties, particularly if he signs Dave’s own tax return as a preparer. Answer (c) is also correct and simply
describes the taxpayer disclosure obligations described in §10.21. For these reasons, the correct
answer is (d).
4. This question is designed to ask you to consider the implications of the fee that AXIS collected in
comparison with the tax savings realized by Dave. Because the case study states that the tax savings
realized from the son of BOSS transaction were $1.5 million, but there is no indication the fee was
contingent on Dave realizing the savings, answer (b) can be eliminated. Although answer (d) might
seem a possibility, the facts of the case study, particularly those having to do with AXIS’s interest
in keeping its clients and the terms of the transactions confidential, would seem to eliminate much
chance that AXIS ever published a fee schedule with information about transactions like this. This
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narrows the choices down to answers (a) or (c). Although answer (c) could possibly be defended if
the fee charged was reasonable on its face, the preferable answer is (a). Because the fee charged is
20 percent of the tax savings, and it appears that AXIS charged more than one or even a few clients
for this advice, it certainly is plausible that the fee could be deemed unconscionable by an independent third party. If it later came out that AXIS charged many clients a fee in this range for essentially
the same advice that was not based on facts related to individual taxpayers, the risk of the fee being
considered unconscionable would likely increase.
5. This question asks you to consider the implications of AXIS’s recommendation of the positions being
taken in Dave’s return on the bank loan and employee leasing transactions. If you apply §10.34 of Circular No. 230 and are willing to go with AXIS’s conclusion that the position it recommended that Dave
take had a reasonable basis, then either the more likely than not standard must be met, or AXIS must
have advised Dave that the opinion could not be used by him to avoid penalties. Answer (b) is also
correct because AXIS must have informed Dave of the accuracy-related penalties reasonably likely
to apply if it prepared or signed the return in which the client took positions (as defined). Answer (c)
is correct, as well, because a CPA preparer cannot sign a return the practitioner knows, or reasonably should know, contains a position that does not meet the reasonable basis standard. For these
reasons, all the answers are correct, and the answer to the question is (d).
6. There are a few possibilities here, some perhaps better than others. Under §10.29 of Circular No.
230, Dave might be able to argue that AXIS was representing Dave at a time when it had a conflict
of interest. The conflict would really be between the firm’s representation of Dave and how that representation was materially limited by AXIS’s personal interest in preserving the confidentiality of its
client names and transaction structure. Under §10.28 of Circular No. 230, Dave might argue that AXIS
was bound to release him from the confidentiality obligations because AXIS was impeding his ability
to comply with his tax obligations. The definition of client records in §10.28 is very broad, including
all documents or written or electronic materials provided to, or obtained by, the practitioner in the
course of the representation. However, this section also makes it clear that the information must
have preexisted the retention of AXIS or must have been prepared or submitted by the client to AXIS.
In other words, if AXIS takes the position that documents that might help Dave discharge his tax
obligations are not subject to disclosure under §10.28 because they were AXIS documents, then Dave
may not have much of a position to demand release of the information under §10.28.
Dave could also take the position that he was waiving the limited CPA-tax client privilege that
would otherwise apply under §10.20 of Circular No. 230 and that AXIS could release information
pertaining to him to the IRS. Of course, if Dave is like most tax clients, he is not going to be willing to
waive that privilege unless he knows exactly what AXIS might be giving up to the IRS. More often
than not, the privilege is not lightly waived by the tax client. On the other hand, because the IRS
already has an examination underway of Dave or the group, it is possible that the fact the IRS has
his identity removes a significant incentive for Dave to continue to assert the privilege. If a criminal
referral appears likely, at which point the privilege issue would become moot, or if Dave is convinced
he has nothing to lose by waiving the privilege, he and his counsel may choose to preempt the IRS’s
request by at least attempting to get AXIS to act on a waiver of privilege.
7. Under subpart C of Circular No. 230, incompetence or disreputable behavior would expose the former
partner to a variety of sanctions. Incompetence and disreputable conduct includes using false or
misleading representations with intent to deceive in order to get employment, willfully participating in
any way in evading or attempting to evade assessment or payment of taxes, or knowingly counseling
or suggesting to the client an illegal plan to evade taxes or their payment. Among other things, the
fact that AXIS personnel informed Dave not to bring money back to the United States would certainly
imply a knowing violation of the rules and regulations, especially when considered in light of the subsequent issuance of the debit card by Grand Cayman Bank. The issuance of the opinion by AXIS, if
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later found to be given knowingly, recklessly, or through gross incompetence in circumstances when
the opinion was false, would also subject the former partner to charges of incompetence. Alternatively, the IRS could conclude that AXIS had engaged in a pattern of providing incompetent opinions
or had issued opinions that were intentionally or recklessly misleading.
The penalties for incompetent or disreputable conduct are censures, suspensions, or bars from
practice before the IRS. These same sanctions apply to willful or reckless failure to comply with the
regulations, as well as willfully and knowingly misleading the client with intent to defraud. If the IRS
was able to prove that the size of the fee affected the motivation and intent of the former partner in
promoting these transactions, the partner could be accused of misleading Dave with an intent to
defraud. A partner who intentionally or willfully filed a number of returns that understated tax liability
or disregarded the regulations could face total fines that, when added together, become substantial.
Circular No. 230’s best practices do not specify the nature of the discipline faced by supervisory personnel in that capacity. However, assuming that the former partner of AXIS had oversight
responsibility, he would be obligated under the rules to take reasonable steps to ensure the firm
had adequate procedures in place when issuing tax shelter opinions. If, as a result of willfulness,
recklessness, or gross incompetence, the firm did not take reasonable steps to comply with §10.35
of Circular No. 230, and a pattern or practice of noncompliance was shown to exist, then the former
partner would face discipline. This would also hold true if the former partner knew, or had reason
to know, that others at the firm engaged in a pattern or practice that did not comply with §10.35, and
he failed through willfulness, recklessness, or incompetence to take prompt action to correct the
noncompliance. The discipline that can be imposed on supervisory personnel under §10.35 will be the
same as that applicable to nonsupervisory personnel: censures, suspensions, or bars from practice.
8. An early and a robust compliance program would obviously be effectively implemented by beginning
with the best practices in §10.33 of Circular No. 230. Supervisory personnel would want to ensure that
the firm’s policies and procedures were updated to reflect these best practices and that all firm personnel were instructed that no written advice concerning federal tax aspects of a federal tax issue
relating to a tax shelter item would be provided to anyone outside the firm without first having been
reviewed and signed off on by a tax compliance partner and, perhaps, the managing partner of the
firm. The advice that would be governed by this policy would be any advice concerning one or more
Federal tax issues encompassed within the expansive definition of “covered opinions” in §10.35 of
Circular No. 230. Compliance with the §10.33 best practices will help the firm’s supervisory personnel
meet the reasonable steps standard imposed on them under §10.36 of Circular No. 230.
To the extent the firm rendered more likely than not or marketed tax shelter opinions, the firm
would want to comply with the four requirements in §10.33. Depending on the conclusion and contents of the opinions, the firm would want to include all required disclosures in the beginning of each
opinion.
If the firm relied on third-party opinions, the firm would want to have procedures in place that
would cause a tax compliance partner or committee to consider the source of the opinion to be relied
on and the reasonableness of that opinion. It might also be helpful for the tax compliance partner or
committee to review all outside opinions to determine if such opinions complied with the rules. If not,
the partner or committee may need to scrutinize the opinion more carefully. Again, given the broad
reach of the term advice in §10.34 of Circular No. 230, the firm would also have to consider whether
it had disclosure obligations to the client, and the client had disclosure obligations to the IRS, if (for
example) another firm’s opinion did not meet the more likely than not standard, or the authorities
on which it relied were not those cited in the regulations. The combined opinions would have to be
evaluated by the tax compliance partner or committee to determine if the combined opinions, taken
as a whole, met the standards of §10.35.
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Finally, the firm would want to put policies and procedures in place that obligated supervisory
personnel to perform a final analysis of whether the opinion was sufficiently persuasive so as to meet
the firm’s obligations under the IRC and regulations. In addition to considering the more likely than
not standard, the firm would want to consider its due diligence obligations under §10.22 of Circular
No. 230, the reasonableness of the fee charged, the absence of conflicts, and whether the good faith
standard has been met for reliance on client information. If these procedures were not already in
place, the firm would want to consider expanding its final review to incorporate these issues within
the overall evaluation of the opinion’s persuasiveness.

Chapter 12
1. Answer (e) is correct because answers (a) and (b) should cause the former officers significant
concerns as a result of noncompliance with Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 409A. Answer (a)
is correct because the fact that most of the 2010 options have already been exercised means those
options cannot be amended or cancelled. As a result, those incentive stock options (ISOs) were
converted to nonqualified options as a result of being granted below fair market value (FMV), thus
triggering compensation to the option recipient on the date of exercise, for which taxes were not
paid. Answer (b) is correct because the imposition of the excise tax on the exercised options that
were granted below FMV can indeed taint the other options or benefits received by the officers in
question, which would subject the additional options or benefits to the 20 percent penalty tax and
interest at the understatement rate plus 1 percent. Answer (c) is incorrect because compliance with
IRC Section 162(m) is an issue of concern to the company, not the individuals, because this IRC section addresses the deductibility of compensation by the company. Likewise, answer (d) is incorrect
because the failure to withhold is an issue the company will be concerned with, not necessarily the
individual officers.
2. Answer (b) is correct. Although not the exclusive way to solve this problem, the replacement of
non-FMV options with FMV options and paying the difference in the form of cash regarding which
withholding is applied is the best alternative among those presented. Answer (a) may be attractive on the surface, but the problem with this alternative is that outright cancellation without the
recipient getting some type of payment (based on the Black-Scholes value of the option or some
other formula) will put the company in the position of having breached a contract (because this is
what an option agreement is). It’s likely that this would result in lawsuits from one or more former
employees and, perhaps, more unwanted regulatory attention for Military Communications. Answer
(c) is incorrect because merely changing the form of the discount stock rights without addressing
the non-FMV nature of those rights will not solve in any way the adverse tax implications of the prior
grants for either the company or recipients. To address the adverse tax implications, the company
and recipients need to increase the exercise price to FMV, pay the difference in cash, or amend the
agreements to provide for fixed exercise dates. Answer (d) is incorrect because filing an information return in order to propose alternatives to the IRS would be akin to inviting the fox to watch the
henhouse—one can rest assured that the results would not be desirable. Although the filing of an
information return may be called for at some point, the idea would not be to ask for guidance. Rather,
the return and any amended returns would simply reflect the action taken to address the adverse tax
consequences.
3. The correct answer is (e), meaning that all the answers are steps the audit firm would want to take
in connection with the following year’s audit. Answer (a) is correct because, as provided in PCAOB
Staff Questions and Answers, Auditing the Fair Value of Share Options Granted to Employees (AICPA,
PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, PCAOB Staff Guidance, sec. 100), auditors should consider
whether the data on which fair value measurements are based are accurate, complete, and relevant.
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Answer (b) is correct because the consideration and evaluation of internal controls over the granting,
recording, and reporting of options, as well as other fair value measurement data, would be called
for given the issues raised by the case study (as also discussed in the Apollo Group case). Answer
(c) is correct because, as the PCAOB indicated in Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 1, Matters Related
to Timing and Accounting for Option Grants (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, PCAOB
Staff Guidance, sec. 400), audit risk is higher in situations when option compensation comprises an
outsized portion of executive compensation and would call for heightened scrutiny in situations when
the company’s stock price increased either frequently or to a significant extent following material
option grants to executive officers. Similarly, answer (d) is correct because the audit firm would
definitely be updating its evaluation of the legal, regulatory, and other contingences, as well as costs
and reserves, that relate to the prior backdating. Because all these answers are correct, answer (e)
is the best answer to select.
4. The correct answer to this question is (c). It is important to keep in mind that the executives in the
options backdating scandal have indeed lost sight of their responsibilities to their stockholders.
Many investors maintain that backdated options injure stockholders who have lost the benefit of the
incentives that options were supposed to provide senior executives to better manage the business.
Answer (a) is not the most responsive answer to Gene’s concerns because the mere fact that other
companies are doing this is not going to make him feel better, and some people will think less of the
company for having been caught up in this scandal. (This is particularly true if one or more former
officers were indicted for criminal acts.) Answer (b) is not the best answer, either, because telling
Gene he shouldn’t take this so hard is akin to saying this is not that important. Rather, as evidenced
by Gene’s own reaction, it is very important, both to him and the company. Also, blaming regulators
by saying they’re carrying this stuff too far is to deny the fact that options backdating is wrong, and
saying the pendulum will swing back soon enough is like saying that options backdating is only situationally unethical. Answer (d) is an answer that is not the most responsive, either, because ordering
a few cocktails to try to forget what has already occurred is like having a seat on the deck of the
Titanic and ordering a cocktail as the ship is going down. Denial, in other words, won’t change the
facts and won’t make the problem go away.
5. The correct answer is (f), meaning that answers (b) and (d) are also correct. In order to accurately
ascertain a measurement date, all required granting actions must be completed, meaning all actions
must have been taken that are necessary to comply with established governance procedures, option
plans, and legal requirements. For this reason, answer (b) is correct. Answer (d) is also correct
because for any changes in grant terms after the measurement date when awards are not expected
to vest under the original service or performance conditions in effect at the modification date, the
company must recognize compensation cost for the fair value of the award at the modification date.
Answer (a) is incorrect because following established governance procedures is, as previously
set forth, one of the required granting actions a company must follow. If the company does so, and
that causes a delay in the measurement date, it is fair to assume that at least the SEC staff will not
see that as an unimportant delay but a very necessary one. Answer (c) is also incorrect because a
measurement date cannot be fixed if the exercise price is subject to later adjustment. In this event, a
measurement date cannot be fixed until the later price adjustment occurs. For these reasons, answer
(e) is also incorrect.
6. A private company’s directors and officers must first keep in mind that options granted to the executive officer must be in compliance with IRC Section 409A, or the company and executive officer will
face the consequences of failing to comply with IRC Section 409A. Those consequences include
required withholding by the company on amounts that are includable in income, the 20 percent penalty tax, the imposition of interest at the underpayment rate plus 1 percent, and the possible tainting
of other deferred compensation or benefits received by the employee. The private company’s option
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plan must be operated in accordance with the reasonable good faith compliance standard and the
2007 final regulations, meaning that nonqualified deferred compensation in the form of stock options,
if granted at FMV, will be excluded from IRC Section 409A. The key issue for private companies will
be whether the company’s board of directors or compensation committee granted the options with
an exercise price equal to FMV. A private company will be wise to use one of the three safe harbors
for establishing FMV: the independent appraisal that meets the employee stock option plan requirements; a formula valuation that is also used for all noncompensatory purposes; or a written valuation
report prepared by a qualified person inside or outside the company (that is not planning an initial
public offering or a sale in the IRC Section 409A-described time frames—the so-called early stage
company valuation) who has significant knowledge, experience, education, or training (at least 5
years) in valuations or the related subject areas described in the IRC Section 409A final regulations.
The private company must keep in mind that a valuation that is more than 12 months old or that does
not consider all material information will not be viewed by the IRS as being in compliance with the
reasonable valuation standard.
7. As reflected in the materials, there are three primary exemptions from IRC Section 162(m): commissions, contributions to qualified retirement plans, and performance-based compensation. The
parameter of performance-based compensation is of critical importance to whether a company can
deduct executive compensation over $1 million that is paid to highly compensated executives. This
parameter is compensation paid on the company or recipient achieving one or more nondiscretionary, pre-established objective performance criteria set by a compensation committee of two or more
independent directors. In the case of performance-based compensation, if the foregoing criterion is
not met, then the compensation will not be exempt from IRC Section 162(m). By way of example, if the
compensation committee consists of “interested” directors (that is, directors who are also officers
who will benefit from the options) or the performance criteria that must be met are at the discretion
of the compensation committee, then the options would not constitute performance-based compensation that would be exempt from IRC Section 162(m).
It is difficult, if not impossible, to envision a situation in which backdated stock options (and the
gain realized on exercise) would be exempt from IRC Section 162(m). The reason, of course, is that
an ISO must carry an exercise price that is equal to, or in excess of, the FMV on the date of grant. If
an ISO is backdated, it is fair to presume that backdating was done to allow the option to be granted
at the lower trading price for the common stock of the company that prevailed at an earlier time.
(Otherwise, why would backdating be necessary at all?) If this occurred, then the option would have
been granted below FMV, which would disqualify the option as an ISO and cause the option to be
converted to a nonqualified stock option. As such, the executive would be taxed on the difference
between the exercise price and the FMV of the stock on the date of exercise. If the company had
previously taken deductions for compensation over $1 million under the belief that the granted ISO
was exempt as performance-based compensation, those deductions would be lost as a result of the
backdating (assuming that the backdating did in fact lower the exercise price from what it would
have been on the actual date of grant).
8. Auditors should consider the factors that are outlined in PCAOB Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 1, Matters Related to Timing and Accounting for Option Grants, as well as the points raised in the related
PCAOB Staff Questions and Answers, Auditing the Fair Value of Share Options Granted to Employees.
More specifically, and looking at this issue using a top-down approach, the auditor may want to start
by looking at the overall control environment and the controls that specifically relate to option grants
and compensation within the organization. The recording, pricing, and reporting of options in public
filings can also shed light on whether there is a higher risk of backdating in particular organizations. Other generalized factors that might indicate a heightened risk of backdating, such as undue
or heavy reliance on option compensation for executive officers, should also be considered. The
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proper determination of grant dates and measurement dates would become a necessary part of any
scenario in which it appeared backdating may have occurred. This will necessarily involve inquiries
concerning whether and when required granting actions were completed, whether a delay was
unimportant, whether an employee was actually serving in that capacity as of the grant date, and the
dates on which the terms and recipients of the grants were finally determined.
Implications for the accounting of backdated stock options include the question of whether
additional compensation cost needs to be recorded under or taken into account in determining fair
value under FASB ASC 718, Compensation?Stock Compensation; the recording of additional costs or
reserves related to legal, regulatory, and other contingencies; the tax implications of prior deductions
that were taken or the failure to withhold by the company and implications for assessing whether
internal controls were effective during the relevant time periods; the implications for executive
officers (regarding penalties, returns they may have signed, other tainted benefits, and whether any
illegal act may have occurred); and the materiality of backdating, including both its quantitative and
qualitative implications.
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